563rd Signal Air Warning battalion

BIOGRAPHIES
GEN. OTTO P. WEYLAND
("Opie" to Gen. Patton). Studied at Texas A and M College, B. S. 1923, LL.D 1945, Air Corps Tactical School 1938 and Command and General Staff School 1939 sent to ETO in 1943 and commander of XIX Tactical Air Command in 1944. He was appointed Commanding General of the 9th Air force in May 23, 1945. He went on to become Assistant Commandant of the Command and General Staff School from September 1946 to May 1946; Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans of Headquarters Army Air Force, Washington D.C. 1946-1947; Deputy Commander of the National War College 1947-1950; Vice commander of Far East Air Forces from 1951 to 1954; named Lieutenant General 1951; named full General in 1952; Commanding General Far East Air Forces 1951-1954 and was Commanding Officer of Tactical Air Forces 1954-1959. He retired in 1959, note that he ended up at the very top of his profession. After retirement he was consultant to Litton Industries and McDonald Aircraft companies. His decorations were Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Korean Air Service medal with 10 stars, Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Legion of Merit, Air Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Six battle stars (U.S.). Officer Legion of Honor, Grand Cordon of the order of Cloud and Banner (Republic of China). Order of Aeronautical Merit (Brazil). Croix De Guerre with Palms (France). Order of the Rising Sun (Japan). Commander Legion of Honor (Philippines). Honorable Knight Commander, Order of the British Empire (Great Britain). Commander with Crown Order of Adolphe of Nassau, Crois de Guerre (Luxembourg). Order of Military Merit Taeguk (Korea). Knight Commander order of White Elephant, Knight Grand Cross order of Crown ( Thailand).
LT. GEN. HOMER L SANDERS
("Tex" to senior officers). He studied at Rice Institute 1922-1926 and graduated from the Air Corps Advanced Flying School in 1928, Tactical School in 1940 and National War College in 1947. He was commissioned a 2nd Lt. of Air Corps in 1929. He was named Commanding General of the 9th Air Force on March 27 1946. Assigned to the ETO in 1943 became commander of the 100th Fighter Wing in 1944. En route to the Pacific Theater when Japan surrendered. He went on to be deputy Commanding General of the 14th Air Force in 1947; Vice Commander of the Tactical Air Forces 1950 through 1952; named Major General in 1952; Deputy Chief of Staff operations Tactical Air Force 1951-54; Commander of Northern Air Forces at Norway 1954-1957; Vice Commander of Continental Air Command 1957-1959; retired 1959. His Decorations were Legion of Merit with Oak Cluster, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal, Bronze Star medal (U.S.). Legion of Honor and Croix de Guerre (France). Commander with Crown, Order of Adolph of Nassau (Luxembourg).
WILLIAM L. McBRIDE.
Col. William L. McBride was born in Woburn, Mass. on 23 April 1891. He graduated from the Fitchburg, Mass. High School. He was employed by the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company since 1910 in various capacities. He was in the Plant Department of that company and upon entering the Federal Service in WW II was Wire Chief of a large area in Central Massachusetts. His military experience is varied and lengthy. When his national Guard outfit was called into Federal service in World War I he was First/Sgt of Company B of the 6th infantry of the Massachusetts National Guard. He served in various units of the 26th Division during the war and was discharged on april 29, 1919. He was appointed a Captain in the Infantry in 1920 and commanded various units of the 181st Infantry of the 28th Infantry Division. In 1940 he was appointed a Major and soon after entered the Federal Service for the second time. On February 1941, he finished Battalion C.O. and Staff Officers Course at Fort Benning and was assigned as commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 181st Infantry 26th Infantry Division. In May 1941 he was appointed a Lt. Col. and assumed command of the 1st Battalion of the 181st Infantry in the 26th Infantry Division. Because of his extensive telephone experience he was transferred to the Aircraft Warning Service at Drew Field. His experience as command officer of organizations on Drew Field made him the logical officer to command his present organization. He had been the Executive Officer of the 504th Signal A.W. Regiment, commanded the 551st Signal A.W. Battalion, was S-3 of the AWUTC for 4 months, Commanded "C" stage AWUTC and was commanding officer of the 4th Training Battalion. On October 11,1943 he organized the 563rd Signal A.W. Battalion for shipment to the ETO. After the war he returned to Fitchburg Mass where he continued with the New England Telephone. He remained in the Officers Reserve and was commanded a Reserve Signal training unit until he retired.
AFTER V/E DAY
OSBORN'S REPORT
"Travels to Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria, the Bavarian Alps and Southern Germany, On June 12, 1945: Left this morning from camp going to Nurnburg, reported to be the most German of the cities visiting the huge stadium which was of magnificent architec- ture. The city itself had been bombed till vast areas were a massive wreckage. Then through some pine forest (indecently, Germany seems to have a well preserved wood supply) hitting the super highway (Der Autobaun) and toward Munich. This was another example of excellent construction and especially the overhead bridges which were beautiful though it brought to my mind the small boys and men that were prisoners at Buchenwald who were forced to build such highways. Then we crossed the Danube River, It being blue green in color and fairly swift. We turned to our right and going through what seemed prosperous country went to the Dachau Prison Camp. Here at the camp were many German war prisoners, many in their silk like camouflaged coats and pants, instead of the victims of the Nazis. We went to the execution and torture houses of this camp. Here, we saw many dog kennels and were told that the dogs had been there where starved so that they would eat parts of the victims. Then, into the place where the prisoners of the Nazis were gassed. Before they were gassed, they were told that they were going to take a shower. The gas chamber looked like a shower room with a small window or so letting the executors look to the inside of the room. The gas came out where the water would be in a shower. Then we saw the ovens where they burned the corpses--300 of them a day supposedly kept going 24 hours a day--there was still some corpses that had not been burned as yet, laying around with blood on the wall. The whole place had a queer stink.
When we came to Munchen or Munich as we call it. Here there were modern or ancient buildings--both showing magnificent architecture. The old on especially showed the result of much patient work, having art work over the outside. The modern ones were had gracious curves and pillars. After looking over some of the frauleins, we retire in a former Nazi building for the night. In the morning we left Munich, and after getting a few more views we came into Austria and the Austrian Alps stood before us. The largest mountains I had ever seen in my life and the most beautiful with snow on their tops and with white streams of water running out of the buildings we started south through a land of well kept fields and buildings. We kept going into more hilly country and up grade and down almost perpendicular. They were covered with pine with exception of the gray rock cliffs showing. The clouds were around the tops of them. The towns in these mountains were made up of Swiss type houses and Chateau with art murals painted on them or showing fin e log work. We came to the town of Oberammergau, the place of the passion Plays. There was a cross on the cone peak that could be seen for miles. There were caves in which the Germans put airplane parts together. All through this time we were traveling through the mountains. You could look down and far below see a beautiful lake almost clear blue sometimes with a small island or so and if the lake were large enough, there would be a village of the same Swiss type with boats and other resort pleasures showing. The people had a distinctive dress something like the Swiss. The men generally wore a green had with a bright red feather in it, a coat that had much art work, on it, such as oak leaves in bright green embroidery on them, a pair of leather shorts, with high wool stockings and buckled oxfords. Some were smoking their Bavarian pipes, a hugh affair of carving and painting on them and resembling a pipe because they were smoking them. The women wore bright skirts with a white blouse plus a vest of black or matching color. The people dried their hay on sticks with prongs on them. There were many small hay busses on the small fields.
[Editors Note 24 The above account was written by Wayne Osborn of the R and R trip starting June 12,1945. The diary did not include the names of his travel companions but it can be presumed that it could have been the men of Post Victor or members of Headquarters Company which was their home base. Wayne Osborn 17168397 was Discharged on 23 November 1945 at Ft. Chaffee Arkansas and died in 1988. His home town was Emporia, Kansas.]

 

REUNIONS
In 1987 Lt. Col. Emory Sweigard initiated the first reunion of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion and was held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The reunion was repeated in 1989 with Emory Sweigard as Chairman 1989. As time went on more men of the other Signal Air Warning Battalions came to the reunion. It was then decided to make this reunion a combined reunion of Signal Air Warning Battalions. The 1991 reunion was organized by Robert Norton of the 563rd and was held at Greenbelt, Maryland. The 1993 reunion was organized by James Lynn of the 573rd and held at St. Louis, Missouri. The 1995 reunion was organized by Wendell Walton of the 563rd and was held in Kansas City, Missouri. These reunions have been listed by VETS which is sponsored by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and they are also listed periodically by the American Legion Magazine. There are two group pictures following. On page 366 is the 1987 and on page 373 the 1995 Reunion. Pages 366 to 372 is the copy of the Reunion Program for the following Reunions
The members of other Signal Air Warning Battalions were also included as all the men were familiar with the other units because they all trained at Drew Field, near Tampa, Florida. Some of the men had at one time been in several units. The Signal Air Warning Battalion's now included are:
555th Signal Air Warning Bn. with the IX TAC
563rd Signal Air Warning Bn. with the XIX TAC
564th Signal Air Warning Bn. with the IX ADC
566th Signal Air Warning Bn. with the XXIX TAC
573rd Signal Air Warning Bn. with the XII TAC
In 1987 Emory Sweigard published an elegant book "A Memory Book of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion". It included photos taken at the 1987 reunion, of the men attending and their wives. There is also extensive collection of snapshots in combat containing the pictures of about 130 of the men of the Battalion.
The reunions were as follows:
Year Chairman Location
1987 Emory Sweigard 563rd Harrisburg,PA
1989 Emory Sweigard 563rd Harrisburg, PA
1991 Robert Norton 563rd Greenbelt, MD
1993 James Lynn 573rd St. Louis, MO
1995 Wendell Walton 563rd Kansas City, MO
After the 1993 reunion a feature of the preparation for the 1995 Reunion was the debut of the "Sawbuck Gazette" a news letter of the Signal Air Warning Battalions with Wendell Walton as the editor. This publication initiated by Volume 1 on 1 March 1994 continues with Wendell Walton as the Editor to this writing and hopefully for the future.
Also at this writing (30 July 1997) the Fifth Biannual Reunion is scheduled for Pittsburgh, PA. James Q. Opperman of the 555th Signal Air Warning Battalion is the Chairman. The date is 28th to 30th of August, 1997 at the Shereton Union Station Hotel in Pittsburgh, PA. The "Sawbuck Gazette" at this date is volume 12, dated 7 July 1997.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS>
AAA Anti Aircraft Artillery
AC Air Corps (obsolete)
ADC Air Defense Command
ALO Air Liaison Officer
AW Aircraft Warning
ASC Air Service Command
BACU Battle Area Control Unit
Bn Battalion
CO Commanding Officer
Com Communications
CP Command Post
CSU Close support Radar Unit SCR-575
CW Continuous Wave Radio used Morse Code
CWO Chief Warrant Officer
D/F Direction Finding Station
DSM Distinguished Service Medal
ETO European Theater of Operation
FCS Fighter Control Squadron
FM Frequency Modulation
FDP Foreword Director Post
FUSA First U. S. Army
GCI Ground Controlled Interception
GLO Ground Liaison Officer
GP General Purpose
IAZ Inner Artillery Zone
IFF Information Friend or Foe
Inf Infantry
LW Light Warning
MEW Micro Early Warning
Ops Operations
PPI Plan Position Indicator
PW Prisoner of War
QM Quartermaster
SC Signal Corps
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SS Special German Troops
TAC Tactical Air Command
TACAF Tactical Air Command of the Air Force
TCC Tactical Control Center
TCG Tactical Control Group
TD Tank Destroyer
TUSA Third U. S. Army
V-1 German Robot Bomb Pilotless Pulse Jet Aircraft
V-2 German Rocket Propelled Bomb
WD War Department
WO Warrant Officer
WOJG Warrant Officer Junior Grade

APPENDIX I
CAMPAIGNS
The officers and men of the 563rd were accorded battle par- ticipation stars for the following campaigns to be mounted on the European Theater of Operations:
Normandy Campaign terminating 24 July 1944
Northern France Campaign terminating 24 July 1944
Rhineland Campaign dated 28 April
Ardennes Campaign dated 27 June
Central Europe Campaign dated 27 June
Having been present for duty during the period established for these campaigns entitled 563rd Signal Battalion men to wear five (5) Bronze service stars on the EAME Ribbon (European Theater of Operations).
Some of the men were assigned to units in Florida who supervised sites in the Carribean and were therefore entitled to the American Theater of Operations Ribbon.
APPENDIX II
GENERAL PATTON'S SPEECH TO HIS ARMY
JUST BEFORE THE INVASION
It was in England on July 5, 1944. By that time the 563rd had landed in the past several days and were operational near Omaha beach. The Third Army divisions and corps were pouring into the Cherbourg peninsula. They gave us transcriptions of Patton's fa- mous address to his troops on teletype tape so we could distribute what he said to us. In any army unit of any size there was always professional writers and journalists to preserve historical occasions in writings. Here is a classical capture of a famous occasion when Patton addressed his troops prior to their landing in France. The Corps Chaplain gave the invocation. The men were standing with bowed heads asking divine guidance for the Great Third Army that they help speed victory to enslaved Europe; Maj. General Gilbert R. Cook then introduced Lieutenant General Simpson whose army was still preparing for their part in the War.
"We are here," said General Simpson, "to listen to the words of a great man. A man who will lead you into whatever you might face with heroism, ability and foresight, a man who has proved himself admit shot and shell; my greatest hope is that someday soon, I will have my own great Army fighting with him, side by side".
General Patton arose and strode swiftly to the microphone; then men snapped to their feet and stood silently. Patton surveyed them grimly. "Be seated", he said the words were not a request but a command. The General's voice rose high and clear.
"Men this stuff you hear about Americans wanting to stay out of this war and not wanting to fight is a lot of Bullshit; Amer- icans love to fight traditionally. All real Americans love the sting of battle. When you were kids you all admired the champion marble player, the fastest runner, the big league ball players, the toughest boxers. The Americans love a winner, and can not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. American's play to win all the time. I wouldn't give a hoot for a man who lost and laughed. That's why Americans have never lost, and will never lose a war; for the very thought of losing is hateful and unamerican."
He paused and looked over the silent crowd, "You are not all going to die, only two percent of you here, in a major battle would die" Death must not be feared. Every man is frightened at first in battle. If he says he isn't he is a ******* liar. Some men are cowards, yes but they will fight just the same, or get the hell scared out of them watching men who fight, who are just as scared as they. The real hero is the man who fights even though he is scared. Some get over their fright in a few minutes in battle, some take hours, for some it takes days. The real man never lets the fear of death overpower his honor, his duty to his country, and his innate manhood. All through your career of army life you have bitched about what you call this 'chickenshit drill'; that is all for one reason--instant obedience to orders and it creates instant alertness; I don't give a damn for a man who is not always on his toes. To continue breathing, he must be alert at all times. If not, sometime, a German son-of-a-bitch will sneak up behind him and beat him to death with a sack full of ****."
The men roared. Patton's grim expression did not change. "There are 400 neatly marked graves somewhere in Sicily" he cried, "all because one men went to sleep on his job." He paused and the men grew silent. "but they are all German graves", he said softly, "because we caught the bastard asleep before they did."
The General clenched the microphone tightly, his jaw out- thrust, "An army is a team. Lives, sleeps, eats and fights as a team! This individual hero stuff is a lot of crap. The bilious bastards who wrote that kind of stuff for the Saturday Evening Post don't know anymore about real battle than they do about ****ing." The men slapped their legs and rolled with glee--this was the old boy as they imagined him to be--and in rare form too! "We have the finest food, the finest equipment, best spirit and men in the world", Patton bellowed, he lowered his head and suddenly he slapped his head, facing the men belligerently, "why, by God", he thundered, "I actually pity those sons-of-bitches, we are going up against, by God I do". The men clapped and howled delightedly. There would be many a barracks tale about the old man's choice phrases, this would become part of Third Army's history.
"My men don't surrender" Patton continued. "I don't want to hear of a soldier under my command getting captured unless he is hit. Even if you are hit, you can still fight back. This is not bullshit either. The kind of man I want is like a Lieutenant in Libya, who with a Luger against his chest jerked his helmet off, swept the gun aside with the other hand, and busted hell out of the Boche with his helmet. Then he jumped on the Boche and went out and killed another German. By this time the man had a bullet through his chest--that is a man for you".
He halted, and the crowd waited. "All the real heros are not story book combat fighters, either." He went on, "Every man in the army plays a vital part, every little job is essential to the whole scheme. What if every driver suddenly decided that he didn't like the whine of shells and turned yellow, and jumped headlong into the ditch? What if every man said-- they won's miss just one man in thousands--what if every man said that?" "Where in hell would we be now? No, thank god, Americans don's say that. Every man, every department, every unit is important in the vast scheme of things. The ordnance men are needed to supply the guns, the QM to bring up the food and the clothes for us. For where we are going, there isn't a hell of a lot to steal. Every man in the mess hall, even the one who heats the water to keep us from getting diarrhea has a job to do. Even the Chaplain is important, for if we get killed, and he doesn't bury us, we would all go to Hell. Each man must think not only for himself, but think of his buddy fighting beside him. We don't want yellow cowards in this army they should be killed off like flies. If not, they will go back to the states after the war and breed more like them. The brave men will breed more brave men. One of the bravest men I saw in the African campaign, was one of the fellows I saw on top of a telegraph pole in the midst of furious fire while we were plowing towards Tunis. I stopped and asked him what in hell he was doing up there at a time like that. He answered "fixing the wire, sir!", "isn't it a little unhealthy right now?" I asked him "yes sir, but this ******* wire has got to be fixed". There was a real man, a soldier devoting his all to his duty--no matter how great the odds, no matter how seemingly insignificant his duty may have been at this time. You should have seen those trucks on the road to Gabus. The drivers were magnificent. All the day they drove along those sons of bitching roads, never stopping never diverting from their course with shells bursting all around them. We got through on good American guts. Many of the men drove over forty consecutive hours!" The General paused, staring challengingly out over the silent sea of men, you could hear a pin drop anywhere on the vast hillside. The only sound was the breeze stirring the leaves and the animated chirping of the birds in the branches.
"Don't forget", Patton barked, "you don't know I'm here at all. No words of the fact is to be mentioned in any letter. The world is not supposed to know what the Hell they did to me. I'm supposed to be commanding this army--I'm not supposed to be in England; let the first bastards to find out be the ******* Ger- mans--Someday I want them to raise up on their hind legs and howl "Jesus Christ! It's the ******* Third Army and that son of a bitch Patton again. "We want to get the hell over there" Patton yelled, "We want to get over there and clean the ******* things up! Then we'll have to take a little jaunt against the purple pissing Japa- nese, and clean their nuts out before the Marines get all the credit!".
The crowd laughed and Patton continued quietly "Sure we all want to go home, we want this thing over with, but can't win a war lying down. The quickest way to get it over is to go get the bastard. The quicker they are whipped the quicker we go home, the shortest way home is through Berlin".
"There is one thing you all will be able to say when you go home. You may all thank god for it. Thank God that at least thirty years from now when you are sitting around the fireside with your brat on your knee, and he asks you what you did in the Great War II-You won't have to say that you shovelled **** in Louisiana."

 

APPENDIX III
BUCHANWALD
CAPT. JACK LA PIETRA'S ACCOUNT
Capt. La Pietra was with his group moving towards Nurnberg after the Rhine crossing. They passed through Buchenwald about a week after the U.S. troops spear-headed into the area. We were told that in civilian life Capt. La Pietra was a professional journalist. Here is his classic description as one of the first of the U.S. troops to witness the horror of the Nazi persecution. Here again the story was put on teletype tape and was available to all troops.
"The moon hangs low over Buchenwald tonight; the sky is starry; the air is warm. There is a ring around the moon-- a very deep orange-colored ring which could easily pass for red: and to those of us who visited the "Koncentration Lager Buchenwald" this afternoon it is definitely red--as red as the blood which flowed from the human veins of its miserable internees. And God knows enough blood has gushed down its large concrete trough--to be blotted up by the dry earth within the electrically charred barbed confines of this diabolical camp.
Yes today is a day that will remain indelible in my memory; I've seen many, many unforgettable things since New York's skyline dropped behind the western horizon fifteen months ago and always finding something which superseded some other thing in impressive- ness or ghastliness. But what I saw this sunshiny afternoon at Camp Buchenwald will never be equaled, even if I travel to the very depths of hell itself!
Somewhat vaguely, I recall the barbarous acts, cruelties and atrocities related in the volumes of ancient and modern history. How far removed they seemed! Deeds of centuries age; deeds of un civilization; small unpleasantries which inevitably accompany the transformation of a world Could such a thing take place today? Impossible! Except maybe on some undiscovered, cannibal infested island. Even then, death would be more or less a speedy procedure, a head hacked off suddenly, or a quick plunge into boiling oil.
Until today, thus ran my trend of thought. Undoubtedly, yours too! But we are wrong--just as wrong as salt is sweet!
I'm sure you have all heard of Buchenwald by now. No doubt the radio commentators devoted at least a minute to it; newspapers carried a half column; and perhaps the magazines showed a few pictures. Yes, it's the same old story--and John Q. Public, war-weary and overall its crimes has slipped away into the for- gotten past.
I saw Buchenwald a week after it was liberated--way before England's members of Parliament and our congressmen did. It was still "in the raw" then, and in the little time I have, I'm going to take you on the same eerie tour of horror a la 1945. Weimar, Germany, is a fair sized city 103 miles Southwest of Berlin. A good highway leads out of Weimar to the Concentration Camp and our jeep made the four or five miles in a few minutes. A hugh factory, completely bombed, flitted by and the wire enclosure of Buchenwald loomed ahead. With me were three Sergeants and a Corporal, members of my outfit. Crowds of visitors, most of them American soldiers, streamed in and out of the main gate which was guarded by a solitary M.P. As we stepped inside and surveyed the square mile of camp area, wondering which way to turn first, one of the stripe-in- formed internees approached us and asked in amazingly good English whether we wanted a guide. Of course, we welcomed his offer and our miserable tour commenced.
But first a word or two about our guide. His name, Reinhold Schienhelm, native of Lorraine; French descent; apparent age, 50; true age, 38; K.L. number 42558; reason for interment, espionage and pro ally sentiments (actually, he is an excellent telegrapher and refused to work for the Nazis); civilian occupation, seaman; traveled widely, spent much time in the U.W.; date of internment, September 1942.
He spoke freely and was willing to tell what he knew. All my questions were answered readily; when he mentioned things which were incredible, I cross examined him to see whether he would contradict himself, but he always had a logical explanation or "on the spot" proof. Never was he offended; he seemed to expect us to doubt him, no less than four times during the afternoon he pleaded, almost tearfully: you must believe all this; it was much worse than what you see now".
As we tramped from place to place, the frightful story of K.L. Buchenwald unfolded. I will relate everything I saw and learned, using generalities in some cases and details in others.
Most of the inmates were political prisoners such as Poles, Czechs, Russians, French, Rumanians, Jews, Hungarians, Italians, Belgians and a very few Germans. It is impossible to estimate how many have been "handled" by the camp during its four years of operation, but the total dead was over eighty three thousand. Of these, fifty one thousand were killed "officially", using such methods of execution as hanging, beating, shooting, and electrocu- tion. The remaining thirty two thousand died a "natural" death of starvation or poisoning. All bodies were disposed of by cremation. A quota of prisoners to be eliminated was established for each day--the number depending on the influx of new ones. Needless to say, the six oven crematorium never had much time to cool. Many of the inmates were children, hanging from 3 years upwards. At this writing there were over 1200 such children in the camp.
The daily food ration was the same for all--one loaf of bread to six men, served at 4 A.M; and one liter of soup for each served at 6 P.M. Deviation from this menu occurred now and then an indication to more seasoned internees that international repres- entatives in their routine inspection of camps were expected that day.
The camp was manned by SS Officers and troops; they in turn were assisted by habitual criminals who did the menial work. The SS personnel lived with their families in fine buildings adjacent to the camp grounds, enjoying all the modern conveniences and com- forts of present day life.
The first torture weapon that met our eyes on this unpleasant tour was called "the beating block". Punishment for any mis- demeanor, regardless of it insignificance, took place here. The victim was laced to this pillory in a prostrate position, face down, and beaten with a leather strap or a wooden club--the latter being used on days when the killing quota was high. A few feet away stood another block with a pole attachment. This was termed "hanging on the tree". After their beating ordeal, victims were suspended here by their hands--and the excruciating pain increased as they recovered from unconsciousness, only to lapse back into it. The crematorium, a one story brick building, featured six ovens, all of which contained charred remains of human bodies. In one of the ovens a complete skeleton rested, and in another there was a half melted skull plus a few chalk like ribs with bits of unburned flesh still clinging on. High above the ovens hung a plaque on which was painted: "allow not disgusting worms to eat my body, give me the clean bright flame". Each furnace operated at full capacity. Eighteen bodies per cremation, 450 per day. Victims of the various murder methods were taken to the crematorium in small carts, dumped down the cellar chute, loaded onto a lifts, raised to the furnace room, and stacked into the ovens. Some of them, even though unconscious, were undoubtedly alive. More fortunate ones recovered consciousness as they slid into the cellar. These were lifted up into one of the 36 nooses which hung conveniently along the white wall and allowed to die before the bright flame did its work.
On those days when the quota was high the crematorium had to serve as a murder house also. Prisoners were marched to the cellar under some pretense, singly, each descended the steps, opened the door, and, as he entered, an SS guard clubbed him. An attendant then lifted the limp body and slipped the head into one of the nooses on the wall. When the 36th body was suspended, the lowest hanging one was lowered and piled onto the elevator. This continued until all the victims were done away with. And while all this murdering took place, a large machine in one corner of the cellar ground out noises loud enough to drown the muffled cries that accompanied the clubbing.
The camp itself was divided into two sections--the "big camp" and the "little camp". All internees had to spend a three month test period in the "little camp" where conditions were absolutely deplorable. Those who survived the ordeal and showed a willingness to abide by the camp policies were "promoted" to the "big camp". Here, conditions were slightly better.
The wooden barracks in which the internees lived were crudely constructed--about 75 feet long. In the "big camp" the prisoners had wooden beds of the upper and lower bunk type. About 100 men were assigned to a building. But in the "little camp" where there were no beds--just shelves--four layers of shelves about three feet apart vertically and six feet deep, with the end nearest the wall slightly inclined so as to act as a pillow. These shelves lined both sides of the barracks and would "accommodate" 1500 men. We walked through one of these barracks and there were still about 10 dozen occupants in it. If ever anyone wanted to see living death, here it was--grey skin pulled tightly around scissor-edged bones, dull eyes peeping through two dark sockets, broomstick legs and arms too weak to support the sixty or seventy pounds of torso. Here was grotesqueness in the superlative. Some of these skeletons hobbled up and down the aisle, using the shelved bunks for support; others rested on their wooden mattresses, apparently dead or very close to it. Outside the door, three of them lay dead, recently evacuated by some of the stronger inmates. Their half-naked bodies were partly clad with the striped clothing familiar to all internees. After on, the cart, which made a systematic tour of the entire camp, would come along and take these bodies to the crematorium area where they would be stacked on the ever-increasing pile (we saw the heap of bodies later and took pictures of it).
On my way out of the barracks, one of the miserable creatures raised his thin arm to his lips in a gesture for a cigarette. I gave him what was left of my open pack, plus a few chocolate bars. Two or three others saw this and came crawling over toward us. A near riot started. In pity and utter disgust I left--The angry shouts and ravenous cries from within the building gradually subdued but even now they are still ringing in my ears. I don't know who finally ended up with all the chocolate, but Reinhold, our guide, said that the victor wouldn't live much longer after he ate it, for the shock would be to much for the man's stomach.
The Laboratory was next on our list. In appearance it resembled the other barracks, but the interior was rather cozy. Most of the rooms were now occupied by internees who had recently moved in because of the better living conditions it afforded. The Laboratory was manned by maniacal SS doctors--men who probably had great medical minds and definitely and insane brain. They devoted their energy to medical research, using the cream of the prisoner crop as Guinea Pigs. All new internees were given a physical examination. The healthiest specimens were quartered in special barracks, known as block 36. Here, living conditions and food were excellent, and for three weeks the inhabitants ate three good meals a day and lived a life of leisure. Then one by one, they were called to the laboratory and sacrificed to "science". All types of disease germs were injected into these healthy men and results were observed daily until death overtook them. The bodies were then dissected and all affected parts were preserved in large jars, carefully labeled. An entire room lined with shelves featured a display of every organ of the human body and various skeletons. The most ghastly sight we saw was a jar in which floated, almost life-like, a half head. And by turning the rectangular glass container, the exterior profile with its agony stained face and its half open eye stared back as if to say, "tell the world--so that it won't happen again", while the other side of the cloven head, exposing to the world the bone and matter of its construction, bore silent witness to the meaning of those words. I don't know who this unfortunate creature was, but I do know that he is a martyr in the eyes of all who have seen him. Silently, I said a short prayer for him--and for those who still expect him to come back. May they never learn of the plight which befell him.
Our guide was hardened to all this. His only comment was "in America you use mice and rabbits; here they use human beings".
The commandant, a beast well versed in methods of torture and murder had for his wife a creature even more brutal than he, himself. One of her favorite hobbies was collecting tattoos. Therefore, when the inclination moved her, she attended the phys- ical examinations of newly arrived prisoners, inspected them for exceptional tattoos, noted the prison numbers of those possessing ones she desired, and turned in her list to the SS in charge. Thus chosen, these particular men received a murder priority, and in a few day's the tattoos plus a good size piece of skin were going through a tanning process. Later, these same tattoos formed a pretty lamp shade in the Commandant's comfortable home. If the tattoo supply became too great, choice specimens were preserved in Jars and put on display in the laboratory until such time as they were needed.
We passed by some low buildings a bit removed from the large barns. They were the storerooms for grain and potatoes. Two large barns housed some pigs--part of many which could not be taken when the SS fled. Our guide told us about how a small pig was missing one day and, since an internee was suspected, the entire camp had to go without food for five days as punishment.
At the Eastern end of the camp were two large stables without horses. One was nicely constructed, high with a beautifully pan- eled interior resembling somewhat a gymnasium. Along one end a balcony extended outward, overlooking the straw covered floor below. This was the "sports arena"; emaciated prisoners "played" with SS troops, the latter armed with clubs. Wives of the SS troops were the spectators, yelling their approval each time a club descended on a shriveled, helpless form.
The other stable was a low building of stone construction, containing numerous stalls and three or four rooms. The rooms were thick walled and soundproof--another murder house! On one occasion over 400 Russian soldiers, prisoners of war, were exterminated the same day they arrived. Here is how it was done. All were marched to an area outside one end of the building. They were told that this was a physical examination. One by one, they entered, stripped, and were conducted by an SS trooper (dressed in the white clothes of a doctor) to the soundproof room at the other end. Another SS (also in white) met the victim, escorted him inside, closed the door tightly, walked him over to a height measuring device, and positioned him with his back to the blanket covered wall. Behind the blanket stood still another SS, with a pistol in position, and, on a short signal, a bullet went racing through the prisoner's skull imbedding itself in the padded wall at the other end of the room. As the body slumped forward, the "doctor" caught it and dragged it out of the room, into the arms of the other white figure, and ;he carried it outside the stable dropping it on the large concrete pavement, slanted toward the center, so that the blood would drain and run toward a trough which emptied int dry earth. As more bodies piled up, the blood ran faster and faster. When the pile could accommodate no more, the drained bodies were loaded on carts and taken to the crematorium. The carts made many trips on this particular day! And so ended our short visit to Buchenwald. As we crossed the large parade ground, six or seven inmates were building a wooden pyramid shaped monument. It was near completion. On it were three large letters "K.L.B". Underneath the letters was the figure "51,000", commemorating those murdered officially.
At the main gate, we thanked our guide--gave him some cigarettes and chocolate. He assured us that we should be on the receiving end of the thanks--that we will never know how happy and grateful all the internees were when the Americans came. I invited him to America and asked what he thought of our country. He answered "Ah;, you should ask that In the states you have all the countries of the world! It is wonderful!"
Soldiers were still pouring in and out of the gate. I paused and took one last look at this inhuman place. here was the gate, through which all prisoners entered, and there was the long smoke stack of the crematorium, through which 83,000 had left. I couldn't suppress the shudder which ran through me: an unexplain- able feeling tugged at my stomach; quickly I did an about face--we headed straight for our jeep. Buchenwald, Hell's only counterpart, shall live forever in my memory. How the German people ever permitted its existence along with other camps such as Lublin, Erla, Nordhausen, Dachau--is far beyond my comprehension. Most German's claim they knew nothing of the atrocities--but they did--it couldn't be otherwise! The question uppermost in my mind is "What is the world going to do about it?".
A slight mist is settling over Buchenwald now; the stars are shining through it; the air is a bit cooler--but the moon still hangs low; and there's still a red ring around the moon.



