Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Does everyone that wants one have a planning map? I had posted the information on it way back in the thread and provided the information to Nishio again the other day.

 

I was proposing that in IJA controlled theaters, that IJA pilots be trained in and undertake ASW missions. This is more of a way to make use of bomber pilots we are attempting to get flight time in so that they gain experience. They can gain experience in flying a similar type to that they will be using in bomber or attck squadrons. I propose that due to the potential need to utilize IJA pilots in the areas south of Japan, areas where they could be operating from island bases and flying long distances over open ocean, that all pilots receive extensive training in over water navigation. At present only IJN pilots are routinely trained in this skill. Optimally, these pilots will only be used on the asian mainland, but if circumstances require, they will be ready for deployment in other areas. Using them for ASW operations will provide valuable flight time and practice in the skill of over water navigation. This will help insure their effectiveness and survivability once committed to combat. I proposed that the modified KI-21 continue in production and be used by both services. Land based Naval units, in navy controlled theaters, will also need ground attack aircraft and they would be good anti-shipping aircraft. They have the ability to carry a significant bomb load and their heavy gun armament would allow for effective strafing attacks of barges, lightly protected merchantmen, cargo vessels, tankers, transports and the like. When used in the ASW role, the additional crew members increase the chances of spotting submarines, the long range increases patrol time, and the bomb load changed to depth charges, they can hurt submarines. I think in this area, like you always mention when speaking of escort ships, numbers are the most important thing.

It would be. Before Admiral Noka was temporarily called away, we had been working on this topic. We have set up the Naval Logistical Command, reporting directly to CinC Imperial Fleet, Admiral Rickanaga. NLC would manage subordinate commands to each major command. NLC would manage all merchant shipping on the strategic level and be responsible for the transportation of oil, fuel, supplies, resources and manpower to and from the home islands to subordinate command hubs. They would be responsible for the escorting vessels and ASW assets protecting the shipping and the shipping routes. If the NLC for a specific area is supporting an Army command a portion of it's ASW air assets would be drawn from that command.

 

Good point about Tarakan. Naval forces from Palau would not be able to strike there until Day 2 or 3, so there is an opportunity for land-based reconnaissance from Indochina in addition to our intelligence information. Is WITP capable of distinguishing nationalities of Allied ships or units? That would seem critical to our policy of not antagonizing the US. I'm a little puzzled by this line in the manual Air units given Naval Attack orders will always be under computer control for the selection of targets. I would think there would be some means of assigning specific targets, such as the carriers in a carrier task force, which could enable us to avoid targetting say USS Marblehead which historically was present. I doubt there are any Dutch naval units of importance at Tarakan, so perhaps we could avoid ships entirely and assign targets of airfields or shore defenses.

Speaking of shore defenses, I suggest including Cruiser Division 4 (the four Furutaka class ships) for gunfire support and general escort of the Celebes Sea area operations.

Question for those who have war-gamed the scenario (i.e. played WITP), if American ships are present, do we need to avoid landing troops at Tarakan altogether? If so, what is our alternative strategy? Can we carry on to Samarinda/Balikpapen? It seems counterintuitive to leave an active enemy base in our rear, but it might be all right if the base has no aircraft or warships to pose a threat. Another alternative would be to use the Tarakan landing force to secure Kendari and begin the isolation and reduction of Ambon. This would be a natural next step from Manado and will be convenient for follow-on forces and supplies from Palau.

Moving to the Singapore-Sumatra theater, as you know I am also reluctant to operate our fleet carriers in restricted waters, but then I don't see how we can claim to control the air and sea around Palembang until we get a reasonable amount of air power established at forward bases like Singkawang. I must also suggest if we are unwilling to risk the the six-carrier Kido Butai in this manner, it seems unlikely that two light carriers could cruise safely from the Celebes area through the Java Sea (nor would they arrive in time to support a Day 1 landing at Palembang).

I will defer to the WITP veterans if they consider an airborne-only operation against Palembang-Djambi feasible. I am agreeable to using some of our H6K aircraft for the initial flight, with the advantage of surprise, but I would not want to employ these valuable assets (of which we currently have only 66 total) if there is risk of interception even by a few obsolescent fighters.

p.s. I recall our intelligence reporting two Dutch cruisers in Palembang, which ones? They only have three in theater, Java, Tromp, De Ruyter. Any other significant warships present?

 

I proposed that the modified KI-21 continue in production and be used by both services. Land based Naval units....

