Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Admiral Noka, Thank you for the information provided.

I still favor Chitose/Chiyoda as CVL's for the Kido Butai and if we can provide them sooner all the better. Nisshin as a APA is appealing and would make a good companion to Shinsu Marru untill we could deploy others of her class. If we can live without replacing these three ships as Seaplane Carriers then by all means turn our CX's into APA's

 

Gentlemen,
The hour is late. I am calling this meeting of the council to a close. With the Prime Minister's approval we will reconvene at 0800 tomorrow morning, 04 October 1941. Good night gentlemen, sleep well, we have a hard days work before us tomorrow.

Col. Bobimoto

 

Time for Sake!

 

Office of Intelligence, Supreme Imperial Council


04 October, 1941

To: Belasar Tekisasu

Fm: Bobimoto Neuchi, Colonel
Office of Intelligence, IJA


Subject: Economy, Diplomacy, Operational Security, Pilot Training, Merchant Shipping.
IJSCADMIN-041041-001


Sir,

1.) I feel it is imperative that we now address our economic situation. Our economic situation is the driving force behind our diplomatic problems with the United States and if not solved, will be the driving force behind our strategic war planning. Our industrial output also bears directly on our ability to produce shipping and to arm and equip our military forces.
2.) I have reliable intelligence that our communications have been compromised. I think it imperative that we immediately adopt a comprehensive security review and adopt policies and procedures to insure we maintain security with regards to our operational communications, both diplomatic and military. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku has implemented such measures within the Combined Fleet and our counter-intelligence services have detected no breach in his operational security.

The following information is provided to support my suspicion that our Diplomatic communications have been compromised.
-Early last spring, German counter intelligence intercepted communications between British diplomatic personnel in Washington and Britain. They were using a low level code that the Germans had broken. The information contained within the communication, related to our actions and intents, was most likely derived from the United States having intercepted and decoded our diplomatic communications with our Embassy in Washington.
-In the late spring and in the early summer, we received additional information from German intelligence sources. Hans Thomsen, a diplomat at the German embassy in Washington, D.C., advised Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, that "an absolutely reliable source" (Konstantin Umansky, the Soviet Ambassador to the US) advised Thomsen that the Americans have broken our diplomatic cipher.

In the light of this information, I feel it prudent that we immediately cease transmission of critical or sensitive information. We should simultaneously begin transmissions of deceptive information, to prevent the United States from realizing we are aware of their ability to read our communications and to shape their perceptions of our intents in such a manner as to provide an advantage to us. We should institute new codes and cryptologic mechanisms to secure all future sensitive information.

3.) In light of the attempted coup, we need to immediately renew our diplomatic efforts at resolving our disputes with the United States. If such resolution is impossible we need to intensify our diplomatic efforts to delay any US intervention in the Asia/Pacific region until we are sufficiently prepared to counter US actions. We also need to review our diplomatic relations with Germany and the Axis partners. To this end I suggest we appoint our Ambassador to Italy, Kourei Yuushou (Tired Old Soldier) to oversee and control our relations with Germany, Vichy France and Italy. Ambassador Kourei, retired as a Major General from our Imperial Army, and during his military service had experience as a ground forces combat commander and later helped develop our IJA aviation component. He has proven an extremely capable diplomat and his strength of character will serve him well in his dealings with our Axis partners, particularly Germany. In the past we have had issues with our diplomats to Germany becoming compromised or enamored with the Germans. In 1936 we signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in regards to our relations with the Soviet Union. Yet in August 1939, Hitler and the Germans entered into the separate Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact without bothering to consult or advise ourselves or the Italians, and basically invalidating our previous agreement. This despite some of our diplomats in Germany being aware of the pending agreement and being asked, by the Germans, not to advise our government. Our previous Foreign Minister, Yōsuke Matsuoka, pushed us into joining the Tri-Partite Pact, which we signed on 27 September, 1940. This despite misgivings by many within our government and military. Matsuoka also failed to warn us of the German plans to launch Operation Barbarossa in June of this year, even though he was had been advised of it in March or April. He even signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets later in April, a pact that is to our benefit, knowing that the German's were soon to put this pact in jeopardy by their actions. This along with his reckless attitude towards relations with the US and pushing the "German" agenda led to him earning the sobriquet "Hitler's Office Boy", and being forced to resign by former Prime Minister Konoe, in July of this year to be replaced by Admiral Teijirō Toyoda. Fortunately, the disloyal former Foreign Minister was killed in the coup attempt of the 3rd.

