Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

But we will not be permitted to hold the resources. We know from past attempts that Chaing will accept nothing less the the total surrender of Japanese forces in China. Historically, the Japanese and American proposals were not all that different from each other. One of the biggest differences was Japans unwillingness to abandon her puppet governments, and the US view that they have no right to exist.

 

Perhaps then the best thing to do is to ask the US to help mediate an agreement with Chaing and mention some acceptable compromises. It will likely come to naught as far as the war with China is concerned but if it lessons tensions with the US then it may still be valuable. Likewise a plebiside could be discussed for IndoChina with the goal of that area becoming independent of France. That should win points with the US and again buy time and perhaps resources.

Finding a way to gain peace with China would have considerable merit but rather takes this exercise in directions I'm not sure it was intended to go. Might be worthwhile exploring in a subsequent one.

 

Remember that my proposals are based on offering Chiang the one thing he wants most, a chance to go after Mao.

 

We have what I'll call for the purposes of this exercise some design studies of AA improvements to light cruisers (what was actually done to them historically). #7 5.5" gun could be replaced by a twin 5"/40; this also required removal of #5 gun, presumably for weight compensation. I am not aware of any fire control improvements associated with this configuration. The catapult would be (was) removed in order to mount additional light AA guns (25mm); in the Sendai class it also blocked the sky arcs of the #7 position.

A complete AA conversion (Isuzu) removes all seven 5.5" and could carry three twin 5"/40 with a Type 94 DP director on the foretop. There would be ten twin/triple 25mm, or I would suggest a smaller number of 40mm.

This indicates how little potential the smaller Tatsuta class have, which I why I suggest using them essentially as gunboats, not because they are better than something else in that role but because they are not good for much else.

AA improvements including the complete reconstruction still retained the ships' eight torpedo tubes, four per side. Removing these might buy an additional twin 5"/40 say in #6 position. Conventional wisdom is that destroyer squadron leaders need to have torpedos themselves, but I'm not sure I agree with that. When leading eight destroyers, the cruiser's own torpedos are a small contribution to the squadron's total, especially since only half can be fired at one time. The leader might do better to provide capabilities not possessed by the led, such as improved AA defense for the cruiser herself and the squadron.

I mention the 5"/40 because we have information on installing those on light cruisers. Twin 5"/40 weighed about 24 tons. I also looked up the new 3.9"/65 in navweaps (or should I say in our ordnance files). The only weight given is 38 tons which I suspect is for the enclosed mount used in the Akizuki class. The open-back Oyodo type twin mount might be more comparable to the 5"/40. The individual guns are close in weight, 6731lb for the 3.9"/65 and 6100 for the 5"/40.

If anyone wants to retain catapults in the Kuma or Nagara classes, we could still give them two twin DP mounts in #1 and #7 positions, the Type 94, and several 40mm mounts. Not particularly suggesting that, just another option.

I expect we will make use of scout planes from our heavy cruisers, which carry three each; perhaps some of our friends who have not previously commented can suggest whether they think additional Tone type ships are desirable. Another option, if we really like the "seaplane cruiser" concept, is more Oyodos (as many as eight were planned at one point) using the available 6.1" turrets and mounting the new 3.9"/65 AA guns.

We might be able to defer large-scale production of escort ships. I suggest that all of our shipping travel in convoys; even a small convoy with a couple of escorts is much safer than steaming independently. We have some escort ships already, and we can use our older destroyers, torpedo boats, etc. It's hard to predict exactly how many escorts we will need, or how effective enemy submarines might be, but the C/D type kaibokan can be built quickly if needed. Hopefully most of our sea lanes will be safe from air attack, so we could also hold off on AA escorts until we see what need develops. Again I invite anyone's comments.

retain at least 1/3 of our graving dock capacity for repairs and maintenance seems like a good initial estimate.

 

I just read yesterday that the USN, in an attempt to reduce budget and modernize fleet capabilities, has decided to push Congress to decommission 7 Aegis equipped cruisers, including the USS Port Royal (2013), over the next few years. The council may want to consider reducing cruisers or going with the Oyodo cruiser as Karanada suggests. I believe the scout planes are vital to TF security. This cruiser reconsideration may allow us greater flexibility to accommodate other pressing needs. :bb-cruising:

AND

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...t_Royal_(CG_73)_aft_elevated_drydock_view.jpg Port Royal in dry dock following 2009 grounding off Pearl.