Arigato for the clarification. If I could ask a follow-up question, would this mean reequipping/retraining some of our existing units now flying aircraft like G3Ms and G4Ms, or are you proposing an expansion of the land-based naval air force?

p.s. I will be conducting a reconnaissance mission to the Norfolk, Virginia area for several days starting tomorrow so may be out of touch.

 

In WItp there is no way to control the target if there are multiple task forces. You can dictate the target if it is land based and you can set a priority for aircraft; airfield, port, land unit or task force. There are not a lot of planes in the British inventory as far as strike aircraft, so if we make a good hit by surpise and coordinate with land based aircraft the risk should be minimal to KB. As far as Tarakan, there has never been a cruiser in harbor when I have assaulted, but I have never tried our variation.
I would suggest two groups with about 4 destroyers each should work, in the game the Dutch have been aggressive in sending warships at times.

 

Yes and no. Yes, depending upon a number of factors the nationality of the ship can be distinguished. Some of these are skill and experience of the pilot and aircrew, height they are flying at, length of the sighting, and weather. In this regards it mimics real life, sometimes the ships and their number are identified correctly, even down to the classes. Sometimes the numbers and types are widely off. It is not uncommon for a spotted battleship to be reported as a cruiser and vice-versa, or a small carrier to be reported as a fleet carrier, but this is correct historically. The game engine does not support the US as a non-combatant and I have spoken with the game designers and programmers on another forum. If we try to use the AI prior to the US becoming a combatant it could crash it or have unexpected consequences. This should not be an issue because I have two individuals standing by to play the US, and they have agreed to base their military moves on the political situation as it develops within our scenario. Once, the US is at war it will be a combination of them and the AI. In regards to the specific question about Tarakan, if say the CL Marblehead and her destroyers were in Tarakan at the time of the assault, and we were bombing Dutch ships and facilities, I find it hard to believe that they wouldn't return fire, just out of not knowing if they would be targeted next. I also think it likely that one our overzealous pilots take the opportunity to attack them, as happened in the Panay incident. So, from our perspective, realistically, I do not think if the ships were in harbor, that we could prevent an incident, even if the ships were positively identified.

OK, with carrier aircraft there are two ways to assign targets (macro) you can leave it to the TF commander to hit the target you ordered the task force to attack, his response, success and capability, will be determined by that particular Officers traits as defined in the game. The second way is to go into the individual squadrons on the carrier and order the attacks by type, naval, port, airfield, land, attack altitude, etc. and they will strike those targets, but again the response, success and execution will be dictated by the individual squadron commanders defined traits. On the airstrike level, no you cannot define the individual targets. You can't say hit TF 12 and target the Lexington specifically. These decisions are dictated by the squadron commander, pilot experience, pilot skill, aggressiveness, and other traits. I'll give an example to illustrate. You launch four squadrons, three dive bomber and one torpedo from two or more ships. Three commanders are aggressive, two of these are highly skilled and the third mediocre in general skills. The fourth is skilled but, fairly timid. The three skilled squadron commanders, marry up and continue on to the target in a coordinated strike. The leader with mediocre skills misses the rendevous and his squadron carries on by itself. His poor navigation skills might make him unable to find the target and his strike will eventually return when low on fuel, unless he's just lucky and stumbles across the enemy. The first three navigate to the attack point and encounter the CAP. The two aggressive leaders push through, the timid one lags and the strike splinters further. Approaching the Task Force, heavy AA is encountered, the timid leader orders his squadron to drop ordinance on the outer ships and turns back. The other two press on, they determine that the Lexington should be the primary target and order the attack. This is where the individual pilot traits come in. An inexperienced pilot may drop his torpedo from too high or too far away. A timid pilot may drop his ordinance on another, easier target so they don't have to push through to the primary one. So in the end specific target determination at the point of contact is a function of the squadron commander and not any orders you have given, other than the general target type. IMO, this is an extremely realistic way to handle it.

You're the Admiral, I leave those decisions to you and your staff. I am here to help with intelligence information, advice on enemy capabilities and the coordination of strategic and operational planning. The pointy end decisions are all yours, though I will be willing to assist in any manner requested by you and the council.

 

I agree to this Col. Bobimoto, the difference is marginal so do it as you´ve said

 

Thank you General. Glad to see you here, I have many questions for you and it is fortuitous that you should be here at this time since Admiral Karonada is away, temporarily, on his reconaissance mission.

