That is indeed a good parallel. But consider difficulties of retreating from Chuikov and at the same time breaking through deep zones filled with Zhukov's fresh troops who have just arrived behind the lines of the 6th Army. Good example is when von Seidlitz ordered retreat to 60th Motorized Infantry Division and the 94th Infantry Division on 23 November. He wanted to force Paulus's hand by starting the retreat. Edwyn Hoyt described the battle as follows: "When the 94th Division started to draw back, it was attacked by the Russian 62nd Army. The men of the 94th Division were caught in the open, and the toll exacted was enormous. One officer observed that this would mean the loss of one-third of the division. As it turned out he was an optimist." Half starved, exhausted men, without enough fuel, with no reserves couldn't break out without the assistance from the outside. To come 40 miles away from the pocket wasn't enough. Reinforcements had to enter the pocket to help. I am not claiming that the loss of the 6th Army was entirely Manstein's fault - that would have been utterly wrong. Just his responsibility was higher than he was ready to admit. On the other side, Pauls' responsibility is exaggerated. The truth is somewhere in between. Finally, Hitler's responsibility was the greatest but we cannot allow generalization of his guilt without investigating participation of his henchmen. I'm sorry, I wasn't that gathered in this post but it is a bit too late and there may be some thought and syntax errors. I do apology for my clumsiness. .