::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::





CLYDE KREBS ACCOUNT OF BUCHENWALD
Yesterday afternoon I visited a German concentration Camp and with the aid of an English speaking internee, I was able to see at first hand one of the most abominable, disgraceful sights I have ever seen. I assure you I will never forget it or the people responsible for its existence. This camp is several miles from the outskirts of a fairly large city and is spread over a huge area surrounded by fir trees set in a beautiful forest. It housed approximately forty thousand men and boys and was primarily a work and experimental camp. Few ever left and to quote the words of our guide "There was only one way to leave- and that was by the smokestack".
The camp was roughly divided into four sections- namely the big camp, the little camp, the factory and the sumptuous quarters of two thousand SS men that acted as combination guards and ruthless torturers. Let me take each one separately and briefly describe them but before I start I want you to know that some of the things that follow will not be nice and perhaps shouldn't be discussed over the afternoon tea but I want you to promise me that a great number of people do read it. I want you to see that everyone at home, in the neighborhood and, if possible, see if the readers of the Harvey Tribune can't read and appreciate some of barbaric treatments that our enemies have been and are still practicing over here. What follows is not propaganda and is not written to wring animosity from those that should read it but it is rather to give as true a picture of death, disaster and brutality that the German race has imposed on the world. If anyone has any pity or compunction for them afterwards and still feels that their prisoners of war should be pampered, and that the rules General Eisenhower haws set down and we are imposing over here are too strict, or that they have worked hard enough at their jobs there at homes to compensate for this, I would deem it a privilege to speak with them.
Before doing so, let me point out the purpose for this the camp existed. These slaves or prisoners were there to work in the factory on in the stone pit until they were too weak and sick and then they were to die. The Germans, the so-called super-race, felt they were better than these Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Rumanians, Frenchmen, Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians, Englishmen and yes, By God!-there were Americans there too, and so the camp existed to get rid of these "inferiors"-but only after extracting all the work they could from them.
As a man entered the camp he was strapped across a table-like arrangement and beaten across the back, posterior and thighs with a round leather strap. Later if they committed a small misdemeanor they were still strong enough not to merit killing, they were subjected to many similar beatings or hung up on hooks with their feet about twelve inches from the ground and suspended from their wrists behind them and then over their heads to a scaffold. The healthy or new men were quartered in what was called the "big camp" where they lived in thin, low-ceiling barracks. In quarters that should have housed little more than fifty men, we found four hundred fifty diseased, misplaced souls. Throughout the [entire camp these men of all ages as well as boys ten to fifteen years were fed the same rations. One loaf of bread for six men consisted the breakfast at five in the morning and one bowl of thin foul smelling soup per person at six in the evening. The men were compelled to run at all times regardless of age of infirmities and if they refused they were beaten and shot. If they became exhausted and unable to keep up the terrific pace, they received the same treatment. Many dropped in their track and many others purposely ran into the highly electrically charged fence that surrounded the entire camp. Some of the men worked in the factory which used to-but thanks to the effectiveness of our bombers no longer does exist at one side of the camp. This factory was engaged in manufacturing munitions and explosives. many times when the leaders would perfect a new weapon of this kind they would take some of the healthier men, stand them in an area, and fire close to them so they could observe the cutting and killing effects. Men were returned to camp mangled, destroyed and almost dead. l In civilized countries for the purposes of experimentation animals, such as rabbits, etc. are used for these purposes but not in Germany! They used men and laughed about it. Those that were not employed at the factory or for experimental purposes worked in the stone pit. I saw this pit and know why so many were slain there. Like all open pit mining methods the material had to be blown and cut out and then transported from the pit to the awaiting ore cars on the surrounding sides. So it was with the rocks but not as we know it. These men who were interned were forced to descend into the pit, pick up a huge boulder, hoist it to their shoulder and return back up the same steep incline running the whole while. One finds it hard to think such as these and other barbaric practices such as this exist in such a day as ours. It is reminiscent of the old Egyptian ;and Roman methods but even those were more civilized than these. Is it any wonder then that these men lost their minds, became diseased, and infected with their living conditions, and soon became nothing more than living (God, that isn't the word!) skeletons. As the men became steadily more starved, diseased and emaciated they were moved from the "big camp" to the "little camp" and at this juncture I lack words to describe the deplorable conditions I saw.
I saw men who were absolute skeletons, who were so weak they couldn't get out of bed, who called out in ;the most pitiful, unreal voices I ever heard. They lived in smaller barracks than the ones I mentioned above, yet each barracks quartered from between 1500 to 1800 of these skeletons. They were, and are, too weak to move from urinating and excretory purposes and have to live just as they are. The stench naturally is unmentionable. I saw big husky fellows that have seen death in all of its forms become too nauseated to remain. These internees are dead now and while the American officials are doing everything humanly possible they can't save the majority of them. Their screams, condition, and waste bodies will always be before my eyes. God the men responsi- ble for this atrocity must pay but death is too good for them. How can a man repay his debt to society for ruining and destroying so many mortal soul?
The first day our troops entered three of these gaunt, inhuman creatures died simply because they had something to ear. Those that remain now are being fed slowly and in sever cases intrave- nously. At the door of one of there "barracks" that I entered I was startled at seeing two of these corpses. Upon questioning I learned that they had just passed away and some of the stronger of the men left had gotten them that far. The agony on their faces alone will always prohibit me from excusing a German from anything he does. In their weak voices that really amounted to screeches they asked us for candy and cigarettes. It was hard to refuse but our guide explained they would kill each other in an effort to get even a small morsel. He knew of cases where men with gold teeth and been put in one of these places only to be found dead a short time later. They are no longer men but half-crazed animals who show the marks of torture and abuse over a long period of time.
I saw the crematory and a more hideously, scientific thing I hope to never see again. Truck loads of dead and half dead men were unloaded at ground level near a trap door. They were passed below into the basement where an SS man waited with a heavy ball bat club. If any were by some way still alive, he killed them by a variety of methods too hideous to mention. From here the bodies were dragged to an elevator which took its grisly burden to the next floor where the crematories were. In this room there were eight huge ovens, each of which still had the partially charred remains of what was once a man in them. On busy days (of which they must have had plenty since the estimate is that since the beginning of the camp in 1939, or 1940 approximately 83,000 have been put to death of which 51,000 are definitely known. They burned as many as three and four bodies in one oven at a time. So, then if the man's loved ones asked for his ashes they received not his but that of someone else. As I left the crematory I stepped into a yard on the left and found a stack of dead that were awaiting cremation, when the American troops arrived. These are daily being taken care of by normal burial procedures but there are so many it is almost an impossibility. Before they burned the bodies they took all the gold from the teeth and mutilated the remains according their insane desires. Never Have I witnessed anything more brutal or scientifically planned for mass death.
I saw a pile of bones in another part of the yard surrounding the crematory that were as neatly stacked as if they were of great value. I also saw the gallows which they used in hanging countless numbers and in so doing learned that all hanging's were conducted before the entire assembled group of people. According to our guide none of the people who witnessed these hangings felt too badly because they all figure that the individual was fortunate to\in being able to die so simply. What wild thoughts must have raced through these doomed men's minds!
Our guide was unfortunately for himself, but fortunately for us, well versed and familiar with all the perversions and insane devices that one found at the camp. You would have to see the camp to believe that such barbarity, uncivilized things such as that exist. He pointed a hugh stable that originally had been used for horses but had been put to different use concocted from the warped brains of these fanatics. The SS men and their women ()yes, women came to there functions) used to make an evening's entertainment such as we would go to the theater out of going to this arena and watching fellow SS men torture, beat and thrash slaves or internees in the floor below. Something basically and emotionally is wrong with men and woman of such low caliber and ideals and it is a direct assault against our standards of mentality, righteousness and decency. Why and how do such blood thirsty people exist.
In conclusion let me describe briefly the scenes that I saw that were absolutely the most maddening of it all. We went through the doctor's clinic and experimental laboratories. here we found parts of the human body in various shapes stored in alcohol. Every part of the body had its place even so far as cutting a man's head precisely down the center and then mounting it in show-case style. What fiendish, diabolical things these insane doctors must have done to some of their specimens, I'm sure only the Lord will ever know. They were known to walk through the ranks of the men and if they saw an odd-sized head on a man or something else that appealed to their bloody temperament they would immediately put the man to death and begin their unbalanced experiments. In a large glass enclosed show case they had an exhibit of various tatoos which they had removed from men"s bodies and preserved. The commandant's wife was often seen going through the ranks when they were all lined up stopping before various men and demanding that they remove their clothes to the waist. If she saw a tatoo that appealed to her, she took the man's prison number and the next day he was put to death; his tatoo given to her for her collection. I've heard of strange hobbies, but none quite so inhuman as that- and a woman collector at that. They resembled hides of animals after they had been treated and preserved. I personally didn't see what was reputed to her most prized collection but several of my friends did. She saw one tatoo on the chest of a man one time that so intrigued her that she not only demanded it for her collection but insisted that it be made into a lamp shade and it was in her home when the American troops entered.
There is the German man and woman fanatic: there is our enemy. Over here we often hear people back home say we are fortunate to be fighting in this theater where the people are at least civilized as compared to the Japanese for instance. If that is civilization, if that is advancement beyond the lowest stages of barbarity, if that is the product of the twentieth century, and if that is the road the human race is beginning to follow, them I'm sure we don't have the same conception of civilization. Why, we in America and countless other countries have trained our pets and animals to be more civilized than those abnormalities can ever overcome.
In closing I might point out this camp not only interned men but children and boys as well. The youngest fellow know to enter was three and a half years old and they ranged up from there to all ages. I saw and with the aid of an interpreter talked with many of the 1200 that are yet in the camp and I'm happy to say they are being well taken care of. Most of them have had little or no formal schooling and judging from their emaciated little bodies small chance to live in the world. They received the same food rations that I mentioned men receiving above. They are now eating wonderfully well, thanks to the Americans and the rich surrounding countryside. Provision have already been set up and formal education of a type is being taught to them in their own native tongue. Most of them are alone in the world with both parents either dead or missing. It's a big burden for a lad of ten or twelve, or fifteen to shoulder with no education or training. Tears almost came to my eyes when I entered one room and found a group of Hungarian lads in he midst of eating supper. They were so happy and grateful that their eyes fairly shown. They all offered and pleaded for us to share their meal with them but no one needed only to look at their emaciated, starved little bodies to say above the lump in his throat, "no, thanks. It is for you".

 

End of document
Editors note 26--- This was submitted by Col. Harold Salfen (then Capt.) of the 312th FCS who was Air Controller for FDP3 in combat. The account was in a letter Clyde Krebs (then Sgt 312 FCS) wrote to his parents during combat. Krebs last address was 100 East Chestnut #16-C Chicago, IL 60611. Col. Salfen's address was 3841 Whitehall Dr Dallas, TX 75229-2757 at this time.]
APPENDIX IV
SITE LOCATION BY MAP GRID COORDINATES
[ too bulky for this document please e-mail webmaster for this data]
BIBLIOGRAPHY>
Signals the Story of Communications in the XIX Tactical Air Command up to V-E Day
Capt. Eugene M. Greenberg

War as I Knew It
General George S. Patton

World War II in the Air
James F. Sunderman

Patton Ordeal and Triumph
Ladislas Fergo

August 1944
Robert A. Miller

Patton's Third Army
Charles M. Province

History of the United States Army in World War II Series European Theater Operations
The Ardennes; Battle of the Bulge
Hugh M. Cole
The Sigfried Line Campaign
Charles B. McDonald
Cross Channel Attack
Gordon A. Harrison
Lorraine Campign
Hugh M. Cole
Breakout and Pursuit
Martin Blumensen
Final Operations
Charles B. McDonald
Chronology 1941-1945
Mary H. Williams
Riviera to the Rhine

Air Force Combat Units of World War II
Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate
The West Point Atlas of American Wars
Vincent J. Esposito

Who's Who in America

The Panzer Battles
Maj. Gen. F. W. Von Mellenthin

Army Air Force History of World War II

Battle of the Generals Martin Blumensen 1993
Morrow and Company

The Patton Papers 1940-45 Martin Blumensen

The Invasion of Japan John Ray Skatwes 1994
University of South Carolina Press

Pamphlet No 672-1
Unit Citation and Campaign Participation Credit Register
HQ War Dept Washington 25 DC 6 July 1961

Seek and Destroy
The Story of the XIX TAC
Author Unknown (Pamphlet)

12000 Missions
The Story of the XIX TAC for the month of August
Author unknown (Pamphlet)

Radar Magazine
Number 1 July 1944
Published by Office of Scientific Research and Development
Radiation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Mediterranean Mission
Published by the 561st SAW Bn at Marina di Pisa, Italy 1945
APPENDIX VI
HISTORICAL AGENCIES
VETS (Reunions)
Veterans of Foreign Wars
P.O. Box 901
Columbia, MO 65205-0901

United States Air Force
Air Force Historical Research Center (AFHRA)
600 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6424
(334)-953-2439
This installation also has the Air University Library. There is a Computer Data Base (IRIS) and card index covering holdings prior to 1980. They will furnish microfilm on unit histories for $22 Per roll.
Air Force Museum Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5001

Department of the Army
Center of Military History
Washington, DC 20005-3402
Publishes books both in paper back and hard back in a series "U.S. Army in World War II" which may be purchased
US Army Military Institute
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5008

Center for Air Force History
Building 5681, Bolling Air Force Base
Washington D.C. 2033

U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
Attn TAPC-PDA (Awards)
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, VA 22332

Ninth Air Force Association, Inc
16 Oak Street
Valley Stream, NY 11581

Ninth Air Force Association Archives
Akron, OH 44325-7832
(330)-972-78322
University Libraries
Collection Management Department
Stanley W. Akers Director
National Archives and Records Administration (NARR)
Washington, DC 20408
(208)-344-2726.
They have stacks of paper which they will copy for 25 cents per page which in most cases are contained in microfilm at the AFHRA but which are of more readable than the AFHRA microfilm.
Suitland Reference Branch (NNRR)
Textual Reference Division
Washington, DC 20409

Defense Mapping Agency
8613 Lee Highway Fairfax, VA 22031-2137
They only have current maps and those with the WW II grid on them would be under the supervision of the Library of Congress.
Library of Congress Geography and Map Division
Washington, DC 20540
(202)-707-6277
They have originals of all the maps used in combat and have a duplication service which will furnish Xeox (black & white) copies
National Personnel Records Center
9700 Page Blvd, St. Louis, MO 63132
(314)-263-3901
Some records were destroyed in a fire
APPENDIX VII
AIR-OPERATION
It must be said that the role played by the weather became increasingly important in the course of the campaign as a factor limiting air-ground co-operation. The fighter-bombers, from the Moselle eastward, were never capable of the continuous and spectacular support which had stamped the pursuit operations in August. The decline in the number of sorties flown by the XIX TAC, indicated in the following table, clearly shows the impact of unfavorable weather and also the strength of Weyland's command was reduced somewhat in the late fall.
August 12,292 sorties
September 7,791 sorties
October 4,790 sorties
November 3,509 sorties
December (1-22) 2,563 sort
The following reports of the Chief of Staff for Operations (A-3) list the damage summaries from August through December 1944.
Beginning of Document
Summary 1-10 Sep 194 Attacked Destroyed Damaged

Railroads
Railroad lines cut 33
Locomotives 58 35
Railroad cars 267 142
Marshaling Yards 1
Freight cars 35
Tank cars 5 3
Guns on railroad cars 5

Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Cars 143 46
Motor vehicles 1139 97
Fuel Vehicles 30
Horse Drawn Vehicles 315 30
Horse Drawn Artillery 23
Motorcycles 1
[Editors Note 28--- The A-3 damage summaries for 1944 were saved in the XIX TAC Unit History. The whereabouts of the reports for 1945 (if any) are not know at the date of this publication. The report of damages from "Patton's Third Army" by Charles M. Province for from September on are incorporated in the main history. For completeness, Province's listings of damage for August are included in this Appendix and are placed after the A-3 Summaries.]
Gun positions

Field Guns Positions 205
Flak Positions 22
Anti-Tank Guns 2
Machine Gu n Ne sts 13

Airfields or ALG's 6

Highways
Road Junctions cut 2
Bridges 2 2

Shipping

Barges 1 1
Boat 500 Ton 1
Naval Vessels 3
River Piers 1

Military Installations Attacked

Fuel Dumps 2
Motor Transport Parks 2
Barracks 1
Troop Concentrations 21
Strong Pointw 43
Buildings 110 156 18
Ammunition Dumps 1
Radar Stations 1
Forts 1
Trenches 2
Communications Centers 1
Supply Dumps 1
Headquarters 4



Summary 11-20 September 1944

Railroads

Lines Cut 42
Locomotiv es 65 42
Railroad Cars 175 403
Marshaling Yards 11

Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 31 50
Motor vehicles 256 74
Fuel Vehicles 1
Horse Drawn Vehicles 39 5

Gun Positions
Field Guns 107
Flak Positions 19
Coastal 1
Pill Boxes 2

Airfields or ALG's 3

Highways

Roads Cut 10
Bridges 1 1

Military Installations

Headquarters 4
Fortresses 7
Buildings 3 27
Oil Storage Tanks 4
Radio Tower 1
Villages 3
Troop Concentrations 4
Strong Points 30
Barracks 11
Ammunition Dumps 3
Dumps 1
Fuel Dump 1
Radar Stations 1

Shipping

Motor Boats 1
Barges 7
Merchant Vessels 1


Summary 21-30 Sept 1944

Railroads

Lines Cut 148
Locomotives 117 21
Railroad Cars 554 325
Tunnels 8
Railroad Bridges 1 1
Roundhouses 1
Railroad Repair Shop 1
Depots 1

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Vehicles 9 17
Motor Vehicles 85 37
Horse Drawn Vehicles 10

Gun Positions

Observation Posts 1
Field Gun 72 51
Flak Positions 17 4
88-mm Guns 3
AA Positions 21

Military Installations

Factories and Misc Buildings 8 1
Building 1
Warehouses 6
Barracks 1
Marshaling Yards 30
Enemy Troop Concentrations 13
Enemy Command Posts 2
Ordnance Depot 1
Dumps 3 1
Fortresses 2
Villages 10
Power Stations 2
Control House for Dam 1

Hiways

Roads Cut 4
Bridges 8

Airfields and ALG's 8

Shipping

River Locks 7 1
Barges 53 82

Summary 1-10 Oct 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 13- 0- 2
On the Ground 19- 0- 26

Railroads

Lines Cut 148
Locomotive 117 21
Railroad Cars 554 325
Tunnels 8
Railroad Bridges 1 1
Roundhouses 1
Railroad Repair Shops 1
Depots 1

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Vehicles 9 17
Motor vehicles 85 37
Horse Drawn Vehicles 10

Gun Positions

Observation Posts 1
Field Gun Positions 72 51
Flak Positions 4 17
88-mm Guns 3
AA Positions 21

Military Installations

Factories and Misc Bui ldings 8 1
Switch Houses 1
Buildings 1
Warehouses 1
Barracks 1
Marshaling Yards 30
Enemy Troop Concentrations 13
Ordnance Depot 1
Dumps 2
Villages 10
Fortresses 2
Power Stations 2
Control House for small Dam 1

Highways


Roads Cut 4
Bridges 8

Airfields sand ALG's 8


Shipping

River Locks 9 1
Barges 53 82


Summary 10-20 Oct 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 5- 0- 7
On the Ground 1- 0- 0

Railroads

Lines Cut 102
Locomotives 98 17
Railroad Cars 471 267
Railroad Stations 1
Tunnels 9
Roundhouse 1

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Vehicles 2 7
Motor Vehicles 113 13
Horse Drawn Vehicles 23
Steam Shovels 1

Gun Positions

Field Gun 14 78

Airfields and ALG's 1

Highways

Bridges 4 10

Military Installations

Marshaling Yards 32
Enemy Command Posts 2
Oil Dumps 1
Fortressess 1
Villages 14
Enemy Troop Concentrations 8
Barracks 25
Factories and Misc Buildings 24 26
Power House 1

Shipping

River Locks 2
Barges 27 5
Dams 1


Summary 21-31 Oct 1944

Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 28- 3- 9
On the Grou d 2- 0- 0

Railroads

Lines Cut 1
Roundhouses 2 3
Railroad Trestles 1
Locomotives 99 16
Railroad Cars 486 348
Railroad Tunnels 4
Railroad overpasses 3
Railroad Repair Shops 1

Vehicles
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 2
Motor Vehicles 92 20

Gun Positions
Field Gun Positions 31 32

Highways
Road Calverts 1
Motor Vehicles 92 20

Military Installations

Marshaling Yards 25
Dumps 2
Villages 7
Warehouses 26
Factories and misc Buildings 40 7
Power Houses 1

Shipping

Barges 1 10
Dams 1


Summary 1-10 Nov 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 8- 0- 0
On the Ground 35- 1- 8

Railroads

Lines Cut 41
Locomotives 48 10
Railroad Cars 102 130
Railroad Trestles 1
Railroad Bridges 1

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Behicles 1 15
Motor Vehicles 67 20
Horse Drawn Vehicles 41 6
Horse Drawn Artillery 2

Gun Positions

Field Gun Positions 39 20

 

Highways

Bridges 1

Military Installations

Marshaling Yards 8
Enemy Command Posts 4
Dumps 4
Ammunition Dump Loading Ram 1
Villages 15
Factories and Misc Buildings 31 12
Enemy Troop Concentrations 5
Power houses 1
High Tension Lines Cut 4

Shipping

Barges 2 3
Dams 1
Control Tower 1
River Tugs 3


Summary 11-20 Nov 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 9- 3- 3
On the Ground 15- 0- 0

Railroads

Railroad Lines Cut 43
Railroad Stations 1
Loading Ramps 1
Locomotives 184 27
Railroad Cars 745 598

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Vehicles 59 40
Tractors 1
Horse Drawn Vehicles 60 9
Ox Drawn Vehicle 1
Horse Drawn Artillery 35
Mootorcycles 1
Steam Shovels 1

Highways

Highways cut 1
Bridges 3
Crossroads 1

Military Installations attacked

Field Guns 59 83
Marshaling Yards 17
Villages 3
Factories and Misc Buildings 69 13
Warehouses 1
Enemy Troop Concentrations 7
Lumber Yards 1
Fortresses 1

Shipping

Barges 10


Summary 21-30 Nov 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 5- 1- 3

Railroads

Railroad Lines cut 18
Locomotives 42 9
Railroad Cars 129 241

Vehicles

Motor Vehicles 59 22
Tanks and Armored Vehicles 5

Highways 1

Military Installations

Factories and Misc Buildings 12 8
Gun Positions 10 15
Marshaling Yards 9
Enemy Troop Concentrations 2
Villages 25
Supply Dumps 1
Balloons on Ground 1

Shipping

Barges 1


Summary 1-10 Dec 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 5- 0- 3
On the Ground 5- 0- 2

Railroads

Railroad Lines Cut 78
Locomotives 91 21
Railroad Cars 301 426
Roundhouses 1

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Vehicles 6 12
Motor Vehicles 98
Horse Drawn Vehicles 30 6
Trailers 1

Highways

Highway Bridges 2

Military Installations

Gun Posisions 17 37
Marshaling Yards 32
Towns 38
Factories and Misc Buildings 36 12
Power Lines Cukt 2
Enemy Troop Concentrations 5
Fortresses 11
Supply Dumps 1
Oil Dumps 2
Barracks 1

Shipping

Vessels and Barge 4 20
River Locks 2


Summary 10-20 Dec 1944

Enemy Aircraft

In the Air 40- 5- 4

Railroads

Railroad Lines Cut 43
Locomotives 67 19
Railroad Cars 552 829
Railroad Shops 2
Locomotive Tenders 1
Railroad Stations 1
Railroad Bridges 1
Roundhouses 1

Vehicles

Tanks and Armored Vehicles 23 5
Motor Vehicles 189
Horse Drawn Vehicles 53 3
Enemy Tank Concentrations 1

Highways

Highways Cut 3
Foot Bridges 1
Pontoon Bridges 1
Road Junction 1

Military Installations

Mortar and Artillery Positions 2
Field Gun Pisitions 44 70
Marshaling Yards 44
Command Posts 2
Towns 34
Natural Gas Tanks 1
Factories and Misc Buildings 49 56
Enemy Troop Concentrations 9
Fortresses 1
Ammunition Dumps 1
Supply Dumps 4
Gasoline Dumps 1
Oil Depots 7
Barracks 1

Shipping

Vessels and Barge 1
Barge Concentration 1


Summary 21-31 Dec 1944

Enemy Aircraft
In the Air 94- 9- 39
On the Ground 1- 0- 0

Railroads
Railroad Lines Cut 156
Locomotives 137 14
Railroad Cars 585 798
Railroad Tunnels 5
Roundhouses 2

Vehicles
Tanks and Armored vehicles 312 172
Motor Vehicles 2302 622
Horse Drawn Vehicles 36 52
Radio Trucks 3
Mobile Guns 1
Motorcycles 1

Highways
Highways cut 27
Platoon Bridges 1
Bridges 7 7

Military Installations
Gun Positions 148 142
Marshaling yards 75 1
Towns 167
Factories and Misc Buildings 215 71
Troop concentrations 41
Barracks 1 2
Dumps 7 16
Oil Dumps 1
Ammunition stacks 95
V-1 Site 1
Enemy Command Posts 1
Warehouses 2 1

Shipping

Barges 24
End of Document

 

Damage August only reports from "Patton's Third Army" by Charles M. Province are listed below.
Daily reports of the XIX Tactical Air Command air activity.
Beginning of Document
AUGUST
1 Headquarters becomes operational
2 Preparing for battle
3 Covered armored and infantry columns is spite of bad weather.
5 Kept the enemy away from the advancing columns while attacking motor vehicles, gun positions and an enemy headquarters and performing fighter sweeps in the St. Malo area.
7 The XIX TAC raised its strength to a total of nine full goups of fighter bombers. The Luftwaffe, growing more agressive met the fighters of the XIX TAC and lost a total of 33 aaircraft. The XIX TAC was responsible for the destruction of twelve tanks and 5 staff cars. They continued to cover all columns moving to the west, south and east while also attacking troops in Brittany
8 Reached a new peak of activity by flying a total of 717 sorties, during which 29 locomotives, 137 freight cars, 205 vehi- cles and 17 tanks were destroyed. Armed reconnaissance sorties were flown to gain aerial superiority, knocking out German Air- dromes north and east of Paris.
9 Flew 72 missions and 780 sorties, destroying 7 out of 12 ME-109's. A rocket carrying squadron was placed into operation.
12 Patrolled the Loire River area and prepared the way to the French capital of Paris.
13 Gave heavy support over Falaise-Argentan, destroying 710 enemy motor transports. A force of 37 P-47 pilots, attacking a concentration of between 800 to 1,000 vehicles, claimed 400 to 500 enemy transports destroyed.
14 Approximately 400 German troops surrendered by waving white flags from their positions. Fighter control was given the so the nearest ground troops could pick up the prisoneers.
22 Bagged another 20 German planes.
26 Encountered very few enemy aircraft while providing protective cover for army columns
27 Conducted a rail-cutting project to sever a main enemy escape route south of the Loire River
End of Document
APPENDIX VIII
TACTICAL CONTROL CENTER OPERATIONS
19th TACTICAL CONTROL GROUP
The 19th Tactical Control Group (TCG) was a provisional Group which was formed to coordinate the Air Corps and Signal units operating the XIX Tactical Control Center. Before this time the Commanding officer of this effort was a staff officer of the 100th Fighter Wing. As things developed other units were put under the 19th TCG. Col. Harry A. French was appointed the Commanding Officer and the following units assigned to the 19th TCG were:
Col. Don Mayhue commanding formed the Group about August 30th. Col. Harry French Commanding took over in December 1944 was previously the Executive Officer of the 100th Fighter.
Maj. Nash was Senior controller
Maj. John F Kraft became Chief Controller in September 1944
Maj. Norton was AAA Liaison Officer.
The following units were assigned to the 19th TCG
312th Fighter Control Squadron
316th Fighter Control Squadron
563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion
738th Signal Air Warning Company (assigned to the 566th Signal Air Warning Battalion Hq Co
979th Military Police Company Detachment A
3rd Radio Squadron Detachment C
564th Signal Air Warning Battalion Detachment A
Lt. Col. Albert E. Opdenweyer, the Signal Officer of the 19th TCG reported the following staff officers of the 19th TCG and they were as follows, with their rank and address in 1943 (see Editors Note 29 below)
Commanding Officer Col. Harry A. French
(succeeded Col. Don Mayhue)
Executive Officer Lt. Col. Mason H. Miller
Signal Officer Maj. Albert E. Opdenweyer
Chief Controller Maj. John Nash
(succeeded Maj. Kraft)
S1 Staff Officer Lt. Francis E. McMullion
S3 Staff Officer Capt. Rodney E. Remick
S4 Staff Officer Capt. Robert H. Northduft
Adjutant Capt Allen D. Broadnax
(Editors Note 29) Lt. Col. Albert E. Opdenweyer now resides at 4402 SE Knapp Portland, OR 97206-9940 and his telephone number is (503)-771-5279. He was Executive officer of the 566th Signal Air Warning Battalion and Signal Officer for the 19th TCG.
I received a letter from Lt. Col. Albert E. Opdenweyer (then Maj.) on 26 May 1995 and he gave the following brief outline of his WW II service
"Having just recently learned of the existence of the Sawbuck Gazette I have been most interested in reading bits and pieces of what happened to the 566th SAWB after I received orders to head home on 6 August 1945. I had spent 13 months in England with the Electronics Training Group before joining the 566th in Florida so I had lots of points.
Seeing you listed in the Gazette reminded me of the time that we ran into the bunch of Germans up on top of that hill. I am still thankful that they were not interested in defending them- selves, and also that the infantry unit at the bottom of the hill was willing to take them off our hands. Some time later I saw a picture in Stars and Stripes which reported the capture of a German General. For all I could see he looked like the leader of our little group."
The reconnaissance party Opdenweyer refers to was in Germany probably in the spring of 1945. The party was seeking possible communications sites to support the next move of the Tactical Control Center. This was a joint reconnaissance of the 19th TCG, the 312th FCS and the 563rd SAWB and the 312th furnished me with a driver and jeep. We had spotted hill on the map and went to the top to get a good look. When we got to the top a German soldier was spotted near the barn on the crest of the hill. One of the officers in the party fired at the barn with his pistol and the German soldier put up his hands. We approached the barn and I went over to the door and invited the German soldiers leave the barn and in the meantime I picked up the pistols of the several German Officers as they left the barn. I later gave one of the pistols to my driver as a souvenir. I also remember that one of the German Officers was a German Major and medical officer and he had one casualty who had a leg wound. I do not recall how many German soldiers there was perhaps a platoon. At this point I suggested to the other officers of our party that we turn the prisoners loose because I was only too familiar with the problem of getting rid of prisoner
(Editors Note 30) Capt. William Y. Brown resides at 4673 Hixon Circle Sacramento, CA 95841 Phone (916)-489-3586 and he recalled the details. He also reported an incident during the time frame of this reconnaissance. He had been on duty and working continuously for several days without any sleep and when the communications were finally in service he was so fatigued that in the early morning he laid down on plotting table of the TCC to take a nap. He was awakened the next morning and the TCC plotters, filterer's and controllers were plotting flights all around him as he laid asleep on the plotting table.
The other officers disagreed and we decided to march the prisoners down the hill and turn them over to some infantry unit nearby. We got turned down at one infantry unit post at the foot of the hill but on the second try (I believe it was an infantry regiment headquarters) the POW processors decided that they had not interrogated any prisoners in the past several days and they agreed to receive them. The rest of the trip was uneventful and now I do not recall whether any of the 19th TCG components used this site or not. All the above pertains to the 19th TCG before V-E day.
The editor recently telephoned Capt. William Y. Brown who was the communications officer in the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and also was one of the members of the above reconnaissance party. So far the names of the others in the 19th TCG have not been found. The 19th TCG Unit history was of no help in this respect and about the only document was the XIX TAC Standing Operating Procedure and the unit history after V/E day.
The 19th Tactical Command Center (TCC) staff assigned to the 19th TCG Group (Prov) and the manpower for the Control Center was furnished mainly by the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and included the following:
Capt. William Brown, TCC Communications Officer, 312 FCS
Lt. Robert McSpadden, Chief Filter Officer, 563 SAW Bn
Following is the account of the TCC as reported by Capt. Eugene Greenburg of the XIX TAC Signal office in his history book published in Germany in 1945
TCC --The Nerve Center
From the TCC, to the pilots in the air, go warnings and instructions, either directly or by relay from the scope control- lers at the FDP's. The Senior TCC controller must see to it that the information at the TCC is made available to all parties concerned, that warnings and important data are passed to the ships on the mission, to the gun batteries, to combat Operations at XIX TAC, and to the many other people who must get the facts for immediate action.
"Hot Targets" called in by TAC Reconnaissance pilots and fighter-bombers must be passed to Combat Operations at TAC. If Operations orders certain squadrons to be diverted, the Senior Controller will see that this is done, either by the scope controllers, or by the deputy controller at TCC. On escort missions, bombers and fighters must be "talked" to their rendezvous point, and important data passed to both formations. Squadrons must be vectored to the area of Army units calling in for protec- tion from hostile air attacks or for air "artillery" against an obstacle in their way. Fighters must be immediately scrambled and put in position to intercept enemy air raids. Planes in distress, lost or hit by anti-aircraft fire, must be brought into the nearest base. Fighters must be sent to the aid of others, who may have attacked by superior enemy formations. Andy "Y" warnings must be given to our ships, to show the presence of "bandits" in the area.
All these things occur, not occasionally or periodically, but continuously throughout a single day's operations. And often, they all occur simultaneously on several channels. At
At night, there arises the serious problem of the Inner Artillery Zones. The controller must make every possible effort to prevent the loss of friendly aircraft due to our own anti-aircraft Artillery fire. At the same time, the vigil of the anti-aircraft units against enemy air raids must not be relaxed. The controller is often in a tight spot, due to failure to receive full informa- tion on a friendly aircraft movements at night, the failure of planes to follow original flight plans, or their failure to use standard safety measures, such as IFF (information friend or foe signal equipment) and other recognition features. To have the Anti-aircraft Artillery officer give a "Hold Fire" order to gun batteries requires firm decision, especially when German night raiders may be in the same area where our own night-fighters of the Royal Air Force may be operating. The night controller also can obtain the use of search-lights operated by the Anti-aircraft Artillery people, when emergency homing of night flying aircraft is needed."
End of Document
The 312th Fighter Control Squadron was initially assigned to the Fourth Air Force and was activated on June 6th of 1943 at March Field, California. On October 10th of 1943 the unit reported to Santa Rosa, California Air Force Base. The unit was transferred to Hamilton Field on 18th November 1943. They were shipped to Boston and departed from there on 5th December 1943. They were disbanded on 8th October 1948.
The 316th Fighter Control Squadron was activated at March Field, California on 20th May 1943 and assigned to the Fourth Air Force. On the 10th of October 1943 they were assigned to the Los Angeles Fighter Wing. They departed from March Field on 15th December 1943 for Boston and shipped to the E on 31st December 1943 and arrived in the UK on 7th January 1944. On 28th October 1944 they reported to France. They were assigned to the IX Air Defense Command on 6th August 1944. On 5th November 1944 they were reassigned to the XIX Tactical Air Command. They reported in France on 14th Oct 1944.
The 19 Tactical Control Group was an activated element of the XIX Tactical Air Command as per General Order 35 dated 1st October 1944. They were discontinued effective 5th July 1945 in accordance with Ninth Air Force letter dated 4th July 1945.
Following is the Standard Operating Procedure of the 19th TCG from their unit history. Apparently this is the one thing that the Group wished to leave to posterity because it is about all that is now included in the history. The record is dated 8 March 1945 from the 19th Tactical Control Group and it is recorded as follows.
Start of Document
I Purpose:
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to prescribe the organization and operation of the Tactical Control Center (TCC).
II Operations
1. The primary mission of the TCC is to provide flight control for aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command.
2. The secondary mission of the TCC is to provide information on enemy air activity in XIX Tactical Air Command area to interested organizations.
3. Personnel and equipment necessary for the operation of the TCC will be drawn from the units of the 19th Tactical Control Group (Prov);
III Positions
1. Positions for the following will be provided
a. Senior Controller
b. Duty Senior Controller
c. Opns "B"
d. Deputy Controllers
e. Deputy Controller-TAC/R
f. "Y" Service Officer
g. Filter Officer
h. Movement Liaison Officer
i. AAA Liaison Officer
j. Ground Liaison Officer
k. Communications Officer
l. Floor Supervisor
m. Monitors
n. One D/F team consisting of the string-man for each D/F station and teller and one recorder.
o. Broadcast Teller
p. Status Clerk
q. Raid Orderly
r. Raid Clerk
s. Adjacent TAC Plotters
t. Advanced Liaison Clerks
u. Filter Plotters
v. Filterer
IV Duties
1 SENIOR CONTROLLER: The Senior Controller is a direct representative of the Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command, and is charged with responsibility for the control of aircraft and Air-Ground coordination in such areas as may be assigned. He is responsible for the operational efficiency of the TCC and subordi- nate stations. he will prescribe hours and rules for operations, supervise training of control personnel, issue standing orders, etc.
2 DUTY SENIOR CONTROLLER: The Duty Senior Controller is the direct representative of the Senior Controller. He is in charge of all operations. He will assign control of aircraft on missions to deputy controllers in the TCC and to controllers at the Forward Direction Posts. He will supervise the operation of Night Fighter Aircraft. In cooperations with the AAA liaison Officer he will control the IAZ when friendly aircraft formations are in the area. He is responsible for the receipt of operational orders from Combat Operations, XIX TAC, and for the passing of pertinent information to Combat Opns. He will see that organizations are alerted in the area when enemy Aircraft approach. He will direct the sweep of Radar Units with the occasion demands. He will determine the best possible fields for the emerging homing of aircraft in distress.
3 OPERATIONS "B": Opn "B" will assist the controller in the performance of Air duties. He will designate the VHF channels to be guarded by the monitors,. He will make sure that Ninth Air Force Common, the XIX TAC Common Channels and the Tactical Reconnaissance Reporting Channel are guarded from dawn to dusk and at other times if Aircraft are operating. He also must see that all Status Boards are kept up to date; maintain liaison with FDP Controllers; maintain an operations log, controllers manual and carry-over orders book, and advise Combat Opns of all aircraft accidents.
4 DEPUTY CONTROLLERS: Deputy Controllers will perform functions as directed by the Duty Senior Controller. Their usual duties will be to monitor operational missions, warn controlled flights when enemy aircraft are in their vicinity, guide flights to their target or rendezvous when required, provide pilots with such information as they may seek, aid pilots returning from missions, etc. Deputy controllers must at all times keep posted on the weather, condition of airfields, capabilities of aircraft, Group and Squadron Call Signs, danger zones, etc.
5 DEPUTY CONTROLLER TAC/R: Will monitor the special TAC/R reporting frequency. Will make written notations of all messages reported by TAC/R aircraft and will pass such information over direct3ect wire when available to XIX TAC Reconnaissance Operations Officer and to Duty Chief Controller. Will pass on any information or instructions to TAC/R aircraft in the air. Will receive flight plans of TAC/R Aircraft, airborne times, and call signs and pass these on to Movement Liaison Officer.
6 "Y" SERVICE OFFICER: The "Y" Service officer will provide the Duty Senior Controller with all available information of the operations of the enemy, particularly of hostile aircraft.
7 FILTER OFFICER: The Filter Officer is responsible for the operations of the equipment and personnel of the Filter and Operations Board except for identification. All aircraft warning personnel, Filter Plotters, Filterer, Broadcast Teller and Raid Clerk, during the period of operation, are under the direct supervision of the Filter Officer. he is in operational control at all times of all radar stations. He will pass Ground Observer Reports of hostile aircraft to Wing Combat Operations for immediate alerting of airfields in the area.
8 MOVEMENT LIAISON OFFICER: The Movement Liaison Officer will make prompt and accurate identification of all tracks displayed on the operations table. He will receive and pass all operational and non-operational movements to those concerned. He will assist with the clearance of non-operational flights when necessary. He will maintain Liaison with adjacent TAC's. He will assist the Duty Senior Controller in Liaison with AAA. He will keep a daily log, and make proper disposal of all classified materials which are received for the section making all necessary amendments to same. He will report and record all information observed which might be useful intelligence information.
9 AAA LIAISON OFFICER; The AAA Liaison Officer will maintain two way communications with Battalion Gun Operations rooms 24 hours a day. He will pass operational orders from the Controller to the Gun Ops rooms and will receive information for the Controller from the gun operations rooms. He will broadcast hostile and unidenti- fied track on the Army Air Warning Net. He will keep complete logs of all operational orders received from the Controller. He is in charge of the AAA enlisted personnel on duty in the TCC, including the broadcast teller and the two FM net Controllers. He will see that a C/W net, for standby purpose, is operational four hours before sunset until one half hour before sunrise, and that meteorological messages are broadcast four times daily.
10 ROUND LIAISON OFFICER: The Ground Liaison Officer, on duty at the TCC from Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, will be responsible for keeping the Controllers at the TCC and those at the FDP's consistently informed of the ground situation.
11 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER: The Communications Officer will supervise all communications at the TCC, and investigate immedi- ately all communications failures. Failure in communications occurring outside the TCC proper will be reported at once to the Filter Officer. The communications Officer will have all changes in status indicated on the Communications Status Board.
12 FLOOR SUPERVISOR: The Floor supervisor will be in direct supervision of all enlisted personnel other than AW personnel. He will synchronize clocks, be responsible for policing, arrange for sanitation of telephones, provide drinking water, etc.
13 MONITORS; Monitors will make a record of all speech channels designated by the Controller, and report immediately to the Controller all emergency calls heard. Conversation containing information pertaining to enemy aircraft, Ground Installations, Troop Movements, etc., will be relayed to the Controller immedi- ately.
14 D/F TEAM: The D/F fixing team will obtain fixed using bearings provided by the fixer stations. This information will be made immediately available to the Deputy Controller on duty at the Intercept Board, placed on the D/F status Board and recorded by the recorder.
15 BROADCAST TELLER:
a. Will tell only incoming unknown and hostile aircraft and tracks showing SOS.
b. Combined Air Warning Code will be used at all times.
c. Time check will be made every 15 minutes.
d. Other tracks will be told upon instructions of the Filter Officer.
e. A record will be maintained of all tracks told.
16 STATUS CLERK; Status Clerks will keep Status Boards up to date.
17 RAID ORDERLY: Raid Orderly will prepare target stands for Plotters.
18 RAID CLERK: Raid Clerk will make a record of all targets appearing on the operations table, listing time and position of the original plot, identification, strength, altitude and time of track's removed.
19 ADJACENT TAC PLOTTERS: Adjacent TAC Plotters will plot targets received from adjacent TAC TCC's.
20 MOVEMENT LIAISON CLERKS: ML clerks will assist the MLO.
21 FILTER PLOTTERS: Filter Plotters will display information received from the reporting station on the operations table.
22 FILTERER:
a. Filterer is responsible to the Filter Officer for the correct analysis and display of all filtered information that appear on the Filter Operations Board.
b. He will aid the Filter Officer in enforcing all standing orders.
c. He will analysis the number of aircraft as reported by the various stations keeping in mind the performances of these stations as it affects their analysis.
d. He has complete supervision of Filter and Operations Board Personnel at all times during operations..
e. He will report to area filtering when directed to do so by his Filter Officer. The Center and direction of area will be displayed only by arrow.
f. He will observe the prescribed priority in filtering.
V DETAILED INSTRUCT section will prepare detailed instructionf for its personnel to supplement this SOP.