1.) Did you get your planning map?
2.) We need to plan our land operations for the Malayan campaign, I have a proposed scheme of maneuver that I'd like to submit for your approval and revision.
3.) Do you approve of the ground attack aircraft configurations I have suggested, for supporting your land units?
The KI-44 with increased external stores hard points, cowling and cockpit armor, and 4 x HO-103 12.7mm machine guns, two HO-3 20mm cannon. You now have a fighter-bomber/light ground attack platform.
The KI-21 with increased cowling armor, a solid nose mounting eight HO-103's (.50cal) and two HO-5's (20mm), retains a 2200lb bombload. You now have a heavy ground attack bomber. (Similar to the historical B-25G, H, J models, the G/H having a 75mm cannon thats low rate of fire made it less than effective) I would like to continue development of this series and once we have our 40mm bofors production ramped up, and have increased performance engines available, look at mounting a couple of these in place of the 20mm, to increase firepower, and increase the bombload with external stores (possibly rockets) but this is for down the road.

 

For the Prime Minister and General Nishio
KI-21 301mph max speed/236mph cruise--1680 mile range--2200lb bomb load.
B-25 272mph max speed/230mph cruise--1350 mile range--3000lb bomb load.

For The Prime Minister, General Nishio and Ambassador/General Kourei

Now I have mentioned this before, but would like to explore it further.

If we are going to be allied with Germany, we need to demand full and equal cooperation, full sharing of technological research and weapons development. I would like to have our Ambassador to Italy (I requested and received no objections, to General (ret) Kourei Yuushou (Tired Old Soldier) being our central diplomatic liason with the Axis powers. He is to control and coordinate our relations with Germany, Italy, Vichy France and Spain), go to Germany with a list of requests and demands. I would prefer that this meeting be between Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and General Kourei, alone. I would further request that he stress to the Germans that we demand complete and unfettered access to each others weapons and technological. That we exchange scientific technological personnel to coordinate and share knowledge in a number of areas. If we reach agreement I propose the following:
1.) We share our torpedo designs with Germany. Our propulsion system and payloads would increase the range, speed and lethality of Germany's torpedos. We follow and adopt German advances in torpedo guidance systems.
2.) We ship a number of our radial engines to Germany for further, parallel development. We have high performance, light weight radial engines. German engineers could use our advances in lightening and optimizing performance in their engines. We could use their assistance in developing further performance increases and help overcome our problems in the areas of high altitude performance. A win-win.
3.) We request full access to German submarine tactics and allied countermeasures. We develop a more effective submarine service. We offer to let German officers train in the relatively safe areas where we are locating our ASW school. They produce better trained officers, we gain from observing their methods and training aginst them create a better ASW office.
4.) Electronics/Radar/Sonar-We share our advancements in antennas and cavity magnetrons. They share their advances. We gain by having their better industrial ability to convert prototypes into working models. When a new system is developed they provide the machinery, tooling and plans for us to implement large scale domestic production.
5.) Follow German developments in small arms and hand-held anti-tank weapons. We do not have much to offer in this area.
6.) Have Germany pressure Vichy France to fully cooperate with us on our plans in the Pacific. Have Germany facilitate the relationship and have France begin direct interaction with Ambassador Kourei.
7.) We provide Germany with our ESD Aluminum for aircraft construction. While Duraluminum was originally developed by Germany in 1909, our 7075 alloy (Extra Super Duraluminum) developed by Sumitomo Metal Industries, is far superior in strength than any other currently available aluminum alloy.
8.) We offer aid in the training, operation and organization of aircraft carriers. Germany is looking into this area, I doubt it will bear fruition, but it gives us another bargaining chip.
9.) Reveal to Hitler and Ribbentrop our plans to initiate hostilities against Britain and the Netherlands. Emphasize that the information is not to leave the room. Stress the fact that if we are successful we will gain control of the majority of the worlds resources in several areas and are willing to supply/trade these materials to Germany in exchange for technological/industrial help. Stress that we will be denying access of these materials to both the US and Britain. Our operations will also force the United States and Britian to reallocate military assets away from the european theater. If we are successfull enough, we might even be able to limit the amount of aid the US is providing to the Soviet Union, which will aid Germany in that theater also. From a logistical standpoint, the allies are at present able to maintain their logistical support of Britain and the Soviet Union, despite the U-Boat offensive. Our combat operations, the size and geography of the Pacific, and any losses we inflict, could be enough to tip the balance in the Axis' favor.
10.) I had previously suggested that we continue development of the Kayaba Ka-1 auto-gyro as an ASW platform for use on limited deck ships. I would like to modify my suggestion to propose we pursue development of the German Fa 223. We will continue production of the KA-1 for the time being, but shift developmental resources to the new type. If development goes well we will cease KA-1 production and replace it with the new aircraft. I have become aware of the German Focke-Achgelis Fa 223 Drache, which was first delivered for tethered testing in September 1939, and actually flew in 1940. (Historically, production was hampered by allied air raids, the second prototype was destroyed by one and the production facility destroyed by another in 1942). Most of the developmental problems thus far have been related to the BMW Bramo 323D radial engine being to fragile and unreliable. This is being replaced by the 1,000 hp Bramo 323Q3, and has resulted in increased performance and lifting capacity. We have a radial engine of similar size, which is extremely reliable and has an output of 1,530hp. I would suggest we request the plans, technical specs and developmental data on this aircraft and set up production facilities. We could be producing them by June of next year. They are a true VTOL aircraft vs an STOL type, are suitable for multiple mission types including ASW, transport and supply. They have a much larger payload than the KA-1 and I feel shows a great deal of future potential.
11.) We already have a number of coal and oil shale synthetic fuel production facilities that we have paid 800,000 Reichsmarks for the patents and built several plants in conjunction with Germany's Lurgi AG, Industrial Group. I suggest we expand upon this and request additional technological support from Germany to support full scale exploitation of this technology. (Historically, Japan showed great interest in the production of synthetic fuels/oil early on and even paid for the patents and partnered with Lurgi to build the gassification plants several coming online in 1939/1940. Then for some reason interest waned and the idea was dropped until late in the war when it was too late. There are huge coal and shale deposits in Japan, China, Manchuria and Korea). Synthetic derived oil also lends itself more readily to the production of high octane aviation fuels. Much of the oil we will get from the DEI has a high volatiles content making it unsuitable for high octane fuel production. If we have higher octane fuels available in large quantities we can change the tuning on our high performance aircraft engines and in many cases achieve up to 40% higher engine outputs.

