A Bridge Too Far

Brian,

Thank you for that, that's just how I pictured it, especially after reading "Forgotten Voices" a book put together from (BBC?) interviews of WW1 vets - English, Aussie, NZ, Germans, French & American in the 60s.

Not quite "band of brothers", but it has that whole Oral history thing going and touched me far more than the Ambrose's book.

One thing I didn't quite understand in your previous post was:

Why would you get rid of your knife? Isn't it obvious from your uniform and your cap that you were commandos anyway?

 

The Commando knives.
We, as assault troops, had these silver steel knives in a special place by the left large pocket on the uniform trousers, We soon learned that the Germans did not like knives,

Hitler had decreed this edict, that all commandos captured be summarily shot. That edict was still in force. What makes a Commando any different from anyone else? Nothing really, only that they carry a distinctive Commando knife. We, not being Commandos, still managed to look like a load of bloody Pirates when we set off into action.

The Germans under battle conditions did not try to hard to find out who was who? That meant that anyone in danger of being captured got rid of that knife quickly. The Enemy had already gained a reputation for murdering captured troops. The Hitler Youth, 12th SS Panzer, Doubty foes!

To that end, digging in a fox hole where our lads had been captured, would sometimes bring up a silver Commando knife...

I would love to have mine now for they have gone up in value to what is now a small fortune.
Cheers Brian

 

Brian, I think a guided tour of Normandy by yourself and us with shovels would lend you a tidy retirement nest egg!!

Again, thanks for the info.

 

Got to be honest... The damage the enemy done to me I have a job to cross the road. Would be nice though to revisit. Though I have never been able to come to terms with the fact that there will be no shell and mortar fire no mines or small arms fire Silly aint iT?
Brian

 

Not at all! You don't have the luxury to go back to (I can only guess) lay ghosts to rest. I know a lot of Vietnam vets who have been back to old battle sites to try and forget...

We can thank our lucky stars and feel priviledged that you can still type

 

Hi,
I don't know who this C. EVANS is but he talks a load of trike. Stephan and Smoke have been the only two that have talked any sense on this issue. My grandfather fought at Arnhem and he never laid any blame on Monty. If anything he blamed 'Boy' Browning'. The use of 38 valuable transport aircraft to take pen-pushers to be near the battle for his own glory was a major mistake. Also the one narrow road from the Border to Arnhem was another. Then Browning didn't listen to intelligence reports, a major blunder. XXX Corps having to travel up that 1 lane road and the stretching of supplies all added to this costly battle.

The plan should of worked had the planning been done with more efficiency. Perhaps the most costly was not getting the Poles in there. I have no doubt that if they had a lot of my grandfathers mates would of still been alive at the end of the war.

In the end it doesn't matter who's fault it was, you can blame the Yanks for not mopping up all resistance around the towns and bridges that they were to capture. You can blame XXX corps for waiting for their infantry to catch them up. We have the ideal place to research this, but lets not blame anyone for this disaster. We are all sitting comfortably in front of the computer, so its easy to blame someone for a disaster. One thing for sure and that is no-one can put any blame on the men of Arnhem.

By the way my grandfather was Major R.T H Lonsdale of the famous Lonsdale Force.

Mike

 

I've just read right back through this interesting thread and still agree with MacDonald in 'Command Decisions' .

Given the speed of the apparent German 'collapse' after Falaise, the decision to risk 'Market-Garden' was justified in the context of what was known at the time .

As you've correctly pointed out, Mike, hindsight is a great luxury for us ....

It's too easy to point the finger at any individual ; Monty, Browning, Horrocks, Dempsey. At the end of the day, it was one of WWIIs greatest battles and nothing will ever detract from the courage, endurance and fighting skill of the men involved, particularly those trapped at Arnhem/Oosterbeek.

And of course, the whole operation provides endless fascination for armchair anoraks like me to study !

 

Hang on! Hang on! Friends.
The drive North to Arnhem was not on a single road. I do know, for I took part in The Market Garden operation. One moment you are saying that Monty was not adventurous enough...the next you are saying he should never have taken that on.

The Germans were running, at Falaise they had taken an unmeciful beating...there was an outside chance that it could be pulled off by a mad dash to take that bridge. It was by all means, just a chance...If it had been successful it would have shortened the war and saved many young British and American lives.

There was only one thing that stopped it, that was the presense of the Panzers at Arnhem.
taking the picture as a whole, I think that the run up through Holland was nothing short of Bloody miraculous, and the ground captured was quite excellent, all by adventurous battle planning,, It only failed at the last hurdle. Then..Only just.


There has been much written about Market Garden by many Authors that never took part. I can tell you it was carried out with dash and elan, The fact remains that it was only ever a chance, but...Who dares wins. But not all the time!

One thing I can tell you, while we were some distance from Arnehm, the battle at night lit up the night sky in a greenish glow, and the reverberations from the shelling were continuous....Not Nice!

I got very close to the bridge on a blasted motor bike. but had to turn back, could get no further.
Sapper
A Founder member of the "Market garden Association"

 

Thanks a lot for that response, Sapper!

I just want to point out what has been said many times and what always affects the outcome of campaigns: supplies.

At 'Market Garden' the Allies' supply lines extended whilst the Germans' shortened. Thus, plus lack of adequate intelligence reports are a recipy for disaster. No matter how good the soldiers are nor how genial the plan is.

 

Absolutely right!
the supply chain was at that time abysmal, but that does not mean that we should not have gone all out for Arnhem. If this event is looked at sensibly, then you will find that the rate of advance through Holland was quite spectacular.

Our job was to advance on the Eastern side through the Limburg area, We got cut off, the Germans had cut the single road behind us, Thus we had to live on captured German rations, I shall never forget the bloody great tins of herrings that looked uncommonly like anti-tank mines. Nor can I, in my life again! eat a herring YUK! I dont mind fighting a war, but having to live on that crap was the ultimate in disgusting rations.

