Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Colonel Bobimoto, that is true for sure and is to accept for the most of the units. What i want is to prevent a third Column like Noka Shijin pointed out. Maybe that we have to sort the foul ones from the cream of the crop and change them in their countries from North to South in an irregular rotation.

For my Special Forces, from when on can i train them and how will i know which of my Army commanders from a Captains to a Colonel level is good in which special aera of interest. ( Tcatics, mountain ops, search and kill tactics...)? To me it makes sense to work in smaller units with them more Regimental level than Divisonal. It makes them quicker in training and during the action. And for that do we need special camps or barracks for that?

For the Engineer Troops, i want to have some of them really good motorized, some of the Combat Engineers too. I´need them as "Quick Reaction Forces" because i won´t being slowed down by destroyed bridges, crossings or railways.

The mortars on the riverine boats have been in my plans too, and exactly for the reason you´ve mentioned! If this is to much time and costs to develop a recoil mechanism, how would our experts think of using blocks of rubber under a steelplate to reduce the recoil that is going into the ships sturcture?

Good, than we´ll let the fighter and fighter bomber Squads in this size and are going up to a size of 24 Bombers per Squadron. It is correct that the enemy has far more troubles to attack a larger unit with its higher defensive fire. What i want is to keep the work a bit simple for our escort fighters so that they have to guard only 2 bombers per fighter. Is that OK? But at this place i need the input of my Navy collegues how big they will size their units.

The Command Chain is a thing that we really should discuss! From my experiences it is slowing down any action by waiting of a answer when it has to go over more than 2 levels.

The next really important fact is the recon. How quick can i have information to enemies troop size, moves and so on? Whats about the radio communication to spread out my orders, are they in good shape or do we need to organize them?

Lots of questions for you Colonel Bobimoto, but they are important!

Thank you much for your excellent work.

General Nishio

 

Found some info on Japanese small boats.
Tullys Port • View topic - JAPANESE MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
lists a warships international volume 44 #3 as having an article on them.

Here's a sample subchaser TROM from combined fleet (if you want to include them in the "small boats" catagory):
Japanese Subchasers
Here's the patrol boat page at combined fleet
Japanese Patrol Boats
River gunboats
Japanese Gunboats
Here's one on escorts that contains some interesting info:
Japanese Escorts

Industiral planning was not a trivial exercise even at that point in time and especially without computers.
And the subchaser page:
Japanese Subchasers

 

Thank you very much for answering my question Admiral Takao. The Emperor was truly wise when he selected you as his Naval Advisor.

Admiral Takao just provided our solution and the historical references to prove the idea is practical. A simple, inexpensive, field expediant solution to the problem.

"The CWS experimented with mortars mounted on landing craft, including the LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) and LCTs (Landing Craft Tank). It took the view that mortars could support an amphibious assault in the crucial period of an invasion, after the naval and air bombardment let up so that troops could land. Mortars could not be placed directly on the bottom of landing craft since there was no way to keep the recoil from kicking mortars backward when the piece was fired. In addition, the terrific pounding might damage the bottom of the vessel. Technicians rigged an oblong wooden frame, filled with a mixture of sand and sawdust, on the floor of the craft. A thick slab of wood (several sheets of plywood) grooved to take the bottom Y-spade of the baseplate, sat on top of the sand-sawdust filling. The Amphibious Training Command, Camp Carabelle, Florida, to which CWS sent the firing platform, saw the utility of the device and asked the service to design a standard model."

We can mount them on our gunboats and landing craft and he even provided the method for mounting them. I'll finish working up a proposal and we'll submit it to the council. What size mortar? I was thinking 120-150mm, losts of bang for our buck, a floating artillery battery! Naval guns are great for certain targets where flat trajectory and penetration are critical, but a big HE round dropping in from above is just the ticket for handling the soft, squishy, things.