Gentlemen, I await your comments.

 

I wholeheartedly agree. I would suggest however, that the talks amd any agreement be kept completely comfidential. Mr. Churchill has made great strides in demonizing Germany in the US press and we do not need to make our perception problems any more difficult then they are. At some point this will leak out, but by then we should be reaping the benefit from any agreement and already at war with the US or near to being so.

Prime Minister

 

-Alright gentlemen, I have finished preparations to allow us to adopt new TOE's for our, infantry (SNLF and IJA), artillery, AA, armored and cavalry units. For infantry we will be adopting the 13 man squad, 3 x 4 man fireteams and a squad leader. Each fireteam will be armed with 3 x 7.7mm Type-99 Arisaka rifles, and one Type-99 LMG. The fireteam will consist of a fireteam leader/rifleman, LMG/automatic rifleman, assistant auto-rifleman, and rifleman/grenadier armed with a rifle and Type-89 50mm grenade discharger (erroneously referred to as a knee mortar). Using this structure the squad leader should have improved command and control, needing only to control the three fireteam leaders, who in turn control three other soldiers. By incorporating an automatic weapon in each team and having three we will always have at least one base of fire element and one or two maneuver elements. We will modify our tactics to stress firepower and maneuver. Our units already exhibit excellent maneuverability, adaptability, hardiness, fieldcraft and discipline. Our training will however now stress pushing the tactical responsibility down to a lower command level. Our sergeants and corporals will now be given increased training in tactics and the responsibility for execution will now rest on them. Personal initiative will be encouraged.

Three such squads will form a platoon and three platoons a company.

On the company level we will now have a medium machine gun platoon. These will be belt-fed, tripod mounted, air-cooled, 7.7mm version of the HO-103 (itself a copy of the browning .50 cal). The platoon will be made up of three squads, each having two gun teams, for a total of 6 guns.

The headquarters platoon will also have 3 x 70mm mortar teams. At present there are none. The 70mm mortar Type-11 used to be a battalion level weapon until it was replaced by the Model 92 70mm Battalion Gun. I propose to delete this weapon from our inventory.

The new, proposed Type-01 70mm mortar will be a smaller version of the Model-99 81mm mortar. The Type-99 will replace the 70mm Type-92 battalion gun in the battalion weapons company. The idea being to incorporate more indirect support, while reducing the weight of the weapons and increase the area covered.