 

APPENDIX A to 19 TCG SOP
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AAA LIAISON SECTION
The AAA Liaison Section with the XIX TAC is the 147th Air Operations Detachment, 38th AAA Brigade, U.S. Third Army. Its operational activities are as follows.
a. One AAA officer is on duty at the TCC 24 hours a day. There are three officers working in 8 hour shifts.
b. The broadcast teller broadcasts all hostile and unidenti- fied flights on the Army air warning net which is monitored by all Third Army AAA and AAA defense at airfields in the Third Army area. Quartermaster and Engineer units using lights to work with at night are required to monitor this net. The net is at the disposal of the Third Army Provost Marshall for any emergency that may arise. Meteorological messages, computed jointly by Air Corps and AAA are combined and broadcast over the net to AAA units. Three tellers work in 8 hour shifts operating 24 hours a day.
c. FM Net controllers operate two nets from the TCC 24 hours a day. The nets are the means of two way operational control between the Senior Controller and all IAZ's. In addition commu- nication is established between each Corps AAA Group and Army AAA Group which sends in AAA information Service data from units ranging down to the Division AAA on the front lines six controllers work on this net in eight hour shifts.
d. An alternate in the FM is a CW net which goes into operation three hours before sunset and ends one half hour before sunrise. Three CW operators operate this shift.
e. The SCR-399 radio is used for the Army Air Warning Net. Six radio operators work in eight hour shifts 24 hours a day and log all messages going out over the air. The SCR-399 transmitters are remote by telephone lines to the TCC for the broadcast teller;'s use.
f. A complete log is kept by the AAA Officer on all opera- tional control orders and a summary report on the following subjects is submitted to the Commanding General, 38th AAA Brigade daily:
1. Communication status
2. Hostile aircraft activity
3. Friendly aircraft activity
4. Unidentified flights
5. Operation control orders
6. AAA information service from AAA units
7. Comments
g. All coded messages are forwarded to Army Headquarters monthly for security checks. The 209 converter is used for routing messages and slidex for fast AAA Information Service communication.
h. The Detachment is self-sustaining, operates it's own mess,quarters and transportation and maintaining all equipment.
APPENDIX B to 19 TCG SOP
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE MOVEMENT LIAISON SECTION
A. GENERAL
1. The prime mission of this section is the prompt and accurate identification of all tacks which are displayed on the Operations Room Table. Tracks are identified as "Friendly", "Hostile" or "Unidentified". The most effective method of identifying hostile aircraft is to know at all time, the position, altitude, strength and turning of all friendly aircraft. If these facts are known, any other tracks observed must be hostile. The number of "Unidentified" tracks is a direct indication of the efficiency of any participating movement section. There should be no unidentified tracks. It can readily be seen that this system is only as good as its communications, plus the movement information received.
B. ORGANIZATION
1. Personnel:
a. Movement liaison officers 4
b. Recorders EM 4
c. Cryptographers 4
d. Radio Operators 4
(exact numbers may change according to situation and men available, radio operators furnished by 4th Tactical Air Communications Squadron)
2. Equipment
a. one SCR-399
3. Communications
a. Available land lines to IX and XII TAC's
b. Available land lines to Continental Flying Command
c. Radio channel to Continental Flying Control
d. Proposed teletype to Continental Flying Control
e. Teletype to flying control, XIX TAC
f. Available land line to Detachment "C", 3rd Radio Squadron
g. Available radio by day and telephone by night to IX Air Defense Command
h. Normal operational switchboard facilities
i. Normal operational teletype facilities.
C. AIDS TO IDENTIFICATION
1. Ground Observer Posts which report visual identification and positions of aircraft through their respective Forward Direction Posts.
2. Use of IFF by friendly aircraft. Any aircraft that indicates IFF is considered friendly and identified as such.
3. Visuals reported by AAA gun personnel
4. Conduct of aircraft--that is speed, altitude, direction and actions.
D.SPECIAL ORDERS FOR PERSONNEL
1. Movement Liaison Officer
a. The MLO on duty will, to the best of his ability and accurately identify all tracks that are displayed on the Operations Table, using facilities and methods outlined above.
b. Clear all non-operational aircraft when Flying Control is not available
c. Receive and pass on to those concerned all opera- tional and non-operational movements.
d. Maintain liaison with the adjacent TAC's, Detachment "C", 3rd Radio Squadron through the "Y" officer, duty Senior Controller, Opns B and the AAA Liaison Officer.
e. The AAALO will be given the flight plans of all aircraft passing through or which may pas through the Inner Artillery Zones as far in advance as possible. Information as to why any particular "hold fire" order was given will be made available to the AAALO.
f. Receive and properly dispose of all classified material received during his tour of duty.
g. Maintain the log, entering any pertinent information or unusual occurrences during his tour of duty. Report and record any information observed which may be of intelligence value.
h. The senior MLO will be responsible for the efficient operational nd training of the section.
2. Recorder
a. The recorder will assist the MLO in receiving, consolidating, passing and display of all movements.
b. The Senior Recorder will be responsible for the neatness, accuracy and maintenance of the file, codes and equipment of the section. He also will name all amendments in publications and keep the Navigational Warning Map up to date.
3. Cryptographer
a. Encode and decode promptly and accurately all messages given him by authorized persons
b. Pass and receive all movement messages to and from the radio operator
c. Keep a record of all messages received and passed for a period of not less than two weeks.
4. Radio Operator
a. maintain continuous communication with Continental Flying Control and report any failure immediately to the Duty MLO
b. Receive and pass on all ra Continental Flying Control and the TCC
c. Keep a record of any irregularity which may have a bearing on our failure to maintain continuous communication
d. Carry out orders given him by his Commanding Officer and as laid down in SOP for radio operators.
E. HOURS OF OPERATION
Movement section personnel will be on duty 24 hours daily, according to a schedule laid down by the Senior MLO. No personnel will quit his post until properly relieved.
APPENDIX C to 19 TCG SOP
DUTIES OF THE GROUND LIAISON OFFICER
1. a. The Ground Liaison Officer, on duty at the TCC from Headquarters Third US Army will be responsible for keeping the controllers at the TCC and those at the FDP's constantly informed of the Ground situation to include.
1. Locations of advance elements of front line troops
2. Current bomb line as established by ground troops
3. The tactical boundaries of the Army and the Corps
4. Location of Command Posts of Divisions and Corps comprising the Army (usually the location of the ALO
5. Changes in air-ground recognition procedure as special provisions for certain operations.
6. Locations and specifications of Inner Artillery Zones established by Army
7. Any other General Intelligence information relative to the ground situation that will better Air-Ground coordination
b. This information will be furnished insofar as possible for the sectors of adjacent armies as well, in order to coordinate the ground picture with the activities of other TAC's
c. In addition the GLO will be responsible that information relative to the ground situation received by the TCC from R?T contact with airplanes is passed to the G-3 Air Section working with combined operations at XIX TAC. In order to save time such information usually is passed by the Duty Senior Controller over his direct wire to combined operations, with the GLO being notified later. The operating procedure for the TCC was included in the unit history. Following is extension of the TCC procedure as issued by the 19th Tactical Control Group
APPENDIX D to 19 TCG SOP
DUTIES OF THE FILTER OFFICER AT THE TCC
1. The Filter Officer is responsible for the operation of the equipment and personnel of the Filter and Operation Board, except for identification.
2. All aircraft warning personnel, filter plotters, Filterer, Broadcast teller and Raid Clerk, during the period of operation are under the direct supervision of the Filter Officer.
3. The Filter Officer is in operational control at all times of all radar stations not actually on GCI mission. Any change of radar operations for missions will be authorized by the Duty Senior Controller and Filter Officer will be notified at once.
4. Maintenance periods for radar stations
a. The Filter Officer will authorize radar stations to go off the air for maintenance at the period arranged, provided conditions permit it.
b. He may authorize a departure from the scheduled maintenance time if necessary, and he may recall any station from maintenance to look for hostile or unknown targets or for aircraft showing broad IFF. He will, whenever possible allow each station to go off the air for maintenance one hour in every 24.
c. Stations when on maintenance, should attempt to be at 15 minutes recall and communications lines will be continuously manned during such periods.
d. Maintenance periods will be postponed in the event that adjacent stations are not operating.
5. Documents
a. The Filter Officer will be fully conversant with the TCC organization and with the instructions for Filter Officers.
b. He will read and initial all instructions in the Filter Officers Instruction Book
c. He will keep the Filter Officers Log and enter matters of interest occurring during his tour of duty, as well as signing in and out at the beginning and end of his shift.
d. He is responsible for all classified documents and equipment other than that of the operational analysis section during his tour of duty.
6. Transmission of Information
a. The filter Officer is responsible that all telephone and other means of communication and are maintained in good working condi- tion.
b. He will report any communication failure to the Communications Officer of the 312th Fighter Control Squadron and make an entry thereof in his log.
7. The Filter Officer will check frequently to see that the tellers know the priority sequence and that they are abiding by it.
8. He will see that during inactive periods a time check is made every 15 minutes on all plotting and telling lines.
9. He will notify the MLO of any target which is showing faulty IFF.
10. He will pass on to the Controller information in regard to faulty IFF
11. He will give all reasonable facilities to the operational analysis representative and will cooperate with him by recording all revellent information with regard to test flights.
12. He will cooperate with and give as much assistance as is reasonably possible to the MLO.
13. In the event of fire or attack the Filter Officer will maintain uninterrupted operations. Should the position become untenable he will inform the Duty Senior Controller.
14. He will control use of IFF equipment at radar stations when necessary.
15. He will see that the radar status boards shows at all times the correct status of all radar stations.
16. He will warn radar stations of the presence of hostile aircraft as the aircraft nears the station.
17. He will warn radar stations of gale warning received from the Meteorological Section.
18. For passing Ground Observer reports of hostile aircraft, the Filter Officer will have two circuits to Wing combat operation. Upon receiving the report from an FDP he will immediately pass the information to the Wing so airfields may be alarmed. Any addition- al information will be passed upon receipt.
APPENDIX E to 19 TCG SOP
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR "Y" SERVICE
1. ORGANIZATION: The "Y" section of 19th TCG consists of two officers and two enlisted men.
2. COMMUNICATIONS: The "Y" section maintains telephone communica- tion with 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile,(C), Detachment "C" (herein- after referred to as Det "C" by means of a direct land line and supplementary line through the TCC switchboard. The direct line in the TCC is maintained in parallel with the TCC MLO.
3.HOURS OF OPERATION: The "Y" post will be manned continuously from the time any aircraft of 19th TAC become airborne until all have landed, or have been released for the day. After the "Y" post has officially closed for the day, the MLO will receive all reports from Det "C" on the parallel direct line.
4. EQUIPMENT: The operator on duty will have on hand at all times
1. Log Book
2. Gazetteers
3. Hand map of Germany
4. Copy of the day's operations orders
5. Message code
6. Grease pencils and ruler.
5. QUALIFICATIONS: As the primary purpose of "Y" Service is to provide our aircraft with information of enemy aircraft, "Y" operators must possess an understanding of the basic organization of the GAF, a knowledge of the geography of Germany, particularly the area of operations of the XIX TAC so as to provide the controllers quick and accurate information of the location of towns and areas, and to be able to interpret and evaluate reports from Det "C". In addition operators must be able to read maps and map coordinates and know the phonetic alphabet.
6. DUTIES: A loge book will be kept in which all messages and reports will be entered together with a notation in the margin of the time of receipt thereof. This log will be opened and closed daily and will constitute a record of each day's operations. All information received from Det "C" will be transmitted directly to the Duty Senior Controller, and where the information so warrants to the MLO and AAA Liaison Office. On receipt of operations Orders all XIX TAC missions will be plotted on the hand map of Germany. At the close of each day"s operations a report will be made by telephone to the XIX TAC "Y" Officer, which report will include the total number of "Y" messages received during the day and those items of information which were actually used by the controller. All items of unusual interest will be relayed to the XIX TAC "Y" Officer immediately upon receipt.
7. TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES: All messages from Det "C" being of immediate tactical importance, will be transmitted in the clear. Messages to Det "C" from the "Y" Post which involves operation of our aircraft, such as releases, airborne and landing times, changes in zero hours, etc., will only be transmitted by a code which has been adopted by joint collaboration with Det "C" and which will be changed at regular intervals.
8. GENERAL: Det "C" will furnish, when so requested German raid reporting for the use and benefit of the MLO. Information which is of interest to adjacent TAC's will be given to the MLO who will relay such information immediately. All hostile and unidentified tracks, other than "Y" reports, will be passed to Det "C" for possible identification. All equipments when not in use will be locked in a strong-box.

 

APPENDIX F to 19 TCG SOP
TCC COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
I. ORGANIZATION
1. The Communications Officer at the TCC will be responsible for all communications facilities at the Control Center and will act as liaison Officer between the senior Controller and the responsible units on changes or additions to the communications system. He will be prepared to advise the Controller on these matters and will maintain such records and make such reports as are required by the TAC.
2. Responsibilities of each unit in the TCG will be designated by the commanding Officer thereof.
II. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.
1. Air-Ground radio.
a. the TCC will have available one VHF channel for each of the four common channels used by the Command and one VHF channel for each Group in the Command. Spare VHF equipment should be on hand for use during leap-frog moves and for use when additional Groups are assigned for control.
b. The MEW station will have a minimum of six VHF channels
c. Each Forward Director Post will have a minimum of two VHF channels and will be provided four channels if equipment is available
d. Each BACU will have two SCR-522 radio nets for air-ground communication, enabling them to operate every one of eight pre- determined channels
2. Point to Point Radio-Reporting Channels.
a. Each Ground Observer cluster, consisting of four or five stations will report by means of SCR-610 to a net control station
b. Each Ground Observer NCS will have VHF/FM radio and HF radio to the FDP with which it is associated. The alternate NCS will also maintain a FM radio set on this channel.
c. Each light warning or similar type radar station will have FM radio and HF radio to the associated FDP
d. Each FDP will have at least one FM radio channel as well as HFS radio for reporting to the TCC. In addition, a FM radio net for plotting and filter liaison will be provided among the FDP's net to the TCC.
e. All reporting channels will be operated 24 hours.
3. Point to Point radio- Liaison Channels
a. A FM radio net will be provided for liaison between FDP Controllers, BACU Controller and TCC. This will not be monitored by all stations during daylight flying hours.
b. A FM radio net will be established, when possible, for liaison between the TCC and the Flying Control installations at Group airfields within the Command, for the purpose of passing information relative to Flying Control. This new will be monitored by all stations during daylight flying hours.
c. A FM radio net will be established in cooperation with Army Ground Forces among the AAA Gun Control Rooms of the IAZ's in the Army Area and the TCC. This net will be under the control of the AAA Duty Officer at the TCC and will be used to pass AAA intelligence from the AAA units to the TCC and to give hostile and friendly early warning to the IAZ. This net may be used by the Controller to issue a "Hold Fire" order when friendly aircraft pass through a restricted zone. An AAA early warning broadcast on HF will also be provided.
d. The TCC will maintain an SCR-399 radio in the Le Bourget Continental Flying Control Net for the purpose of receiving movement information on RAF and Eighth Air Force activities, and movement of aircraft from other than the TAC's.
4. DF Fixer Service
a. A Direction finding system will be maintained for the TCC and will be operated at least during daylight flying hours. The fixer layout will consist of a minimum of four stations sited to give their most efficient coverage over the TAC area.
b. Each of those stations will maintain a FM radio in each of two nets for reporting to the TCC.
c. Facilities for utilizing the DF fixers associated with the FDP and BACU installations as a second fixer layout will be provided at the TCC. Each of these dual purpose fixers will maintain a FM radio in one of the two DF reporting nets mentioned above, and will be prepared to report bearings to either the TCC or the FDP controller or both. Normally, the primary fixer layout will operate on the designated TAC fixer channel. The secondary layout will set up on any designated channel at the order of the Chief Controller.
5. Telephone and Teletype Communications
a. Wire communication in all cases will depend upon (1) the availability of material (2) the practicability of installation and (3) operational necessity. The scale of wire communication listed below is that which, it is expected, can be maintained under normal conditions. However in the Tactical Control System, wire communi- cations must be regarded as a luxury supplement to radio, and the system must be planned so that full operation is possible without dependency on long land lines.
(1) A minimum of two switchboard trucks, one redline speech circuit and one telephone circuit will be installed between the TAC and The TCC.
(2) A minimum of one redline circuit will be installed between each Fighter Wing Combat Operations Room nd the TCC.
(3) A minimum of one speech circuit will be installed between Detachment "C", 3rd Radio Squadron and the TCC.
(4) Whenever possible, two speech and one teletype circuit will be installed between each FDP and the TCC and between MEW and the TCC.
(5) Whenever possible, one speech circuit will be installed between the FDP and its associated GO NCS, LW and BACU and between each DF station and the TCC.
(6) Whenever possible one speech circuit will be installed between the TCC and the Central Centers of the TAC operating in adjoining sectors.
(7) Wire communication to other installations in the system and administrative lines to unit headquarters will be installed under the provisions listed above.
End of Document
Invasion of Japan Proposed Task Force
After VE day the activities of the 19th TCG were fairly well set out in the unit history of their assignment to the task force for the invasion of Japan. For this expedition the 19th TCG, the 100th Fighter Wing and the XIX TAC were specifically requested by General MacArthur and the 19th TCG and several Signal BACU units were on the high seas and the 100th Fighter Wing were getting ready to embark to Japan when the A Bombs were dropped and ended the War. There was no question what would have taken place if the war had not ended at that time as Maj. Gen. Otto Weyland (XIX TAC commander) and Brig. Gen. Homer Sanders (100th Fighter Wing commander) were flying to the Philippines in a bomber and were over Omaha when the war ended. Just before that Weyland was promoted to CG of the 9th Air Force and Sanders had been promoted to be CG of the XIX TAC. Both stepped down and returned to their former unit in order to participate in the final invasion. Some of the men have said that some of the troops being redeployed were already in the Philippines when the war ended.
This was also a provisional unit organized for the task of the invasion of Japan and was to function under the XIX Tactical Air Command. The new unit had a new TO&E tailored for the operation. Personnel for the new unit were drawn mainly from volunteers from the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion.
At the October 1995 Reunion at Kansas City, Bob Norton explained that he took great pains to keep the original as it was when used by Lt. Col. McBride and it not only shows the roster but some changes made at the time and that a few of the entries were not necessarily final and perhaps changes that were planned. The names on the roster were as follows. (The roster is shown in Appendix XVIII)
The 19th Tactical Control Group (prov) issued Standard Oper- ations Procedures on 9 March 1945 which contained the procedures for the FDP units. The procedures were as written up in the 19th Tactical Control Group Unit history as 19th Tactical Control Group Memorandum 100-42 and were as follows.
Beginning of Document
I PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. To prescribe the organization, mission and employment of Forward Director Posts of this Group.
II ORGANIZATION
1. A Forward Director Post will consist of the following
a. Four TGI (Ground Control Interception) controllers; technical and administrative personnel, as required by Signal Corps Tables of organization for FDP; one Direction finding crew and one or two VHF Radio-Telephone crews, as required by Tactical Control Center Operations.
b. Equipment will include two SCR573-4 (one as minimum requirement); one D/F SCR575, which will be at the disposal of the FDP Controller; Teletype facilities, including TG-7B; and Control Plotting equipment as directed by Signal Corps Section.
2. Personnel and Equipment may vary according to the req- uirements set forth by the Tactical Control Center and FDP Chief Controllers and will be furnished by the Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion of Fighter Control Squadron.
III CAPABILITIES
1. An FDP, under direction of the Tactical Control Center, is designed and organized to be of utmost assistance to all Allied Aircraft in problems of ground to Air Control. It will be exp- ressly responsible for Aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command, either in offensive or defensive combat operations. Chief types of missions are as follows:
a. Close Support: Of any action requiring the use of Fighter or Fighter-Bomber aircraft under ground air control. Direction to and from the Combat Area or Target shall be the responsibility of the FDP on its assigned missions.
b. Armed Reconnaissance: For destruction of the enemy or the protection of friendly troops. The FDP will direct to any target of opportunity, any target assigned by TCC, or to any aircraft for the purpose of identification or destruction. The aircraft leader will be briefed in most cases, thus requiring only stand-by aid from the FDP Controller.
c. Bomber Escort: Under Field Order direction of TCC an FDP will rendezvous fighter with their bomber formation at any location within range. The entire mission will be monitored by VHF in order to give E/A warnings, aid in navigation if necessary, and facili- tate homing for any aircraft on such mission.
d. Fighter Sweeps: Which attack E/A and Targets deep in enemy territory will be controlled with every available facility to eliminate range handicaps. Squadron leaders will be advised when actual control is no longer possible, and when warnings can no longer be given by VHF.
e. Enemy Aircraft Interceptions: Will be accomplished during all missions when identification is confirmed by the pilot. A controller will not direct a pilot to attack any other aircraft unless full identification has been accomplished. Night fighters missions will be assigned by TCC and will include, Patrol, Intruder, Gangster and harassing flights. A Controller may direct his controlled flight to any suspected flight, depending on the requirement of the mission, but he may not divert the flight from its responsibilities or its objective.
f. Pin-point Target Bombings: Will be in accordance with 19th Tactical Control Group (Prov) SOP for Battle Area Control Units. The FDP will be prepared to resume or coordinate such missions throughout the time of flight.
g. Reconnaissance Flights: For weather information, enemy activity,s photography, calibration, or any other military subject will be carried out at the request of TCC. Information will ge gathered only at the request of TCC. Required help will be the only duty of an FDP during such flights.
h. Patrol: To protect or defend Allied property will be done under the direction of TCC, by assignment.
i. Emergency Homing: Will be the duty of an FDP Controller during all operational hours. Aircraft in distress, or Mayday, will be given priority over all other types. The FDP will so arrange its facilities to be of greatest possible efficiency in handling and emergency operation. The Controller may direct the aircraft to any location which is safest as determined by immediate known conditions. The FDP Controller may dictate the emergency procedure of the aircraft, thereby taking exceedingly important responsibility for all concerned.
IV ASSIGNMENT
1. The TCC Duty Senior Controller will issue all Control Orders and assignments to the FDP GCI Duty Controller. The most expedi- tious means of communication will be used for liaison between the TCC and FDP Controllers. The TCC Controller will coordinate the FDP as follows;
a. At the time of assignment, pass all full responsibility of Aircraft control to the FDP Controller.
b. Notify the FDP of any important information in regards to:
(1) Change in Field Order Plans or assignment
(2) Status of weather, communications, aircraft emer- gency field, available E\A warnings
(3) New or important targets in relation to the mission under FDP control.
(4) Emergency conditions and the TCC Facilities avail able during such time
(5) Relieve the FDP of mission responsibility in case of equipment failure.
V CONTROL PROCEDURE
1. At the FDP, all elements of control during operational hours will be under the complete jurisdiction of the GCI Duty Controller or Controller on duty. FDP personnel and equipment will be at the GCI Controller's disposal for the greatest possible control efficiency.
2. A Controller will plan and execute all the facilities of his mission so that every phase of control can be brought to use during any mission. A mission, depending on its type, requirements and objectives will be carried out to the best of his ability and at his discretion in relation to controlling. He will consider the following items in acceptance and control of any mission.
a. Possess the latest information for aircraft involved, including bases, weather, targets, maps, field order and commun- ication.
b. Communicate with the mission flight leader at the earliest moment of VHF allowance, establish the correctness of the mission, and give any changes in pre-planned order.
c. Find and follow the flight from its base, to its desti- nation, and home, on the visual scope of Radar. Use D/F, IFF or any other method of identification of fixing available to maintain the position and track throughout the mission.
d. Advise the flight leader, or pilot concerned, of dangerous weather conditions, flak areas over the target or course, E/A plots as given by TCC; and stand by to navigate the pilot, by vector, to any position or area requested.
e. Keep the flight oriented, notify the leader when his fl- ight is off course or target, and be prepared to home emergency aircraft at any time during the attack. He may advise the flight of its proximity to a safe area, and their steer to base, giving the distance in minutes of flying time.
f. The Controller will aid the flight on its return trip by checking their position frequently, giving steers as requested, advising of IAZ Areas during late flights, and notifying the leader or pilot of his entrance into friendly lines.
g. All Controllers will observe the important elements of R/T conversation concerning:

(1) Military security
(2) Clarity and accuracy of information
(3) Channel priorities during emergency
h. The FDP Controller may refuse to accept responsibility for the safety or success of any mission if he deems it impossible or improbable because of limitations such as:
(1) Mechanical failure
(2) Power failure
(3) "Jamming" scope failures
(4) subordinate equipment failure.
The TCC Controller will be immediately notified of any limitation which will affect the controlled mission, and he will re-assign or so arrange the mission so that it can be controlled.
3. The items set forth in paragraph 2, section V, must be considered as policy suggestions and not as set rules. A GCI Controller must consider any possible control point, and may pattern his methods of control, of R/T, or of mission direction to fit whatever situation may arise. He must be aware of all conditions pertaining to the aircraft under his control and consider them as his responsibility. The Communications at the Controllers command must be available and clear for use to successfully complete ny controlled.
VI CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES, FDP
1. Cooperate with the FDP Company Commander in solving problems of control and filter work.
2. Maintain liaison with the FDP Filter Officer in order that TCC may receive accurately plotted information on controlled flights.
3. Activate the FDP Equipment and Personnel to the best advantage and most continuous use for aiding aircraft.
4 Train or require the training of personnel in the direct use of control equipment. At the discretion of the FDP Chief GCI Controller, Enlisted personnel of the Air corps, or Signal Corps will be trained in all phases of control. These will be known as Deputy Controllers, but will not act only under the direct supervision of the Duty Controller.
VII DIRECTION/FINDING
1. D/F Crews will be under the control of the FDP Controller. The Group Channel or channels used during actual control may be used on the D/F set for fixing during a mission unless otherwise commanded by the TCC Chief Controller. During hours of non oper- ation, the D/F channel will join the TCC #2 Net. Other regulations on D/F are given in par 5b, XIX Tactical Air Command SOP 100-30.
VIII VHF COMMUNICATIONS AND ELEMENTS:
1. See SOP XIX Tactical Air Command 100-50
2. VHF operators will log all control, all pilot air-ground conversation. Individual FDP Code may be used to facilitate log- ging excesses, but complete "story" must be available from the VHF Logs. Important items, such as conversation between pilots which indicates a state of emergency; e.g."Hello Rudy, Blue-two here. I've got fire in the cockpit." VHF logged, this might be 1300 Blue 2 cockpit fire".
IX IFF PROCEDURE
1. See XIX Tactical Air Command SOP 100-50 (not included)
End of document

 

APPENDIX XI
TCHNICAL DATA
563rd SIGNAL AIR WARNING BATTALION
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
.
This SOP was a first at the Aircraft Warning Unit Training Center. The first version, which follows, was written primarily for the operational training period prior to shipment overseas at Drew Field. Prior to this it was a practice for the units undergoing final operational training to rely on classroom learned procedures which were not necessarily written down by the unit. In the final evaluation of units to be shipped to combat situations the battalion got very high marks and this was one of the factors. At the end of this operational training the SOP was improved and published. After the reorganization and field training in England the SOP was again changed for the Forward Director type of operation which would be used in Combat. The SOP proved to be useful in orienting assigned and attached troops in combat. In combat it was used to fill in before the 19th Tactical Control Group wrote their own Standing Operating Procedures in the Winter of 1944. There is no record left in the unit histories of the final combat version, probably because the 19th Tactical Control Squadron issued their own version which the 563rd used in combat from about December 1944 and on. The final SOP for the XIX Tactical Air Command integrated the operations from Radars to Airfields. The issue letter was as follows with the Standing Operating Procedure attached.
HEADQUARTERS
563rd SIGNAL A. W. BATTALION
DREW FIELD, FLORIDA
15 November 1943
Subject: Standard Operating Procedure
To: All Concerned
1. The purpose of the standard operation procedure is to obtain uniformity of operation and reduction of orders and instructions. Normally the standard operating procedure will be followed. Situations arising wherein variation produce more efficient results will be prescribed in orders.
2. Company commanders are responsible that pertinent informa- tion contained in the standard operating procedures are made known to the lowest element of their command who must know the informa- tion in order that each procedure undertaken may be assured of success. It will be concerned.
3. This standard operating procedure will be effective upon receipt. Additions or changes will be published when appropriate and added to this publication when issued.
4. Superseded data will be removed and destroyed.
By order of Lieut Colonel McBRIDE