It will be your AO, you are free to train, not train, shift units, change commanders whatever. Per our alternate timeline the attempted coup takes place on Thursday night 02 October, 1941. Belasar will be appointed the new Prime Minister by the Emperor the following morning Friday 03 October. Let's give the weekend to get organized and to select and call the various members to Tokyo. First Council meeting Monday 06 October, so any time thereafter. If the council gets arround to appointing you that day, we could fly you to China and you could assume command as early as 07 October.

Upon assuming command you will be provided with a list of officers, their commands and skill/trait levels. At that time you can recommend that they be replaced and what traits you are looking for in that units commander. I will give you a list of possible replacement commanders and their traits. You choose and they will be re-assigned to your command. However, be advised that replacing some commanders costs political points, these are officers that because of reputation, friendships or political clout are hard to replace. Think MacArthur.

I'll add some independant special engineer battalions, organized along the lines you requested and you can attach them to units as needed. I'll even make a couple special airborne engineer battalions that can be airdropped in, though they'll be light on equipment. I'll add a combat engineer platoon to the TOE of each battalion in your Airborne Regiments, when you take command just upgrade them to the new TOE and the requisite trained manpower, weapons and equipment will be allocated, you'll just need to train them to standard.

 

The Type two flamethrower boats were called "Zippo Boats".
There was a bunker buster version with a high powered water cannon called "Douche Boats". We squids generally have a good sense of humor. A great ste for anyone who is interested is RiverVet.Com

The Four battles for Changsha are absolutely riveting to me. The IJA put forth so many resources for this important rail center and crossroad only to be pummeled each time. Symptomatic of their profound struggles within the country. Persistent anyway.

 

I believe the Romans used a similar solution for placing Onagers on top of walls. Without a buffer fireing them multiple times would start to crack the stones (or more likely the mortar/concrete holding them together) so a frame of wood packed with dirt was used as a shock absorber. Anyone who had studied siege engineering in the Western Ancient period would probably be familiar with it.

 

Dear Noka Shijin, thank you for your kind words and your believe in my skills! I hope that i´m worhty of your trust. And many thanks for offering your support to me!

All the best

General Nishio

 

Destroyer leaders, and light cruisers used in that role like our Kuma or the British C class, originated in WWI when destroyers were much smaller and had minimal command and control facilities. The increasing size of destroyers made almost all navies consider dedicated leaders less necessary. As mentioned earlier the RN, who originated the leader concept, ceased producing them with the Tribal class.

Is it possible to get an assessment of the need for leaders for effective command and control under current (i.e. game) conditions? Is there a limit to the number of ships a task force commander can manage? Or the distance over which he can exercise control?

The Kuma class: Kuma, Tama, Kitakami, Oi, and Kiso, plus the similar Nagara class: Nagara, Isuzu, Yura, Natori, Kinu and Abukuma, if converted to CLAA's, would be a great asset for providing AA protection to our carriers. I've been looking into what we could actually do conversion wise, the way it looks now, based upon space and weight, we could fit 14 x 3.9" guns in 7 twin mounts (12 of which could fire to each broadside) and 16 x 40mm bofors in 8 twin mounts, if we deleted the floatplanes and most of the torpedo tubes.

Great if we can do it, but it appears to be in excess of what these or comparable ships accommodated historically, even before we consider ammunition supply and manning. I hope for that number of AA guns it includes at least two Type 94 directors, also Type 95s for the 40mm, preferably one per mount. Any reason not to do the three Sendai class also? I suggest converting the ships as they rotate home for repair or upkeep, rather than pulling them all out at once. This will also allow us to get some operational experience with the cruisers in their squadron leader function, to help judge how essential they are in that role.

Does the "gadget" list distinguish between the two types of 3.9"/65 mounts, the "Oyodo" or "Akizuki" types unless we have a better designation? Can we compare them in terms of weight and rate of fire? I would like to finalize a design for AA-capable escort ships, whether or not we elect to build them at this time.

I agree that the Fuso/Ise class battleships should be left as they are except for improvements to AA firepower, electronics, etc. Either a partial or complete aviation conversion is a waste of resources for very marginal results. While they are not our most valuable assets, they are comparable to older battleships in both the USN and RN. If battleships end up playing a significant role in the coming war, we will need all of ours.

