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Ambassador Grew sent Pearl Harbor attack warning

Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by DogFather, Dec 7, 2009.

  1. Tristan Scott

    Tristan Scott Member

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    I agree with that, sure, there were officers who were privvy to the fact that the IJN was competent, my statement was for Americans in general, I'm just saying that if they didn't think we could do it they didn't think the IJN could either. Obviouslythe American Naval leadership in Washington was assuming the main push would be to the south, which it was, don't forget that PH was a raid-in and out=no follow up. Any naval strategist at the time would assume that the carriers would support the enormous effort to the south. It is only with hindsight that we can see that the southern attacks could be almost entirely supported by Japanese air fleets in Formosa and Indo-China and by the light carriers not assigned to Nagumo, leaving him free to raid Hawaii, Ceylon and Darwin during the first months of the war. In reality these raids were support for the southern campaign except for the fact that they didn't catch our carriers at Pearl.
     
  2. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    There's a book to be found in finding what, exactly, the US authorities thought of the Japanese. I've found that impressions vary as widely on that as on any other topic we'd want to mention. As stated above, the US military in the Pacific were very concerned about the Japanse, and the Weekly Intelligence Summaries certainly don't dismiss them as nothing to worry about.
     
  3. syscom3

    syscom3 Member

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    There also was an element of racial prejudice involved. Its hard to comprehend these days it, but the Japanese (and Asians in general) back then were not thought of being highly competent in "modern warfare".

    I think many of the wests military and political leaders didn't think the Japanese could do it, simply because they weren't "white".
     
  4. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Almost everybody was "casually racist" back then. The dean of a large American University said in a speech that "if a black male is capable of being taught to do more complicated jobs, perhaps we should consider letting them do those jobs." The Japanese considered all non-Japansese as gaijin, foreign devils. And Hitler, of course, considered the US a race of mongrels because we allowed blacks and Hispanics to even live here. The military planners, however, were held to a more rigorous standard of reality.
     
  5. Tristan Scott

    Tristan Scott Member

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    I'm afraid that we're beleaguering a point that I only intended as tangental. Of course naval leaders in the know like Admiral Hart and Captains Turner and Rooks are on record acknowledging the capbilities of the IJN. Likewise there is a lot of evidence that leaders in Washington did not think they were in the same league as the USN. The PM of Britain tragically understimated the Japanese when he sent the PoW and a Battlecruiser to Singapore without air support.
    The real point here is to underline what OP pointed out upthread and that is the attack on Pearl was a completely audacious move. No one seriously thought they would do it.
     
    brndirt1 likes this.
  6. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    I'm not sure I agree with the "No one seriously thought they would do it"
    part of this post. Here is a letter to dated Jan 24, 1941.

    Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox advised the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. Knox wrote: "If war eventuates with Japan, It is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack (2) Air torpedo plane attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5) Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire".

    He is my source: Attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese Armed Forces-77th Congress, Senate Document No. 159 (Roberts Commission).

    Guess who appointed the Roberts Commission.....FDR. He packed the
    the commission with his cronies, looking to absolve himself and his staff,
    in Washington, of any of the blame for the PH disaster.
     
  7. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    DogFather, you need to start looking at the source, and not the secondary source. The item you're quoting is from the Martin-Bellinger Report. Now go look at their testimony and see what they said about that ESTIMATE. You'll see it's not a smoking gun. Potential is not intention.
     
  8. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Here is where I got the 6 dangers letter from:

    Roberts Commission

    FINDING OF FACT:

    VII

    In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the
    Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation
    had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific
    Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. The writer stated:

    "If war eventuates with Japan, It is believed easily possible that
    hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or
    the naval base at Pearl Harbor."
    The writer stated that the
    "inherent possibilities of a major disaster "
    warranted further speedy action to
    "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid
    of the character mentioned * * *"
    The letter proceeded:
    "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are
    considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack,
    (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by
    gunfire.

    This is a copy and paste from the report. The report goes on to say:

    "Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at
    about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies".

    I was just trying to get a head of the what's your sources question!
     
  9. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Now read the Martin-Bellinger report. And Gen. Martin and Adm. Bellinger's testimony. They're all online. Get the big picture instead of quote mining. You'll understand the issue better.
     
  10. mikebatzel

    mikebatzel Dreadnaught

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    I see you completly left out the part that states:
    emphisis mine
     
  11. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Secondary sources tend to delete information they don't find convenient. This frequently leads to outbreaks of foot-in-mouth disease.
     
  12. Tristan Scott

    Tristan Scott Member

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    Don't you think that if the Secretay of the Navy thought there was a probablility that the Japanese would attck the fleet in PH that he would have expressed that to his commander there?