MAURICE E. BYRNE
Major Signal Corps
Executive
SECTION I
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY
1. GENERAL. The detailed duties of staff sections are set forth in Chapter 1, Staff Officers Field Manual FM 101-5. This reference will be used in all cases as a standard operating procedure unless modified by theCommanding Officer. In case of conflict of the above reference with this SOP, this SOP will guide. All previous standard operating procedures memorandums and bulletins are hereby rescinded.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER.
a. Correspondence of special importance or interest of the commanding officer.
b. Communications relating to irregularities within the Battalion.
c. Communications containing censure, criticism or commenda- tion to the battalion or its various units.
d. Important orders and instructions from higher echelons.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
a. Communications of special importance not covered by existing policies or instructions.
b. Accidents or damage involving personnel, installations or equipment which are of a serious nature.
c. Communications in which the proposed action disapproves a recommendation of the Company Commander.
(Editors Note 31) At the time this original SOP was written it was not known that the operation of the Fighter Control Information Center would be handled by the 563rd or an Air Corps unit, (turned out to be the 312th Fighter Control Squadron). In fact the Air Corps failed to acquaint us with this until about March of 1944. I remember that the filter center personnel of the battalion were stationed near Andover and we were continuing the Information Center training and using improvised equipment as we had not been issued any filtering hardware for an operation center. In the meantime the Air Corps had allotted this equipment to the 312th FCS. In the spirit of the 563rd the men made their own hardware out of tin cans and imporvised a mobile Control Center with 2 1/2 ton trucks and pyramidal tents.
d. Applications for leave, detached service or other absence of the head of any staff section.
e. Matters covered by paragraph 2 in the absence of the Commanding Officer.
4. CORRESPONDENCE TO BE SIGHED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER
a. Communications addressed to civilian officials.
b. Correspondence in which it is desired to emphasize that theCommanding Officer has given his personal attention.
5. CORRESPONDENCE TO BE SIGHED BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
a. Correspondence mentioned in paragraph 4 in the absence of the Commanding Officer.
6. CORRESPONDENCE TO BE SIGNED BY THE ADJUTANT
a. All correspondence not listed in paragraph 4 and 5.
SECTION II
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADJUTANTS SECTION.
a. Organization and maintenance of a message center in Battalion Headquarters.
b. Organization of the headquarters file section other than matters pertaining to supply, personnel and technical matters.
c. Coordination and forewarning of all reports prepared by staff heads of Company Commanders.
8. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-1 SECTION
a. Coordination of the personnel reports required by higher headquarters consolidating when necessary.
b. Coordination of the personnel functions in all companies.
c. Inspection and supervision of all administrative functions in companies
d. Custodian of the Forms 66-1 and 201 files for all officers.
9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-2 SECTION
a.Intelligence functions directed by higher headquarters.
b. Cryptographic security officer for the battalion.
c. Custodian of classified documents and cipher devices used in Battalion Headquarters.
10. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-3 SECTION
a. Preparation of all field orders, march orders, training directives and master training schedules.
b. Coordination of use of training equipment
c. Preparation, revision, publication and distribution of Standing Operating Procedures
d. Preparation or consolidation of all reports to higher headquarters of all things pertaining to training, operation or tactics.
e. Custody and maintenance of a technical and tactical library at Battalion Headquarters.
11. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE S-4 SECTION
a. Preparation or consolidation of all reports to higher headquarters pertaining to supply.
b. Supervision and responsibility for the functioning of all supply throughout the battalion.
12. COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
a. The Communications officer of the Headquarters and Plotting Company will also be Communications Officer for the Battalion. He will be responsible for the installation and maintenance of all signal communications employed within the Battalion Headquarters and the Information Center, except the inter-room and intra-room communications that are provided for the information center equipment. He will supervise all other communications.
b. He will assist the S-3 in the issuance of instructions, SOP as pertains to communications, line route diagrams, SCI, allotment of call signs and frequencies to all radio nets.
13. GAS OFFICER
a. The Gas Officer will supervise the operation and instruc- tion of unit gas officers and maintain liaison with gas officers of higher echelons.
14. MOTOR OFFICER
a. Supervision of the operation and maintenance of all motor transportation
15. CHAPLIN
a. Supervision of the spiritual welfare of the command.
16. SURGEON
a. Advisor to the commander on all matters pertaining to health and sanitation
b. Training of all troops in military sanitation and first aid, coordinate with the S-3
c. Location and operation of medical aid stations and evacuation service
d. Training of Medical troops.
17. POSTAL OFFICER
a. Safeguarding and breakdown by companies of all mail service.
18. UNIT JOURNAL
a. A unit journal will be kept by the Battalion. It is under the supervision of the S-3. The journal is a chronological record of one days events of the unit. It will contain a record of all important decisions that were made and of all tactically important written messages and orders received and sent by headquarters and the action thereon. The journal is supplemented by the journal file. This file contains copies of all the messages, orders and other documents arranged in the order of entry in the journal. They serve as a permanent record of the operations of the unit and are the basis for the war diary. The work sheet affords the staff officers a convenient means of keeping memoranda for their own ready reference map.
19. OPERATIONS MAP
a. A single map will be kept at the Battalion Command Post, this map will incorporate the situation and operation map. All data pertinent to the situation is plotted. The map should be posted up to date at all times by correcting, or adding information that can be shown graphically. The prescribed symbols are used whenever possible, and notes may be used to explain, or to take the place of symbols. Such notes should be placed on the margins where they will not obscure important data or terrain features. The S-3 is responsible for the keeping of this official map. The informa- tion plotted on the map will include: Location of Radars, ground observers, relay stations, wire and other obstacles, anti-aircraft weapons automatic weapon, Observation posts and command posts, boundaries between units, dumps, aid stations and supply establish- ments, shelled, bombed or gassed areas, adjacent, higher and supporting units.
SECTION III
ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTALION
20. HEADQUARTERS AND PLOTTING COMPANY
a. Will consist of four platoons, Headquarters Platoon, Filter Platoon, Operations Platoon and Communications Platoon. In addition a medical section will be attached.
b. Headquarters platoon will consist of 1 A team less 1 2nd Lt., 1 M/Sgt (542), 1 Sgt (261), 1 T/4 (089) all to the communica- tions Platoon, 1 T team and 3 P teams.
c. The Filter Platoon will consist of 1 E team, 1 L team and 6 F teams
d. The Operations Platoon will consist of 1 E team
e. The Communications Platoon will consist of 12 I teams, 2 J teams, 1 2nd Lt., M/Sgt (542), S/Sgt (261), T/4 (089) all from the A Team
21. REPORTING COMPANY A
a. Will consist of three platoons, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Reporting Platoon (EW), 2nd reporting Platoon (GCI)
b. Headquarters platoon will consist of 1 B team and 12 I teams
c. The 1st Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 C team, 1 P team and 1 S team.
d. The 2nd Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 C team, 1 S team, 1 J team and 1 P team
22. REPORTING COMPANY B
a. Will consist of three platoons, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Reporting Platoon (EW) and 2nd Reporting Platoon (GCI).
b. Headquarters Platoon will consist of 1 B Team
c. The 1st Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U Team
d. The 2nd Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U team
23. REPORTING COMPANY C
a. Will consist of three platoons, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Reporting Platoon (EW) and 2nd Reporting Platoon (GCI).
b. Headquarters Platoon will consist of 1 B Team
c. The 1st Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U team
d. The 2nd Reporting Platoon will consist of 1 J team, 3 P teams, 1 S team and 1 U team.
24. GROUND OBSERVER COMPANY D
a. Will consist or three Platoons, Headquarters Platoon, Ground Observer Platoon and Reporting Platoon
b. The Headquarters platoon will consist of 1 B team
c. The Ground Observer Platoon will consist of 24 M teams, 3 P teams and 1 S team
d. The Reporting Platoon will consist of 1/2 U team, 2 N teams, 1 S team and 1 P team
25. GROUND OBSERVER COMPANY E.
a. Will consist of three Platoons, Headquarters Platoon, Ground Observer Platoon and Reporting Platoon.
b. The Hean will consist of 1 B team
c. The Ground Observer Platoon will consist of 24 M teams, 3 P teams and 1 S team
d. The Reporting Platoon will consist of 1/2/U team, 2 N teams, 1 S team and 1 P team.
NOTE Tentative tactical considerations dictate the following employment for tactical purposes: 2 Officers in the L team of the Filter Platoon of the Headquarters and Plotting Company will be placed on Special Duty with Ground Observer Companies D and E, one officer in each Company, for the purpose of commanding the ground observer platoons in these companies. The 12 I teams in thlatoon of Reporting Company A will be put on Special Duty the Headquarters and Plotting Company for use in the Communications Platoon. The T/Sgt (953) in the U team divided among the Ground Observer Companies will be assigned to Company D. The Sgt(824) in the U team divided among the Ground Observer Companies will be assigned to Company E.
SECTION IV
ADMINISTRATIVE SOP FOR THE BATTALION
26. PURPOSE
The purpose of the procedure outlined below is to relieve the company Headquarters of some of the burden of keeping track of the enlisted men to develop leadership among the non-commissioned officers to improve the control of the command as a whole to impress the platoon officers and non-commissioned officers with their responsibilities: to raise the general morale by making the training more realistic and to improve the physical coordination of the command as a whole.
27. BREAKDOWN OF THE COMPANY
a. The Company will be divided into platoons paralleling the T/O. Each Platoon will be assigned an area and a barracks for which it will be responsible.
b. The Headquarters Platoon will consist of the company administrative overhead, administrative overhead for battalion headquarters, transportation,supply and mess personnel.
c. All personnel over 38 years of age, CCD, or others awaiting discharge physically or technically disqualified and overages will be placed in one or more complete platoons in Headquarters and Plotting Company
d. Each platoon will be divided into squads of 10 to 12 men.
e. The organization will be built up around key positions. Each key position will have an assistant who will act in the absence of the key man. Their key position and assistants are as follows
Platoon Commander Officer
Asst Platoon Commander Officer
Platoon Sergeant NCO
Asst Platoon Sergeant NCO
Squad Leader NCO or acting NCO
Asst Squad Leader NCO or acting NCO
28. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR OFFICERS.
a. Our primary purpose here is the training of troops for combat operations. With this objective always in mind, Officers will spend every available moment on training. Office work will be left to the enlisted clerks. A properly organized office staff can carry the bulk of routine administration paper work.
b. It is the responsibility of the Company Commander to insure that officers are detailed as training instructors. Schools for officers and Non-commissioned officers will be held after training hours to insure each instructor is well qualified in the subject of instruction for the following day.
c. All officers will participate in physical exercise at each period prescribed by the training schedule.
d. One officer in the Company will stand reveille each day.
e. One officer in each platoon will stand retreat each day. He will make an inspection of all weapons in the platoon before the retreat formation. He will also inspect personnel at the retreat forma- tion.
29. DELEGATION OF DUTIES
a. Company duties as outlined in paragraph 30,31,32,33 and 34 will, where practicable, be delegated to platoon officers and warrant officers as additional duties.
30. DUTIES OF THE COMPANY TRAINING OFFICER
a. He will post the training schedule on the officers bulletin board the company bulletin board.
b. He will clearly designate, at least 24 hours in advance, the exact area in which each class is to be conducted the time the class starts the equipment to be brought by the individual soldier the uniform to be worn and other remarks deemed necessary for the smooth functioning of the class.
c. He will notify instructors concerned of any change in training directed by Battalion Headquarters. This will be done at least 24 hours in advance of the proposed change.
d. He will cooperate with instructors in the manufacture, requisitioning or procurement of training aids and training equipment.
e. He will be custodian of company training material and property which is not picked up by the company supply
f. He will keep the Company Supply, Mess and Transportation officer informed at least 24 hours in advance of any requirements that may be made of him in accord with training procedure.
31. DUTIES OF COMPANY ATHLETIC OFFICER.
a. He will be in charge of the obstacle course and responsible for its maintenance.
b. He will keep records pertaining to the physical achievement of the men in the entire company
c. He will supervise athletics at all periods of organized athletics and will be assisted by other company officers designated from time to time by the Company Commander.
32. DUTIES OF THE COMPANY SUPPLY MESS AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
a. He will store, requisition, preserve, inspect and distrib- ute all company supplies in accordance with AR's.
b. He will handle all details pertaining to mess and transpor- tation as required for training purposes or movements as requested by company officers, and authorized by the Company Commander.
c. He will coordinate matters of supply, mess and transporta- tion for all Company functions.
d. He will be responsible to the Company Commander for First echelon maintenance of company vehicles.
33. DUTIES OF THE COMPANY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
a. He will coordinate all company administration matters except those pertaining solely to supply, mess and transportation.
b. He will supervise the operation of the orderly room.
c. He will conduct all normal routine administration and sign for the Company Commander. he will prepare outgoing correspondence for the signature of the Company Commander.
d. He will maintain the company files and most appropriate data on the bulletin board and will inspect the bulletin board frequently to insure that all superseded and outdated information is removed.
e. For all the above duties he will employ the company clerks.
34. DUTIES OF PLATOON COMMANDERS OR ASSISTANT PLATOON COMMAND- ERS ACTING IN THEIR ABSENCE
a. He will appoint squad leaders and assistant squad leaders for each squad and recommend platoon and assistant platoon sergeants.
b. He will divide his platoon into squads assigning 10 or 12 men to to each squad.
c. He will be responsible to the Company Commander for the appearance and behavior of all the men in his platoon and the condition of their clothing and individual equipment.
d. He will be responsible that members of his platoon report for formation and classes or details at the designated time and place with the proper equipment and prescribed uniforms.
e. He will be responsible to the Company Commander for the disposition of each man in his platoon during duty hours.
f. He will be responsible that men in his organization who have medical or dental appointments or are alerted, will be ready at the proper place and time.
g. He will assign and reassign men to squads in his platoon and keep the records he deems necessary to facilitate the same.
h. He will keep the organization progress chart up to date.
i. The platoon commander will handle breaches of discipline in his own platoon with the exception of cases to be handled by court martial or cases which occur off the post, or where a delinquency report in concerned. Such cases will be handled by the Company Commander.
36. DUTIES OF THE PLATOON SERGEANT OR THE ASSISTANT PLATOON SERGEANT ACTING IN HIS ABSENCE
a. He will be the assistant to the platoon commander.
b. He will call for the report from his squad leaders at all formations and report the number absent to the First Sergeant. At each class he will report the absentees to the instructor
c. He will form the platoon and be responsible for getting his platoon to the proper place at the proper time with the proper equipment and uniform
d. He will be responsible to the Platoon Commander for the appearance of the individuals of the platoon as well as the policing of the barracks and platoon awill be responsible to the Platoon Commander that all assigned to details report at the proper time and place and to the proper person.
f. He will check with the squad leaders to be sure that those men who have medical and dental appointments keep them.
g. He will, at all times, keep an up-to-date roster of members of his platoon. For this purpose he will retain a card file. A card will be made up for each man assigned to his platoon. This card will initiate with company headquarters and will come down to the platoon when the man is assigned to the platoon. If the man is reassigned to another platoon the card will be sent to the new platoon. If the man is transferred out of the Company the card is sent back to company headquarters to the dead file. This card will always be marked in pencil with the most recent squad assignment of the man in order that the man may be readily located if necessary.
37. DUTIES OF THE SQUAD LEADER OR THE ASSISTANT SQUAD LEADER ACTING IN HIS ABSENCE.
a. He will habitually keep a roster of the men in his squad being prepared to check roll at any time.
b. He will know the whereabouts of all men in his squad at all times.
c. He will be responsible to the platoon sergeant for the cleanliness and appearance of all his men and their individual equipment at all time.
d. He will be responsible to the platoon sergeant to get his men to the proper place at the proper time with the proper clothing and equipment
e. He will not be authorized to excuse men from school, detail or other duty.
38. CONCLUSION
a. The success of the system depends upon whether the squad leader has constant check and control of the men in his squad in order to accomplish this, all requests for details, medical appointments, dental appointments, pass and furloughs must go through the squad leader. The squad leader will be responsible to the platoon commander for the disposition of his men at all times during duty hours. Obviously, squad leaders must be checked frequently to determine their efficiency and sense of responsibili- ty.
b. Men appointed as Non-commissioned officers must not only be capable of meeting normal duty requirements but they must be fully aware of the responsibilities of their position. Non-commissioned officers who do not meet the requirements of the grade in every way must give way to more competent men. Non-commissioned officers are the backbone of the Company and the importance of having capable men in these positions cannot be stressed too strongly.

 

SECTION V
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR GROUND OBSERVERS
39. INTRODUCTION
a. In order for the Ground Observer team to function properly, and to insure the reception of intelligent information at the Information Center rapidly and accurately, it is necessary that a uniform procedure be adopted. This procedure, must of necessity be carefully observed by all Ground Observer units in Operational Training in this battalion.
b. With this objective in mind, the procedure contained herein has been set forth as a standard.
40. TEAMS
a. The ground observer team must be a flexible unit, and the number of members will depend on the type of coverage desired.
b. The teams will be grouped together in sections but may be deposed in any manner as dictated by the tactical situation.
c. One ground observer team will operate an observation post.
d. A Relay Station will consist of one relay team and usually one ground observer team.
41. CHIEF GROUND OBSERVER
a. He is in charge of each ground observer post and duties are as follows
b. Selection of site for location of post
c. Spacing his observers. Since each observer can see for about five miles to either side with conditions of normal visibili- ty, spacing of observers at six mile intervals should provide adequate overlap for good coverage.
d. Cover. Because of the short time normally spent at each location both observer scouts and the relay station crew will limit themselves to the simplest facilities. Those should include
(1) Construction of foxholes and slit trenches at spots well covered by shrubs or trees for the protection of personnel from ground or aircraft fire.
e. See that observers under his jurisdiction do not violate radio net discipline.
f. Supervise camouflage in order that it will be consistent with the terrain around the post. Remember, the best defense for ground observers is to avoid detection
43. REPORTING OBSERVATION POST TO RELAYS STATION
a. The sections of each ground observer platoon will be numbered, and each relay station will assume the number of its section or platoon. Outlying observation posts will be lettered to distinguish each post from the other of thee same section.
b. Information on aircraft will be reported by observations posts to the relay station in polar coordinates, according to the following procedure

(1) Alphabetical name of there reporting post
(2) Direction and distance of aircraft from the post
(3) Direction of flight
(4) Number of aircraft
(5) Identification of aircraft
(6) Altitude of aircraft in thousands of feet
44. VOICE TRANSMISSION
a. Post to Relay Station- An example of a report would be:
Able, East five miles, going South, one P-40, at four.
This means that observation Post 4, is reporting one aircraft five miles to the east of its post, flying in a southerly direction at a height of 4,000 feet.
b. Relay station or Net Control Station to Information Center. At the relay station, a radio operator at the receiver will plot on a small grided plotting board. A teller operator will read grid coordinates from then pass them on to the information center, using the following procedure

(1) Relay Station number (same as section number)
(2) Grid coordinate
(3) direction of Flight
(4) Number and identification of aircraft
(5) height in thousands of feet
c. Example of Relay Station or Net Control Report:
2 Nan 3468, South, one friendly bomber, at 6
This means that Relay Station number Two reports a flight in position 34 (abscissa) 68 (ordinate) in the major grid square N, flying at a height of six thousand feet.
Reports made at night or in conditions of poor visibility should be rendered as "heard". To render a "heard" report, insert the word "heard" after post or NCS identification.
45. CW TRANSMISSION
a. While it is desirable to use voice transmission whenever possible in reporting plots, it may occasionally be necessary to use continuous wave (code) transmission to cover the reporting distances involved. For the efficient reporting of plots by CW in such instances, a different procedure is required.
b. Normally CW, when necessary will only be used from the Relay Station to the Information Center. This procedure for reporting grid coordinates from the Relay Station in code gives information in the sequence a voice reports. Plotting information is all contained in two groups of numbers and letters. The first group will contain one letter and five numbers, while the second group will contain six numbers. The two groups together represent the following in order
c. First Group:
(1) Number of relay or net control station transmitting the plot is necessary only when more than one station is reporting to one Plotter.
(2) Letter indicating the major grid square in which the plot is located
(3) and (4) Numbers indicating the abscissa of the plot to the major grid square, the first number indicating the basic grid square in which the plot falls, the second number indicating the abscissa of the of the plot within the basic square,
(5) and (6) Two numbers indicating the ordinate of the plot in the major grid square, in the same manner as the abscissa was indicated by the previous two numbers.
d. Second Group:
(7) Number indicating direction in which the flight is moving. This may be any number from 1 to 8, representing the eight principal points of the compass directions, starting with North as 1 and proceeding around the points of the compassn a clockwise direction so that
1. North
2. Northeast
3. East
4. Southeast
5. South
6. Southwest
7. West
8. Northwest
(8) Two numbers indicating the number of aircraft. If there are less than ten aircraft in the flight, a zero is used as the first number of this two number group.
(9) One number representing the type of aircraft. Numbers are assigned the type of aircraft to represent the type according to the following class identification table
1. Hostile bomber
2. Hostile fighter
3. Hostile transport
4. Hostile observation
5. Sound Plot
6. Friendly bomber
7. Friendly fighter
8 Any transport
9 Friendly observation
0 Unknown
(10)
One number giving height of flight in thousands of feet
EXAMPLE
First Group Second Group

Direction
of No of
Relay No Grid Square Grid Coord Flight AC type Alt
2 H 6545 3 03 5 4
c. If CW is used from Post to Relay or Net Control Station, report in the number code of the following sequence
First Group
1. Number of letter designating post identification
2. Number identifying Net Control Station or Relay Station, to which the plot is reported.
3. Number denoting sector in which plane is sighted (use one of the numbers in Chart in Paragraph 7).
4. Number denoting miles away from post
5. Number showing direction of flight (use Chart in Par.7)
Second Group
6. Two numbers denoting number of aircraft. If less than ten (10) insert a zero before number viz: three aircraft should be shown as 03
7. Number designating type
8. Altitude of plane using one number for each thousand feet.
EXAMPLE
f. Assume that post number w, reporting to NCS number 4,s sights two P-40's three miles north of the post going south at an altitude of 6,000 feet, the following report in the number code would be rendered:
24135 2356
g. If planes are heard instead of seen insert letter "h" after NCS number and the number 5 in place of the plane. This shows it to be sound plot.
EXAMPLE
24H135 0256
46. ROUTINE REPORTS
a. "ALL WELL" Reports. It is not contemplated that incoming plot will normally be acknowledged wither by the relay station or by the plotter at the Information Center. Routine "ALL WELL" reports will be made by each observation post by transmission of the post letter followed by the word "null". The frequency of these reports will depend on the situation. Thus observation post "A" would report "Able null". Such reports will be made only if no plots have been reported by the post in a designated period of time. The time of each post reporting its "null" should be specified by the officers in charge. These reports should be sent at staggered intervals.
b. Administrative Messages. Periodically, as required by the situation administrative traffic will be handled offer the net. Such time shall be set aside by the Unit Commander or higher headquarters.
47. LOG SHEETS
a. Log sheets will be kept at each Observation post and Relay Station. All plots reported will first be entered upon this log sheet.
b. Ground Observer will put his initials in order provided, after transmission of each plot
c. Under "Remarks" indicate any unusual occupancy or action of aircraft such as "Circling", "Strafing", "Bombing", etc.
48. WEATHER.
a. In accordance with an existing AR, the weather will never be sent over the air in clear text. A coded sheet to cover will be issued by the next higher headquarters.
49. FALSE GRIDS
a. During Operational Training, true grid coordinates will not be sent to Information Center but shall be coded in the false grid coordinates in use by the battalion during such training period.
SECTION VI
OPERATION PROCEDURE INFORMATION CENTER
50. OPERATIONS BOARD PLOTTER.
a. The Operations Board Plotter plots all information told him by the OPS Teller. Thus, he reproduces on the operations board any flight exactly as it appears on the filter board.
b. He will plot with 3 colors of arrows, red, yellow and blue as indicated by the color clock. When a color is reported the color clock he will remove all previous arrows of that particular color.
c. The OPS plotter will not ask the OPS teller to repeat any information, unless instructed to do so by the controller.
d. The OPS plotter calls to the raid orderly for a card stand, giving target designation, no of AC and height.
1. Solid Red Flag for Hostile
2. Solid Green Flag for Fighter
3. Yellow "F" Flag for Friendly
4. Yellow "X" for unknown
e. Card stands displaying the proper designations and data will be kept at the head or the proper tracks at all times by the OPS plotter.
f. If the OPS board plotter gets two flights called at the same grid reference, he will use only one set of arrows, and carry both of his flight identification markers at the head of the one track.
g. Raid Orderly is responsible to the OPS Board Plotter and must furnish to him the exact display equipment requested. To aid him in doing this as quickly as possible he should
1. Keep all cards filed in numerical order.
2. Know what the next new raid will be numbered. He should have that number in a card stand ready for the OPS Board Plotter.
H. He will use the following order in marking the card stand. From top to bottom
1. identification
2. Raid Number
3. No of AC
4. Height
5. Speed
51. All other functions will be as per WD Standing Orders for Radar Filter Room.
SECTION VII
PROCEDURE FOR RADIO, RADAR TO FILTER ROOM
52. GENERAL DESCRIPTION.
a. The transmission of information from Radar Stations to the Filter Room must be accomplished in the minimum time with complete accuracy. The use of radio to accomplish this is not the most rapid means however, in most mobile installations, radio will be the only rapid means of communications available. In an active theater, radio is more dependable than wire 53.SIZE OF NETS
a. The present table of Basic Allowances provides for two (2) Radio Sets SCR-188A per Reporting Platoon. One of these is used at the Radar Station, and the other at the Filter Room. This means that each Reporting Station will be in a two station net. However, if it happen that insufficient sets or personnel are available to accomplish this, up to three reporting platoons can report in one net on a single frequency. Any more then three stations in one net will seriously reduce the effectiveness of the net.
54. EMERGENCY ASSIGNMENTS
a. In a two station net, it has been found advantageous to use a different frequency for each station if the frequencies are available. This is generally termed the Duplex Method. It will generally be difficult to obtain a sufficient number of frequencies in this country, but easy in foreign theaters. The Radar Station transmits, and the Filter Radio Station transmission on another frequency. The Duplex Method is more difficult to use than the single frequency or Break-in method, but is more secure and less vulnerable to jamming.
b. Another possible method of operation places each radar reporting platoon on a separate frequency. At the information center, there is a separate radio receiver and radio operator for each reporting platoon, but only one transmitter for each three to six reporting platoons. The Information Center operators take turns using the transmitter. Each such operator should have his own key. A signal system is necessary to indicate when the transmitter is sin use. This prevents two operators from attempt- ing to use the Information Center transmitter at the same time. Targets will generally have to be receipted for in groups. The system described is not desirable, but it provides for the economical use of transmitting equipment and maintenance personnel. When all stations are at true normal distance, a number of high power transmitters are saved.
55.NET CONTROL STATION
a. In all cases, the Filter Station in each net is the Net Control Station (NCS), and will follow the procedure for a NCS as outlined in "Combined Radio Telegraph (W/T) Procedure, FM24-100.
56. SPEED
a. The speed of transmission in any net will always be the speed of the slowest operator in the net.
TEAMS
57. GENERAL
a. All radio teams are essentially the same in that they have the same mission and use procedure standard throughout the armed forces. However, because of the special requirements of Aircraft Warning, the composition and specific duties of the operating teams require special definition and discussion.
58. RADAR RADIO TEAMS.
a. The group of men that operate the radio station in a reporting platoon is called the Radio Section. The Section is made up of as many 3 men operating crews as there are tours of duty. Each three men operating crew is called a Radar Radio Team. This term is composed of

(1) One Operator, Radio
(2) One Recorder, Radar (see Fig 1A)
(3) One Electrician, Radio
b. The duties of the men on the radar radio team are as follows:
(1) the Operator will transmit all information given him to the Filter Radio Station as quickly and as accurately as possible. The Operator is responsible for the maintenance of Radio discipline at his station. He is responsible for the correct tuning adjustments of the transmitter and receiver, and correct frequency calibration with the net Control Station. He will adjust his frequency to zero beat with the NCS once each hour. He is responsible that all messages sent are coded and that all traffic received is promptly delivered to its destination. He will transmit Radar reports as urgent messages. Reports should not be more than one minute old. All reports sent will be sent in the same order that they appear in the Log. He will keep a Station Log and Number Sheet
(2) The recorder will perform his duties as outlined in the 'Standard Operating Procedure for his Radar. He will sit in such a position that the radio operator can read his log and transmit reports directly from his Log.
(3) The Radio Electrician is always on call to make repairs within the limit of his ability, tools, and parts. He will conduct preventative maintenance periodically, and will include the Power Plant when it is separate from the Radar Power supply. He will turn in to the Supply section all damaged and worn out parts for replacement.
59. FILTER RADIO TEAM
a. The personnel at the Filter Radio Station have different duties and responsibilities. The team is composed of
(1) One operator, Radio
(2) One Converter-Teller
(3) One Electrician, Radio
b. The Duties of the Filter Radio Team members are as follows
(1) The operator will control the communications net. He will assure that the proper radio discipline, procedure and frequency is used. He will copy all radar reports in a radar log, and locate the log sheet so that the converter-teller can readily see it. He will keep a Station Log.
(2) The converter-teller is a member of the plotting platoon. His duties are outlined in Memorandum 55-10, which outlines False grid procedure. When no false grid is used, this man will only be a teller, transmitting his data direct to the filter board plotters as it is logged by the radio operator.
(3) The Radio Electrician is always on call to make repairs within the limit of his ability, tools, and parts. He will conduct preventative maintenance on the equipment for which he is responsi- ble. He will turn in to the supply section all damaged and worn out parts for replacement.
60. In order to attain continuous and satisfactory communica- tion between Radar and Radar Filter Room, many factors must be considered. Among those that will directly affect radio operations are

Weather
Distance between stations
Frequencies
Location of individual sets and antenna systems.
Of these, only the latter can be selected or controlled by the Aircraft Warning Organization. Therefore, it is essential that this one be as perfect as possible to get the best operation.
61. SPECIFICATIONS
a. The following requirements have been found to be necessary in order to obtain reasonably good operation.
b. Radio Station Section (MOBILE)
(1) The radio station should be located approximately 200 to 500 yards from the Radar. This is a distance sufficient to eliminate most of the electrical interference caused by radar equipment.
(2) The radio transmitter should be located to the rear of the radar with respect to the normal area of sweep
(3) If the proper wire is available for transmission of power, the Radar power supply should be used for Radio, and the radio power plant kept on "stand-by"
(4) When set up, the antenna should be installed with due consideration given to the camouflage problem in addition to the usual technical considerations. For an ideal installation, the antenna should be located on high ground with no large obstacles in the direction of the Filter Room. When hills interfere, the effectiveness of the array will generally be reduced, although the condition is often unavoidable.
c. Radar Radio Station (FIXED)
(1) The radio station should be located as far from the radar operations building as possible. If the barracks or bivouac area is at some distance from the station, radar traffic should be told by wire line to the radio station.
(2) The antenna should be placed so that it will get the least interference from the radar, and also give optimum communications performance.
(3) The radar power supply may be used for the radio equipment whenever possible. As the radar power supply often supplies power for the barracks installations, this should generally be no problem
c. Filter Center Radio Stations
(1) The receivers should all be located side by side in the communications room of the filter center, each receiver plainly marked with the code name of the reporting platoon it is to serve
(2) The transmitters should, whenever possible, be located from on-half to two miles from the Filter Room. This arrangement requires the use of remote control lines between the transmitters proper and the communications room at the Information or Filter Center.
(3) Transmitters should be on high ground with no obstructions near the antenna
(4) Antennas should be so arranged in order that each gets the best results with the particular station in its net.
(5) Commercial power should be used whenever it is available.
(6) A stand-by installation is almost mandatory because the entire AW System is dependent upon continuous communications facilities at the Information Center.
62. ADMINISTRATION
a. The types of traffic that come under this classification include all messages that have the routine classification of "Urgent" or Priority" or "Routine. Every effort will be made to handle administration matters by radio, holding the use of messengers to a minimum. In this command priority administrative traffic will be given precedence over radar traffic. In a theater, the reverse will normally hold. The hours for dispatch of routine administrative traffic are from 2200 to 0400, and when ever the radar is shut down. If more that one reporting platoon is in a net, each radar radio station must be careful not to interfere with the reporting of another. This is best accomplished by scheduling each station for its administrative traffic during the periods listed above, and also by sending target reports in groups of two or three, then pausing to allow the other stations to report if necessary.
b. Nets will be opened using Combined Radio Telegraph W/T Procedure. Thereafter, all contact will be made and all traffic except radar reporting will be handled with "Q" signals.
c. All messages will be encoded, using the current code as prescribed in the Signal Operation Instructions (SOI). Nothing will be sent in the clear, unless the message itself includes the phrase "authorized in clear" and the original of the message filed bears the signature of the officer authorizing such transmission.
63. TACTICAL
a. Radar reports and other Radar Information will always be considered as having urgent classification.
b. (1) The average radar report will consist of a series of jumbled letters and numbers. It is absolutely necessary that each of these be transmitted accurately, because incorrect information is often more dangerous than none at all.
A sample report might be SM645015f03
(2) If more than one reporting station is in a single net, every station in the net will send the first letter of its code as the first of a report or message
for example LSN645015 carries "L" as the identifying letter
.
c. Procedure
(1) Continuous wave (CW) transmission will be used.
(2) When the recorder starts to receive a report from the radar team The operator will send a V followed by the code identifier. Immediately following this, he sill transmit the coordinates as noted in paragraph 2 above. If there is more than one coordinate to send, a separate sign (II) will be transmitted between coordinates. At the end of each coordinate or series of coordinates, K will be transmitted. A pause will always be made after each three coordinates sent in close succession, if there are other reporting stations in the net. This will allow the other reporting stations to transmit their coordinates. If the NCS receives the intelligence, he will acknowledge with an R. If he fails to receive it, he will send IMI and the report will be repeated until it is either received, or is more that a minute old, at which time it is canceled. Break-in will be used, if possible, and the transmitting operator will be "broken" by the NCS as soon as a report or correction is necessary.
(3) In the handling of administrative traffic the regular call letters will be used. This will identify to the receiving operator as to what type of traffic is coming through. Regular call signs identifying "Administrative Traffic" code identifiers indicating "Radar Traffic"
(4) If there is more than one reporting station in the net, the same procedure will be used by each reporting station. However, if the traffic is heavy at all stations, the NCS will designate an order of reporting, so that stations will not interfere with each other.
(5) If for reasons of security, the NCS has been ordered to remain silent, the reporting stations will utilize the same procedure as outlined above except that after the transmission of the coordinate once, he will transmit IMI and report the entire transmission starting with V followed by AR instead of K.
(6) A good operating team, operating at a speed of 10 words per minute, should be able to handle between 5 and 6 average radar reports per minute.
d. There may be from time to time additional information to send, or questions that the Filter Room wants to ask. Rather than take time to encode the messages, a short abbreviated prearranged code is used. This is complete enough to cover most tactical situations. The current code appears in the Signal Operations Instructions
e. If the radar reports are being made faster than the radio operator can handle them, it becomes his duty to see that none are sent which the Recorder has had on his log more than one minute. Any that have been on the log for one minute or longer and which have not been sent forward will be scratched off the log and not sent at all.
f. Visual reports will be plotted on the plotting board, and the recorder will enter the information in his log. The altitude will be estimated.
64. CONCLUSION
a. The requirements of an efficient Warning System are stringent. Speed, accuracy and teamwork must be achieved before an organization is prepared for combat duty, and this can be attained only through standardized procedure. No one phase is the most important part of the Warning System. Each is equally important, and the success of the system depends on all. Radio communication is a necessary link in the chain of successful interception and must be a strong link if the mission of the Aircraft Warning Service is to be realized
65. REFERENCES
Combined Radio telegraph (W/T) Procedure FM24-10
Signal Communications FM24-5
Training of Signal Communications Personnel TM11-450
The Radio Operator TM11-454
TM's in reference to types of radios used.
SECTION VIII