I wonder what happened to the young girl that washed all my filthy clothes while I slept in the bloody pig sty, To the day I leave this mortal coil, I shall never forget the stench of that bloody awful pig smell. But she was a lovely young lady washing my clothes, for we were both really kids. I had to grab a pile of wet clothes and slung them in the half track, I dont think I ever used them again.
Brian tell me lads is it really 60 years ago?

 

Already 60 years this September, Brian...

Thanks a lot for the response. I like those kind of stories —like the one you've just told about the pigs, yourself and the pretty girl— because when reading my grandfather's WWI diaries I've found a lot of them. He was in France in WWI and had a lot to mock about the French and his English comrades.

 

Cheers! Yes 60 years is a long time. though not for us. I just wish I was fit enough to go back to Normandy, and perhaps to Holland, I have never been back, I need far too much care. I shallbe going to the Tank Museum area where we are to be served by the army at lunch should be nice..
Brian

 

Dear Brian,

I am very happy to have found this forum and your input!
I am a member of a Dutch Study- and Living History group here in Holland.
We often take part in displays at the Overloon museum, once site of the battle.
Here we portray Dutch civilians during the war.
Not knowing much about Overloon before I started this 'reenactment', now I am very interested in it.
Especially since talkin local civilians who were there at the time, or in the area.
Also having been to Arnhem a few times I am happy to meet another person who was there at the time.
I could ask you a million things!

I would like to invite you to visit our website, you'll see we mostly have a interest in the civilian side of things.
Any stories you would have about the Dutch, the resistance, or the collaborators, are welcome!
I would love to hear a allied soldier view on the Dutch back then.
And of course if you ever come to Holland I would be proud to make sure you get a nice welcome at the museum, whos owner I know very well.

www.nederland4045.nl

With regards,

 

Anyone care to comment on the effect of Monty not listening to the local intelligence given to him trough Prince Bernhard as head of the Dutch resistance?
Apperantly local intelligence warned the allies about certain roads not being useable for the kind of transport they had in mind, some of the ground being to soft for vehicles, streets to narrow, etc.
Im not sure about the details but I do know that the resistance supplied the allies with information that they decided not to follow up on.

 

At least it was a known fact that the Germans had arrested in 1942 some Dutch Resistance members and used them to get material and new spies until late 1943 when the Germans´ game was revealed. This might have something to do with trusting the Dutch Resistance.

[ 13. April 2005, 10:21 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

 

At the end of 1941 the Dutch Resistance was very effectively penetrated by the Abwehr ( with the help of a collaborator )in the operation code-named 'North Pole'.

False communications were relayed to the Dutch section of SOE in London and as a result, between 1942 and early 1944, 60 agents, 15 tons of supplies, 50 radio sets, 2,000 pistols and revolvers, 900 automatic weapons, 8,000 grenades 50,000 rounds of ammunition and 500,000 guilders in cash were dropped straight into German hands. In addition, twelve bombers were shot down by the waiting Luftwaffe after the drops.

It was only after two courageous Dutch agents, Ben Ubbink and Pieter Dourlein, escaped to Switzerland in late '43 and made a full report to London, that 'North Pole' was terminated.

However, senior British officials remained deeply suspicious of the Dutch Underground and this certainly prejudiced 'Market Garden', both before and after the Operation commenced.

 

True, just like all resistance groups troughout Europe some parts of the Dutch resistance was infiltrated by the Germans.
However the intelligence on the area was given by Dutch resistance members who were still considered okay, the information was analyzed and then given to Prince Bernhard who could in many cases easily validate it.
Afterall when someone tells you a road is too narrow for certain vehicles and the sides of the road are too soft to drive over this is something easily checked.
Besides the whole Englandspiel was a SOE setup that had ended by this time.

 

Yes this is the so-called Englandspiel, recently new files have confirmed Dutch suspicions that the SOE didnt mess up but actually knew about everything and continued the game to secure D-day.

Either way, it wasnt just the Dutch resistance that was in many cases ignored, also Dutch intelligence officers, departments, soldiers, etc, attached to the Allied forces.
Their information about the dropzones and the distance to the bridge could have made a difference.
Some people even suggest all this information was ignored simply because Montgomery didnt take Berhard serious.

http://www.arnhemarchive.org/RepDutch.htm

Either way, he was told that he should attack at a certain date because the Germans around Arnhem were retreating, he didnt believe the intelligence and attacked later, when new troops had entered the area.
Montgomery indeed didnt trust the resistance or didnt take their information serious, in this case he made a mistake.
Lack of intelligence failed the operation some think, the Dutch were not consulted and in this case they should have been, not just the local resistance but many Dutch who had already been liberated, those fighting in the Allied army for years and those in the high command and government in exile could have helped.

 

Certainly, from a tactical point of view, it was an error not to utilise local intelligence once the operation was underway. This failure has frequently been admitted since.

As for launching the operation earlier, I'm not sure that this would have been feasible under the circumstances ; preparations were rushed as it was, leading to many of the failures which together doomed 'Market Garden' ( tactical air support, to give just one example ).

Allied forces tended to distrust 'locals' not just in Holland but in other theatres ; I used to know an Italian partisan who recounted to me his frustrations at not being given credence by US forces.

Although lack of attention to local intelligence is a factor in the 'Market Garden' tragedy, it was only one of many flaws, none of which caused it to fail on their own, but added together - well, we know the rest.....

 

Yes I think thats probably the whole of the story, many mistakes made, all together leading to its failure.
The failure causing thousands to die in Holland that wasnt liberated till may 45.
Still, some of the information 'ignored' by the allies could have made a huge difference.