    Is there any evidence that nox still held the belief in November or December of 1941? I believe at that time everyone was looking for an attack in Malaysia.
     
  13. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    I don't think it was necessary to re-warn Kimmel, about a possible air
    attack on PH. He had been warned, once should have been enough.

    In defence of Adm Kimmel, had he gotten the message, that the USS Ward had spotted a sub, trying to sneak in the harbor. As soon as it was rec'd, he would have taken action sooner, which may have reduced our
    losses.

    Ammo lockers would be opened, ships boilers would have been cookin',
    allowing them to maneuver. History, of the attack, might have been very different.
     
  14. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Kimmel DID get the message. He left Short waiting for him (Sunday morning golf date) and went straight to his office. The fleet was already reacting, to the sub threat. "Five minute" destroyer was sent out and the "fifteen minute" destroyer was getting ready to move out.

    Kaminsky is a clue here, if you want to review the materials.
     
  15. mikebatzel

    mikebatzel Dreadnaught

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    Of course he doesn't want to look at the material. It would defeat everything he is advocating
     
  16. Tristan Scott

    Tristan Scott Member

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    Kimmel was never given a warning that an attack on PH was expected in December. It wasn't expected, that's the point.

    I believe there is a consensus among most historians that Kimmel as well as the ranking intel officers at PH were not privvey to the diplomatic code deciphering going on in Washington. This fact has caused the conspiracy nuts to foam at the mouth for decades, however it appears that it was a turf issue rather than any conspricay to keep the commanders in the dark. The fact is that while there is evidence that data was obtained that should have led our intellegence people to conclude that an attack on PH was imminent, there is no evidence that anyone actually put the pieces together. I believe had the data been given to Kimmel and Rochefort that they would have seen the danger.


    It could have been worse, one of the big ships coould have been sunk in one of the channels blocking the harbor for weeks, or even months, or if they got out they could have been sunk in deeper waters-unsalvagable.
     
  17. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    "The fact is that while there is evidence that the data was obtained that should have led our intelegence people to conclude that an attack on PH was imminent, there is no evidence that anyone actually put the pieces together."

    Ummm, which 'data' are you referring to?
     
  18. Tristan Scott

    Tristan Scott Member

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    Here's a snip from a pretty good article on the subject written by a member of the Air War College:

    MAGIC also intercepted messages sent to Japanese agents throughout the Pacific and
    United States. These messages were sent in the simpler codes known as J-19 or PA-K2,
    and were translated and sent to national and military decision-makers with the Purple
    decryptions.11 Most contained requests for information concerning shipping, ports, cities,
    and installations. A small number were sent between Tokyo and the Japanese Consulate
    in Honolulu, and are important in the analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
    The first message was intercepted on September 24 and provided instructions for
    Tadeo Yoshikawa, an undercover Japanese naval intelligence officer assigned to the
    Honolulu Consulate. It specified:
    Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
    along the following lines insofar as possible:
    1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas.
    (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you
    like.)
    2. Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
    3. Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
    (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
    4. Area C. East Loch.
    5. Area D. Middle Loch.
    6. Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes. 2. With
    regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you
    report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at
    wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. if
    possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
    there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)12
    This MAGIC intercept became known as the “bomb plot message” because it created a
    grid to plot exactly the location of ships in the harbor.13




    I believe if Cdr. Rochefort had been given this information he would have been alarmed, don't you?

    But there were failures in the system. You can read the entire article here:
    http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/ADA397295.pdf
     
  19. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Ah, the "bomb plot" message. You know, of course, that there was no need for a "bomb plot"? The pilots had a pretty good view of the harbor from two miles up. The "bomb plot" was simply a way to save telegraph fees. It wasn't considered a red flag at the time, and it isn't a red flag now.
     
  20. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Pls, if you going to tell me to review materials, send me the link!

    All of you, with a bais towards just pretending, FDR did not have a lot of the responsible for our initial defeats of the Pacific War, follow the same
    pattern.

    1. Say I'm a conspiracy nut.
    2. Deny the info in my post, without giving any source.
    3. What's your source, when I give it, that source is no good.

    Maybe you should all read this book: A biography about Adm Richardson (by Skipper Steely), Pearl Harbor Countdown, on page 363:

    Richardson wrote down his judgement about the Japanese & the mistakes made by FDR and his civilian staff:

    1. The President & the Secetary of State viewed the Japanese through
    rose-colored glasses, when they did not actully misread their
    intentions.

    2. The President consistently overestimated his ability to control
    the actions of other nations whose interests opposed our own.

    3. The President's responsibility for our initial defeats in the
    Pacific war was direct, real and personal.

    Adm Richardson was forced to retire in 1942, right in the middle of a world war. I don't think he has gotten the credit he deserves, for trying to
    protect the Pacific fleet and the men under his command.
     

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