Thinking about this. sniff.....Respectfully, An old cruiser / tin can salt. Loved the Bird Farms but they stayed on the water too long. Sorry, I digress.

 

To give Chiang anything he wants, we need to have it before! So if we have the chance to occupy larger territories of China, and we have this possiblility, than we can go back to a smaller area and say to Chiang: We can give you this part of your country as a sign of good will. And we can give you the support to fight against your foe Mao. But only if you will make this agreement with us. Otherwise we will find you and you can have a cup of tea with your ancestors in heaven! There is no chance for a withdrawal of our troops out of China. This would give our enemies in a future time the possibility to start actions against our country with Bombers, the Navy and under some circumstances a invasion fleet, plus it will cut down our own supply lines. We must hold this Country under control. No matter how unpleasant it will be and how a agreement with Chiang may look like. The occupation of some of the Islands are neccessary, but if we want to have to much of them it will split our forces over the Pacific and the Chineses sea. And to guarantee a well working supply of all of those islands seems to be as hard as to fight the Chinese. A statistic says that a besieged island with really good prepared defenders will survive a time range between 3 weeks up to maximum 8 weeks without any further supply. And we would loose a lot of good men in such fightings. To me there will be no real alternative to it.

 

I was confused by the two cruisers also. As far as I can tell they were the Ibuki Class, and the first one not laid down until '42. If this is the case we're not locked in and can change. There is conflicting information about the Ibuki's, some sources claim they were to be repeats of the Tone class, other sources state they were repeats of the Mogami's. I would appreciate any clarification on this anyone has.

Symphonic Poet wrote:

We have a number of merchant shipbuilding yards also, I don't think I gave their locations and capacities. We also have a number of naval repair yards where conversions can be made, without stealing capacity from our new construction.

I don't know if Oyodo or Agano would be best converted to CLAA's because they are a more modern type. The second Agano the Noshiro could be completed to a modified design since she was just laid down in September. Either look at the feasibility of adding a triple 6.1 turret aft instead of the seaplanes and at least 6 x 3.9" twin turrets or build her from here up as a light carrier.

 

The Pacific Oceans Area is to be Mike Batzel's area of operation and he stated earlier in the thread that he wanted to expand the number of SNLF's for the use in his AO. I am in agreement with this concept. Most of the islands are undefended or lightly defended, those that aren't can be bypassed and isolated to "die on the vine". No one has yet suggested that we invade New Guinea, that was one campaign that historically used a large number of Army assets. We have also had a good deal of discussion on, not abusing the native populations. Historically, the Japanese were in virtually all cases greeted as liberators. It was atrocities by our troops that turned the population against us. We seek to avoid this and recruit indigenous troops heavily. We can arm them with much of the equipment you give up when you upgrade your TOE as was discussed earlier in the thread, if we decide to pursue that option.

We must resist over expanding, but a chain of defensive positions (islands) to protect the home islands, IMO, is something we really have to have.

There is a way around this. First we will require adequate aircraft and pilots. We are working on that. Then we develop our bases in clusters, with mutually supporting airfields. The main base that the cluster is based upon will be our main supply point and we will run convoys to it.. The surrounding bases will be minimally protected and be can supported and supplied from the main base, primarily by barges. When the enemy attacks one of the bases they must hit them all simultaneously or risk a counter strike. If we counter strike we call for Kido Butai, in the meantime we strike and aim for the transports. If they continue to press their attack they risk the full fury of our carrier strike force and our cruisers will hit their landing areas and beacheads at night. We will counter-land with overwhelming force when the westerners strike. The problem with Guadalcanal is the Japanese were overconfident and didn't react to the initial landing quickly enough. When they did land ground forces they landed too few. Mike won't make these type errors.

 

This is just one source that I found, Bob san.
I will compare others later but this may give you an idea about the Ibuki cruiser class comparison. Interesting question.

Ibuki Class Source Materials of IJN (Vessels - Ibuki class Heavy cruisers) The link has an index and you can compare the other classes within the site.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/tone-ca-schem.htm

Well formatting issues preclude posting the table now but the link may help. I'll try and get to it later.