US M2 60mm mortar-wt.-42 lbs. range-1985 yards, shell weight-2lb. 15oz., ROF-18rpm
IJ Type-01 mortar-wt.-45lbs. range-1600 yards, @3lbs., ROF-18rpm

US M1 81mm mortar-wt.-136lbs., range-3290 yards, shell weight-6.87-15.01lbs.,ROF-18rpm
IJ Type-97 81mm mortar-wt.-145lbs., range-3100 yards, shell weight-6.93lbs+., ROF-18rpm

Type-92 70mm battalion gun-wt.-476lbs., range-3060 yards, shell weight-8.37lbs., ROF-10rpm

Compare the Type-97 81mm mortar to the Type-92 gun and you will see we can retain a comparable performance for lesser weight and increased portability.

The battalion will consist of three companies and a battalion weapons company containing heavy support weapons such as the 81mm mortar platoon (3 x two gun squads), a heavy machine gun platoon with 4 x two gun squads, 8 guns total (this weapon will be a new type either a copy of the Vickers water-cooled or the browning water-cooled, I prefer the browning for commonality of parts, either type in 7.7mm caliber. We have captured huge numbers of the Browning from insurgent Chinese forces chambered for the 7.92mm Mauser cartridge). Starting production will be simple and rapid. They will also have an anti-tank platoon equipped with the Type 1 47mm ATG as their standard weapon, the 37mm Type 94 will be replaced and relegated to second line/foreign forces service.

The infantry division will be standardized with three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a combat engineer battalion, and divisional troops (support elements, motor transport bn, anti-tank bn, communications battalion, medical battalion, etc.)

We will retain this triangular structure up through the divisional level for infantry, SNLF, and cavalry forces. We will retain the triangular level up through the regimental level on armored and mechanized forces. At the divisional level they will have a square structure. Three motorized/mechanized and one tank regiment for mechanized/motorized divisions. Three tank regiments and one mechanized/motorized infantry regiment for armored divisions. All divisions/regiments/battalions will use the combined arms concept, where the higher headquarters will detach higher level components to form a combined arms sub-unit. (regiments with have BCT's battalion combat teams, divisions will employ their units as RCT's regimental combat teams).

Initially, I do not favor forming an armored division. We will form our armored units into regiments and independant battalions, to be attached for specific operations. Once our initial offensive operations are completed I would suggest that we move our most experienced regiments back to Manchuko and consolidate them to form our armored divisions, with an eye towards potential confrontations with the Soviets. We will continue to employ our other regiments and battalions in combat operations until they have been fully seasoned and then they too can move north, and new formations will be created to take their place.

AA artillery will no longer be a component of infantry, SNLF and cavalry divisions. AA artillery will be formed into seperate BN's, Regt's and Brigades and attached as the situation requires. Armored and mechanized/motorized units will have an intrinsic AA component.

Protection and defense of island bases will be performed primarily by SNLF Defense BN's/Regt's/Bgde's. Each of which contains a ground force infantry, MG, artillery, anti-armor, anti-air and anti-shipping elements. DP weaponry will be used wherever possible. The 25mm/60 guns removed from our ships (to be replaced by 40mm bofors and 20mm oerlikons) will be reworked into land based mounts and used by these units. They have a decent anti-air, anti-personnel, anti-armor and ant-boat capability. The Type 99 88mm gun for heavy AA, light anti-shipping, anti-personnel, anti-armor, anti-boat usage.

IJA base forces will come in two types and be used to defend IJA controlled locations. One type for strictly land based operations and one for coastal and island operations. They will be configured along similar lines to the SNLF Defense units, but those slated for land based only use will have the heavy anti-shipping artillery substituted for additional anti-air/anti-armor DP guns. The Type 88 75mm/L44 gun will be used. The older Type 11 75mm/L34 gun will be issued to indigenous units.

Allied forces in China, Korea, Malaya, and Cochin China willl be upgraded to our old TOE and be armed with our discarded weapons systems, and discarded small arms and machine guns, many of which are in 6.5mm caliber. Since, these forces will be largely used for garrison duty and population control the logistics of supplying multiple calibers is not as critical. A select number of these indigenous formations, those exhibiting above average skill, esprit and fighting ability will be designated Guards divisions and adopt our new TOE and weapons.

 

Eventually we will want an armoured div at least in Burma, since Britain will have some qround 1943.

