Admiral Kimmel's Family Seek Reputation Restoral

In working from memory so excuse a lack of precision, but the lack of intell shared about Japanese espionage (IIRC the source was FBI), i.e. the request for Pearl Harbor ship berthing locations and sailing schedules. The failure to timely notify Kimmel when the last 14 part message was decoded and it became apparent the timing indicated Pearl Harbor. Then you have the over compartmentalization that hampered proper analysis of raw inteligence. Pearl Harbor not having access to J-19(?) decrypts where Japan seemed to be particularly interested in ship positions. Washington interpreted it as probably related to sabotage and Kelly Turner wouldn't allow the message texts to be sent to Pearl, where an alternate, and correct interpretation possibly would have been reached.

I'm not suggesting any of the revisionist arguments such as "Roosevelt knew", nor am I trying to absolve Kimmel or Short for what in retrospect were poor decisions. I am just stating that internal dysfunction in Washington shares in the blame.

I agree with an internal NSA assessment on the issue that was released through a Freedom of Information Act request, (FOIA Case#51633);

Pearl Harbor still has a poignant relevance today to us as cryptologists, as well as to
us as Americans. The conclusions are as timeless as the problem we confronted.
First, interservice and intraservice rivalry always loses. If the coordination between
Army and Navy was bad in Washington and in Hawaii, it was even worse within the
Navy itself. Admiral Turner unquestionably harmed the defense effort through
overzealous aggrandisement and turf quarrels. It was inexcusable then - it is inexcusable
today. And it can be seen everywhere one goes in the Federal Government.
There is a delicate balance between the requirements of secrecy and the needs of the
customer. At Pearl Harbor this balance was not properly struck. Information was kept
from field commanders on whose shoulders the administration had placed a great deal of
responsibility. Information did not flow because we feared losing the source. It remained
bottled up in Washington, serving as small talk for intelligence professionals, State
Department officials, and a limited number of operational staff planners. It is not easy to
achieve a balance, but it must be done, constantly, in thousands of daily decisions over
disclosure and dissemination. We face the same decisions today, in far greater quantity,
though with no greater consequence. We weren't smart about it then. Are we now?​

*Emphasis mine
With rigorous analysis of all sources it is hard to see how we could have missed the
signs. There were too many of them to miss. Sigint and Humint (there was no Photint)
provided enough information to alert even the most complacent. But they were not being
integrated and reported in thoughtful, prescient reports. They were being shuttled about
Washington in black bags, fragmented and uncorrelated. Wohlstetter's "noise" thesis
applies to the situation as it existed in 1941. It was a situation made to order for surprise.
Should the cryptologic community have been more active in analysis and
interpretation? Should we report conclusions? When Safford read the bomb plot message,
he wrote a report for Kimmel containing analytical conclusions and a blunt warning
about possible attack. In an epic battle among Turner, the intelligence professionals, and
Naval communicators, the effort was squashed, and the message was never sent. The
issue haunts us today as it did then and has never been completely resolved.​

​

Yeah but how do you cashier Short for getting his planes destroyed on the ground and then give MacArthur a pass when he has the same thing transpire except he had access to "Magic" and had a nine hour heads up that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor?
My personal opinion is that Kimmel and Short were convinced to postpone a full hearing on their culpability for the good of the nation and the war effort. Had they relieved Emperor MacArthur, his ego was such he wouldn't have fallen on his sword for the good of the country, but would have tried to take the leadership in Washington down with him.

 

Price is right on this...The "Bomb Plot" was transmitted using the low-level J-19 code, and later, the ship messages were in the even lower-grade PA-K2 code.


Overall, I believe that the focal point has unfortunately shifted to what did Kimmel and Short not know. When it should be focused on what they did know, what they did with that knowledge, and what one knew, but did not tell the other. By looking deeper at these aspects the command failures of Kimmel and Short becoming more glaring.

Don't even get me started on MacArthur...

Problem is...That is also a strike against Kimmel. Short is expecting advance warning from the long-range air reconnaissance that the Navy was supposed to be flying. Except Short was never informed that the reconnaissance was not being flown. As a result the radar is only being used for training purposes, the Triple-A was in a woefully prepared state for immediate action, and a small number of fighters were kept in a state of advance readiness.

 

Unfortunately, more shop talk is what was needed...Not less.

 

Just putting this out there, so don't shoot the messenger.
How much of what has been mentioned can also be assigned to the "We're America and no-one would dare attack us" mindset? Is there an element of that?

 

If they had won, they would have taken the credit. They lost, so they can take their share of the blame. If a commander can't do that, he is no commander.

 

Most certainly, it is reasonably well documented.

Also, because it was beyond known Japanese Navy capabilities at the time. Japan had only begun experimenting with underway refueling, and then only with small warships.

 

AFAIK, that is the Navy way. As captain of a ship, you are responsible for all that occurs, even if you are sound asleep in the your cabin when the ship runs aground.

 

The primary responsibility for the Air Force in the Philippines would be with Brereton, not Mac

 

Except Mac was the one that was "Large and in Charge," and Brereton answered to Mac. The Far East Air Force was under Mac's command, it was Mac's responsibility, no matter which underling he put in command of it.

 

Was he assigned directly by Mac? Or by Washington.
I have to disagree, a commander is always responsible for HIS forces, regardless of who is in command.
So, yes, while Mac has some responsibility, it does not absolve Brereton

True enough, but suppose Mac had keeled over dead on the morning of the 8th, does that mean that the FEAF should fall apart?

I'm seeing a command failure in both men, but do you hold Brereton blameless?

 

I'm just curious to hear your opinion of Brereton's role, and how much of the blame does he deserve for the destruction of the PI air force