To this end I would also like to suggest that we appoint General Terauchi Hisaichi (steverodgers801), as commander our forces in Indo-China and Thailand. We will ask him to also manage our relations with the Vichy French government located there, and apply sufficient pressure to insure their cooperation. We will re-designate this force the Army of Indo-China, at present it will report directly to the Army's General Defense Headquarters, but in cases where joint offensive operations are required with JEF-C, he will report to and fall under the command of Field Marshall Nishio and JEF-C.

4.) Merchant shipping is directly related to our economy and should be addressed because of the need for the two areas to interact effectively.

5.)Pilot training will directly effect our military operations, shipbuilding program and industrial production. We need to address it prior to looking at our military shipbuilding program

Respectfully submitted,


Col. Neuchi Bobimoto, IJA

 

Minutes of 03OCT1941 meeting, Imperial Supreme Council

Chain of Command IJN
-Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Minister of the Navy APPROVED
-Admiral Rikanaga, (recalled from retirement) Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet APPROVED
-Admiral Karonada, CiC Kido Butai (promotion and appointment) APPROVED
-Admiral Michizane, CiC 1st Fleet (promotion and appointment) APPROVED
-General Nishio Toshio-CiC Japanese Forces, China. APPROVED
-Captain Noka Shijin, Deputy Commander Kido Butai APPROVED
-Captain Noka Shijin, TAD (Temporary Additional Duty) Chief of Naval Intelligence, IJSC APPROVED

-I have had one of my aides contact Admiral Yamamoto. He has submitted a request to be moved to the retired list and has agreed to accept the position of Minister of the Navy. He is currently being sequestered in a safe location for his protection until we are sure all the assassins have been apprehended. Once I have given him the word, he will travel to Tokyo to join our conferences. I would estimate that this will be Monday or Tuesday, 06 or 07 October.
-Admiral Rikanaga, will be returned to active duty, effective todays date, 03 October 1941, and is hereby directed by Prime Minister Belasar, to assume command of the Combined Fleet and serve as commander in chief of all Imperial Japanese Naval Forces.
-Captain Karonada, has been assigned as CiC of the Kido Butai and will be "jumped" two ranks and promoted to Kaigun Chūjō, (Vice-Admiral) with date of rank 04 October, 1941. The promotion warrant will be issued Monday 06 October.
-Captain Michizane, has been assigned as CiC 1st Fleet and will be "jumped" two ranks and promoted to Kaigun Chūjō, (Vice-Admiral) with date of rank 04 October, 1941. The promotion warrant will be issued Monday 06 October.
-General Nishio, has been assigned to Japanese Expeditionary Forces China (JEF-C), a command we will immediately stand up. Furthermore, General Nishio will be promoted to Gensui Rikugun Taishō, Field Marshal, with date of rank 04 October, 1941. The promotion warrant will be issued Monday 06 October.
-Japanese Expeditionary Forces China; JEF-C, has been established as the overall command of all Japanese Forces in China. The Kwantung Army is hereby dissolved as of 04 October, 1941. All it's personnel and assets will immediately be transferred to the control of JEF-C. It has been determined that JEF-C will consist of three separate armies with an attached and subordinate airforce.
-Army of North China;1st Airforce
-Army of Central China;2d Airforce
-Army of Southern China;3d Airforce
Additionally a logistical/training command, Airforces-China will be established under JEF-C and located at Tsingtao, China.
*The actual areas of responsibility for each Army within JEF-C are listed in appendix A of this document.
-Colonel R. Kagawa, has been assigned as his Executive Officer and Chief of Staff, JEF-C. Colonel Kagawa will be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, with date of rank 04 October, 1941. The promotion warrant will be issued Monday 06 October.
-Captain Noka Shijin, has been approved as Deputy Commander, Kido Butai. Captain Noka has been approved for promotion to the rank of Kaigun Shōshō, Rear-Admiral, with date of rank 04 October, 1941. The promotion warrant will be issued Monday 06 October.
-Captain Kano Matsudaira, has been approved as Deputy Commander, 1st Fleet, IJN. Captain Kano has been approved for promotion to the rank of Kaigun Shōshō, Rear-Admiral, with date of rank 04 October, 1941. The promotion warrant will be issued Monday 06 October.