(page237)

 

WIRE COMMUNICATIONS
RADAR TO FILTER ROOM
66. INTRODUCTION
a. Speed and accuracy are the most important considerations in the Aircraft Warning System. Wire communications affords the fastest, most accurate and most reliable means of transmitting information from the radar stations to the Information Center. In order to obtain the most from this type of communications, however, the operating personnel must be well trained in the correct procedure and well disciplined in the use of available facilities.
67.OBJECTIVE
a. The objective of the various types of wire communications is to transmit the information from the radar station to the Information Center, accurately, securely and in a minimum amount of time.
68. GENERAL
a. When reporting by wire visual reports will be made. In making these reports the information will be given to the plotter and recorder. The plotter will plot the target and call the grid coordinates to the recorder. The recorder will log the grid coordinates and any other information received. In the remarks column he will note that it was a visual report.
b. The reporting line between the radar station and the filter room is an operational line and may only be used for administrative and other matters when the line is not required operationally. Such matters should, where possible, be dealt with on the line during the maintenance period of the station.
c. Under no circumstances will the reporting line be left unmanned at either end.
69. OPERATING PROCEDURE
a. For purposes of uniformity, the description of the operating procedure will begin with the plotter and recorder since all radar equipment employs a plotter and recorder. The operations previous to the time the plotter and recorder receive the informa- tion is described in the standard operating procedure for the particular type of radar used.
70. TELEPHONE
a. Crew, when reporting by telephone, no additional personnel is required.
b.Equipment
(1) the plotter and recorder will have head and chest sets partied on the line to the operators. Their transmitter switches will normally be in the "off" position.
(2) The radar teller, who will be the radio operator on the shift will have a head and chest set in the reporting line
(3) The reporting line at the information center is connected directly to the filter room plotters head and chest set.
c. Operating procedure
(1) The plotter plots the targets as received from the operating crews.
(2) The recorder will log any additional information received from the operating crew such as altitude, number of aircraft and identification.
(3) The plotter will convert the target to grid coordinates and call them to the recorder.
(4) The recorder enters the grid coordinates on the log and removes his hand allowing the teller to see the log.
(5) The teller reads the information from the log to the filter room plotter
(6) The report will contain, in order, the following informa- tion:
Station identification (if two or more stations are partied
Number of aircraft
Identification
Altitude (if determined)
(7) All reports must contain grid and number of aircraft. The other information is omitted where not applicable.
(8) A typical report is Orange Nan Fox sev-ven too ate fi-if thw-ree AC showing niff wun fi-if.
(9) Broken down this reports means Orange-station code name used with two or more stations partied. Nan Fox sev-ven too ate fi- iv is the grid coordinates, thu-ree AC number of aircraft, showing niff Identification (narrow Wun Fi-iv altitude in 1,000 feet (15,000 feet)
(10) When no IFF is indicated no mention is made of it. If a broad IFF is indicated the letters SOS is used.
(11) The recorder will log the number of aircraft and altitude as two digits but one digit may be used in reporting
(12) The phonetic alphabet and numerals will be used at all times
(13) Should the traffic become too heavy for the plotter to convert all targets to grid coordinates the recorder will assist in converting.
(14) The radar teller and filter room plotter teller will never refer to aircraft as such but will use the letters "AC instead. They will not use the words thousands, altitude, foot or height.
71. TELEGRAPH
a. Crew, when reporting by telegraph the radio teams which would be normally employed on radios will operate the nets.
b. Equipment
(1) The instrument at the radar station will be located near the plotter and recorder. The three positions will be arranged so the telegraph operator can easily see the recorders log, and the recorder can see the plotting board.
(2) The instrument at the Information Center is located in the communications room. The communications room teller will sit where he may see the operators log and relay the information by use of a head and chest set to the filter room plotter.
c. Operating Procedure for telegraph is the same as that for radio.
72. TELETYPE
a. Crew
(1) The telegraph printer teams consisting of three operators and installer repairman, will be added for each reporting platoon. One team will be at the radar and one at the information center.
b. Equipment
(1) The teletype instrument at the radar station will be located near the plotter and recorder, using the same arrangements as for telegraph.
(2) The instrument at the Information Center will be located in the communications room of the Information center the operator will wear a head and chest set to relay the reports to the filter room plotter.
c. Operating procedure
(1) The plotter plots the target as received from the operating crew.
(2) The logs any additional information as to number of aircraft, altitude, and identification received from the operating crew.
(3) The plotter converts the target to grid coordinates and calls them to the recorder who enters them in his log.
(4) The teletype operator will send the information from the recorders log without the preliminary call up.
(5) The operator will receipt for the report by sending an "R" and then call the information to the filter room plotter over his head and chest set.
(6) Each report will start a new line and the receipts for each will appear on the end of the same line.
(7) Should several stations be netted and the traffic become heavy the operator at the communications room will designate a reporting order for the radio station
(8) The reporting sequence is the same as that described for telephone.



::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::


SECTION IX
FALSE GRID PROCEDURE RADAR TO FILTER ROOM
73. GENERAL
a. The first grid plotting board is operated by one plotter- converter. At the radar station the plotter, who is a member of the radar operating team, gets his information from the same operator and azimuth teller, if the latter is used on the team. He tells the false grid information to the recorder. At the filter room, the converter is a member of the plotting platoon. He gets the false grid plots from the radio operator, and tells the true grid plots to the filter room plotter.
74. EQUIPMENT
a. Radar station off the early warning type has a wooden plotting board with the true grid and azimuth circle printed on it. A range arm is fastened to the board at the center of the circle. The false grid is overlaid on the board. The plotter converter plots the true grid and reads the false grid.
b. Radar Station of the GCI type must use an illuminated board since the operating room is blacked out. >[> c. The filter room uses the same equipment as the radar station early warning type. His procedure is to plot on the false grid and read the true grid to the filter room plotter.
SECTION X
MESSAGE CENTER PROCEDURE
75. MESSAGE CENTER PERSONNEL
a. The message center personnel will operate under the direction of the Adjutant and will consist of the following personnel.
Message Center Chief Senior enlisted specialist
Code and Authentication Clerk
Messengers
The following listed personnel are not included in the message center personnel list but must work in close coordination with the message center in order to accomplish the mission of handling of messages in the minimum amount of time, employing the proper means of communication to each message and finally obtaining the greatest accuracy, security and speed.
Radio Operators
Operators of Panels, Flags, Lamps, etc
Telegraph operators
Telegraph printer operators.
76. OUTGOING MESSAGES
a. Message center chief
(1) Receives message from writer, scans message for legibility, sufficient address, signature and form in general.
(2) Enters "time filed", "message center number" and "how sent" on message form in the appropriate place
(3) Draws diagonal line through next unused number on the numbers wheel, and enters on line after the number the following remarks concerning message: From-To-How sent-Urgency classifica- tion.
(4) The duplicate, (or if no duplicate, a skeleton copy) is filed in the live file of the unit to which the message is addressed.
(5) If the message must be encoded before transmission, he hands the message to the code and authentication clerk.
(6) Receives serviced original message from operator and files in dead file of unit to which message is sent then destroys duplicate in live file.
(7) Completes X mark on number sheet
b. Authentication and Code clerk.
(1) If message is in the clear he determines the authenticator according to the system being used and places it in the correct location on the message if the message is in the clear. he then disposes of it by giving it to the operator of the means concerned.
(2) I message is to be encoded he encodes message making one copy of encoded message.
(3) He is very careful in encoding to repeat all entries made by the chief on top line of message form and replaces the address, signature, urgency classification and operating instructions from the clear message by placing the radio operators heading below the word "Message" on the message form such as AB1 V CD2 Y O
(4) When encoded he determines the authenticator and gives the completed message to the operator of the means selected.
(5) He services the original clear message which has been encoded by writing "Encoded" followed by his initials or personal sign.
(6) He places the serviced original message which has been encoded in the "Clear " file
c. Operator of the means selected.
(1) Completes radio heading as begun by code and authentication clerk or places radio heading at top of message form.
(2) Transmits, obtains receipt, and services message by placing his personal sigh and time of receipt in a clear place at bottom of the message form
(3) Returns serviced message to chief.
77. INCOMING MESSAGES
a. Operator of means which the message was received.
(1) Copies incoming message in duplicate and services
(2) Sends both copies to code and authentication clerk
b. Code and Authentication clerk
(1) Receives message in duplicate from operators or a single copy and skeleton from the chief.
(2) Determines the correct authenticator according to the system being used and compares this value with that shown on message
(3) If the message had the correct authenticator on it, the word "Authenticated" will be written or stamped plainly on both copies of the message or if the message did not have the correct authenticator on it the phrase "not Authenticated" will be written on both copies of the message. he then gives the duplicate or a skeleton to the message chief
(4) If the message is in code he decodes the message making one copy of clear message, using the retained original message
(5) When decoding he repeats the radio call up and station serial number on the clear message. Replacers remainder of the radio heading by inserting address, designation of sender, urgency classification, and operating instructions in correct place on clear message. he reports the authentication on the clear message.
(6) He sends the single clear message which has been decoded to the chief who time stamps it "in"
(7) If the message is in the clear he authenticates it and gives it to the chief who time stamps it "in"
c. Message center chief.
(1) Receives single copy of incoming messages by local, special or scheduled messenger from other message center or pigeon loft or ground panel.
(2) He time stamps such message in blank space and makes a skeleton
(3) He sends the original and skeleton to the authentication and code clerk for authentication
(4) In the case of a code message he receives duplicate of skeleton from the authentication and code clerk which he time stamps and files in the live file
(5) Dispatches message by messenger on local delivery list listing message center designation at the top, showing the message on the list by number, by time stamping the delivery list "out"
(6) Dispatches local message with delivery list and message
(7) Local messenger delivers message to addressee, obtaining signature and time of receipt on the delivery list
(8) Messenger initials and returns list to chiefs
(9) Chief receives completed delivery list and takes corre- sponding duplicate short skeleton from live file staples or clips the two together, and files in the deaf file of the unit from which the message came
d. The messenger delivers the message to the addressee, obtaining the signature and time of receipt on the delivery list. Initials and returns to chief
78. RELAYED MESSAGE
a. Operator
(1) Receives and copies message in duplicate, services and sends both copies to the chief
(2) Receives message to be relayed from the code and authentica- tion clerk if message has been re-authenticated or encoded, and transmits it (3) Services message which has been transmit- ted and returns it to the chief
b. Message Center Chief
(1) Receives message to be relayed in duplicate from the operator or receives single copy of message from scheduled or special messenger which is to be relayed. Makes skeleton copy of single copy messages
(2) Time stamps the message indicates the means it is to be relayed with and places duplicate or skeleton copy in live file of unit from which the message came
(3) If the message must be re-authenticated before transmission the original is handed to the authentication and code clerk or if clear message is to be transmitted by radio it is handed to the authentication nd code clerk
(4) He receives completed delivery list from the messenger if message was dispatched by messenger and removes duplicate or skeleton from the live file, places delivery list and the duplicate or skeleton together in the dead file or receives serviced copy of message from the operators, files it in the dead file, and destroy duplicate or skeleton which is in the live file if transmitted by other means.
c. Code and Authentication clerk
(1) Never decodes relayed messages
(2) Encodes message received in clear text to be transmitted by radio exactly as in an outgoing message being extremely careful to show for the benefit of the operator the retransmission instruc- tions necessary to route the message to its destination
(3) Determines the authenticator according to the system being used and places it in the correct location on the message
(4) Disposes of message sent by messenger by sending back to chiefs or by sending to operator or means selected, other then messenger
79. TECHNICAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PUBLICATION
a. Certain procedures are not provided for in this publication because they are prescribed by the War Department or are included in other tentative manuals. For reference the are as follows Filtering Procedure--Chapter IV " Radar Filterer's Manual" Hq AAF AW Drafting Procedure--"Tentative Drafting manual for Aircraft Warning Hq" 4th Tng Bn G.O. Filter Room-- "Standing Orders for Fixed Ground Observer Filter Centers" Hq AAF Radar Filter Room--"Standing Orders for Radar Filter Rooms" Hq AAF SOP for SCR-588__"Tentative Operating Procedure for Radio Set SCR- 588" Hq AAF SOP for SCR-602--"Tentative Operating Procedure for Radio Set SCR- 602" Hq AAF SOP for SCR-270--"Tentative Operating Procedure for Radio Set SCR- 270" Hq AAF Performance Test Procedure "Section IV Radar Performance Testing Manual" Hq AAF Siting Procedure--"Siting of Radar Equipment" AAFSAT Radar RCM Procedure--"Radio Counter-measures on Air Defense" AAFSAT SCR-270 Log--"TM 11-1310 equipment Performance Log Instruction Book" WD SCR270 Installation, Maintenance Procedure "TM 121-1117D" WD RC150 Installation Operation and Maintenance "TM 11-1117 WD

 

SECTION XI
VEHICLES IN CONVOY
80. GENERAL
a. The organization of a motor column depends primarily on the tactical and traffic conditions likely to effect its movement. The main column may be organized into serials and march units to facilitate column control. the management of the main column is handled by the column commander, assisted by the column trail officer, commanders of serial and march units, and such traffic control personnel as may be posted along the route. Necessary ambulances and medical personnel and necessary maintenance vehicles, equipment and personnel, accompany the column to care for march casualties. Detached parties, operating apart from the main column, are detailed to perform special duties in connection with the march. Such parties may be provided by a higher headquarters for general assistance to several columns, or they may be detailed from the march column itself. Often it will be possible to combine one or more of the groups indicated below. When so combined, they are collectively referred to as the advance party
81. COMMAND
a. Movements of organically motorized tactical units are made under the direction and supervision of the senior commander in the column.
b. Motorized columns carrying organic equipment, and supplies likewise move under the command of the senior officer, or non- commissioned officer present in the column and each individual vehicle is commanded by the senior officer or man riding therein
c. Movements of troops or supplies in non-organic vehicles are in the absence of orders to the contrary, commanded by the senior line officer present. In this case the motor transport officer accompanying the vehicles acts only as a technical advisor to the commanding officer of troops. However, if the troop or supply movement is being handled by the staff of a higher headquarters as part of a large move, command arrangements are as follows:
(1) The motor transport units are organized, staffed, and a commander of troops and a convoy commander are designated by higher headquarters ordering the move.
(2) The convoy commander designated by such orders is responsi- ble both for the technical operations of vehicles and for the movement of the column. Orders to convoy operating personnel in this case are given only by the convoy commander and his assis- tants.
(3) The commander of troops exercise no control over the movement of the convoy or of individual vehicles, except in a tactical situation, then the decision rests sole with him. the troop commander is in all situations responsible for the adminis- tration and discipline of the troops being transported.
(4) Whenever a tactical situation can be anticipated, the seniors combat troop commander will be placed in command of the convoy, the motor transport acting as his technical advisor.
d. The following are the officers exercising control of the movement
(1) Column commander is the senior officer with the column or the person designated by him to exercise command
(2) Control officer is an officer designated by the column commander, who rides in the central car, normally at the head of the column and regulates the march. Upon occasion he may direct the load truck to regulate the march and may and should, drop out of the column to observe the march, and double banking the column police the same with reference to speed, distance, discipline and the like
(3) Trail officer rides in the trail car, at the rear of the column or element thereof, usually is the Motor Maintenance officer. He polices the column from the park to the IP and supervises the initial movements thereto. During the march he:
(a) Inspects disabled vehicles and decides whether to repair them on the spot, or take them in tow
(b) Reports location of tail of column to control officer when called on to do so.
(c) Notes infractions of march discipline and takes immediate corrective action
(d) Prevents vehicles of either column from passing from the rear whenever this operation presents a traffic hazard.
(e) When the column halts he posts the necessary guards, warning flags, lights or flares to warn traffic approaching from the rear
(f) In case of a disabled vehicle not possible to take in tow, he is responsible that all traffic precautions are taken or displayed and carefully notes locations for report to column commander for future wrecking or salvage operations.
(g) Prior to the beginning of the search he thoroughly familiar- ized himself with the route, including detours and alternate routes. Provided himself with all data, maps, etc., procurable and in the event that an element or elements of the column become lost, he reorganizes the same without delay and assumes command thereof proceeding to the prescribed destination or rejoining the column, at which time he resumes his normal post and duties
82. PLANNING AND PREPARATION
a. The running of a successful convoy requires careful planning and a constant supervision on the part of the officer in charge. A successful convoy is one which clears the IP at the exact time prescribed in the orders and reaches its destination without accident or loss of time, vehicles, personnel or equipment, and having arrived at the destination, moves off the highway in a prompt and orderly manner to areas or lanes previously selected and marked. With a number of vehicles traveling on the road, much time and money (in gasoline, `etc) can be lost not to mention complete fumbling of the tactical situation, should the convoy run out of gasoline or go astray. Days may possible be required to obtain the needed supply. therefore careful planning is imperative if there is to be andy certainty that the convoy movement will run smoothly. All the care and skill of the planning officer (that time permits) is well spent.
83. PREPARATIONS
a. Check that you have competent drivers and that they are familiar with the type of vehicle they are assigned to drive and that an assistant driver is assigned to each vehicle
b. Assign the best driver to the lead position, since improper driving of the lead truck will prevent even good drivers in the rear trucks from doing a good job.
c. Check all vehicles before starting
(1) Mechanical faults in engine, brakes, battery, generator, windshield wipers, lights (especially trailer and stop lights), trailer couplings and safety clips
(2) Check gasoline, water, oil and air on all vehicles. Include spare tires
(3) Check for a full complement of tools in each truck, including winch shear pins
(4) Check all vehicles for lubrication, include inspection of the rear and transfer cases, grease cups, etc
(5) check fire extinguisher
d. Pick the route and overnight stops with care
(1) The route and other pertinent data will probably be prescribed in the march or Warning Order, together with maps or march gear. Study this data carefully and obtain clarification of anything not entirely understood
(2) If you do not know the route well, select a capable and experienced reconnaissance officer to go over the prescribed route and at least the alternate route, in time to return, if possible, at least one full day before the start of the march
(3) Obtain all information possible on condition of the roads and bridges, etc. from any units which have recently traveled the proposed route. Particular emphasis should be placed on the location and character of road blocks, time distance between various points marking off distinct sections of route, and types, conditions and widths of surface including shoulders.
(4) Pick overnight stops whenever possible at military posts, camps, stations or bivouac areas, since obtaining supplies is much easier in such locations
(5) When military establishments are not on the route and overnight stops are necessary, carefully study the terrain and determine the terrain features on the map that will help prevent stopping at an unsuitable location.
(6) Do not try to cover too much ground in any single day, since fatigue of drivers is extremely dangerous. Three hundred miles is a practical maximum on good roads, and, under the same conditions, 250 miles is average. With poor roads and inexperi- enced drivers, considerably less mileage must be expected
(7) Knowledge of the following will be of inestimable value
(a) Limiting features (clearance widths and heights and culverts and underpasses
(b) Location of turnouts for concealment, cover or protection from hostile attacks (mechanized or air), turn around facilities, detours, by-passes around congested areas, bottlenecks, possible ambush sites and road blocks.
(c) Maximum gradients and length of steep hills, condition of fords, etc., and an estimate of pioneer engineer work necessary as well as the time, equipment, material and personnel involved.
(d) Location and characteristics of mines and contaminated areas, and estimate of personnel, equipment and materials required for neutralization or decontamination.
(e) Data on at least one alternate route, if the movement is over any considerable distance, to the same destination
(f) Secure gasoline credit cards if travel is to be performed in the Continental limits. In other areas, be sure that there will be gas supplies at various points along the route, and whenever possible notify the supply depots of your arrival in advance. Where gas supply is impossible, be sure that sufficient gas is carried in the convoy. Figure into the expected mileage a surplus supply to cope with any unexpected situations.
(g) Obtain instruction from the finance officer in regard to emergency procurement.
(h) Make the last truck in the convoy a maintenance truck, and have extra oil, gas, water, small parts, first aid kit, tools, tow chain and any wrecking tools available.
(i) If the first stop is to be a military post, camp or station notify the commanding officer of such an establishment on the preceding day by radio, telegraph of your arrival, stating the number of officers and men, whether quarters and mess are desired, the type and number of such meals, the expected time of your arrival and whether large amounts of supplies (such as gasoline) are required. All this will aid in the obtaining what you need when you arrive.
(j) Instruct the personnel of the last truck of their mainte- nance duties. <[> 84. MOVEMENT
(a) Halts for rest stops should be made 15 minutes at the end of the first hour and 10 minutes at the end of every two hours thereafter. Refer to reconnaissance report for determination of rest stops in congested areas and adjust halts accordingly
(b) Switch drivers at each stop, if sufficient drivers are available. Rest stops should not be made in congested areas due to lack of latrine facilities and the traffic problems generally caused by parking. Pick a suitable spot for the lunch stop, in the shade when possible. Post guards on the convoy and in a theater of operation disperse the vehicles for protection from air attack
(c) The lead vehicle must travel at the speed of the slowest truck. The lead truck must not slacken speed going down all but the steepest hills, as the heavier trucks need the additional speed in order to negotiate the next rise without excessive shifting of gears.
(d) Ride the lead truck on the shoulder of the road several times, to be sure that the shoulder is not too soft for the heavier vehicles. Do this prior to each stop. Avoid parking on a hill or curve unless the vehicles can be pulled well off the road. Do not park on approaches to bridges or other places where traffic may be tied up due to congestion. When going through congested areas, clear the intervals between vehicles and reduce speed. Request police escort through large cities. Have men refrain from giving destination, type and organization of the convoy in their conversa- tions with civilians encountered along the route. Such conversa- tions should be held to a minimum. When necessary, stop the lead at intersections, and without stopping the convoy eave the convoy in the right direction.
(e) Check all suspicious bridges for load carrying capacity. If the owner of the toll bridge refuses passage to the convoy, show the order, unless secret and instruct him to charge the cost of the toll to the authority shown on the orders. Should this fail, let the situation govern the action. Armed force is never to be resorted to in the con>tinental limits or friendly country but such things as stopping traffic on the road by having the convoy parked at the bridge entrance will often suffice. Such methods are to be resorted to only after all normal methods fail. When necessary to drive through water, drive very slowly. Report all accidents and obtain the names and statements of all witnesses.
(f) Stopping at a post overnight
(1) Send a truck ahead whenever possible to make final arrangements.
(2) On arriving at the post gate , call up the adjutant for instructions to where to park, mess and quarters.
(3) Call the officer of the Day if the adjutant is not to be found
< (4) Unload the men, except drivers at the sleeping area, to set up either their cots or pup tents, and to wash up
(5) Park vehicles, leaving the keys in the cabs or in the care of an officer of the convoy. At this time the vehicles must be gassed and oiled, etc., post guards on the parked convoy.
(6) Arrange to mess as near the normal mess time as possible and request the type and number of noon lunches required.
(7) If the men are to arise the following morning for a long trip, do not allow them to go to town at night and order an early lights out.
(8) If the next days trip is long, leave as early as possible in order to get the maximum number of daylight driving hours.
83. MAINTENANCE AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
a. Have a good maintenance man ride in the maintenance truck. This truck is to stop whenever a vehicle drops out of the convoy.
b. The towing of a vehicle for long distance is a difficult and dangerous job. It is hard on both drivers and trucks. Make every effort to repair inoperative vehicles on the spot where the breakdown occurs.
c. Do not stop the convoy when a vehicle drops out since in most cases the trouble is minor and quickly repaired. If, after inspection of the damaged vehicle, it is found impossible to make the necessary repairs, put the load onto the remaining trucks of the convoy. Abandonment applies only to vehicles other than radar vans.
d. It is essential that sufficient precautions be taken to safeguard against the possibility of convoy operations as well as other emergency.
(1) In hostile country, have the assistant driver a Thompson sub-machine gun man, with the stock removed. This latter will allow for easy operation in the cramped quarters of a truck cab
(2) In case of an air raid, disburse the trucks as widely as possible, then have the men leave the trucks and disperse them- selves.
(3) When parking in dangerous country, set up weapons in strategic positions and have those manned at all times.
(4) After a gas attack, have all portions of the trucks that men came in contact with decontaminated and if possible, decontami- nate the entire truck and its contents to reduce the fumes.
(5) During a blackout, drive very slowly and very close together. Drivers must be instructed never to show other than blackout lights, under any conditions. Under very difficult conditions have a men walking in front of each truck or riding a fender to aid the driver.
(6) During bad weather, drive slowly and when necessary use chains. Have a winch truck or two near the head of the column to "snake" the vehicles across the bad spots in the road, etc.

 

SECTION XII
OCCUPATION OF A BIVOUAC
86. OPERATIONAL RADAR SITE
a. The position of the radar, within the designated area is the first priority, inasmuch as the characteristics of the Radar equipment over certain terrain conditions requires extended and definite consideration of antenna site position. The Radar Platoon Commander will make his own selection of the site and bivouac within the area designated by the tactical plan.
b. Beginning at the time that the platoon is released to the command of the RPC at either a Control Point on Motor March, or an assembly area, or at an Operational position, and the RPC is ordered to occupy bivouac within a defined area, he becomes in effect the Officer in Charge of the Motor march column and he is responsible for the movement of his command in accordance with SOP for Motor Convoy. In addition he is responsible to make disposi- tion of his various components and personnel to achieve the best possible technical and tactical results from a standpoint of Operation, Security, Defense, Camouflage, Supply and Communica- tions.
87. RECONNAISSANCE
a. The Commanding Officer makes a reconnaissance for the purpose of selecting and exploring the route from the point where the platoon was released to him to the area designated for bivouac. He also selects the best location in the area for cover, defense, security, shelter and evacuation.
b. He will sketch a plan showing the route of ingress from the last main highway, with location of prominent land marks and speedometer mileage to cross roads, road junctions, orientation etc., in sufficient detail and scale to serve as a guide map for one not familiar with the terrain to find the bivouac. He will show on the sketch the location of the various components of the platoon such as the Radar vans, antenna, Radio units, mess, supply, headquarters, medical aid station, heavy weapon emplacements, BAR, shelter areas for personnel, road circulation, observation and alert gaud posts, documentation stations and alarms. He will also sketch the location of and route to alternate site, details of which should be completely prepared not later than the day following actual occupation of the present bivouac.
88. LOCATION OF ARMAMENT
a. The location of armament is based upon the reconnaissance of the ground bearing in mind the approaches available to the enemy, vulnerability of the position to mechanized attack, field of fire and final protective lines of automatic weapons, and available of the machine guns and anti-aircraft fire, remembering the Machine gun is capable of defense against mechanized attack as well as antis aircraft.
89. PRIORITY
a. The priority of vehicles in the convoy so that they may pull into the area in the order needed as follows
(1) Radar vehicles
(2) Personnel carrying vehicles
(3) Camouflage material
(4) Radio equipment
(5) Mess and Supply
(6) Medical Aid
(7) Platoon Headquarters
(8) Maintenance Vehicles or Wrecker
b. Signs and stakes will have been placed to mark the positions of the various components. Guides have been assigned to lead the several components to their positions. Plans will have been made for the use of the wrecker and winch trucks which road conditions etc adverse to the movement into the bivouac area.
c. Normally, the bivouac will be occupied during the dark hours, generally just before daylight following a night movement. Therefore the first action after rolling into the area with each element in its designated position will be the quick and efficient camouflage of all vehicles, installations and personnel. During this time the area guard has been posted. Following this in order of priority will be:
(1) Dig in by constructing slit trenches around all operational positions and fox holes near quarters. Care will be taken to insure that this operation does not destroy camouflage security
(2) Dig in emplacements for machine guns including slit trenches for operating personnel
(3) Dig in fox holes for automatic weapons
(4) Put Radar into operation and install Radio
(5) Sand bag equipment
(6) Lay defensive wire
(7) Install Administrative communications
d. All protective measures will be installed before any thought is given to sleep or mess. When sufficient progress has been made to offer security to personnel installation of mess, supply and headquarters facilities may be worked concurrently with the installation of the Radar and Radio utilizing the various specialists in their own function.
90. OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER SITE
a. The Commanding Officer Headquarters Company will be responsible for the protection and local security of the Control center and Battalion Headquarters as well as his own company headquarters
b. Upon the alarm signifying the approach of enemy, all headquarters personnel will report on the double to previously prepared positions for the defense of the area. This plan will work in coordination with the troop commanders of other branches in the vicinity of the control center. Plotting functions will cease upon direct order of the officer in Charge of the Control Center only. Defensive measures will be necessarily based upon the utilization of small arms. The priority of vehicles will be as follows:
(1) Plotting Equipment
(2) Radio equipment
(3) Personnel carrying vehicles
(4) Camouflage material
(5) Maps and supply
(6) Battalion Headquarters
(7) Medical Aid
(8) Company Headquarters
c. Order of priority for installation will be
(1) Camouflage of installation and personnel
(2) Dig in slit trenches for operating personnel and bivouac
(3) Installation of plotting equipment and radios
(4) Sandbag equipment
(5) Lay defensive wire
(6) Lay administrative communications
All defensive and protective measures will be installed before any thought is given to slee sufficient progress has been made to insure security to personnel and installation of the of the mess, supply and headquarters facilities may be worked concurrently with the installation of the Plotting and Radio equipment utilizing the various specialists in their own functions.
92. TEMPORARY BIVOUAC
a. All functions in a temporary bivouac will be the same as in an operational bivouac except that the technical equipment will not be set up with execution of administrative radio



:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::


SECTION XIII
RAPID MOVEMENT WITHIN 4 HOURS
90. RADAR PLATOON, HEAVY
a. Orders for the movement of a Reporting platoon may normally be expected to specify that the unit is to remain in operation until a given time and be ready to move at a given time after. If so, the Platoon Commander has some additional time to prepare the other actions of his command for the move. However an order or the tactical situation may necessitate a movement at any time. The following preparations will effectuate a rapid movement with a minimum of confusion.
(1) Assemble Officers, Warrant Officers, and key NCO's
(2) Acquaint them with the orders, time of movement, availabil- ity of transportation, and whether it is to be a complete move or a shuttle.
(3) Direct the Warrant Officer to disassemble the radar and prepare it for movement using the Radar crew on duty at the time of the disassembly, assisted by one other crew
(4) If a complete move, direct the administrative officer to lead the mess, supply and headquarters material and impedimenta so as to not interrupt normal operation until shutdown. For these functions he will employ the mess, supply and administrative personnel. If a shuttle movement he will split the overhead personnel so as to maintain such facilities at both positions as are necessary
(5) Direct the Platoon Sergeant to take charge of filling and marking of latrines, filling of fox-holes, and police the area, camouflaging the abandoned installations. For this function he will employ the remaining operating crew.
(6) Direct the Radio Chief to disassemble and pack the radio equipment and pick up the wire using the radio personnel
(7) Direct the Senior Medical Aid to check the sanitary conditions and report back the condition before the area is evacuated.
(8) After final inspection assures the platoon commander that the readiness for movement is completed according to plan he gives the order to move.
b. If the movement is a shuttle the Platoon Commander will accompany the forward echelon with the Warrant Officer and such overhead personnel as are necessary plus one of the operating crews and half the radio operators. The Supply Sergeant and the Mess sergeant will go in the first echelon. The Administrative Officer and the Platoon 'Sergeant will stay with the rear echelon. The supply sergeant will accompany the shuttle vehicles back so as to report to the Administrative officer any requirements or special arrangements that are necessary due to the move. The Administra- tive Officer will then lead the remainder of the equipment and personnel and complete the move.
94. RADAR SECTION LIGHT
a. Normally the light radar section will move intact. The operating crews will load the radar, the mess personnel will load the mess equipment and rations and the radio operators will load the radio equipment and pick up the wire. The preparation to move will involve the same general plan as the heavy radar.
< 95. CONTROL CENTER
a. Normally, the Control Center will move by leapfrog and will depend primarily on the movement of the radar and ground observer in front of it. A part of the board already painted will be prepared in advance. At the time of the move, the board will be sent forward along with sufficient communications equipment and plotting personnel to start operations at the new position. When enough facilities are available to carry on operations at the forward position, the remainder of the control center will move up. The Communications Officer will send up with the forward group, the forward Control Center. When the installations are completed and sufficient volume of information has accumulated on the board, the rear Control Center will close and the forward Control Center will open. One filter officer will move forward with the forward Control Center.
96. BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
a. Each staff action will be responsible to move the equipment pertaining to his own section. The s-4 will furnish the necessary transportation.
97. COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
a. Normally, Company Headquarters will be superimposed on one of its platoons and will move with that platoon. In case of shuttle movement, the Commanding Officer will go with the first echelon and the Supply Officer with the rear echelon.
98. GROUND OBSERVER POSTS
a. Normally, Ground Observers will move by nets. All personnel in one net will move together. This is because of the limited range of their equipment, since when one moves it looses contact with the relay station. If movement is by foot each post will move forward in squad columns with the squad leader at the head.
SECTION XIV
DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT IN CASE OF CAPTURE
99. RADAR EQUIPMENT
a. Before equipment is destroyed in the combat area, the Platoon Commander must make a quick estimate of the tactical situation to determine the necessity for destruction. If the equipment is to be destroyed, the following equipment will be destroyed by the persons indicated.
b. The Administrative officer will keep a 5 gallon can of gasoline in the close proximity to the storage area of restricted and classified documents. Burn each sheet separately, crumpling it if the time allows. Saturate, with gasoline, and ignite from a distance of 6 feet.
c. The power man on the shift will destroy the engine, generator, rectifier with an ax, smashing the magnets, carburetor, distributor, with a sledge. Cracking the head and block with a sledge. Destroy all meters wit a pick or sledge. Brake off commutators on all alternators with a chisel and hammer. Saturate several fused termite bombs on the engine head of each engine and on the generators and alternators. Fire the gasoline. If there is a rectifier unit in the power van smash all the meters in the unit, open a hole in the case with an ax and set off the gasoline by tossing a hand grenade into the hole. For the destruction of the power unit, the power man will be assisted by one operating crew.
d. Large installations such as antennae for radars will be destroyed by using one half pound packages of nitro-starch. Tied to the framework the selsen motors, drive meters and the base and midpoint of the tower. Telephone and telegraph equipment will be destroyed by crushing. All test instruments and meters in the maintenance van will be smashed and the drawers emptied out on the floor in a pile. The pile of parts will be smashed with a sledge and the entire van saturated with gasoline and ignited.
100. PLOTTING EQUIPMENT
a. Each plotter will remove his head and chest equipment and destroy the transmitter and receiver units by hammering. The telephone operator on duty will destroy the switchboard by hammering the front panel and shearing the switch handles. He will cut the cords and the wiring connected to the switchboard. The frameman on duty will destroy the mainframes by slashing the relays and wiring with an ax. He will then cut open the back side of the switchboard and destroy all circuit components with the ax. The Wire Chief will cut all the cords and cables and pile in a heap, saturate with gasoline and burn. All information will be cleared from the plotting boards and paint spilled over the surface. The tables and balconies will be piled in a heap and ignited by the Filter Officer.

