US military after full mobilisation and manufacturing turnover

From 1943 on, when increased numbers of US troops with more battle experience were pouring into the front lines, and manufacturing was fully converted to full-capacity war production with better planes and increased numbers of Shermans with upgrades and the TDs with 76mm and 90mm guns, our fleet in the Pacific alone outmatched the other powers, what would have happened if we were to turn the entire might of the military onto just Germany alone, if we were never in the Pacific. Could we have taken advantage of the huge fleet of Aircraft carriers and the excellent fighters, the Hellcat and Corsair, and the large fleet of battleships, etc., the the European theatre? Would the defeat of Germany happened quicker if we could commit all ground troops and materiel to Europe?

 

I would think it would have been quicker but I'm not sure by how much. The additional naval power could see some use in the Med and I could also see the potential of another major invasion there in 44 as well as D-day. I still would expect the war to last into 45 though.

 

If America never went to war with Japan and didn't expect to. The Pacific/Atlantic fleets would control the Med and Atlantic by early 43 at the latest.

The Army didn't want the Marines in the ETO but this time wouldn't have the excuse of the PTO. They would still receive the worst assignments though. Marines would likely be ordered to invade and capture Italy rather than the army.

With Landing Craft production now 100% ETO. The invasion of France might be viable by June of '43.

 

It's quite possible that, without a Pacific threat, the US may very well have stayed out of the war

 

Yes, it is a matter of "when", not "if."

 

The hell you say? <=====Sarcasm

 

So what you're saying is that all of the infrastructure and industrialization of the "New Deal" was a preparation for war in Europe? or at the very least FDR et al anticipated taking action in Europe to ensure Germany's compliance with the Versailles treaty?

 

The "New Deal" and things like the CCC were indeed preperations for WWII but they were unintentional ones. It wasn't until the late 30's with the Marko Polo Bridge incident and the German occupation of Austria that it became clear that the war clouds were gathering. From all I've read FDR saw Germany's conquests of Checkoslavakia and Poland as signifcant threats that needed to be dealt with. In many senses of the word the US was at war once the "shoot on sight" order was given all be it a limited one.

Back to the OP. One of the problmes is that I'm not sure enough landing craft could be moved to Britian by 43 to launch an invasion of France even if the US wasn't at war in the Pacfic. The US might have been able to speed up the invasion of North Africa though and I can see the USN being heavily committed to Med. That would suggest the possiblity of the Marines taking a number of islands in 43 and early 44 possibly including Crete which would put Rumania in range of US bombers. However the sheer effort of moving the amount of men and equipment needed would likely preclude knocking more than a month or 3 off the war.

 

No doubt that the industrial base was going full throttle after the war started; It just strikes me as too coincidental that parallel programs in Germany and The US would culminate in a showdown of good v. evil all under the guise of economic recovery.

In 1941 the US was perfectly poised to increase it's industrial output to outpace Germany and Japan, all of the infrastructure was in place: Transportation, workforce, electricity and government contracts; all due to the recovery programs which sprang from the "New Deal".

I do not, necessarily, think that Churchill and FDR sat around smoking cigars, twisting their mustaches, and thinking about ways to goad Hitler and Tojo into war; but, they had to have seen the writing on the wall.

 

Germany's "recovery" is often over rated. Indeed they were on their way to bankrupcy by the early 40's if not before. Hitler's economic plan amounted to a huge Ponzy scheme that took the gold reserves of Austria and later Checkoslavakia to keep it afloat until the war actually started. For info on this topic I heartily recomend Wages of Destruction. Since the Depression hit most countries at about the same time and Europe and the US were linked at least to some extent even then it's hardly surprising that they were recovering around the same time as well. My impression is that there was still hope that war would be avoided through the mid 30's but said hope declined rapicly in 36-37 time frame.

It has been reported that when the bill freezing Japanese assets was interpreted to include a pretty much total embargo on Japan FDR was either told or stated that this would mean war. From what I've read he wasn't thrilled with that interpretation but he didn't do anything to "correct" it either.

 

Several books I have read recently has pointed out that most US military leaders favored a peaceful Japan so that they could concentrate on Europe. A peaceful Pacific would have freed up considerable resource's, landing craft, shipping, long range aviation, warships and ground forces. That being said the US could not transfer the whole Pacific Fleet to European waters.

By the summer of 1943 my guess is that perhaps 4-5 fleet carriers, 1 or 2 light carriers, several escort carriers, half the battleships/cruisers/destroyers/escorts could be in the region with the remainder in the Pacific to keep a eye on the Japanese. This would be a formidable addition to the Royal Navy. These would grow as new fleet and light carriers came out of the shipyards.

Where this would impact Allied actions was the proposed 1943 Landings in NW Europe. These were never favored in Great Britain all along the line and they held the trump cards because they would have to provide the bulk of the assault troops, shipping and landing craft. The availability of 2-3 USMC divisions and perhaps twice that of Army troops (especially service troops), along with the shipping and landing craft would go far to negating these trump cards.

Britain would still believe it was better to wait till 1944, but I'm not sure they could resist the pressure. The Carrier aviation, mated with that of the RN would allow them to consider landing sites outside of land based fighter cover.

 

Since Churchill favored an assault through the Med he might be able to push that. I can see Torch being pushed up by maybe a month or two at most. After that the weather isn't really condusive to landings in Northern Europe until at least some time in the Spring of 43 likely the weather won't cooperate until late spring early summer. In the mean time there are more opertunities in the Med. Sicily and Italy obviously but Crete and other misc island are possiblities as is Southern France and Greece.

 

I agree Sicily would almost certainly be invaded as it offered the chance to 'clear' the Med for shipping. Italy proper or elsewhere is another matter. Historically they had too many troops to leave idle, yet not enough to risk a landing in France. The American troops available (in this scenario) would permit a mid-late summer lodgment to be made with a spring 1944 'breakout' coupled with 'Anvil' type landing in my opinion.

 

Belasar:

The dual question of when to launch the invasion of France/what to do in Italy and the Med was not merely a question of numbers of troops. The air factor had to be considered as well. In 1943 the Allied air forces had not yet won complete control of the daylight skies over France, let alone NW Europe as a whole, and they would not win it until the "Big Week" battles of spring 1944. Until daylight air superiority was won, no invasion of France could be launched--or at least no invasion with a really good chance of success. Everyone seems to forget this now, and Marshall forgot it (or ignored it) throughout 1942-43.

As to the idea of a quiescient Japan...I shy away from 'what ifs,' which lead to too many blind alleys and impossibilities. Given the realities of the world situation and internal Japanese politics, Japan WAS going to be aggressive and a danger to the Allies. The only question was whether the Japs would be a greater danger to the USSR or to the Western Allies.

 

Where are the Russians in all of this?
And the only benefit I see of having more aircraft and surface vessels would to provide more targets for the U-Boats. The CV / EVs in the antlantic were used mainly in the anti submarine role, big exception being the Bismark.

Carrier borne aircraft were more suited to the Pacific. Even launching bomber escorts from carriers wouldn't have been a great advantage as there were land bases, unless you wanted to put a carrier group in the North Sea or sail one up the Rhine.