Additional actions for approval:
-Establishment of Joint Special Operations Training Center (SOTC) to be located NE of Moppo on the southwest coast of Korea. APPROVED
-Permission to upgrade Truk with a repair shipyard. PENDING
-Transfer of all IJA naval assets to IJN. APPROVED
-Adopt the principle that all commands will be joint commands and the senior area commander will command all forces in his area, regardless of their service component. APPROVED


Review of Operational plans

a.) Naval air raid on the US Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii. (NAY-Captain Kano-General Nishio-PM Belasar-Admiral Rikanaga-Captain Noka-Admiral Michizane*) (YEA-none)

b.) Operations to invade and occupy the Philippines. (NAY-Captain Kano-General Nishio-PM Belasar-Admiral Rikanaga-Captain Noka-Admiral Michizane*) (YEA-none)

c.) Amphibious operations against US positions on Guam in the Marianas and Wake Island. (NAY-Captain Kano-General Nishio-PM Belasar-Admiral Rikanaga-Captain Noka-Admiral Michizane*) (YEA-none)

d.) Operations against the British base at Singapore and it's supporting military facilities. (NAY-none) (YEA-Captain Kano-General Nishio-PM Belasar-Admiral Rikanaga-Captain Noka-Admiral Michizane)

e.) Operations against the British position at Hong Kong. (NAY-none) (YEA-Captain Kano-General Nishio-PM Belasar-Admiral Rikanaga-Captain Noka-Admiral Michizane)

f.) Invasion and seizure of British and Dutch resource areas and military bases in the southern resource area (SRA) to include but not limited to Borneo, Sumatra, Java and the Celebes. (NAY-none) (YEA-Captain Kano-General Nishio-PM Belasar-Admiral Rikanaga-Captain Noka-Admiral Michizane)
(no vote recorded Admiral's Takao, and Karonada)
*It should be noted that Admiral Michizane raised the point that planning for Guam, Wake and the Phillipines needs to go forward in the event that the United States intervenes. He does not, as his vote is recorded, support a preemptive strike against these locations.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix A

Army of North China: If looking at your map, there is a "Y" junction in the railroad about 130mi. south west of Tientsin. I would establish a base here let's call it Forward Logistics Base 1 (FLB1). So from Tientsin sw along the railroad to FLB1, then cross country to FLB2 which would be established at the "X" junction of the main rail line located about 40 mi. west south west of Anyang and 40 mi. north north west of Kaifeng. The border would continue west along the road-road/rail lines west to Loyang, then Sian and on to Tienshu. I would initially establish a line of small Forward Operating Bases (FOB) along the rail line from Chengting SSW to FLB2 in order to secure the population areas to the east of the rail line from incursions by Nationalist Chinese Forces.

Army of Central China: From the southern border of the Army of North China's AoR south to the Yangtze, follow the Yangtze from Shanghai on the coast all the way to Chungking to the west. When you have eliminated the Chinese position at Chengchow, I'd establish a string of FOB's from FLB2 along the railway all the way to Hankow. Again to protect the population centers from incursions.

Army of Southern China: The Yangtze south to the border with Indo-China.

-Army of North China;1st Airforce-Harbin, China
-Army of Central China;2d Airforce-Tsingtao, China
-Army of Southern China;3d Airforce-Canton, China
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B-Basic Strategic planning China.

What I think we need to do strategically in China is:
1.) Adopt a basically static stance initially. Use the time to reorganize some of our best units to the new TO&E, and train them up.
2.) Limited offensives to establish the AoNC's FLB's and FOB's.
3.) Once the units are ready concentrate our air assets at Kaifeng and launch a coordinated offensive by AoNC against Loyang and Chengchow by AoCC.
4.) Rest and re-organize these forces and use forces that should now be upgraded to clear the railway from FLB2 to Hankow establishing FOB's.
5.) Transfer the rested and reorganized units from the Loyang/Chengchow offensive to AoSC and marry them up with best units from AoSC. AoSC should have several with the new TO&E that are trained up to a high level and hopefully we will have some armored units by this time equipped with the new tanks/assault guns and enough brown water navy assets completed to attack Changsha. We will adopt a semi-static stance in AoNC and AoCC and concentrate all our assets for the assault. We need to do a great deal of work shaping the battlefield, we do not need to fail in this effort again. If we win it will prove a devastating morale loss to the Nationalist forces and a great morale boost for our own forces.