 

SECTION XV
CHEMICAL DEFENSE PLAN
101. MISSION
a. The mission of this plan is to reduce to a minimum the disruption of normal operations incident to any form of chemical attack likely to be projected on the field. The plan is intended to include measures deemed necessary for defense prior to attack, during attach, and after attack.
102. SITUATION
a. The area is susceptible to chemical attack both by spray and bomb.
103. DEFENSIVE PREPARATION
a. A map of the area will be kept up to date showing locali- ties of all gas alarms. The gas officer of each organization will be responsible for the location of suitable alarms in his area. In the case of the Radar Platoon, the second in command will be the Gas Officer.
b. Each unit will instruct men as gas sentries, and as soon as the first alarm is given the sentries will report the alarm, on the local alarms. In the case of isolated units the responsibility will rest with the second in command (who is the gas officer or non-commissioned officer). Personnel in charge of storage facilities and mess installations will immediately cover all food and other material.
c. Gas proof shelters not being available, officers and men will immediately put on gas masks at the first alarm and report to their prearranged positions, if they are members of decontaminating groups or will continue normal operations if they are not
104. DURING ATTACK
a. All orders from the gas officer or sentries will be obeyed immediately. Any violations will be reported to the Commanding Officer. The Gas Officer only will give the signal for the "All Clear". Any contaminated personnel will report immediately to the first aid station for treatment.
105. AFTER ATTACK
a. The gas officer and non-commissioned officer will reconnoi- ter their zones for she effect of gas. Each unit will have their decontamination personnel trained and will have available required material.
b. The Gas Officer will submit his findings to the Commanding Officer and priority instructions for decontamination will be given. The Gas Officer will supervise decontamination within their zones. All food and water will be inspected by the Medical Officer.
c. The Gas Officer will submit to the Commanding Officer a report consisting of the following
(1). Unit or units affected by the Chemical Attack
(2) Time, place and duration of the Chemical Attack.
(3) The meteorological conditions sat the time of the attack
(4) The Chemical agent used
(5) The number and type of aircraft and method of chemical dispersion
(6) The size and number of chemical bombs used
(7) The extent of area and facilities covered by the attack
(8) Area and facilities contaminated with persistent agents which are to be decontaminated or evacuated.
(9) The number and nature of casualties
(10) Any defects noted in chemical protection equipment or supplies
(11) Deficiencies noted in chemical defense plan
(12) Description of chemical material found
(13) Notation of samples of contaminated earth, duds, or unidentified objects forwarded
(14) Recommendations
SECTION XVI
DEFENSE AGAINST VERTICAL ATTACK
106. GENERAL
a. Knowing that the enemy is capable of dropping paratroops and that he will try to put your site out of action, the platoon leader will make definite plans against paratroops landing.
b. He will place men on high ground, camouflaged to observe in all directions for paratroops. At the sight of paratroops he will blow three (3) long blasts on a whistle, repeated on vehicle horns or klaxtone thereby alerting the platoon. he will give the information to the Commanding Officer and continue to observe.
107. RADAR PLATOON
a. The Commanding Officer will quickly establish sufficient troops to cope with the situation. This group will move out to the area of the landing of enemy in a skirmish formation, scouts out and will take sufficient force to envelop their position. The area and roads will have been previously reconnoitered. It is necessary to attack before the enemy have a chance to form a defense. He will no doubt try to assemble under cover of woods, so a careful search must be made to assure that all have been put out of action.
b. The Platoon Commanding Officer will lead the attacking force. It is possible for paratroops to be dropped after darkness so every precaution must be taken to always be alerted for any attempted attack at the time, especially at dawn. Barbed wire entanglements will help defend the site.
c. The BAR man will move out in the attacking party. The .50 Cal machine gun crews will man the guns and be prepared to fire at planes or use the weapons for ground defense.
d. The radar and radio men on shift will remain with their equipment and continue operations. They will be prepared to destroy equipment on orders of the second in command or officer remaining with equipment in accordance with SOP "Destruction of Equipment"
108. PLOTTING PLATOON
a. The Commanding Officer of Headquarters Company will quickly assemble sufficient troops to cope with the situation. This force will be employed as in paragraph 107 a and b
b. The information center personnel and radio men on shift will remain with their equipment and continue operations. They will be prepared to destroy equipment on orders of the second in command or officer remain with the equipment in accordance with SOP "Destruction of Equipment"
SECTION XVII
MATERIAL TO BE SACRIFICED IF REQUIRED
109. GENERAL
a. The organization will be able to perform its primary mission even if certain equipment is required to be sacrificed. The major items of equipment which each platoon may sacrificed under this condition is listed below.
110. HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
a. Radio sets will be reduced in the communication room dy netting. Two radars will be netted into one FCS station. Each pair of ground observer relay stations will be netted into the FCS station. One net will still be used for each cross telling channel. The number of command sets will be reduced to one and the channels to the airports for the control of Company B will be netted to one NCS station. With this number of radio sets in use the remaining radio sets will be sacrificed and equal number of teletypewriters MSC188 will be sacrificed
b. If the requirement is stringent enough the entire wing operations room will be sacrificed including the AN/TM-1 and associated tentage and auxiliary equipment. This will only be done on direct order from the Air Commander.
c. All tentage used for purposes other than Radio and Information Center shelter will be sacrificed. All officer equipment and supplies other than the bare essentials will be sacrificed. One switchboard BD72 will be sacrificed. Fifty six (56) telephone sets EE-8a will be sacrificed. Tree (3) Converters M209 will be sacrificed. One company drafting set, one transit, one each of Unit equipment, second echelon set no 2,5 and 7, one- third of all GI Cans, Officers Mess equipment, all safes, and one Frequency Meter set SCR-2311 will be sacrificed
111. REPORTING COMPANIES
a. All office equipment and supplies other than the bare essentials will be sacrificed. All tentage, except the radio shelter will be sacrificed. Officers mess equipment, one switch- board BD72, All telephone EE8a except five per radar and two safes will be sacrificed.
112. GROUND OBSERVER COMPANIES
a. All office equipment and supplies other than the bare essentials will be sacrificed. All tentage, except the radio shelter will be sacrificed. Officers mess equipment, all large tools except tools in individual kits, one switchboard BD72 will be sacrificed. All telephone except five (5) per radar will be sacrificed. Two (2) safes will be sacrificed.
APPENDIX A TO SOP
DIVISION OF THE A TEAM
Lt. Col. Battalion Commander
Maj. Executive Officer

ADJUTANTS SECTION

1st Lt. Adjutant
WOJG Asst Adjutant
M/Sgt Sergeant Major (502)
Pvt Clerk, General (055)
T/5 Clerk, Typist (405)
T/5 Clerk, Typist (405)
Pvt Orderly (695)
Pvt Basic (521)
Pvt Basic (521)
Pvt Basic (521)

COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON

2nd Lt. Communications Officer
M/Sgt Communications Chief (542)
S/Sgt Wire Chief (262)
T/4th Frameman (089)

S-1 Section
1st Lt. S-1
Sgt Chief Clerk (052)
Pvt Clerk, General (055)
t/5 Clerk, Typist (405)

S-3 Section

Capt. S-3
Pvt Clerk, Supply (835)
T/5 Draftsman (070)
Pvt Draftsman (070)

S4 Section

Capt. S-4
1st Lt. Supply Officer Pvt Clerk Supply (835)
WOJG Motor Officer T/5 Mechanic, General (121)
T/Sgt Motor Sergeant (813) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
S/Sgt Mess Sergeant (824) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
S/Sgt Supply Sergeant (821) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
T/5 Armorer (903) T/5 Truck driver, Hv (245)
T/4 Motor Mechanic (914) Pvt Truck driver, Lt (345)
T/5 Motor Mechanic (914) Pvt Truck driver, Lt (345)
T/5 Clerk, Supply (835) Pvt Truck driver, Lt (345)


APPENDIX B TO SOP



DISTRIBUTION OF VEHICLES


Trlr Trlr Truck Truck Truck Truck Truck Truck Truck 1/4T 1T 1/4T 1 1/2T 2 1/2T 2 1/2T 4T C&R WC
Hq 9 2 8 4 3 1 2 4
HQ Fil 4 2 2 1
Opr 2 1 1 1
Com 2 2 2
A Hq 2 4 1 1 1 1
A 1st 3 2 1 1
A 2nd 4 1 4 1 1
B Hq 2 4 1 1 1 1 1
B 1st 4 5 4 4 1 1
B 2nd 4 5 4 1 1
C Hq 2 2 1 1 1 1
C 1st 3 1 3 1 1
C 2nd 4 1 4 1 1
D Hq 2 1 1 1 1 1
D Go 1 1 24
D Rep 2 4 2 1 1
E Hq 2 1 1 1 1 1
E Go 1 1 1 24
E Rep 2 4 2 2

Total 4 49 30 20 44 14 6 7 66


APENDIX C TO SOP



USE OF VEHICLES

Headquarters Company 1 1/4 T Chaplain
1 1/4 T Surgeon
Headquarters Platoon 1 3/4 T O&R Company Commander
1 3/4 T W.C. Message Center
1 1/4 T Executive Officer
1 3/4 T W.C. Adjutant and S-1
1 1 T Trailer Adjutant and S-1
1 2 1/2 T Cargo Battalion Hq

Filter Platoon 2 2 1/2 T Cargo Mobile Group Control
2 1 T Trailer Generators

Operation Platoon 1 2 1/2 T Cargo Mobile Operations
1 1 T Trailer Generator

Communications Platoon 2 2 1/2 T Cargo Wire Trucks


End of Documrnt

 

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR MEW RADAR



Following is the Standing Operating Procedure for the MEW Radar pertaining to FDP5 operated by the 738th Signal Air Warning Company and assigned to the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion. This procedure was written by the 19 TCG.



Beginning of Document


I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE


1. To prescribe the organization, mission and employment of the MEW of this Group


II. ORGANIZATION


1. The MEW unit of this Group will consist of


a. Twenty-one (21) GCI( Ground Control Interception) Controllers; Technical and administrative personnel, as required by Signal Corps Tables of Organization for MEW's; at least two (2), preferably four (4) Direction-finding Crews; and three (3) or four (4) VHF Radio-Telephone crews, as required by Tactical Control Center operations.


b. Equipment will include a minimum of six (6) SCR-5734: a minimum of two (2) D/F SCR-575, which will be at the disposal of the MEW Controllers; Teletype facilities, including TG 7B; one complete ANTT/Q set for internal communications; Control plotting equipment as directed by the Signal Corps Section.


2. Personnel and Equipment may vary according to the requirements set forth by the Tactical Control Center and MEW Senior Controller and will be furnished by the 738th Signal Air Warning Company and other units of the 19th Tactical Control Group.


III. CAPABILITIES.


1. The MEW, under direction of the Tactical Control Center, is designed and organized to be of utmost assistance to all Allied aircraft in problems of Ground to Air Control. It will be expressly responsible for aircraft of the XIX Tactical Air Command, either in the offensive or defensive combat operations. Chief types of missions at the MEW are as follows;


a. Close support: The direction to and from the combat area or target of fighter or fighter bomber aircraft on close support missions shall be responsibility of the MEW Control on missions assigned to the unit.


b. Armed Reconnaissance: Armed reconnaissance for the destruction of the enemy or the protection of friendly troops. MEW will direct aircraft to any target of opportunity, any target assigned by TCC, or to any aircraft for the purpose of identifi- cation or destruction. The aircraft leader will be briefed in most cases, thus requiring only stand-by aid from the MEW controller.


c. Bomber Escort: When specified in field order or when directed by TCC, MEW will rendezvous fighters with their bomber formations at any location within range. The entire mission will be monitored by VHF in order to give E/A warnings, aid in naviga- tion if necessary and facilitate homing for any aircraft on such mission.


d. Fighter Sweeps: Offensive fighter sweeps deep in enemy territory will be controlled with every available facility to eliminate range handicaps. Squadron leaders will be advised when efficient control is no longer possible, and when warnings can no longer be given by VHF.


e. Enemy Aircraft Interceptions: Interceptions of enemy aircraft will be accomplished during all missions when identifi- cation is confirmed by the pilot. A Controller will not direct a pilot to attack any other aircraft unless full identification has been accomplished. A controller may direct his controlled flight to any suspected flight, depending on the requirements of the mission, but he may not direct the flight from its responsibilities or its objective. Night fighter missions will differ from the above in that MEW Controllers will intercept any unidentified aircraft in XIX Tactical Air Command area. All Fighter, Intruder, Gangster, and Photo missions run at night will be controlled by MEW and controllers will keep all flights identified. Positive identification is the responsibility of the night Fighter pilot.


f.Pin-point target bombing: Pin-point target bombing will be conducted in accordance with 19th TCG SOP for BACU units. MEW will rendezvous fighters for BACU mission, and monitor VHF channel to assist and coordinate such missions throughout the time of flight.


g. Reconnaissance Flights: Reconnaissance flights for weather information, enemy activity, photography, calibration, or any other military subject will be carried out at the request of TCC. Information will be gathered and passed to TCC. Degree of control to be exercised will depend on weather conditions and assistance needed.


h. Patrol: Patrols to protect of defend Allied property will be done ;under the direction of TCC by assignment.


i. Emergency Homing: An MEW Controller will be assigned to give emergency headings to any aircraft during all times the station is operational, Aircraft in distress, or "Mayday", will be given priority over all other types. The MEW will so arrange its facilities to be of greatest possible efficiency in handling any emergency operation. The controller may direct the aircraft ;to any location which is safest as determined by immediate and known conditions. The MEW Controller may dictate the emergency procedure of the aircraft, thereby taking exceedingly important responsibili- ty for all concerned.


j. Night Photo Missions: One MEW Controller will concentrate his full effort on Night Photo missions. He will identify each mission by track number on the plotting screen, will monitor channel and warn of unidentified aircraft in immediate area, and will take aircraft over targets, when requested to do so, advising exact moment to drop flash bombs and take photos.


k. Night Gangster Missions: MEW Controllers will have previously designated ground reference points and will take aircraft to any of these points or any number of miles on any azimuth from any of these points. Warnings will also be given of unidentified aircraft. All night aircraft will be steered around IAZ's whenever conditions warrant. In cases of emergency when aircraft must take shortest possible routes Controllers will notify AAA at TCC at once.



IV. ASSIGNMENT


1. The TCC Duty Senior Controller will issue all Control Orders and assignments to the MEW Duty Chief Controller. The most expeditious means of communication will be used for liaison between the TCC and EW Controllers. The TCC Controller will coordinate the MEW as follows:


a. At the time of assignment, pass full responsibility of aircraft control to the MEW Controller.


b. Notify the MEW of any important information in regard to:


(1) Change in Field Order Plans or assignment


(2) Stratus of weather, communications, aircraft, emergency field, available E/


(3) New or important targets in relation to the mission under MEW Control.


(4) Emergency conditions and the TCC facilities available during such time.


(5) Relieve the MEW of mission responsibility in case of quipment failure.


V. CONTROL PROCEDURE


1. At the MEW, all elements of control during operational hours will be under the complete jurisdiction of the chief controller on duty. MEW personnel and equipment will be at the MEW Controller's disposal for the greatest possible control efficiency.


2. The Duty Chief Controller will plan and execute all the facilities of the MEW station so that every phase of control can be brought to use during any mission. A mission, depending on its type, requirements and objective, will be carried out to the best of his ability and at his discretion in relation to controlling. He will consider the following items in acceptance and control of any mission.


a. Possess she latest information on aircraft involved, including bases, weather, targets, maps, field orders, and communication.


b. Communicate with the mission flight leader at the earliest moment of VHF allowance, establish the correctness of the mission, and give any changes in pre-planned orders.


c. Find and follow the flight from its base, to its desti- nation, and home, on the visual scope of Radar. Use D/F, IF or any other method of identification of fixing available to maintain the position and track throughout the mission.


d. Advise the flight leader, or pilot concerned, of dangerous weather conditions, flack areas over the target or course, E/A plots as given by TCC and, stand by to navigate the pilot, by vector or any position or area requested.


e. Keep the flight oriented, notify the leader when his flight is off course or target, and be prepared to home emergency aircraft at any time during the attack. He may advise the flight of the proximity to a safe area, and their steer to base, giving the distance in minutes of flying time.


f. The Controller will aid the flight on its return trip by checking their position frequently, giving steers as requested, advising of IAZ areas during late flights, and notifying the leader or pilot of his entrance into friendly lines.


g. All Controllers will observe the important elements of R/T conversation concerning:


(1) Military security


(2) Clarity and security of information


(3) Channel priorities during emergency.


h. The MEW Chief Controller may refuse to accept responsi- bility for the safety or success of any mission if he deems it impossible or impractical such as:


(1) Mechanical failure


(2) Power failure


(3) "Jamming" scope failure


(4) Subordinate equipment failure.


The TCC Controller will be immediately notified of any limitation which will affect the controlled mission, and he will reassign or so arrange the mission so that it can be controlled.


3. The items set forth in Par 2, Sec V, must be considered as policy suggestions and not as set rules. An MEW Controller must consider every possible control point, and may pattern his method of control, of R/T, or of mission direction to fit whatever situation may arise. He must be aware of all conditions pertaining to the aircraft under his control and consider them as his responsibility. The Communications at the Controllers command must be available and clear for use to successfully complete any controlled mission.


VI. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF CONTROLLER


1. He will have all positions, necessary to efficient control manned by capable personnel.


2. He will not issue orders other than operational instruc- tions nor will he reprimand individual members of the crew: he will issue all his communications through the crew chief or Filter Officer on duty.


3.He will keep all controlled flights identified on the plotting screen so that they may be told to the TCC as such.


VII. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL CONTROLLERS


1. Before taking over from the off going controllers they will thoroughly acquaint themselves with all operations in progress or pending.


2. In the event of the off going controllers having any aircraft under control, they will not be handed over to the relieving controllers, until they are convinced that the latter are thoroughly conversant with all details concerning the aircraft and the control of them, and the operations in which they are engaged.


3. Prior to operations, time permitting, all controllers will study the front line situation, flack areas and plan of attack as displayed on the maps of the army liaison officer.




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VIII. D/F BEARING AND FIXES


1. The D/F station at this control station will be crystallized on the channels where they are most needed. Watch will be maintained to insure that all possible fixes are coming from the TCC and/or the status fixer board, and that those are being properly and quickly displayed on the tote board provided for this purpose. Two men of each crew will be specialists on the D/F tote board.


IX. VHF COMMUNICATIONS AND FM NETS


1. See memo 160-50 SOP XIX TAC


2. Responsibilities of R/T monitors


a. 11 VHF radio channels will be maintained and R/T logged on forms provided. Abbreviations may be used but it is of great importance that all logs can be read and understood. Times must be entered in column provided in all cases.


b. Everything said over every channel should be logged. All messages from one flight to another, intercom must be logged so far as possible without interfering with logging of messages between ground and air.



X. IFF PROCEDURE


1. See 100-45, SOP Mark III IFF, XIX TAC



End of Document

 

APPENDIX IX



TECHNICAL OPERATIONS



SITING RADAR



A word about the siting of Radar. The Radar's all had to locate themselves on the ground in terms of the grid coordinate. The coordinate was arrived at mainly from large scale maps on which one can usually spot where you are to within 50 meters on a map with a scale of 1/250,000 and to within 2 meters on a 1/10,00
scale when they were available. Sometimes maps of 1/100,000 and 1/25,000 were available when there was no maps of a scale of 1/10,000 available. Units were also furnished a French Army Artillery terrain feature guide which had the locations of church steeples, road crossings and other features surveyed in to within a fraction of a centimeter. When you were lucky enough to be near one of these the coordinate could be calculated by measuring the distance or pacing it off. All units were also furnished with a surveyors transit to aid in getting accurate directions and distances from known points.


Another use of the transit was to measure the angle of height of obstacles surrounding the radar location. This was necessary in order to get an estimate of the expected range of the radar when in this site. The obstacles were usually lines of trees, hills and mountains. If the obstacles were too high they would shut off radar radio waves and prevent the radar from seeing low flying aircraft. Also when controlling aircraft an obstacle would limit the distance you could follow the aircraft when it was flying at a given altitude.


Anyone who is spotting or following aircraft has to consider the curvature of the earth. For example if the radar had a range of 100,000 yards out (about 57 miles) then the aircraft would have to be at an elevation of about 2,000 feet or higher before it could be seen. To make this more complicated if there were about one degree of obstacles in front of the radar then there would be another 5,000 feet added and the aircraft would have to be over 7,000 feet altitude to be seen. The attached charts show the effect of curvature of the earth. Anotheion above sea level. For one thing the higher the site is above the terrain over which the air will be observed then the further you can see because this elevation negates the effect of curvature of the earth. Locating at a higher elevation has one more benefit and that is the radio communications which is usually line of site can go further and therefore the radar site can be longer distances from the TCC. There is also a problem that usually
goes with a high elevation site and that is that you start getting ground echoes of hills and mountains further. When following an aircraft and that aircraft passes through one of these ground echoes he is completely lost to the radar until he emerges from the ground echo locality and this leaves the pilot exposed to unknowns during this period.



REPORT ON SCR-582



Following is the Report on the SCR-582 by Lt. Robert A. Homan to the MIT Radiation Labs in Cambridge, Mass. This is the field operation report on unit SCR-582 Mark III, serial No 7, which was the unit assembled by Lt. Homan and Lt. Wetherill in Cambridge and assigned to the 563rd Signal AW Battalion for operations. The report is dated 14 November 1944.



MAINTENANCE



"During the first two months of operation in the field some major troubles were experienced with SCR-582 but since then only minor faults have occurred.


The only injury in transit has been a broken pin on one of the high voltage rectifiers. The spark gap and T-R box have been the main source of trouble. However, a large part of the spark gap trouble was not the fault of the gap itself, but of the power unit. The gap will operate satisfactory at 59 cps to 62 cps, but is very sensitive to variations in frequency. The PE95 power units are satisfactory when new, but after a few hundred hours become very difficult to keep from varying slightly, even with no change in load. The reversible A-C Azimuth motor makes this condition worse because of the heavy starting current. The design of the gap does not tend toward ease of adjustment. Very Little adjustment can be made without removing the complete cap assembly. Experience on this unit and unit no 9 has shown ;that the T-R box must be kept polished for it to give proper operation. The sharpness of the stub tuning gives a good indication of its condition. The percentage of bad T-R tubes has
been much higher than was to be expected.


The following is a report in chronological order of the major troubles.


At 137 hours the T-T box and tube were replaced and a Chaffee type mixer was installed, replacing the pound type double barrel mixer. Crystals burned out immediately except when minimum R-F coupling was used. The T-R tube appeared to be operating properly. A 200K, 1/2 Watt resistor was placed to stop oscillations should they be present. This did not change the operation. Another T-R tube was installed, but it failed to fire. A third T-R tube was installed and proper operation was obtained. Maximum F-F coupling could be employed and operations appeared to be slightly improved.


At 176 hours the fuse blew out on the A/R unit. Resistors R34 and R35 burned out because of a shorted winding in the main transformer. This unit was one of the two containing unpotted main transformers. A potted transformer was installed and R34 and R35 replaced. Satisfactory operation was resumed.


For some time after this trouble was experienced with tubes going bad. This trouble finally cleared up and for the past two months no trouble has been experienced with the A/R unit except for markers as noted later.
At approximately 400 hours the efficiency of the set dropped although the echo box ringing time and meter reading were normal. The permanent echoes were poor and very few targets were being picked up. Maintenance which could be performed while still keeping the set on the air as much as possible did not help. At 408 hours the set was taken off the air to find the trouble.


The crystal as tested and found to have a back to front ratio of 300 to 200 ohms. A new crystal with a ration of 5100 to 220 was installed. The T-R tube was firing and appeared to be normal. After 30 minutes operation the crystal ratio was 1800 to 220. Some drop is normal with a new crystal, and although this drop was somewhat high it was not considered too unreasonable.


The gain in Receiver no 14 was down so it was replaced with receiver no 13. Oscillations appeared on the scopes. Receiver no 18 from unit no 9 was installed but the oscillations persisted. it was then found that vibrating cable no 5 eliminated the oscilla- tions. Two loose connections were found in the Amphenol connector and were resoldered. This eliminated the oscillations. Receiver no 13 was reinstalled. Using the Signal Generator, Receiver no 13 and the pre amplifier were realigned. There was no noticeable improvement.


The A/R unit began operating spasmodically at this time. Four 6SN7 tubes and a 51K resistor were bad. These were replaced and the A/R unit operated properly.


The spinner table was found to be loose so it was removed and three 1/4 x 20 holes were tapped. The main spinner bearing appeared to have never been greased, so it was packed and the table was replaced. While on the table was being tightened all R-F plumbing was removed and cleaned. There still was no improvement in operation.


The Klystron was replaced, but with no improvement.


The Magnetron was replace, but with no improvement.


It was then found that the T-R box tuning stubs gave very little control over the tuning. A new T-R box, tube and mixer were installed. The T-R tube did not fire so another tube was in- stalled. This tube fired and appeared to be normal, but the stub tuning was still very poor. A T-R box, tube and mixer from unit no 9 were installed. There was still no improvement in stub tuning or set performance. The T-R tube was replaced by the tube from the T- R box last used with the round type mixer. Sharp[ stub tuning was obtained. The ringing time was 3.1 miles and the permanent echoes were very good. The set was put back on the air.


Shortly after this, arcing was heard at the slotted section. The arcing was at the flexible bullet and the transformer in the T- R Tee. The bullet was replaced and the edges of the transformer were buffed. The arcing was stopped, but it reoccurred later and could not be stopped. However the efficiency was not impaired. As noted later in this report, the arcing was found to be caused by the Magnetron.


At 534 hours the fuse blew in the A/R unit. Resistors R24 was burned out, caused by a shorted winding in the pulse transformer, T3. T3 was replaced by an unpotted OA18 transformer and R24 replaced. The pulse transformers had to be respaced because of the size of the OA18 transformer.


Shortly after this the five mile markers became unstable. Indications were that the pulse characteristics of T4 were bad. It was replaced by and A18 transformer and resistor R30 was reduced in value. This gave stable markers out to 85 miles. Since that time the markers have again become unstable, and are not functioning properly at this time. This condition has not been corrected since it involves removing the unit from operation for some time, and the unit is operating properly except for these markers.


At 634 Hours the overcurrent relay kicked out and would not hold upon starting again. The spark gap was replaced using the same pothead cable, but this did not help. During the process of locating the trouble the resonant choke, the pulse-forming network, and the high voltage supply filter condenser were changed. The trouble was finally found to be in the pothead cable. The insulation had broken down where the cable connects into the pothead at the resonant choke and pulse forming network.


At 821 hours the spark gap began splattering the PPI tube and then kicked out the overcurrent relay. The pin spacing was changed, but with no improvement. The spark gap was changed but it did not help. Upon trying to start up there was a large amount of flashover to the rotary pin which had already gone past the stationary pin. A complete new set of pins was installed but made no improvement. There was still flashover and the gap fired intermittently with as much as one or two seconds pause. Tests indicated that the fault was in the pulse transformer. The pulse transformer was changed, but with no improvement. The Magnetron was changed but this did not help either.


The next morning all panels were removed from the modulator and various tests were conducted. The weather prior to this day had been very damp and the set had not been operated after nightfall on the four preceding nights. This morning the sun was shining and there was a warm breeze. About the middle of the morning the flashover stopped, but the spark was still erratic and the undercurrent relay would not hold. The pins were respaced and the gap would then run without kicking out relays. However there was bad splatter on the PPI tube.


That afternoon the PE95 power unit was sent to ordnance to have the valves ground. It would not hold constant frequency although the variation was slight. Upon getting the power back the next day the spark gap ran smoothly and there was no splatter on the PPI tube.


The arcing in the T-R Tee was gone. This arcing had been due to the characteristics of the Magnetron.


At 725 hours a British 20KVA Lister Diesel was speeded up from 50cps to 60cps and used as the power for this set. The Diesel is being carefully watched and maintained, and no detrimental effects have resulted. Since then the PE95 power unit has been used as the standby power supply


Very little trouble has been experienced with the spark gap since this change. Some splatter occurs during very damp weather. This generally occurs late at night, but clears up early in the morning. Splatter also occurs after an adjustment of the pins but clears up within 30 minutes to an hour.


At 1405 hours the modulate blower was changed. It had become very moist. Although the bearings had oil on them they were badly worn. The base of the blower was strongly magnetized, and it is thought that this might be the cause of the excessive wear.



OPERATION



The operation of this set is difficult and the training of operators requires time because of the type of azimuth control employed. Using a reversible A-C motor as it does, time is lost when it is necessary to stop on a target. Even the best operators often experience difficulty. No more that four targets can be tracked at one time if they are at different angles of elevation.


An Amplidyne or similar system would greatly increase the operational efficiency of the set. Such a system should be obtained if at all possible.