 

Thank you for your patience!

 

For clusters of AFB only New Guinea/the Solomons and the Philipines meet the criteria. The Marshalls dont have enough islands for large bombers. The Marrianas are not big enough for a 1944 type US task force. The problem with NG and Solomons is that the US will have bases in Australia that can match ours and we would lose an attrition battle. I am gaming in WITP Japan cramming the Philipines with planes and with Kido at Manila I hope to neutralize the American carriers. For China part of the issue we are taking areas that do not have resources and we are losing men in battles with nothing to show for it.

 

Strange, my map shows lots of resources at there where i want to go?

 

I may have contributed to the confusion. I interpreted SP's two Tones as an addition to what was built historically, which led me to question whether we had the resources. Of course there is a historical basis for them in the Ibuki class, two of which were laid down in 1942. The second ship, No. 301, laid down June 1, was stopped and scrapped almost immediately to free up the slipway for the carrier Amagi; apparently someone made some very prompt decisions after Midway! It seems building sites were indeed a concern.

The Ibukis were originally intended to be similar to the Tones; but after a couple of years operating experience with those ships, the IJN returned to a conventional design similar to the 8-inch-gun version of Mogami.

I don't know if Oyodo or Agano would be best converted to CLAA's because they are a more modern type. The second Agano the Noshiro could be completed to a modified design since she was just laid down in September. Either look at the feasibility of adding a triple 6.1 turret aft instead of the seaplanes and at least 6 x 3.9" twin turrets or build her from here up as a light carrier.

Oyodo is the one which lacks an after turret, and I think adding a turret where none was designed for would be a major structural change, probably not feasible. My recommendation, whatever we end up deciding about "seaplane cruisers" in general, is to leave this one ship as is except for additional light AA.

If we did delete the hangar, it might be feasible to mount addtional 3.9s, they appear to be simple pedestal type mounts, but ammunition supply would be a problem. According to that very helpful link you provided recently, the 3.9" ammunition was stored forward and brought up to a handling room in that bit of superstructure on the main deck between the turrets and the bridge, then simply carried along the deck to the guns. Additional mounts further aft would be harder to keep supplied, and total magazine capacity is a constraint unless some additional interior space can be found, perhaps from aviation ordnance if they carried any significant amount for what were primarily reconnaissance aircraft.

I think the light cruisers are too small and narrow to make useful carriers. We could replace the Aganos' 6" with 3.9s if we want to go all-AA, or we could just accept a few modern surface combatants (American plans include some 40 new cruisers, mostly 10-13,000-ton). They might look a bit odd as AA ships, they could have enclosed 3.9" mounts in place of the turrets but would probably have to stick to open shielded types in lieu of their 3" AA guns.

If we feel we need more scouting capacity in the carrier force, maybe we should just build another carrier. An Unryu is not much larger than a Tone, uses literally the same engines and boilers, costs about 90 million yen vs. 60 million, and of course offers vastly more aviation capability.

 

The main resource which has driven us to consider expanding the war is oil; if we have options for oil supply other than the East Indies, this would be a real good time to mention it....

 

None that I see, if there is another source that has slid under the radar, I too would be interested.

 

Frankly, I think this is not the way to go, the US is solidly in support of the KMT, and nothing short of withdrawl will satisfy the US.

OK, there is in fact another option that I would suggest.

 

gebirg, even if the resources are there how much did Japan actually get out side of Manchuria.

 

most honourable sirs, i was just doing some map work and realized that kunming was approx.400 miles from hanoi, and that chunking was approx. a further 400 miles away. perhaps if we were to send a force of about two divisions thru the jungle to kunming we could take it, remove the american mercenarie pilots and thier support staff there,use the airfields to cover an advance towards chunking.

 

The oil is to find outside of China at Borneo and Sakhalin. But we need to have some more than oil too. I fear that cruiser and destroyers made fully out of wood will swim fine, but aren´t that good against shells!

 

I didnt meant the resources at the Mandchuria, i meant the resources at the southern part of China, there are Oil at Nanchung and between Nanchung and the coast are Tungsten, Manganese, Copper, Lead, Zinc, Antimony, Tin and Iron ore.