-Overall concept APPROVED Field Marshal (select) Nishio Toshio, Commander JEF-C, 03Oct1941.

 

Administrative Note: Gentlemen at the opening of each meeting I will provide an official Administrative communication with a communications number IJSCADMIN-(date)-(message number for that date). These will provide the official agenda for that days meeting. Any additional topics may be introduced by any council member. It is only an outline to provide background and to introduce matters that I feel are pressing.

I will also provide the minutes from the preceding days business to show a general summary of what was discussed and decided upon in our previous days discussions. This is presented as an aid so that if members miss a day or so they can review the summary to help bring them current with what has been going on, without having to dig through days of individual posts. I periodically update the minutes to keep them current with the discussion as it progresses and try to insure it's accuracy. Please take a moment to review it and advise me of any corrections needed. I provide it merely as a tool to help keep members current without having to put the work in to go back and read large numbers of posts, if they are away for any length of time. I am saving copies of these communications and will EM or PM them to anyone if they need them and will send them to any new members we might "acquire" along the way while the exercise progresses. I'd like to thank all of you for the time and effort you have put into getting this whole thing started. With the progress we have made since kickoff, (post#1360) I am well pleased with the prospects that this thing will actually work. We have a couple of more meetings where we need to take care of certain critical items (such as production and the economy) before we'll be able to begin to see the results of our efforts. Field Marshal Nishio, Ulrich and I have managed to accomplish a great deal towards getting China up and running. Admiral Noka has proven a tremendous asset and I may eventually be able to nearly totally divest myself of the nitty-gritty portion of my naval tasks. GENTLEMEN, I THINK IT"S GOING TO WORK AND IF IT DOES IT WILL BE THE COOLEST AND MOST INFORMATIVE SIMULATION EVER!!!!

 

Thats a good idea, Bob! And i think that i´m allowed to speak for all with this words:

" Many thanks for the idea and the tremendous work you stick in this Project! This would be nothing without you and your huge efforts and great advices!"

Sincerely,

Ulrich

 

Bobimoto,

I suspect you were talking about the hull numbers I had assigned. If you have combatant hull numbers built into the game I will modify my lists accordingly. I am fond of my own, of course, as I researched them carefully to include retired units as best as I might, but in the end their function is administrative first and illustrative second. I will certainly change mine to reflect any work you have already built into our official records.

Honorable Prime Minister,

I will refine my own plans based on your desires that Chitose and Chiyoda begin conversion immediately to light carriers and Shinyo to an APA. This seems an acceptable balance.

Sincerely,
Admiral (select) Noka Shijin

 

You are correct sir. I was referring to hull numbers. Interestingly, I included retired units also when assigning them. We can compare them, they are probably quite similar.

With the Prime Minister's approval I would suggest we hold off on actually scheduling conversions or new ship construction, until we have a chance to discuss the economy. I have canceled all scheduled future construction and modifications, and have only continued with the building of ships already laid down. The council might even decide to suspend or terminate some of those I have left building. We have to address our economy first. It is the economy and which direction we take there that will determine what we can and want to build. We have recently had much discussion about our carriers. One issue I avoided bringing up because I needed to finalize the issues we were discussing in yesterday's meeting was pilot training. It won't do us much good to have the decks, if we don't have the pilots to crew the aircraft they carry, or even the aircraft to equip them. We will address this issue in todays meeting. I think we will take Sunday, 05 October, off for rest and reconvene on Monday the 6th, when Naval Minister Yamamoto will be present. I would like you to be prepared for that meeting with the information you have gathered on our various shipbuilding facilities, particularly the size of the docks. I have the data on dockworkers and materials available. We need to plan our shipbuilding by critical need first, schedule those ships we have docks to accommodate, then determine the remaining dock sizes and determine what we can build there.