Robert A Homan
2nd Lt. Sig C
Technical Officer

 

ROBERT'S TECH REPORT ON THE SCR-584
On 14 November of 1944 Lt. Jack F. Roberts, the company's chief radar officer forwarded the following technical report in response to requests from higher headquarters signal sections
"Subject: Technical report on Light Weight Radar, British type mark 111; Similar to American SCR-602; and, American SCR-584.
Company D, 563 Signal AW Bn, has had 12 of the British Type light weight Radar Sets in operation since 15 April 1944. Recently 6 of these type radars have been replaced with the American SCR-584 units. During early operation of these sets, Most of them were of the portable type (tent models). Later all of the tent models were
(Editors Note 32) The battalion was particularly pleased to obtain this US made microwave unit for use as a mobile LW unit on an US made truck. The disappointing note to Lt. Homan's report occurred shortly after the report was written when the unit was transferred to Company A and east of Luxembourg city and a German Cavalry unit came in one night and blew it sky-high, a total loss. As can be seen above the presence of an Electronic Engineer was a must. We were lucky to have Lt. Wetherill and Lt. Homan assigned to us as their experience with US microwave was invaluable in integrating the SCR584 units into the Battalion as BACU units. The Radar Men in the other FDP and LW units had problems associated with their sets but they were not documented The SCR582 was experimental with report required.
replaced with the mobile type (mounted in British one-ton Fordson Radio vans). All personnel for the operation and maintenance of these units were trained on the American SCR-602 equipment and after being sent overseas received around 21 days of training n British Radio Schools on the British Light Weight Radar.
The difficulties encountered with this equipment will be enumerated below under the captions of the various components of the radar set.
TRUCK: This radar equipment is mounted in a British Fordson one ton radio type van. This vehicle has rear wheel drive only. The total weight of the truck with the radar and power plant is nearly 7,000 pounds. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in moving this vehicle in and out of the various sites, especially where unsatisfactory roads are available, and in many cases it has been necessary to use another truck (that has 4 wheel drive) to get this van in and out of location. It is suggested this vehicle be made of the 4 wheel drive variety. No spare wheel or tire was provided for this vehicle which causes a delay hazard when moving the van in convoy. A spare wheel and tire should be provided.
TRANSMITTER T.3154: No special difficulties have been encountered with this component. When replacing transmitting tubes made by the different American manufacturers difficulty has been encountered in getting the transmitter tuned to the proper operating frequency. Usually serious arcing occurs throughout the transmitter which at times is uncontrollable. Also many of the tubes refuse to oscillate at any frequency. This is generally true of the RCA type tubes. Canadian tubes seem to give the best results. Rectifier tube trouble has been encountered; a new tube usually correcting the difficulty. The blower motor which cools the transmitting tubes is a constant source of trouble, both mechanical and electrical trouble has been experienced. On many of the blower motors the bearings are of the oil-lite type and after a few hours constant operation( 50 to 100 hours) the mechanical vibration becomes excessive and the electrical interference is noted on the oscilloscopes. This trouble has been partially corrected by drilling oil holes in these bearings and by removing the motor from the unit and cleaning and greasing same at least every 48 hours. It is also essential that a spare blower motor be kept on hand in the spare parts at all times. In some cases electrical breakdown has occurred in the artificial line. It appears that if a variac was provided in the power input circuit of the transmitter, the transmitter could be tuned up with a reduced plate voltage thus eliminating the possibility that full plate voltage might cause unnecessary arcing when tuning the transmitter. Since a variac of suitable size has never been obtained, this modification has never been attempted by this organization. No major difficulties has been experienced with the modulator unit or the vacuum tube type spark gap.
RECEIVER R.3168: No major difficulties has been experienced with the receivers (each unit is provided with a spare receiver), other than the replacement of by-pass condensers, resistors and tubes. In some isolated instances the tube sockets have been found to be defective and would not make proper contact with the prongs on the tubes.
INDICATING UNIT TYPE 60 (Range oscilloscope): This component has caused very little trouble other than the replacement of tubes, by-pass condensers and resistors. In some isolated cases, trouble has been encountered by the "jittering" of the sweep trace on the cathode ray tube. It is believed this trouble is not caused by a defect in the range unit. The variable potentiometer in this unit, in some cases, have been of poor quality and have been replaced
INDICATING UNIT TYPE 74 (PPI)and POWER UNIT TYPE 228: No special difficulty has been encountered with the PPI unit, other than the normal replacements. Great difficulty has been experi- enced with the PPI power unit. This trouble has, in every case, been due to the breaking down of the high voltage transformer in the unit. These transformers have a life of from 2 to considerable over 4000 hours. Replacements on these transformers have been very difficult and in many cases unobtainable for long periods of time. The cause of this transformer failure has been more or less undetermined by British Engineers and to this date no satisfactory replacement has been issued. The degree of efficiency of this PPI unit is a subject of wide debate. In many instances, target information fails to show up on this oscilloscope and in order to give efficient operating information, many operators use only the range oscilloscope for targets and fall back on the PPI sweep for the azimuth. On all sets a mechanical azimuth indicator has been improvised (the sets were not provided with a mechanical azimuth indicator) which is used in cases of total PPI failure.
SWITCH UNIT TYPE 95 (T&R box): The main difficulty in this unit has been the burning of the contacts on the phase/antiphase switch. In many cases a severe arc occurs and results in mis- matching in the small transmission lines within the unit and causing electrical breakdown. Replacement of these switches has been difficult.
CONTROL PANEL TYPE 7 (Voltage Control): No difficulty has been encountered with this unit, especially the voltage control regulators. In some isolated cases the power cable female socket has given difficulty due to poor contact which caused severe head which melted the Niphan from which this plug is insulated.
GENERATOR SET In general it can be stated that this engine performs very satisfactory and the regulation of the AC alternator and the DC generator is quite satisfactory. The oil and gasoline consumption is quite low. However, this engine must be provided with un-leaded gasoline for satisfactory operation. During much of the operation, it has been impossible to secure unleaded gasoline. During this time considerable difficulty was undergone with these engines. The trouble encountered was mainly due to sticky valves and excess carbon in the cylinder heads. During the period red- leaded gasoline was used, it was not al all uncommon to have a complete overhaul on each engine at least every 36 hours. In attempting to overcome this difficulty various experimental measures have been taken; such as increasing the valve clearance for exhaust valves, both decreasing and increasing the clearance on the intake valves and increasing the spark adjustment. None of these experiments seemed to improve the operations of these engines with leaded gasoline. Replacement parts for these engines has been very difficult and in many cases none were carried by the service depots. The starting of this engine is a time quite difficult, especially during cool or cold weather.
MOUNTING AND ANTENNA: No difficulties have been undergone due to the mechanical mounting of the equipment or due to the method of mounting the antenna array. However during transit the antenna arms are taken off of the framework braces and carried on top of the radar van. Due to this method of carrying same, the antenna di-poles become bent, especially when moving into, or through, a wooded area. Some vans have been provided with an improvised protective shield on to top of the vans in order to protect the antenna di-poles when the unit is in transit.
IFF EQUIPMENT MARK111: All units are provided with this type of IFF equipment. Generally speaking, this type of IFF is highly unsatisfactory mainly due to the fact it is not of the directional variety. Considerable difficulty has been experienced with this IFF equipment. Replacement of tubes, resistors, condenser has been frequent in some installations. In order for IFF to be used effectively with these units, it is suggested a modern directional type be installed.
For the Commanding Officer
Jack F. Roberts
1st Lt. Sig C.
Radar Officer"
End or Document

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APPENDIX X
ALLIED AIRCRAFT UNITW>
Only available in ard copy e-mail the webmaster]
APPENDIX XI
[Branch to SAW DECORATIONS at top of document]
APPENDIX XII
OPERATIONS OF COMPANY D
The best account of the operation of Company D that can be given is the report of 1st Lt. Jack R. Roberts the Radar Officer for the company.
"On 10 April 1944 Company D consisted of 14 Officers and 19 Enlisted Men who were detached from the 563rd Signal A.W. Battalion and attached to the 21st AAA Group for rations, quarters and tactical employment and further attached to the 635th AAA Bn for administration. This authority was obtained by Par 1, SO 50 dated 8 April 1944, Hq 563rd Bn. By verbal orders from the Commanding General of the 51st AAA Brigade the company was attached to the 118th AAA Group for rations, quarters and tactical employment and further attached to the 635th AAA Bn for administration.
On 16 April 1944 the entire company moved, using it's own organic transportation, to Kent, with Company Hq. near Woodchurch. The various sections of the company were moved to predetermined sites for tactical operations with the various batteries of the 633rd and 635th AAA Battalions. These sites, which totaled 6 included the Company headquarters site, were in command by Lt. Roberts, Lt. Martinsen, Lt.Owen, Lt. Kenny, Lt. Cobbs and Lt. Altman. This operational setup included two lightweight portable radar sets at each site with wire communications direct to the various battery Command Post operations rooms. The primary objective of this tactical employment was to give aircraft warning service to the various gun positions which were used for protection of the six airfields used by the fighter bombers of the Ninth Air Force.
On 10 May 1944, the 118th AAA Group was transferred to the Eighth Air Force and the 21st AAA Brigade, this company was placed with the 21st Group for tactical employment and further attached to the 635th AAA Battalion for administration.
The operation of this company in giving early warning reporting aircraft warning service was considered very important, inasmuch as complete and accurate information was given the various AAA organizations aiding in the shooting down of several hostile aircraft in this area. When the V-1 bomb attack was made on the U.K., these robots were intercepted by the radars and such information as was necessary was given to the AAA Gun positions which aided in shooting down many of these bombs. This information was given to the AAA organization with considerable risk to the Personnel and Equipment of the company. Several of these robot bombs landed in the immediate vicinity of the various sites, however no personnel casualties resulted and no equipment was damaged, with the exception that the antenna tower on one LW unit was damaged by 50 cal. firepower from the fighter aircraft which were used in combating the robot bombs.
During the operation of these various sites, many inspections were made by many general Officers, which included Brig. Gen Curtis, C.G. of the 51st Brigade and Brig. Gen William L. Richard- son C.G. of the 9th Air Defense Command. Due to the sincere interest shown by these officers, arrangements were made by them, to replace all of the portable radars with mobile radars (mounted in Ford trucks) and to provide each radar with IFF equipment. Also these officers made arrangements to have the information from the various radars transmitted to a gun operations room where British AAA batteries were given any useful information that might be used in combating hostile aircraft and Robot Bombs.
Due to the many organizations to whom this company furnished aircraft warning information, on 3 June 1944, this company was placed on attached service direct with the Ninth Air Defense Command for administration and tactical operation by Par 6, SO 154 Headquarters 9th Air Force, dated 3 June 1944.
On 12 July 1944 all tactical operations of this company were stopped and on 13 July 1944 the Company moved using it's own organic transportation to a Port of Embarkation in order to move to the continent. The trip across the channel to Omaha Beach was made under very adverse conditions. Due to the very rough water and storms, the unloading dock at the beach, on the continent, had been broken up. After some 36 hours of waiting for the weather conditions to improve unloading of equipment was started. Two barges were being used and after being partially loaded with equipment and personnel, broke away from the ship in which the channel crossing was made. These barges with equipment and personnel were unable to make shore for 15 hours and considerable difficulty was experienced in the saving of men and equipment. The entire company personnel and equipment was unloaded and on shore within 96 hours after the channel crossing. From Omaha Beach, the company moved to Levast, France, in accordance with the verbal of the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Defense Command.
Organizations that this company worked with in the Levast area included the 71st Fighter Wing and the 566th Signal A. W. Battal- ion.
On 3 August 1944, "U" team #3, which included Lt. Cobbs section and Lt. Altman's section were relieved from attachment with the 9th Air Defence Command per Par 13 GO 187 dated 27 July 1944, and placed with Headquarters Company of the 563rd. This group was sent back to the U.K. for the purpose of studying a new the of radar set.
On 13th August 1944, the company was further attached to the 564th Signal A. W. Battalion for administration and tactical employment, per Par 2, GO 36, Ninth Air Defense Command dated 12 Aug 1944. With "U" team #3 detached from the company the strength was 10 officers and 127 Enlisted men. Eight Enlisted men (radio operators) being on detached service to the Ninth Air Defence Command.
The unit was moved via its own organic transportation from Levast to Chateaudun of 30 August 1944.
The 564th Signal A.W.Battalion was assigned the tactical employment of providing aircraft warning service in connection with the defense of the Paris area. Since this Battalion had only British GCI equipment, this company was assigned to provide the early warning service and to provide gap filling between the GCI radars. This program called for one LW section north of Paris, One section south of Paris and two sections east of Paris. Company headquarters was established at Morangis. These radars were on a full 24 hour operating schedule and all plots were reported via radio and wire to the large filter room of the 564th Battalion which was also the headquarters for the Second Air Defense Wing. During this tour of operation the LW radars of this company were responsible for giving early warning service on many hostile flights in the Paris area. This information was in turn given the GCI units via the filter room and interceptions were made by the P- 61 Night Fighters. V1 bombs that were sent toward the Paris area were also plotted by means of the LW radars. During these operations all of the LW radars were visited by British Technical officers of the RAF who were making a survey of British Radar being used by the American forces. All site commanders were complimented on the siting of these radars and the excellent way they were operated and maintained. The commanding officer of the 564th Battalion highly commended the officers and men of this company for the effort put forth on this work.
In accordance wit Par 3 GO 224 Ninth Air Force dated 24 October 1944, the company, except Lt. Owen's section, was relieved from attachment to the Ninth Air Defense Command and rejoined the 563rd Battalion and established company headquarters near Toul on 25 October 1944. Lt. Owens and his section were moved to the Belgium area with the 564th Battalion to provide early warning service.
During the period of time this company has been on the continent many of the enlisted personnel have been of great value in apprehending stray German soldiers in the various localities where the sites have been located. Due to the isolated spots of these sites, such prisoners were turned over to the F.F.I.
Due to the fact that this company has been a part of a Battalion instead of a separate Company, the supply problem has been very acute since the supply sources are not set up to deal with individual Companies of a Battalion. The same has been true with special services equipment and supplies, however, with the constant efforts of the Company Commander, Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr. and supply officer, Lt. Gordon P. Wilson, these difficulties have been cut to a minimum.
The report for November and December, by 1st Lt. Jack F Roberts follows:
November 1944
This company had headquarters near Toul, France, having moved to this location on 25 October 1944. Operations consisted of one light weight radar at this location. Lt. Martinsen was in charge of one light weight radar in the vicinity of Thelod, France; Lt. James Kenny in charge of one light weight radar in the vicinity of Thiaucort, France, Lt. Owen and his platoon have been relieved from the 9th ADC per Par 1 GO 244 dated 14 October 1944, Lt. Cobbs and Lt. Altman's platoons were located near Mannonville, France and engaged in the operation of SCR584's and training with this equipment.
On 4 November 1944, 1st Lt. Wetherill and 5 E.M. were attached to the company from headquarters company and their equipment which consisted of 2 unmodified SCR-584's replaced the light weight radars of Lt. Robert's platoon. Immediately personnel of this platoon began training and actual operation of this new equipment.
Lt. Altman and his close Support unit platoon with Lt. Martinsen's Light weight reporting platoon moved to near Deline, France for close support work in connection with the XII Corps. This move was accomplished on 16 November 1944. Shortly thereafter missions were attempted, several of which consisted of strafing, photo reconnaissance and bombing.
On 25 November 1944, Lt. Cobbs Close Support Platoon and Lt. Kenny's reporting platoon moved to near Distroff, France for close support work with the XX Corps. Several satisfactory missions were conducted from this site.
Both of the close support units received field orders for their daily missions from their respective Army Corps Headquarters, via motor courier.
The only difficulties experienced by these units in their operations was the difficulty in picking up the mission aircraft over the rendezvous point.
The different Light Weight units reported into the different FDP's whichever was nearer to the LW site.
Company Headquarters was moved to near Pemerville, France on 13 November 1944. the SCR584's of Lt. Roberts were used to give early warning and low angle coverage over the Nancy, France area.
Lt. Owen's LW Reporting Platoon moved to the vicinity of Sierch, France on 21 November 1944. This unit reported into FDP3 from this new location.
Company Headquarters was near Remereville, France, having moved to this location on 13 november 19444. On 9 December 1944 Company Headquarters was moved to near Metz, France. Lt. Roberts Platoon continued operations with modified SCR584's and reported to FDP1 and assisted in the control of many day and night fighters due to automatic tracking device which this radar is equipped with.
Lt. Cobbs Close Support Unit moved to near Tromborn, France which offered a better site and nearer the XX Corp's front line. This move was accomplished on 6 December 1944. Lt. James Kenny's LW Reporting Unit was also moved to near this location, in order to aid in the close support operations. Lt. Altman and Lt. Martin- sen moved their respective units to near Gras Tenquin, France which offered a better site and nearer the XII Corp's front line. Both of the close support units operated in connection with several "pin-point" missions for both the XII and XX Corps. On 21 December 1944 Lt. Altman and Lt. Martinsen moved their respective units in the vicinity of Sarregumines. No operational missions were handled from this site, however, since the XII Corps required this unit to move in the vicinity of Luxembourg on 23 December 1944. (see Battle of the Bulge, Ardennes operations).
On 25 December 1944 Lt. Owen's LW Reporting platoon moved to the vicinity of Anqeviller which offered a better operational site for a LW radar, and continued to report into FDP3. On the first 12 hours of operations from this site this operating crew reported over 800 plots to FDP3.
During the latter part of December all operating units were confronted with an unusual amount of German air activity and all units undertook special precautions as far as security measures were concerned. The close Support Units were still confronted with the difficulty of picking up mission airplanes over the rendezvous point.
Special arrangements were made with the XIX TAC special services to show motion pictures at company Headquarters daily. By so doing, the different Platoons could send men to this Headquar- ters on their ration truck and enjoy the motion pictures shown and tat the same time pick up their rations thereby eliminating a separate run of this special service feature. This being the one of many ways in which this Company has is endeavoring to cooperate with General Eisenhower's "save rubber" campaign. (see Editors Note 34 below).
On February 11th of 1945 on breakup of Company D Capt. Arthur G. Root, Jr. issued the following letter to his men:
"Most of us have been together for approximately two years, and in this length of time have covered quite a few places. Now the time has come when we will go our separate ways. In this period we have had a job to do and we can all say that we did our best. As some guy once said, "It is not the winning or losing but how you played the game", we all know that we have tried to play a clean, hard game.
So, in parting, I wish to thank each one of you for the splendid co-operation you have given me and tell you that you are a bunch that I have been proud to work with.
If I came from "Merry Old England", I would say "Cheerio, Blokes", but being just another American, I'll say:
"So long, guys, all the best in the world to you"
Sincerely
Arthur G. Root, Jr

 

[Editors Note 34]--- For a time when Company D LW units were brought back into the 563rd operation they were designated as LW5, LW6, LW7 and LW8. At first it was thought that they would be attached to FDP1, FDP2, FDP3 and FDP4 but operations necessitated varying assignments. Later on the units with SCR584's were redesignated as BACU1, BACU2, BACU3 and BACU4 with intent of adding a unit to each FDP4. Here again the operation requirement required an assignment varying with the tactical conditions. Lt. Clarence T. Wetherill and Lt Robert A. Homan and their men also participated in modifying the SCR584's into BACU's}. /p
CRAIG'S REPORT ON COMPANY D HISTORY
The following report was written by Thomas C. Craig who was a member of Company D and was the senior repairman in Lt. Emre Altman's BACU1.
" I was in D Company under command of Capt. Arthur G. Root. We were a LW radar unit in training and were issued a British Radar mounted in a Fordson Van of about 3/4 tons. After D-Day and after arriving in Normandy we returned to England. The radar technicians from the units of Lt. Cobbs, Lt. Burns, Lt. Altman and Lt. Dworshak were sent to Great Malvern, Worstshire 12 hospital unit for training on radar Set SCR-584. The rest of the operators and officers were sent to a RAF training school for Airplane Control. Our instructor for the SCR-584 was a technician from a AAA unit as the SCR-584 was an Anti-Aircraft Radar whose output was input to a M-9 Computer and it controlled four 90-MM Anti-Aircraft guns.
After return to France, we had no equipment, but were assigned controllers from the 19th Tactical Air Command. The Captain in charge of controllers, S/Sgt Donald E. Anderson, S/Sgt Vickers and myself returned to England and altered the SCR-584's to Ground Support per blueprints of the Radiation Labs of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We drove two Radars back to Southampton and returned to France. If I am not mistaken wee stopped at Battalion Headquarters. I still have my notebook from the school and the blueprints for all alterations of the SCR-584 that I was the technician on. The picture of the SCR-584 in the History of the 19th Tactical Air Command Signal Section history and published by them in 1945 (Signals) showed an SCR-584 that I was the technician on. My immediate officer was Lt. Emre Altman.
End of Report
Later in October 1995 Craig made this report:
"I first must go through, in an orderly manner, my training before joining Company D. I went to 13 weeks of Radio School and upon completion was sent to the Southern Signal Corps School at Camp Murphy, Florida. This was located at Hob Sound, Florida. This school gave instruction for Radar Sets SCR-270, SCR-271, SCR- 268 Air Borne Units and SCR-602. Instruction was given to U.S. Army Officers, Enlisted men and U.S. Marine Corps. This school had its own Mess and Security and we were assigned to companies so that everyone in the company took the same course. I was given training to become a Radar Repairman (973). My training was on early warning portable radar SCR-602. This was a Canadian made radar with a spark gap modulator. Upon completion of training in late August or Early September 1943 I was sent with the weeks graduates to Drew Field, Florida. After arrival I was processed and was moved to the early warning LW training units which was Company D of the 561st Signal Air Warning Battalion which was located at Bradenton, Florida. (see page 7 for camp activities). All companies D were the same in the Signal Air Warning Battalions from the 555th through the 570's. Each company had a Guide On of orange displaying the Company. This camp was commanded by a West Point Officer and sat retreat marched for review between Camp headquar- ters and the Company area. The company area was two rows of tents with a company street in between. Companies were identified by the Company Guide On. Each company consisted of 16 platoons. Each platoon consisted of 1 cook, 1 truck driver, 2 CW radio operators, 1 stationary motor mechanic, 6 radar operators, 2 radar repairmen and was commanded a Lieutenant.
This camp had a centralized mess, motor pool, radar pool and guard detachment. Each company allotted needed personnel when called for. About the last of the September of 1953 I was transferred to Lt. Emre T. Altman's platoon of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion from the 561st Signal Air Warning Battalion as they were short of repairmen. I stayed with this same unit until I arrived back in the United States on the 27 of October 1945.
Company D at the beginning was commanded by a Captain from New York, but he was relieved of his duties after I believe failure to pass Signal Corps inspection shortly before going overseas. Also, after being in the field with radar sets at Punta Gorda and Wachla, Florida. Lt. Altman, S/Sgt Francis Pepper and I held a long discussion and we all felt we could not operate 24 hours a day and provided the security that was ordered with the personnel.
When we were deployed overseas and we were issued radar sets, Company D platoons were paired. Radar sets issued were British LW (Light Warning) sets mounted in a Fordson van and was identical with the one we trained on with the exception of the modulator. Also the power supply was greatly improved going from 2 cycle motors to a 2 cylinder Raliegh Motor Cycle engine. All power was 120 volts at 400 cycles.
On page 20 of the History of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion the reference to Company D the history omits the LW units of Lt. Altman and Lt. Charles Cobbs as they were paired together with Lt. Martin Dworshak's and Lt. Donald Burn's platoons. This record is after the 3 August 1944 as both LW platoons left these officers and about 15 men in France. Lt. Altman's and Lt. Dvorshak's unit operated in the U.K. about one mile east of the Ashford Airport on the road from Ashford to Hythe in Kent. I personally never saw or visited any of the 7 other LW units from drawing the sets in the U.K. and on. We always operated apart from others. I guess the one time we might have met was on the Liberty ship going to France.
We setup a LW unit in France but departed after about ten days for training. I might be of some interest to you to know that Lt. Charles F. Cobbs father worked with Lt. Col. William L. McBride in the American Tel and Tel. Lt. Cobbs father was an electrical engineer and at that time lived in East Pepperell, Mass.
The concept of BACU (Battle Area Control Unit) was thought up by The Radiation Laboratories, British Branch to overcome the problem of hedge rows in France. This was told to me by two of their employees. They visited our site with BACU1 and BACU2 about every two weeks. I can only guess as there were 12 total class number 16 men in other units going to this one month course in the U. K. They also supervised units in other areas. They related to me that all new plotters in the units we would be employed in the Pacific would be Electronic. Only about one half of the personnel on the roster of Company D is on the list. I still have the note book and blueprints for all changes required to alter the SCR-584 to a BACU unit. Range on the SCR-584 was originally 30,000 Yards and was enlarged to 100 miles. This was mostly done by change the PRF (pulse recurrence frequency). As a two Oscilloscope radar and not counting the PPI (plan position indicator), the first oscillo- scope was a 2,000 yard tracking oscilloscope which could pickup any part of the 100 mile oscilloscope. The Radiation Laboratories were the ones who procured a Diesel generator for us with transformers so we could have a well regulated power of 60 cycles as most of the system used 60 cycles for reference in tracking. The antenna dipoles spun at 1800 cycles and the incoming signal was beat against 60 cycles for a differential for tracking.
I will give the officers and repairman for each of BACU1 and BACU2 as follows (see Appendix XVIII)
The campaigns of the officers and men of Company is a little different than the rest of the battalion. Company D had the five battle stars in the European Theater with a sixth star for the ground combat in the U.K. Also we earned the American Theater Ribbon while we were training in Florida as we were on the South Florida net covering the Gulf of Mexico.
Thomas Craig"
End of Report
Thomas Craig's report also reported this interesting information not recorded elsewhere.
"When Sgt Vickers, Anderson along with Lt. Austern and myself picked up SCR-584's in Burtonwood Army Depot there were about 325 sets in stock and we took the first two altered and had them working before departure, then we landed them on Utah Beach and took the Red Ball Express to the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion headquarters. On map L of the Ardennes Campaign on December 28, 1944 the town of Godbrange is off the road that runs between Luxembourg to Echnach. Godbrange is about two miles from Radio Luxemburg at Junglister, Luxembourg. We moved with the XII Corps from just northeast of Sarre Union, back to Nancy, through Metz to Luxembourg City then northeast to Godbrange."
End of Report
Thomas Craig also reported that Lt. Altman's Platoon was BACU1 was shipped as BACU2 and Lt. Cobbs platoon was BACU2 which was shipped to the Pacific theater as BACU1.(see Editors note 35 below). BACU2 re designated as BACU1 was being shipped to the Pacific Theater but was diverted to New York when VJ day arrived.
{Editors Note 35--- The fighter control for the invasion of Japan was to be handled by the XIXth Tactical Air Command, the 100th Fighter Wing and the 19th Tactical Control Group, and two of the BACU units were designated BACU1 and BACU2 of the task force. Lt. Col. William L. McBride had been transferred to the 19th TCG where he was Executive Officer and Maj. Byrne had been transferred to the 100th Fighter Wing where he was the Wing Radar Officer.]
APPENDIX XIII
COL. McBRIDE COMMENTS ON WW I
Woodrow Carlile preserved a copy of a letter given to him by Col. McBride when he wrote home to one of his WW I buddies. Woodrow had accompanied Lt. Col. McBride on several occasions when he visited various WW I battle fields. The letter Lt. Col. McBride wrote was as follows:
"Dear George:
Now that we are allowed to tell of places twenty five or more miles from our present location, thought I might forward a few line that might be of interest to you and the old gang. Of course I was in Paris, shortly after its liberation, and all the things you read regarding the joys, hilarity, and etc., definitely were true. It is the same care-free, joyous Paris that it was when we all went through, AWOL, in 1918, however, I did miss Bill Ewen, and it's still the number 1 city for any one's money.
I did not get to my favorite city of Soissons, but C'est le guerre: I hope to go back there. Naturally, I had to go through Meax and Le Ferte (remember)? on my way out, we stopped at Chateau Theirry, and on the hill overlooking the Meause and the city, there is a most beautiful moment dedicated to our dead. I have been informed that it was erected at a cost of over 30,000,000 francs: wonderful to behold, and it states that the Germans were held there in June of 1918, and that the big drive began July 1918, as we well know, and that of the 310,000 men taking part, 67,000 were casualties. I wish that you all might be able to view it. it also has an overlay of the area of battle on a high marble slab, giving the divisions, and ground gained by each.
Approximately 7.2 Km northeast is Belleau and the woods, we all remember so well, and the once terrible wheat fields are now serene and quiet, and one would never know a war had occurred there. The church the YD rebuilt is on the corner and it is truly beautiful, thrilling me beyond words. The priest of Chateau Thierry, upon learning I was there, and had been in the great battles of 1918, along with the Mayor, came over to my vehicle and spent a pleasant hour in reminiscing.
The church is kept immaculate, and you would be more than proud of, and to behold the results of our contribution to the little town that cost us so heavily in real men. The names of our dead are inscribed in it's walls, by the regiments participating, and an artistic placque of General Edwards hangs upon the wall. The YD is on each window, and above the door of the church by the YD, as a monument to it's dead in France.
The Germans shot holes in ten windows and knocked off a small piece of stone high above one window, otherwise little or no damage was done. A former member of the 103rd Infantry sig is most thrilling to be one of the first to inscribe my name upon this honored roll. Gazing upon the names of our departed dead made me wonder.
The Boche stole the large American and French flags from the church. I asked the Mayor if anything could be done to make immediate repairs, and was informed that a commission had been formed in Paris, to repair damage, but if possible he would like to have the flags replaced. He also stated that six vestments for the little altar boys of eight to ten years old, were taken, and that they cannot be replaced now. It is just a thought, but if the YD would like to makes theese people in Belleau happy, send the mayor of Balleau, two flags and vestments for the little lads, as the remaining people are few and poverty stricken.
Almost opposite the church is the entrance to the Belleau cemetery. Assuming you have seen many pictures of it, I shall try to give you a few added details. The cemetery is in charge of a supervisor and four aides, who are continually beautifying the plots, and as a result it is a most awe inspiring sight.
On either side of the entrance are erected stone houses for the visitors,, and a beautiful hand-book, containing the names and countries, numbers, and etc., upon a mantle in the lobby of the main building and so help me, hun wrote "Hail Hitler" on the front page. The son of a ____. Crosses, row upon rod--YD plenty. The first one I saw was Bill Daily, 101st Infantry, Hq Company, killed July 15,1918. Above is a beautiful Chapel and monument, and of course the Huns had to fire into it, ut it can be easily repaired. It stands part way up the hill of Belleau, and upon the very spot from which the big drive of July 4th began, and looks down upon a peaceful valley, and the woods that was once a place of destruc tion and death, is now the most quiet spot on earth. Time changes all thing.
(Editors Note 37) The reference YD means the Yankee Division, the 26th Infantry Division. On another occasion Col. McBride took me on a tour of some of the WW I action sites he remembered and he showed me the exact spot where he had pitched his tent at one of their bivouacs in 1918. I never recorded where that location was but one could see he was mentally reliving old memories. That same day I do remember that we stopped at the Chateau at Hatton-Chatel on the heights above Hattonville. In the Chateau they had a visitors register and He made a note in the register that he had been there in 1918. Probably on could still find his entry. Another aside is that on 29 August 1993 the Defense Department announced that the 26th Infantry Yankee Division was to be deactivated. The newspaper comment filled in that it was formed in 1917 but its roots date back to the 17th Century. It was formed from units that patrolled the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636 and fought the British at Lexington and Concord. In WW II the unit was under Patton's Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge. When I read the news I could not help to think that Col. McBride must of turned over in his grave. S/Sgt Bernie Cavanaugh, who served in the Division during WW II echoed this and was quoted as saying "this is a miserable day".
Well, George, I trust this little missive will be of interest to you, and the boys of 1918. As time progresses and I re-visit scenes and places we knew so well, I shall forward my impressions to you.
Winter is gradually descending upon us: cold, rainy days, early darkness, and biting winds is the order of the day, but C'est Le Guerre. Say hello to J.T. Burks, and all the boys. So long for now. Regards and best luck.
P.S. Yankee Division men may want to read this."
End of Document

 

APPENDIX XIV
GENERAL ORDERS OF THE 563rd SIGNAL AIR WARNING BATTALION
[only available in hard copy e-mail webmaster]
APPENDIX XV
FDP4 LOG
Lt. Frank Van Camp (now Lt. Col.) was Commanding Officer of FDP4 and in combat kept a log of events. Lt. Woodrow W. Cole was the administrative officer and 2nd in command of the Platoon. The Technical officer was Warrant Officer Reginald J. Stark (now Lt. Col.).
In the Log book he also reported Locations of FDP4 from January 9, 1943 to September 10,1945. His FDP was inactivated on 28 December 1944 as an FDP4 and the platoon continued to function in a different role. All the sites up to VE day were with the 738th Signal Air Warning Company. Following is a list of all the locations of the platoon as recorded by Frank in at the end of the log. The original log itself was donated to the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Field, Alabama.
Glasgow (Debarkation) Scotland Jan 9 1944
Winchester England Jan 12
Leightons Buzzard Jan 26
Swanage Feb 8
Durnford Feb 22
Henly on Thames Mar 14
Andover Mar 17
Lenham (Maidstone) Apr 14
Sittingborne Apr 30
Headcorn Jun 1
Winchester (Marshaling area) Jul 3
Southhampton (Embarkation) Jul 8
Omaha Beach (Crossing) Jul 9
St Pierre Eglise France Jul 10
Gouberville Jul 13
Chateaugrion (Rennes) Aug 8
Montfort (Le Mans) Aug 27
Comteray Sep 5
Franchville (Toul) Sep 15
Fort Oct 9
Serres (Nancy) Nov 14
Erstroff Nov 25
Audon Le Tiche Dec 27
Longwy
Immerath Germany Mar 17
St Joann (Kassel) Apr 2
Alsfeld Apr 9
Nurenburg Apr 27
Munich Aug 15
Igolstadt Sep 7
Munich Sep 10
Recorded in the log is brief mentions of visiting inspecting Generals and those included a visit by General Eisenhower on the 28th of March of 1944 near Andover, England. On April 5th 1944, logged at 1950 hours, probably when the FDP4 was still at Andover, there was a visit from General Quesada, commander of the IX Tactical Air Command which was under the 9th Air Force. The XIX Tactical Air Command was probably under his command at that time and later the XIX TAC would be split out and operate directly under the 9th Air Force and support the U. S. Third Army and the IX TAC would support the U. S. First Army.
Lt. Van Camp had organized the Platoon operators into four crews, each crew was to man a shift. Among those named in the log were
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3 Crew 4

Crew Chiefs

Sgt Fiebing Sgt Keith Sgt Jortner S/Sgt Fox

Acting Crew Chiefs

T/5 Skwarck T/5 Pond T/5 Jackson Sgt Schiefer
T/5 Cronin
S/Sgt Rogoff was mentioned as communications chief and also he and T/4 Reinhard was mentioned radar repairman on October 21 1944. On May 1st 1944 these tellers were mentioned
Sgt Cummings
Cpl Knight
Pfc Gainor