Hiyo and Junyo will carry around fifty aircraft, enough of an asset that we need to use them in more than just training or escort roles. Our general policy is to keep our carrier force concentrated, but let us not be dogmatic. This does not mean that six or eight or ten carriers are going to operate in one formation, but rather that task groups will operate in close proximity for mutual support; and that is how we should employ these two.

Nor does a general policy of concentration rule out the occasional need for a small carrier group for a specific operation, for which the Hiyo/Junyo division is an obvious candidate. For both these reasons, I would avoid designating them as scouting or CAP carriers or any such specific role, although they can take their turns in the duty rotation when serving with Kido Butai.

Speaking of conversions, does anyone feel strongly about proceeding with the conversion of Taigei to Ryuho? If the game system measures it accurately, that will be our least cost-effective conversion, requiring complete replacement of the engineering plant to get a mediocre carrier.

While it is good to share ideas with our allies, our situation may not always be analogous. Hopefully most of our sea lanes will be beyond the reach of hostile aircraft, whether for attack or scouting, so fighters to knock down snoopers may not be so crucial (somewhat like an earlier discussion of AA armament for escort ships).

There was also a discussion about using land-based fighters for CAP, when it was pointed out that it takes a large number of land-based aircraft flying in relays to provide the same level of coverage as smaller number on a carrier with the force or convoy. Although land-based patrol aircraft (usually multi-engine) have longer endurance than fighters, the situation is analogous; we might be better off with a few planes on an escort or merchant aircraft carrier.

 

Colonel Bobimoto,

again many thanks for your answers and your understanding of the situation!

Whats about using the Type97 150mm mortar?


Sincerely

General Nishio

 

Steverodger: I'm perfectly fine with the idea of designating a CAP duty carrier, but that duty should rotate through all the carriers in a force. Further, the IJN had plenty of CAP aircraft aloft at Midway at the time of SB strikes, however they were off position and the strikes arrived undetected and thus unopposed.

The D3A regularly carries nearly 700 pounds of bombs: the typical loadout is one 250 kg GP or semi-AP bomb under the fuselage and one 60 kg fragmentation bomb under each wing, for a total load of 310 kg. I believe we could probably carry a 500 kg AP bomb at reduced range, which might be acceptable attacking battleships. But the standard load is probably quite adequate for most purposes. She can reduce the effectiveness of enemy AA by doing topsides damage to heavily armored enemy units, which will then be more vulnerable to our torpedo carrying aircraft. She can do considerable structural and engineering damage to lighter units like cruisers or aircraft carriers, which are the greater threat to us.

In any event, it is our hope to replace the D3A fairly quickly. She is a good aircraft, but nearing the end of her useful frontline life-cycle. Once the teething problems of the D4Y can be solved she will replace the D3A on all our fast carriers.

Carronade: It is my understanding that the engineering plants on our destroyers are quite a lot larger than on comparable US and British destroyers, thus our destroyers appear on paper more spacious than they really are. I would agree with you that they're quite capable of operating independently in small numbers, say as many as six, but in numbers where it might be best to divide them into multiple formations is there sufficient space for the plotting and communications necessary for command and control? Or sufficient space for berthing flag crews?

 

Hiyo's

Support the idea of employing these two ships, along with our other light carrier with poor hanger/deck arraingements (Ryuhu?) with our slow battleline as an organic unit. Seems a wise corse of action.

Other than Yamato 4, I do not favor conversion or scrapping of any of our battleline. Shinano is a special case, if we can incorporate two hangers for a credible air compliment I favor conversion. If not the yard needs clearing and the hull scrapping. Taiho is acceptable to me if the others agree.

ASW, Convoys and Aircraft

Blimps are a novel idea, but we have no expierence with these craft and limited resources to employ on new research, so we must make what we have count.