Colonel Bobimoto

 

Gentlemen,

Now we must discuss our most pressing issue and one that will determine which direction as a country we will take in the near future, the Economy.

Attached (attachment A) please find a spreadsheet giving an overview of our economy. It is based upon our current rate of manufacturing, military training and arms production. These figures do not include fuel needed to undertake naval operations, additional numbers or flight time for our aircraft or intensified operations by our ground forces. These actions will place additional strain upon our strategic reserve. Oil and fuel are our two most pressing needs. We are currently running a deficit of 8110 tons of oil per day for processing by the refineries located within our Empire. We have a strategic reserve of 3,767,420 tons of crude oil stockpiled, enough to run our refineries at their current rate for 464.54 days or 1.27 years. These refineries produce 9315 tons of fuel per day and 1035 tons of motor oil, lubricants and other petroleum based materials. Our daily requirement for fuel at our current level of usage, excluding naval and shipping requirements is 13900 tons of fuels, leaving a daily shortfall of 4585 tons, over and above our refining capacity. We have 4,862,678 tons of fuel stockpiled or a 1060.56 days supply (2.91 years). We could expand our refining capacity by expanding or building new facilities, but that would only exacerbate the crude oil problem. The United States embargo on oil and fuel has placed our economy in an extremely precarious position. We can curtail manufacturing, arms and aircraft production, but all will have serious short term and devastating long term effects. I would estimate that we have no more than 45 days to reach a diplomatic solution and have the embargo lifted, or find an alternate source of oil. I have reliable information that while the prime factor behind the embargo was to place hurt us badly enough economically to have us accede to their demands, but the United States had an additional domestic consideration. The US was on the verge of being forced to institute fuel rationing for their civilian populace, because the demand placed upon the United States for supplying the necessary quantities of refined fuels, especially aviation gas and gasoline to the British and Soviets, has severely constricted their supply. They are in the process of increasing their refining capacity, but this will take some time or they could dip into their strategic stockpiles, which they will not do, because of the probability of war with Germany. If we can get them to resume the export of crude oil, we can begin expansion of our refining facilities, but that will take some time and leave us even more vulnerable if they turn off the oil supply again. One option, long term, would be to shift some of our manufacturing to China or convert a portion of our industry to coal fired plants. China has an estimated 12.6 percent of the world coal reserves, but it will take years to fully develop.

 

Attachment A

View attachment 16729

 

Not a nice forecast that you present to us, Col. Bobimoto! That shows that we have to work at two options: 1.) Try to get a diplomatic solution 2.) Set up plannings of Invasion of Borneo and some other places and to risk to get in war with the USA. Which means to set up plannings for defense actions and the capturing of the Phillipines and other strategic important places. A lot of work for 45 days!

 

Colonel Bobimoto,

do we have any chance to get some of our best units upgraded to our new TOE´s? I think we will need it no matter if it fits in our resources at time or not. If we have to make a main assault against any place we need them powerful to have a quick success. BTW, how about the production of fighters/ Fighter bombers and Ground Attack aircrafts?

 

Now the following spreadsheet, attachment B, shows the location of oil production and refinery capacity that we can readily seize, if that is the course we choose. I have not included sources that can not be readily seized, such as in India or in Soviet controlled areas. Though in the long term, these sources may also prove practical to acquire.
It should be noted that our heavy industrial (HI) manufacturing base produces 13900 tons of materials per day. Our current production levels require 12477 tons of that. We actually have, at present, a daily surplus of 1423 tons or 11.4 percent over our current needs. This 10% excess capacity will not go far in allowing for increasing our aircraft production, building additional ships, or give Field Marshal Nishio the new arms and equipment he needs. Once we do solve the oil/fuel problem we can expand our manufacturing base by expanding our factories. Oil/Fuel is the largest constraining factor, solve it and we solve most of our problems.

 

Hmm sounds easy " Solve it". How´s the POV of our Admirality?

 

The forecast is not as bleak as it first appears General. There are options. Fortunately, the British and Dutch are weak and we can seize the resources we need, if diplomacy fails. I do think the economic overview shows you why it is important to solve our economic issues before we turn our full attention towards China.

Attachment B

View attachment 16730

 

Ohh, i don´t panic i only want have it solved quickly if needed.

 

Gentlemen, a few quick thoughts.