The following Air Controllers probably assigned from the 312th Fighter Control Squadron mentioned on March 28th 1944 were Lt. Sulfen and Lt. Bechtold
On March 31st 1944 the log notes that a General and Colonel arrived to inspect. Inspections were so frequent that no names were mentioned. On April 5th 1944 General Quesada arrived again for an inspection which lasted from 1850 to 2010 hours. A copy of the log now resides at the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Georgia
APPENDIX XVI
S. S. QUEEN MARY
The steamship S.S. Queen Mary was owned by the British Cunard White Star Line. The Captain of the ship was Commodore Sir Gordon Illingworth during this period. For this particular trip the Queen Mary sailed from New York Harbor probably on 22 January 1944 and arrived at Gulock, Scotland on 28 January 1944. The Queen Mary was docked on the north side of Pier 90 in New York Harbor for loading of troops. About 11,000 troops were loaded and besides the 563rd SAWB the 564th SAWB was another unit to make this trip. There were a number of other units loaded who cannot now be identified. I remember there was an Anti-Aircraft unit because one of their Officers was a school mate of mine. There was also a Royal Canadian Air Force unit because I remembered that there was a number of Pilot Officers who were designated to assist me in duties pertaining to my assignment as B Deck Commander. I also remember that there was a U. S. Field Hospital unit loaded because they were assigned quarters on A deck in "Picidilly Circus" which was the locations of shops in peace time. They were forward in those rooms and also forward of the Ship Troop headquarters where I reported. This area was also in front of the Grand Saloon. Needless to say this area had all the Nurses in it and the area was immediately declared "off limits" to Men. There was Naval troops aboard because one of my bunk mates was a Naval Commander. Others in the troop command were Lt. Col. McBride who was assigned the herculean task of Mess Officer and Commander of D Deck. The Mess itself was set up in the boarded up Ship Swimming Pool. I also believe that Lt. Col. Higginson was commander of C deck. There was a Marine Gun Crew that manned the rear deck and although I think it was U.S. Marines it could have been British Marines.
The destination port was at Gulock, Scotland which is about two miles West of Greenock, which was the railroad terminal which the troops were loaded on the Southbound railroad trains. Jim Buchanan of the 564th SAWB is in possession of a book named the "Queen Mary" which is an engineering description first published in 1936. In 1960 this book had pages added with some history of the operations from 1941 to 1952 and perhaps beyond. Oddly enough this history had no mention of the trip made by the 563rd SAWB and the 564th SAWB. All it says is that during January 1944 the ship had just returned from a repair dock in Clyde, Scotland and shortly after that but before January 1944 also underwent repairs in Boston, Massachusetts.
The accident causing the need for repairs was a very interesting incident that had occurred to sailing that transported the 563rd SAWB and 564th SAWB.
The Queen Mary had sailed on 27 September 1942 from New York to Clyde, Scotland with 10,398 troops on board. It was on this trip that the Queen Mary had a collision that provided the most tragic incident in the ship's long career. On Friday October 2nd, the HMS Curacoa, a twin-screw anti-aircraft light cruiser of 4290 tons displacement, 450 feet in length , assigned with six destroyer anti-submarine screen, to Guard the Queen mary, sighted her at a given position in about Longitude 12 degrees West. She had come over from New York without escort until then, relying on her speed and planned zigzag, known as "Zig-Zag 8", for her chief defence. The zigzag took about 40 minutes to complete, steering to port and starboard, and her speed was taken as 28 1/2 knots. Her mean course was 106 degrees, and it was calculated the ship would advance on it 93 percent of the total distance run. The Caracoa's best speed was 25 knots, and so the Queen Mary, despite the zigzag would ultimately overtake her escort. At 12:20 Captain Boutwood of the Curacoa sent a hand signal to his convoy,which was still well astern.,
"When you are ahead I will edge in astern of you"
His duty, or course, was to guard the transport against air attack. They were now in a zone where the danger was increasing, and although the sea was rough with a heavy westerly swell running, the weather was fine and clear, with visibility extending for miles.
By 1:30 PM the Queen mary was close astern of the cruiser. The Curacoa had a compliment of 430 officers and men, and in broad daylight, under a shining sky, just 42 minutes later, the Queen Mary had killed 329 of them. Her bows struck the Curacoa on her port side aft at a fine angle and divided the warship into two parts, which sank almost immediately. By the hard practice of the war the Queen Mary steamed straight on, over and through the wreck, the still living, the dying and the dead. American soldiers rushed to the rails and threw life belts into the sea, and the Queen mary summoned help from her destroyer screen. In her engine room, her engineers felt a slight bump and thought she had hit a large wave. Captain Illingworth in his chart house, just having checked his estimated time of arrival asked his Junior First and navigating Officer, Samuel Joseph Wright to check his figures and, when they had agreed, told Wright to send for the signalman and make the signal.
"Mr. Wright had called the signalman," said Illingworth in evidence, "and then we felt a bump. I said, "I wonder what that is, I wonder if we are being bombed". We always expected to be bombed. We never were, howevthe bridge. I said to the Quartermas- ter, who was steering, "Was that a bomb?" He said, "No, Sir, we hit the cruiser'.
The first "MOST SECRET EMERGENCY" despatch from H.M.S. Bulldog to the Admiralty, C. in C.W.A. (Commander in Chief Western Approaches) at 14:20 read:
"H.M.S Curacoa rammed and sunk by Queen mary in position 55 50 N 08 38 W.
"Queen Marys' damaged forward speed 10 knots"
The bows of the Queen Mary were badly damaged and bent round to the port, but the collision bulkhead held well at 13 1/2 knots and without assistance she arrived safely in the Clyde.
The maximum speed of the Queen Mary was 28 1/2 Knots. When in convoy it had to drop back to convoy speed which usually 18 Knots. When traveling alone the speed was upped to maximum to avoid the German "Wolf Packs" (Submarines) by sheer speed and the zig-zag maneuver. With the zig-zag course the progress was about 30 1/2 miles for each hours run although the ships speed in the water was 32 3/4 miles per hour. Assuming the distance from New York to Gulock as 4800 miles the crossing under full speed would be 156 hours or about 6 1/2 days from port to port. There was also the loading time and the debarking time to add to this. On the Atlantic trip very high waves would be encountered when entering the Irish Sea. I estimated the waves at times to be over 100 feet as they seemed to be higher than Bridge deck. Some of the men suffered prolonged sea sickness. In the Irish Sea storms large quantities of salt water would splash over the deck and down the stairs between decks. I did not hear of and injuries on this trips but one of the Stewards told me that in peace time almost every trip a passenger would get a bone fracture falling down stairs. One thing that kept the men from roll and pitch injuries was that they were restricted to their bunk area most of the time and only going on deck for a limited time each day.
Long after WWII the Queen Mary was docked at San Pedro, California and was setting on the beach and used as a hotel and museum. I noted that some of the areas I thought I was familiar with had been altered greatly during the post war period when it was making regular Trans-Atlantic voyages. In particular I noticed that some of the state rooms, particularly around "Picidilly Circus" had been converted to shops and restaurants and I could not find the stateroom I used during the crossing.
APPENDIX XVII
COMPANY C CONDENSED HISTORIES
Here is a previously unreported item of history which was submitted by Lt. Paul E. Bechtold, who was attached to Company C as the FDP3 Controller from the 312th Fighter Control Squadron. It is dated 1 July 1945. His report was as follows:
"The following commentary is a condensed history of activities by FDP3, Forward Direction Post in Company C which were units of the 563rd Signal Air Warning Battalion under Lt. Col. William L. McBride and the 312th Fighter Control Squadron under Maj. Noble L Hull.
1. A. The mission assigned FDP3 essentially was to support units of the third US Army, including Air Warning, Fighter/Bomber direction, E/A interception, Pinpoint bombing, Bomber escort, Night Fighter patrols, and emergency homing. The latter two were operated as standby to more specific equipment. Through many such missions were successfully accomplished in this capacity. Fighter Bomber direction missions accounted for more than 600 of the 1,000 missions controlled from that one site.
B. FDP3 undoubtedly set an ETO record for continual operation, with more than 152 uninterrupted days. The US front pulled up to the Moselle River in preparation for its final victorious push. FDP3 took its place on the left flank near the city of Luxembourg. After having been pushed back from a front position, 9 miles forward, by a ground attack directly upon the station. The succeeding months brought battle activities swinging in a narrow circle around the station, which itself was at no time further than 12 miles from the Moselle-German Line.
C. September 27th Brought the first FDP directed bombing on a small town 20 miles southeast of the site. Five months later, this same town was still a bombing target when the great 3rd army push began. The battle for Metz, forty miles south, was the first large fighter bomber objective. Railroad mounted Artillery and rocket shells, from behind the German Lines and in and around Luxembourg and in an arc around Luxembourg, were stopped by reconnaissance and bombing, largely under control of FDP3. During this time the city and station were being shelled for three nights, but few enemy airplanes were allowed through. In early December two ME 110's were destroyed in the immediate vicinity, after interceptions with airplanes from the 354th Fighter Group.
D. The first signs of a German counterattack came on December 11th, when "business" became pressing, when as many as 100 Fighter Bombers were being controlled at one time. For a period of 21 days the entire station either worked or stood at readiness 24 hours a day. On December 20th, the vicinity was strafed by ME 109's, followed that night by the dropping of enemy paratroopers. Personnel of FDP3 not only elected to continue full operation, but aided in the capture of a number of enemy troops in Luxembourg. Because of nightly paratroop drops, and the enemy holding a spearhead only four miles from the equipment, Christmas Eve saw the civilian population in an anxious state.
E. 1. Three major contributions of control during this period and the breaking of the Bastogne Siege were as follows:
2. Reconnaissance planes, under FDP3 control, discovered a large enemy vehicle concentration on the evening of January 4th, in the area of Prum. Night Fighter Airplanes covered the area for the night, and the following day brought XIX Tactical Air Command its greatest haul of enemy M/T's, the largest number for World War II. More than 600 vehicles were destroyed. This was the turning point in the Ardennes roll-back of Field Marshall Von Runstedt and his highly dangerous effort.
3. The sole rescue of more than 25 aircraft (8th AAF Bombers, 9th AAF A/C, and transports). Exceedingly poor weather conditions would otherwise have caused the loss of such planes and their valuable personnel. Five crippled or lost friendly A/C were landed at field A-97 in a single days work. The state of emergency was such, that at times direct VHF communications replaced the direct land line from Ripsaw 3 to A-97 operations, in order to facilitate immediate landing instructions. It was also due to accurate grid coordinates from the station plotters and controllers that several"bailed out" pilots were rescued by the GO3 Ground Observer posts often within the sight of enemy lines.
F. Activities swung from the north to the Third Army's drive up the Moselle River from Trier to Coblenz, and again, FDP3 was in a central position for almost al important missions. As the other control units moved into the "Push" positions, FDP3 was able to execute and absorb the extra work required. While the original siting was for a great part responsible for the complete success of the mission, the credit for continual operation was due to the efforts of the Company C technical and maintenance men, and the excellent network of communications to higher headquarters and operating points.
2. A. So that a more graphic picture we presented, the following statistical figures are given, representing the period between 19 September 1944 and 12 Mar 1945:
B. 950 Squadron Sorties
C. 8,780 aircraft controlled
D. 58 E/A destroyed by controlled friendly A/C
E. 24 blind Bombing missions in conjunction with BACU's
F. 78 Night Fighter missions as standby for moving MEW
G. 33 Distress emergency airplanes brought to safety
H. 5 Fighter Bomber Pilots retrieved by grid coordinate and Ground Observer Personnel
I 152 days of continual 24 hour per day schedule.
Paul E. Bechtold
1st Lt. Air Force
312th Fighter Control Squadron"
End of Article
Following is an account submitted by Capt. Fanklyn Glassow on 25 October 1995 outlining his experiences.
"In January, 1943, 1st Lt. Franklyn Glassow was relieved of assignment to the 554th Sig AW Bn at March Field, CA, and ordered to proceed to Oakland, CA, to take command of a cadre of 27 EM and one Oeld, Florida. Upon arrival at Drew field the cadre became Sig Hq and Hq , AWI, 14th Ftr Cmd. Personnel were added to this company, and it was transferred to the 563rd Sig AW Bn in Octo- ber,1943.
The entire 563rd Bn departed 'Drew 'Field to go on maneuvers in central Florida near the town of Bartow. At the conclusion of maneuvers members of Co C enjoyed a BBQ of two roasted pigs and 100 lbs. pf turkey along with a barrel of beer before returning to Drew Field.
In January, 1944, the battalion boarded a train to travel from Drew Field to a camp at Nyack on the Hudson River in N.Y. to prepare for embarkation to the European Theater of Operations. Within a few days the battalion was transported to the Queen Mary in which we crossed the Atlantic Ocean without escort to the Firth of Clyde near Glasgow in Scotland. A train took us to a tent camp at Henley on the Thames where we were confined to camp for about 30 days. Company C went on several marches around the country side to relieve boredom, get a look at our surroundings and get tome exercise.
Following the assignment of British Radars, Company C was ordered to a training site near Beaulieu just south of Southampton. Company C moved again to a location about five miles SE of Turnbridge Wells where we occupied the grounds of a ruined mansion. A third move was to a wooded area behind a flax farm further east in Kent. Our maneuvers in this area included dispersal of our ground observer posts along the channel coast, one of which occupied Pevensey Castle, a well-preserved fortress erected by Romans and Normans. In June of 1944 we prepared our vehicles for moving off an LST through water to a beach in France. Our location was directly in line with the V-1 Buzz Bombs the Germans began sending to London. For a few days we tried to shoot them down with our 50-caliber machine guns, but then our area was declared a zone where fighters were to shoot at them. One was hit directly over us and exploded about 100 yards from our camp, creating a huge crater. Our medics rendered first aid to some children cut by flying glass.
Company C's next move was to a rain-soaked camp near Southamp- ton where be boarded an LST and crossed the Channel on July 4, 1944. We landed on Omaha Beach and noted that all U.S. vehicles made it off the LST to the beach with no trouble, but all the British vehicles had to be towed through the surf. While Company C was waiting to follow the Third Army out of Normandy, a jeep occupied by Lt. Frank Jane k and 3 EM strayed into a mine field and was blown up, injuring all occupants. Lt. Janek managed to crawl out a d call for help. Lt. Joe Eichbaum and two medics from Company C rushed to the scene, and Lt. Eichbaum lead the medics through the mines field and with their help rendered first aid and carried the injured men out of the mine field and got them to a field hospital. This action resulted in award of the Silver Star Medal to Lt. Eichbaum and Bronze Stars to each of the medics.
When the Third Army broke out of Normandy in late July 1944, their advance was so rapid that our first significant stopping point was a woods just west of the city of Orleans close to the Loire River in central France. Company C was ordered to operate operated this location while the rest of the battalion continued on toward Germany. While at this location Company C learned of a German supply depot in a large cave beside the Loire River that contained hugh stores for submarines that docked at St. Nazaire. We were able to drive a 2 1/2 ton truck into the cave and load it with non-perishable rations and several cases of wine. our supply sergeant kept the wine in locked foot lockers, and each time we obtained our supplies from a new depot, a few bottles were given to the issuing personnel. Needless to say, we often received favored treatment. When the threat of a German army in southern France was thwarted, Company C was ordered to move to a position in southern Luxembourg.
In September of 1944 the company moved to a previously selected position in southeastern Luxembourg. The company arrived in Luxembourg late in the afternoon and set up tents in an orchard surrounded by a stone wall. Vehicles were parked outside the wall, and sentries were posted to guard them during the night. About 1:00 PM a German patrol opened fire on Company C, putting bullets through a number of vehicles and hitting a newly arrived experimen- tal U.S. radars with a rocket, completely destroying it. The attack lasted only a few minutes, and no personnel were injured, largely because of the stone wall, although bullets pierced the upper portions of some tents.
Infantry solders nearby advised us to move since were only about four miles from the Germans and within artillery range. Fortunately we had selected an alternate site that looked good for operation of the radars. It was about twos miles south of the city of Luxembourg and 15 miles from the Germans. Following repair of a cable that had been severed by a bullet in one of our main radars, Company C operated very successfully at this site from September, 1944 to March, 1945.
Initially we bivouacked in a densely wooded area near the radars, but on of our resourceful EM uncovered a vacant chateau just outside the woods and suggested we move into it. We were able to house most of the company in the chateau which proved to be quite comfortable during the winter of '44-'45. Some of our talented EM managed to scrounge some lumber and build a small barracks which housed those who didn't fit into the chateau.
Company C had two small radars in addition to the two main radars. The small units were located approximately in the center of Luxembourg. When the Germans launched the Battle of the Bulge, our small radars were missed by about 1/2 mile. We moved them to a safer position and moved Lt. David Schultze's five ground observer posts to positions along the souther \n flank of the Bulge.
In March, 1945, the Third Army was on the move into Germany. Company C crossed the Mosselle River and then the Rhine River over a pontoon bridge. Shortly after entering Germany the company liberated an enclosed trailer which the company carpenter quickly equipped as a neat orderly room. it served us well as we proceeded further into Germany. There were two brief stops in Germany at vacated military camps and another in a small town where we took over a hotel building. Since Company C was the only Allied unit in this town, the mayor came to us daily for orders. In this period as we moved rapidly into Germany, Company C accepted surrender of German soldiers on several occasions.
Our final location was near the German town of Ansbach and was within sight of a vacated military air field. company C took over three apartment buildings from a group of about a dozen. these apartments had housed German soldiers and their families associated with the nearby air field. The company was comfortably house at this location and celebrated the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 9,1945.
In spite of being narrowly missed by a Buzz Bomb, being shot up by a German patrol in Luxembourg and earning five battle stars, Company C completed its mission with credit to itself and without a single casualty due to enemy action. members of the company can be proud of the valuable service they rendered during their 16 months of action in the European Theater of Operations

 

APPENDIX XVIII
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
The XIX TAC published a pamphlet "Seek and Destroy", the story of the XIX TAC which was issued to the troops so they could send it back home to show their part in combat. One of the chapters in the pamphlet follows because it gives another version of the Battle of the Bulge. A copy of this pamphlet was sent in by Douglas Rainbow, the original was given to him by his father, now deceased, who was T/Sgt William R. Rainbow the Communications Chief of Company A in combat. The pamphlet is in color and features what is thought to be one of the few reproductions of the XIX TAC insignia which is reproduced below. An original pamphlet is in possession of Douglas Rainbow whose address is
R.D. #2 Lakeport Road
Chittenango, NY 13037 Ph (315)-687-3550
Following is an extract from Seek and Destroy which is headed up with the following letter from Maj. Gen. O. P. Weyland as follows:
"This is a story about the officers and enlisted men who have made our tactical Air Command one of the most powerful weapons in the Battle for Germany. Without their hard work, courage, loyalty and self-sacrifice, joint air ground operations could not have been achieved their present high degree of effectiveness.
The record of the XIX Tactical Air Command represents one of the greatest chapters in the history of Air Power and I am proud and grateful to every individual in the command who helped this story become true.
O. P. Weyland
Major General
Commanding"
The history continued as follows.
THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE
DECEMBER 1944
Bastogne becomes the American rock of defense in Belgium as German forces in a great counter-attack lunge for the Meuse River. XIX TAC joins the 101st Airborne Division to form an unbreakable ring around the town. Enemy forces under the imperus of their initial breakthrough, surge forward many miles through thinly held American lines. But Bastogne never is taken.
Hovering constantly above the beleaguered town, XIX TAC Thunderbolts keep the desperate Germans at bay, abort attempts to infiltrate the Bastogne ring, burn fuel stores and supplies, take heavy toll of enemy troops and transportation.
Never have air and ground cooperated in such unison. For ten days the 101st Airborne holds the pivotal road center of Bastogne while German armored columns vainly try to crack through. Every large enemy effort is headed off and blunted by XIX TAC.
During the first days of the Battle of the Bulge, XIX TAC hangs a deadly net above the German spearheads. Roads are littered with wrecked equipment. Towns overrun by the Germans are bombed and set afire. When fog comes to shroud the battle area on 28 December, Gen. Von Runstedt's drive has lost its momentum. Initiative passes to the Americans.
This is reiterated proof that close air-ground coordination pays off.
New Year's Day, Maj. Gen. Anthony G. McAullife,(Then Brig. Gen.) Commander of the 101st's heroic stand at Bastogne, visits the XIX TAC "Raiders" group. To its new commander, Lt. Col. Leslie R Bratton of Hastings, Neb, he expresses his appreciation:
"If it had not been for your splendid cooperation we should never have been able to hold out. We were able to hold the vital road junction at Bastogne with your aid. I thought flak in Holland was bad, but the stuff your boys flew through here was worse"
The next several weeks see Nazis being squeezed slowly from the salient and driven back towards the Siegfried Line, while XIX TAC chews away at German attempts to reinforce and resupply forward elements.
The crescendo of destruction is reached when XIX TAC again upsets the German cart on 22 January. Attempting a daylight withdrawal, Germans clog roads between Prum and Viaden and along the Our River. They stream eastward in ten mile long columns, vehicles lined bumper to bumper.
Concentrations are spotted early in the day by an army liaison cub pilot. Relays of thunderbolts race to hamstring the massed traffic. Diving through breaks in the clouds, Thunderbolts hammer long columns of trucks, tanks, self-propelled guns, horse-drawn vehicles.
For eight hours fighter-bombers punished German convoys. By nightfall destruction totals are greatest in XIX TAC history. Destroyed are 1179 motor vehicles; more than 100 others damaged. Close behind rampaging fighter-bombers, advancing American troops move towards the Siegfried Line. Bastogne and "The Battle of the Bulge" are history.
Bastogne adds another bright chapter to the story of XIX TAC. Ahead are other chapters. SIC TAC also could look back on a story- -a story of important and significant tasks well done
PLANES PROTECT ARMY FLANK
AUGUST 1944:
General Patton's crushing right hook opened the way toward Paris. Punching ahead 20 to 30 miles a day, the drive exposed and weakened his right flank. The XIX Tactical Air Command went the task of protecting a whole army's flank.
Successful execution of this bold plan was a vitally important tactical victory, underscored by the surrender of 20,000 enemy troops. For the first time in history an entire army capitulated to an air command as well as to a ground unit.
A resistant chain of air armor had been thrown above the Loire River bounding the long flank to the command's tactical reconnais- sance group fell the job of locating sizable concentrations. Attacks were snuffed out as soon as they were planned by thorough drubbing from the air. German Gen. Erich Elster's hapless Huns, harried by French Forces of the Interior, finally were cut off from Germany by the junction of the Seventh and Third U. S. Armies.
With cessation of terrorizing air attacks as the primary of condition of surrender, Gen. Elster threw in the towel to Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon of the U. S. Ninth Army and to Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) O. P. Weyland of the XIX TAC on 16 September 1944. This was concrete acknowledgment that an "idea"--close air-ground cooperation--had paid off.
Surrender to Gen. Weyland was the payoff of more than an idea, it was the logical conclusion of ceaseless training, of the will to win. It was the angry answer to an arrogant challenge. It was the reply of mechanics working in the winter with numbed hands or delicate engine changes, of tense, steel-nerved pilots who matched front line GI Joe for guts, of paper shufflers in specialized office machinery, of responsibility-ridden CO's--all contributing, all necessary to the big show at the Loire.
Surrender was the highlight. Back of it was a victorious history. Each GI and officer contributed to a holocaust unequaled in aerial warfare history. They were important parts of a new, powerful weapon. Destroyed in 10 months were 1351 enemy aircraft, 15,501 motor vehicles, 1,743 tanks and armored vehicles, 1,708 locomotives, 10,561 rail cars, 1,642 horse drawn vehicles, 1,794 gun positions, 270 vessels and barges, 255 bridges, 188 fuel and ammunition dumps.
A WEAPON COMES OF AGE
Back in late 1943 (the "Mild and Bitter" era) the real sig- nificance of "tactical air command" was envisioned by only a few imaginative military men. The man in the street and the GI on the ground knew little of the paralyzing power of the air-ground machine. yet now, one year later, the tactical air weapon has been developed to peak efficiency, is acknowledged as a vital factor in all large military operations.
Development of the weapon is not only the story of the tac- tical air commands of the Ninth Fir Force alone. It symbolizes the entire Allied war effort. The effective character of the present organization is due to unprecedented inter-service cooperation, to adequate supplies and, above all, to imagination and foresight of frenzied organizations, speculation and experimentation during pre- invasion months.
A broad outline of the tactical air command "idea" was conceived and developed by top drawer Washington military planners in 1942 and 1943. It was practiced in maneuvers by units training in the States. Basic techniques were improved during the victori- ous North African campaign. Now, under the impact of battle experience, the form of the weapon still is changing. Early in the war in general pattern was hammered out, in many respects almost literally, for today's air-ground organization is the happy result of a well-balanced debate between the ardent disciples of Gen. Billy Mitchell and those of Hannibal.
A blueprint of the "idea" landed win the pre-invasion workshop that was England in 1943 where the welding and fusion began. The VIII Air Support Command's 1st Fighter Division (provisional), large composed of 44th Bomb Wing personnel, fresh from the States, began experimenting with air-ground tactics at Aldermaston Court, near Reading, Berkshire. Key personnel from the IX Fighter Command then emerged from the sands of North Africa to add battle experi- ence to the testing ground.
Careful plans were laid for direct cooperation with an army in the field. Growing rapidly, the command soon split into two units; IX Fighter Command which went to Middle Wallop, and IX Air Support Command, later the XIX Tactical Air Command, which returned to Aldermaston. IX Fighter Command continued and integrated the activities of the two tactical air commands until late July, 1944.
Gen. O. P. "Opie" Weyland took over the XIX Tactical Air Com- mand on 4 February 1944. Not long after, the command was given two wings and seven groups for training and fighting---to the great relief GI's and officers who had been spending weary weeks guiding non-existent planes around the skies, plotting hypothetical targets and forever moving very real tents and equipment over English countryside.
Grueling cross-channel operations, which were to form such an important part of the softening-up process, began 13 April 1944, when seven fighter bomber groups and their wings settled down at advanced bases in Kent. Four of the groups had been flying long- range bomber escort from bases in East Anglia, the other three were straight from the States. They played hell with enemy rail and motor transport, participated in semi-strategic bombing, helped the planned isolation of the enemy south of the Seine River by bombing rail and road bridges. Their command of the air, was demonstrated by the destruction of 276 enemy planes (115 in the air) during the Luftwaffe's periodic bursts of energy prior to D-Day.
Yawning pilots climbed into their Mustangs and Thunderbolts each day when the first sunlight stretched across the channel, often flew three of four missions lasting until dark. Ground crews on hand to refuel, rearm and repair, sweated out each mission and worked late in blacked-out hangers to have every possible plane ready for action the following morning.
The phase was keynoted by "Liaison and Learning". EM's and officers went to RAF operational centers to learn what the English had found out to coordinate their activities with the greater overall invasion plan. Simultaneously, others trained and planned with ground officers of units later to be part of the air-ground team.
Reconnaissance planes of the command flew for months over the heaviest flak defenses in the worked to photograph every detail of the invasion coast. The mission was as dangerous and as important as that of fighter-bombers.
"There is nothing more frustrating," said 1st Lt. Clyde B. East of Chatham, VA, a recce pilot, "than riding over the stuff someone below you is throwing up and not being able to do more than take pictures of it. What I wouldn't have given for one big bomb."
ANGRY EAGLES CLAW FOE
Early the wet morning of June 6, fighter-bombers roared down runways while it still was so dark pilots could not see the control towers. They flew that day and during the next days of assault in continuous, successful beach patrols to keep Allied troops free from air attacks. Within a short time the angry eagles also were clawing enemy troops and transports with destructive armed reconnaissance missions.
The groups moved to the continent as soon as strips were prepared--often while possession of the field itself was in violent debate. One thunderbolt group, commanded by Col. Morton D. Magoffin, of Deerwood, Minn, actually had to reverse its traffic pattern because of enemy flak positions. Weary pilots, along with everyone else at the base, spent unhappy nights diving into foxholes while Allied and Germany artillery exchanged blows. "Close air cooperation" probably never before had been so mean- ingful to the participants
S/Sgt Wade W. Frazee, of Oakland, Md, an armorer, had a narrow escape while on the job one afternoon:
"I was on the wing of a P-47 loading ammunition when three ME- 109's came down low and made a staffing pass. Ack-ack boys crippled one flying about 300 feet over me. It crashed down the runway. I just stood there on the wing until what was happening dawned on me. I hit the foxhole until it was all over, then went back to get the Thunderbolt ready for its next mission".
Incidents like this didn't prevent Sgt Frazee from servicing his plane's guns so well they fired 25,290 rounds without a stop- page.
Units to come in later assault waves (July and August) had been given something other than warm beer and Piccadilly Circus to remember England: flying bombs. Many units were located just under the "main highway" for V-1's, and pilots gained grim satisfaction in destroying them while returning from missions.
Nightly bull sessions under canvas were something like this:
"Here comes another!"
"Hell, no! That's an airplane"
"Oh, yeah? I never heard an airplane that sounded--OH-OH, it stopped"
"Well, there it went. I'll bet that was five miles away."
"Five miles! That wasn't an inch over two miles. By the one just before this sounded....."
The command's advance echelon came to France 2 July 1944 and moved to Nehou, joining Third Army Headquarters to plan for the job ahead. At last the "idea" and weapon had finished the "Plans and Training" Base, Groups, Wings, Command headquarters, all were prepared to give air cooperation to an army in the field, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third.
That was one week after the famous "Operation Cobra" in which a good portion of the whole Allied Air Forces participated. American troops massed along a line from St. Lo westward through Periers and Lessay were being held up by a lack of maneuverability and by terrain well adapted to defense. "Operation Cobra" was an all-out air attack on enemy positions in one small sector south of the Periers-St. Lo road followed by an all-out infantry -armor drive. Heavies, mediums, and fighter bombers made their bomb runs in waves. Group pilots reported "planes at all possible levels."
"For a while", commented Lt. Col. Frank S. Perego, of Can- adaigua, N.Y., "it looked as if we would have to signal with our arms in order to make a turn."
Air blasting shook the Nazis down to their socks. Rapid tank columns finished demolition of the tottering hedgerow line. One week after the epoch-making attack, Third Army and XIX TAC began the razzle dazzle end run that was to reach the enemy' ten-yard line one month later.
As Gen. Patton's armor coiled south and east towards Rennes, Nantes, and Lavel, enemy air opposition was so weak planes could fly 30 miles ahead of the armored spearheads in search of targets. Often air activity was halted by low rain clouds, but with the weather permitting, groups flew as many as five missions a day-- some squadron averaging as much as 11 hours and 41 minutes aloft.
The Breton Peninsula overrun in a few days, the bulk of the air and ground power wheeled and headed towards Paris. Some units were assigned the job of clearing out stubborn pockets in the ports. St. Malo surrender 17 August 1944. An ultimatum had been sent to the Col in command and while a squadron of Thunderbolts weighted with 500 pound bombs hovered menacingly overhead, he read "...the planes now over your forts will begin to dive bomb..."
The white flag was run up. P-47's and bombs went off to hit targets elsewhere.
Brest continued to hold out. Because of the call for air cooperation there and because of the advance on Paris, the command was forced to attack simultaneously on fronts 350 miles apart. Effective operations under these conditions demonstrated the flexibility of Allied air power. They were also a tribute to the harried operations sections in the commands, the wings, and he groups.
In one of the attacks on Brest, a squadron of Thunderbolts led by Lt. Col. Joseph L. Laughlin, of Omaha, Neb, now commanding the group then under Col. Magoffin, spotted a concentration of enemy shipping in the harbor. Slipping through a small hole in the clouds, Col. Laughlin destroyer a light cruiser while other Thunderbolts damaged a destroyer and 14 additional ships. It was one of the few cases in which fighter-bombers have destroyed a warship of cruiser class.
Armored columns often raced so far ahead of the general ad- vance that one of the important functions of fighter-bomber pilots was to report positions of our own armored spearheads. In this fluid situation Air Support Parties from XIX TAC attached to units of the Third Army proved indispensable in effecting the smooth cooperation between air and ground that was to become classic. They rode close to the heads of columns to identify strong points that sometimes were only a few hundred feet away and then watched fighter-bombers pulverize them.
One Tactical Air Command GI was pinned down by German machine guns spitting fire from hedgerows on both sides. While bullets tore into his trailer he called to a squadron of Thunderbolts overhead. In a couple of minutes both sides of the field were "policed up" by 96 machine guns.
A patrol was completely cut off by a German counterattack. A call for "all available aircraft" not only freed it but caused the complete rout of the enemy counter-thrust.
COMBINED OPERATIONS PAY OFF
Many complications of air cooperation could not have been anticipated. Gen. Patton's army drove so rapidly that XIX TAC sections in charge of operations had to get larger scale maps to keep track of columns that ran off more detailed maps. Pilots had to check their well-conditioned impulses to blow up every bridge. Wrecked bridges in this type of warfare only served to slow progress of the troops. Front lines and "bomb-lines" moved so fast that greatly extended communications sometime made keeping situation maps up to date impossible. Long planned systems for rapid identification of ground units from the air were put into effect.
Capture of Gen. Elster's army climaxed the drive. Although credited as a great accomplishment it did not overshadow other fighters whose work all over the front vied with the river roundup in importance.
To the north fighter-bombers increased the destruction and congestion in the Argentan pocket where retreating German vehicles were jammed. Rocket-bearing fighters from Col. Anthony V. Grossetta's Thunderbolt group roared up and down the columns in search of tanks. In one mission they reported rockets blew open and destroyed 17 Tiger and medium tanks. Later in the day 13 more thick skinned tanks were punctured and left burning by the same pilots.
In from a squadron mission which had destroyed hundreds of vehicles, 1st Lt. John A. McNeely, of Clevland Ohio, said
"It would have been hard to shoot at the road in any place and not hit a German car or truck. We followed the roads right down, over hills and around corners until we ran out of ammunition. When we looked back, fires were flickering all along the roads."
Spotting a few Germans in a field, another squadron of Thunderbolts from the group commanded by Col. Robert L. Delashaw, of San Antonio, Tex, buzzed low for a strafing attack. Just before making their pass they saw nervous Nazis waving white flags. As the P-47's roared over their heads other jittery Ger-mans joined the first few. In a matter of minutes there were about 400, all frantically waving white cloths. Guarded by relays of cocky Thunderbolts, they formed columns of fours on the road and trudged off to Allied lines. The pilots radioed the nearest fighter control station to pick up the prisoners.
Air opposition grew as TAC planes stabbed at numerous German airdromes ringing Paris. Occasionally Mustang and Thunderbolt pilots were diverted from dive-bombing and strafing attacks by formations of enemy fighter. But the enemy gained only temporary diversion by these attacks. Nazi losses invariably exceeded the number they shot down. The battle for Paris airfields was climaxed 25 August 1944 , when the crack Pioneer Mustang Group commanded by Col. George R. Bickell, of Nutley, N.J. shot down 36 fighters and destroyed 13 more on the ground.
The main show still was ground cooperation and the weapon worked more smoothly every day. Gen. Patton presented the Bronze Star to Gen. Weyland for meritorious service with this commendation
"The superior efficiency and cooperation afforded this army by the forces under your command is the best example of the com-bined use of aid and ground troops I have ever witnessed."
"Due to the tireless efforts of your flyers, large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our advancing columns have been harassed or obliterated. The information passed directly to the head of the columns from the air has saved time and lives."
"I am voicing the opinion of all the officers and men in this army when I express to you our admiration and appreciation for your magnificent efforts"
Close liaison between army and air command kept XIX TAC headquarters on the move. Weary GI's packed and unpacked tons of maps, radios, papers and miscellaneous equipment nine times in the trek across France. Harassed M/Sgt Thomas F. Quealey, of Brooklin- e, Mass who had repeatedly pitched and struck numerous administra- tive tents and the large "circus tens' used for combined operations snapped
"We're not only mobile, we're portable" Chairtroopers suspected that some day they would each a town be- fore Gen. Patton's armor.
Communications, strained to the breaking point by the rapidity of the advance, was one of the greatest problems. While each move of Army's headquarters brought it in closer contact to its elements, the contrary was true of XIX TAC. Demands for ground cooperation had scattered the groups over a large section of central France. In 30 days communications men net-worked all of Brittany, most of the area between Paris and Loire River, and 140 miles beyond. Altogether, more than 500 miles of main trunk tel- ephone lines were laid by the hard-working communications teams.
Crews stringing lines to Air Support Parties at the front shared the misery of the infantry. They not only dodged shells and snipers but also took prisoners. When rapid communications were necessary they worked 18 to 20 hours a day setting up new lines, repairing old ones.
Not content with merely doing their job, these men also de- vised new ways and means of improving communications. T/Sgt Fred W. Warden, of Venice, Calif, developed a method of rewiring radio circuits that permitted transmission of homing signals to pilots on all wire channels, increased accuracy of transmission, and lengthened the range of transmission over 150 mile. Sgt. Warden was awarded the Bronze Star.
The Wings did a great deal in these days of difficult com- munications. Stationed at fighter fields, they maintained vital intergroup and ground-air coordination. The Army or Ground Liaison Officer also contributed much to their coordination. The GLO made certain that pilots always were well briefed on the latest positions of friendly troops.
Important functions were carried on through the Wings: operations reports from groups to command headquarters, field orders from command to groups, the abundance of routing paper work that is one of the unromantic but essential functions of any large military unit.
Groups often moved unto airfields in the wake of evacuating Germans. Usually they spent more time repairing their own bomb damage than anything the fleeing Nazis had been able to destroy. Control towers were erected on the edge of bomb packed runways; complicated repairs were made in the open because hangars had been blown up: functions of personnel, intelligence, operations, plans and training and supply sections often had to be kept at the usual high level of efficiency in the midst of the most primitive field conditions. War-weary typewriters rattled out detailed reports by flashlight while persistent rains helped keep the situation fluid.
Airdrome squadrons, normally the first Air Force units to reach an advanced landing strip, often performed near miracles in speedily rearming and refueling fighter and recce aircraft, and in rearing damaged planes. Little known even in the Air Force they came into their own during the sweep across France. To them must go a large share of the credit for the mobility of XIX TAC groups.