Protecting our covoys do not require that we sink all enemy submarines, mearly keeping them from getting close enough to fire torpedos is enough. In my opinion aircraft are our best tool for forcing submarines to keep their distance from our transports.

Land based aircraft may not be the best tool, but until we can deploy enough CVE's/MAC's they remain a usefull option. As our older Nell's and Betty's are retired from frontline service in favor of more survivable units they can be profitably employed in this task.

As I see it we will have 5 major and several minor convoy routes to protect

Major routes,
!) Home Islands to and from Korea/North China
2) Home Islands to and from SRA for oil
3) Home Islands to and from our forward fleet base at Truk
4) Home Islands to and from Central/South China, Indochina, Malaya
5) Refined oil (once back up and running) from SRA to Truk

Minor routes,
1) Home Islands to Pacific island outposts Carolinas, Marshals, French Colonies
2) Home Islands to our Sothern Defence line Solomon's
3) Refined oil fro SRA to our seconday Fleet anchorage, Singapore or Rabaul
4) Burma Possibly
5) Phillipines eventually

While some could combine for portions of the journey at some point they will need to break apart to finish their journeys. Because of distance and the importance of oil for our industry in some cases there will likely be both an outbound and inbound convoy at the same time. This leads me to feel that any given time we will have 4 to 6 convoys at sea, possibly more.

I do not feel we can wait to begin producing CVE's/MAC's. My research indicates that apprximately a year is needed to convert a merchant man into a CVE and probably 4-6 months to create a MAC. Factor a 6 month period to develop an effectively trained unit and if we wait to 1943 to begin produce them then it will be 1944 before we begin to have anywhere near enough to properly do the job. This is much too late in my opinion.

I would like to see us commit to producing/starting 1 CVE per quarter, beginning with the last Qtr of 1941. Further that a certain percentage of new tanker hulls be complete as MAC ships. By mid 1944 I would like to see us have enough assets to provide 1 CVE and 2-3 MAC's per convoy. This would entail enough CVE's for 4-6 convoys plus enough spare hulls to allow for special taskins and for some to be down for refit and repair. In my mind this would be 12 CVE's and 20 to 30 MAC's. Alot yes but most if not all can be completed in civillian yards mostly if not entirely.

We cannot fail in protecting our conoys or we will never produce the tools our military must have to keep the enemy away from the Home Islands

 

Well, SP, if I had a crystal ball I might envision complex operations involving as many as twenty destroyers being commanded by an admiral from one of them (Ke, evacuation of Guadalcanal) but for now we'll have to see what either the game system or combat experience tells us. The IJN designed the Agano class for the destroyer flagship role, so apparently it was called for in their tactics or doctrine, whatever other navies did. It also provided a floatplane integral to the destroyer squadron, although the Aganos do not appear to have carried the E11A of the older ships.

The proposed AA improvements are not incompatible with the flagship role, indeed more AA firepower might be an asset to the destroyer squadron. If desired we could even retain the catapult and aircraft in the Kuma or Nagara classes, with a few fewer AA guns.

 

The idea of a squadron commander is to allow one person to concentrate on the battle and the captains to concentrate on what their ships are doing. Until we do get CVE I think the seaplane tenders are perfect for ASW coverage along with the AMC class ships that carry a seaplane or two. For Midway I know the issue was lack of control, but there still was a time when the need to recover the strike would have prevented more cap from taking off. Just because we use the Junyo/Hiyo for scouting does not mean they cannot be used for additional tasks. I also thought we can use the light carriers specificely for landing support and raiding.

 

No, Sir. Both the Akagi and Kaga launched two groups of CAP, and the Hiryu launched one group of CAP while the Midway Strike was waiting to land, and the Kido Butai was under attack from Midway-based SBDs, B-17s, and SB2Us. "Shattered Sword" provides an excellent time-line of air operations for Kido Butai on pgs. 154-55. Here it is from Google Books: Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway - Jonathan Parshall, Anthony Tully - Google Books
Just click on the Page >> link, the air operations diagram is right below the highlighted passage.