1 Fleet must be kept at the highest state of readiness possible, so I strongly favor the the proposal to upgrade the repair facilities available at Truk. 2 Fleet, based here in the homeland, can rely on our excellent facilities already present there. In time, and after we have fully secured them, a 'enhanced' repair facilty in the SRA region might be of merit for the light units operated there.

Singapore would seem ideal for this facility. While not as expansive as our homeland shipyards, or those planned for Truk, something extensive enough for the escorts, auxilleries, merchant and other assorted light units to be operated there would solve some of our repair yard bottlenecks.

General Terauchi Hisachi's appointment CinC Imperial Forces, Indo-China-Tailand Command Area, has my full endorsement. His interest and insightfull commentary on this region and its political-military complications has proven most illuminating. I have every confidence that his service to the Empire in this posting will prove most satisfactory

I am equally delighted that General (Ret.) Kourei Yuushou has accepted the difficult task as our repesenative to our European 'Allies'. As Col. Bobimoto has detailed, Herr Hitler has been less than candid with us in the recent past, placing us in a difficult diplomatic position. General Kourei's appointment will signal to Berlin that we cannot be considered Germany's lapdog and that we are set upon a new strategic direction for the Empire.

This also has merit to us in that it could be construed to the Anglo-American powers that the beginning's of a political shift is in the offing and that perhaps a more concillatory attitude toward the Empire by them could be of value.

I suggest that we in effect tell both our European Allies and our our Anglo-American adversaries a little of what each wishes to hear. We can explain, privately, that any contridiction in our duel messages is a reflection of our need to address internal political difficulties that have arisen due to the attempted coup, and quietly assure each that politicly we are moving in 'their direction' and simply need some time to sort out the internal threat to the Imperial Throne.

We cannot hope to fully convince the Western Powers arrayed against us, but any internal confusion we can create works in our favor. Nor can we comepletely forsake our undestanding with Germany. While they cannot harm us if we did so, and cannot offer direct military aid in any future conflict, the possibility of some form of technology exchange between us is too valuable to discount.


Prime Minister Belasar Tekisasu

 

My apolgies, my assistant presented a duplicate communication. He will be reassigned.

 

Note gentlemen, that the seizure of the oil wells, intact, at Palembang Sumatra alone, would actually solve our oil deficit and actually result in a surplus of 890 tons per day. If we capture the refineries intact, their production would solve our fuel deficit, and result in a fuel surplus of 4645 tons per day. Not shown on the chart is if we were to operate the refineries there our oil deficit would increase to 9130 tons of oil per day. If we seize Balikpaupan, Djambi, Medan and Soerabaja, also and do not operate their refineries we will again be into an oil surplus of 370 tons per day.

If all the locations listed in the top portion of the attachment are seized, we would be running an oil deficit of 4510 tons per day. While this may seem counterintuitive, this wouldn't necessarily be a bad thing in the short term. It would increase the length of time our oil stockpiles last from 464.54 days or 1.27 years to 835.35 days or 2.29 years or into the first month of 1944. We would however have the benefit of 13105 surplus fuel per day to be used for naval, aviation and industrial needs.
My suggestion would be that we manage it very closely. If we seize all assets in the SRA, we operate their wells and refineries at full capacity. It is also more efficient to transport refined fuel than crude oil to be refined at home. We shut down portions of our refining capacity on the home islands to upgrade and expand their facilities, this also helps in maintaining our oil stockpiles. During periods we need to expand our manufacturing or are experiencing a high operational tempo with our naval forces, we bring them online. If later we start losing refineries due to enemy counter-offensives or strategic bombing, we can also use the improved refinery capacity in the home islands and bring idled facilities back on line to maintain a steady flow of fuel. We should attempt to maintain fuel reserves at 2 years instead of the current 2.91 years. Use the excess reserve, plus the new production to increase our manufacturing capacity.

As a phase two of our operations I would attempt to seize the oil/refinery assets in Burma. (lower section of attachment) We do not need the refining capacity at Rangoon, if we seize the facilities in the SRA intact, but it would be nice to deny it to our enemies. If our enemies do manage to sabotage a portion of the refining capacity in the SRA then Rangoon could be used to fill that loss. The oil production at Magwe and Ledo would help us build our oil stockpiles.