Any knowledgeable carrier commander would, if necessary, replace his CAP before a returning strike began landing.

 

I meant that there could have been an issue if more cap had been needed while the strike was being recovered. I am not saying it did just a hypothetical.

 

I think what Takao is saying is that proper planning takes care of this problem. If you have reason to suspect that you might be subject to enemy attack, it would only be prudent to launch the most robust possible CAP before beginning to recover a strike.

Mr. Prime Minister,

I concur with your analysis of our CVE needs. As an interim measure I believe that Steverodger is correct: we might use our many auxiliary seaplane carriers for convoy escort. Some could even be converted to escort carriers if we so desire, though new powerplants might be necessary, as all are quite slow. We have many oilers and tankers that would make suitable interim merchant CVs. Some of these and some of our transports would be suitable candidates for conversion to escort carriers.

 

Yes there is a limit depending upon the type of task force. There is also a limit to the distance a task force commander can exercise control, 40 nautical miles. Since the question is about destroyer leaders, no, to the best of my knowledge, but I'm continually finding new areas that were modelled that I never realized, the game does not model the additional space required to house the additional facilities, communications, and personnel a squadron leader would require. To keep things realistic I'd say that we should require it, if it is part of our doctrine. I do not see why we can't produce a large destroyer with enhanced facilities. but with say fewer torpedo tubes, and use them as destroyer squadron leaders. IIRC, that was one of the roles the US designed the Porter class for, and in the South Dakota class BB's, the South Dakota had two fewer 5"/38 mounts, 8 vs 10, than her sisters. This was because she was built with additional facilities to use as a flagship and the additional space was needed to accomodate this function. Destroyers are pretty quick builds and if we can come up with a specification and lay them down we will probably have them in the water by the time we would be facing a significant threat from US surface forces.

The Kuma class: Kuma, Tama, Kitakami, Oi, and Kiso, plus the similar Nagara class: Nagara, Isuzu, Yura, Natori, Kinu and Abukuma, if converted to CLAA's, would be a great asset for providing AA protection to our carriers. I've been looking into what we could actually do conversion wise, the way it looks now, based upon space and weight, we could fit 14 x 3.9" guns in 7 twin mounts (12 of which could fire to each broadside) and 16 x 40mm bofors in 8 twin mounts, if we deleted the floatplanes and most of the torpedo tubes.

Good questions sir. The ship has the physical space to support the mounts. It also has the displacement to support the weight. As built the Nagaras had 7 seperate 5.5" turreted single mounts, two 3" guns, four twin torpedo mounts and a floatplane and catapult, she eventually mounted 30 25mm guns and 5 single 13mm's. All that will go and it will free up a lot of space (especially the aviation/catapult equipment and aviation stores/fuel) and weight especially the torpedo mounts and torpedo reloads. The 3.9" twin turret is only 79% the weight of the 5"/38 Mk12 twin mounting found on the US Sumner/Gearing class DD's and only 70% the weight of the Atlanta's 5"/38 Mk 29 twin mounting, and the Atlanta had eight of these mounts on only 430 tons greater displacement. The Azikuki class had 4 of the twin 3.9" mounts on a 2700 ton displacement or 1 mount per 675t of displacement, my proposed conversion would be 1 mount per 795t of displacement. The proposed Kuma's would have 1 mount per 59308 cu.ft of hull volume, the Azikuki's 1 mount per 58520 cu.ft of hull volume. I have a lot more data on this if you'd like to discuss it further. As for ammunition the 3.9" ammunition takes up only 70% of the volume of the 5.5" round so without altering the actual physical ammunition spaces you could carry about 66% the number of rounds per gun. I've been looking for some good internal plans for the ships to see if we can find more ammunition storage space in the hull, but no luck yet. The former torpedo storage I was going to use fo 40mm ammo storage and crew berthing.

Yes, I had planned for this based upon a recommendation you made much earlier in the thread.

No, except you might want them as your destroyer leaders until replacement leaders come on line.

I agree.

No it does not distinguish, neither does NavWeapons. I assumed it was the same mount because most sources state it was the same gun as mounted on the Azikuki's. Now that you mention it the actual Mod of the mount is not specified. The rate of fire per 3.9" gun is quoted as being the same for both ships.

I do see a difference between providing CAP and performing ASW duties as I proposed. CAP has to remain over the task force/ship. ASW just has to provide security for a prescribed area. I'd envisioned running the shipping lanes along the coasts where possible. Aircraft from bases would be assigned sectors that they would patrol, secure and clear. The convoy would move from secure sector to secure sector with the aircraft remaining over their sector even after the convoy had gone on. Since these squadrons would be operating from airfields on along the coast, many would be operating from fields co-located with a port. I'd have hunter-killer groups of ASW escorts operating from the ports and being vectored in to possible sightings by the aircraft. An ASW hunter-killer team could consist of a DE type ship as the team command and coordination center and three subchasers. The subchasers are short legged but they would be great for hunting down contacts called in from the aircraft. For a positive sighting the aircraft could attempt to bomb or torpedo the sub and call in the ASW team to finish the job.

 

We will face a shortage of large tankers when we go to war so we do not want to convert any. A wag is that 30% of our oil is carried in foreign flag ships so one additional priority will be to build more. For ASW we also have small PB's that can be asigned to the various ports to cover sectors.

 

A merchant carrier would still carry nearly the same tonnage of oil. We remove the bridge and upperworks of the superstructure and build a light deck and a new bridge forward. We carry a modest handful of older aircraft on the deck: perhaps six or eight. We could use surplus B2Ms or D1As, for instance. Older Biplanes will be able to operate from slow ships and short decks. They won't take up much space, they'll have good loiter time, and we won't want them anywhere near a front line. Even if we found it necessary to fully convert tankers, fewer tankers sunk is more oil delivered and more capacity to deliver it in the future.

Not converting a tanker saves us one tanker hull. Converting one and escorting a convoy that would have otherwise been attacked saves us many tankers. Our tonnage shortages go beyond just oil. General Nishio will want transports that we convert into escort carriers to carry his troops. Our families at home will want bulk freighters we convert to carry rice from Indochina. I'm not sure I'd choose to convert a tanker to an escort carrier, but I'd gladly convert one to a merchant carrier. And tankers, with their large displacements, large interior volumes, and comparatively modern power plants are uniquely suited to conversion. Our conversions and new construction will require careful consideration. Tankers should be included in that conversation.

 

Historicly Japan produced 5 CVE's Taiyo (ready now, but no aircraft), Unyo (May 1942), Chuyo (November 1942), Kaiyo (November 1943), Shinyo (November 1943), all of which were converted liners. I believe the Army had at least one as well. I would say use these first as conversions, then take a tanker/merchant hull out of new construction each qtr to build new CVE's thereby saving tankers already built. Again take new tanker construction to create 'Tanker Carriers' so that we retain the oil transport and get a mini carrier on the same hull.

Unyo seems to be already in the conversion pipeline (or at least we should convert as Japan did historicly) Chuyo, Kaiyo, Shinyo should be accelerated. Unyo conversion 4th Qtr 1941, Chuyo 1st Qtr. 1942, Kaiyo 2nd Qtr. 1942, and Shinyo 3rd Qtr. 1942. After that use new construction Tanker/Merchant hulls to meet our need, again 1 per quarter. A large liner/tanker/merchant that comes into the yard for major battle damage repair might be considered. If we lose one, and surely we shall, allocate an extra hull during the next quarter to replace it.

I have no idea how many tanker hulls we will start each quarter, but I would like to see us launch 8-10 'Tanker Carriers' per year. Again one that already exists and comes into the shipyard for repair/refit add the flight deck for 4-6 aircraft.

 

Can a tanker go fast enough to launch aircraft? I believe that a carrier has to go a certain speed to launch. Considering the shortage I think we should keep every tanker.