 

General Terauchi Hisaichi,

I am glad you raised this point, because it allows me to address more indepth our proposed plans for our armored units. This is only a proposal, we seek input from all council members in order to solidify it into a workable course of action. At present the British are required to keep their armored forces in North Africa to face our German allies. We do not know how long they will be tied up there. The same goes for the Soviets, they are presently occupied with resisting the German offensive in Russia. If Germany is victorious there, we may decide to push into the Soviet Union and seize the resource rich areas in Siberia and on Sakhalin. If the Soviets are victorious we have to assume that they may turn their armored formations in our direction. In our border battles with the Soviets in 1939, their armor was the telling factor in our defeat. Our present tank types are too light to successfully engage more modern tank types.
The proposed plan for our armored units should, over time, rectify the situation. We will be reorganizing our independant tank regiments and battalions into light or medium types, not mixed. We can and will attach as many light tank battalions/regiments to your operations in Burma and General Nishio's operations in Malaya, as you request and we have available. Light tanks are quite capable, and in fact superior, for operations in the jungle terrain where your operations will initially occur. We will retain the medium tank battalions/regiments in China where the more open terrain and better roads allow them to be effectively employed.

Our present tank inventory and suggested changes:

Type 89-I-Go medium, reclassify as light tank, if and when our needs are met by more modern types transfer these to form armored units within our indigenous allied forces. At 14.1 tons it is too light to be considered a modern medium tank. It's 57mm Type 90 gun can be used to support infantry operations, but is totally ineffective as a modern anti-armor weapon. It currently has 2 x 6.5 mm Type 91 machine guns (1 hull, 1 coaxial). Those to be used by indigenous forces will retain this weapon because as discussed earlier we will standardize on the 6.5mm for allied forces, except Guards formations which will share our 7.7mm standard cartridge. All type A models will be upgraded to the type B's deisel engine for ease of supply.



Type 89

Type 95 Ha-Go light tank. This will be the primary tank of our initial light tank formations, we have produced 2,300 units. This is a 8.17 ton vehicle mounting the Type 98 37mm gun and 2 x 7.7mm Type 97 machine guns (1 hull, 1 turret). The 37mm gun is comparable to the US type found on it's light tanks. These tanks will prove usefull for supporting our operations in jungle terrain, where their small size, light weight and manuverability will make them effective. They will not be in the TOE for our armored divisions because of their light armor and armament, but will be retained in independant battalions until replaced by newer models. It would be my suggestion that since we have so many of this type and light tanks will be of limited utility in armored battles that we develop a new turret for mounting the 47mm Type 1 ATG and upgrade the existing chasis. We will designate this the Type 95II 47/L54. (Historically in 1944 the Japanese attempted to upgrade these tanks as the Type 4 Ke-Nu conversion mounting a short barrel 57mm gun, in 1945 they attempted to make a Hetzer type tank destroyer mounting the 47mm gun designated the Type 5 Ho-Ru and a 1945 version the Ho-To, mounting a Type 38 120 mm howitzer).

Type 95

Type 98 Ke-Ni light tank. We developed this tank to meet deficiencies we recognized in the Type 95. Design work was completed in 1939, but we have not started production. As I do not think we will have the long term need for light tanks, I suggest we forego production of this type and concentrate on medium tank types. (Historically Japan did not start production on this type until 1942).

Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank. Production of this 14.7ton tank began in 1938. The initial version mounted the 57 mm Type 97 gun, and two 7.7mm Type 97 machine guns. The short barrel 57mm gun is not suitable for a medium tank, lacking good anti-armor capability. We have thus far produced 1134 of these units. We have a new type, the Type 1 Chi-He, of which we already have operational prototypes, but production has not been approved. I suggest we immediately begin production of it's improved turret, mounting the Type1 47mm gun. Retrofit these turrets to all new production and 634 of our existing vehicles. The other 500 hulls will be converted. 70% to casemated, Hetzer type, hulls and mount the Type 90 75 mm gun. Proposed designation Type 97 75/38 GMC. This should provide us an interim tank killer/support weapon. The other 30% to open top, shielded artillery support/anti-strong point type mounting the 100mm T91 Howitzer. Proposed designation Type 97 100/24 HMC. (The Type 1's turret was historically mounted on the Type 97 chassis to create the Kai Shinhoto Chi-Ha, starting in 1942).

Japanese Type 90 75mm/L38 gun-mv 2241fps, range 16369yds, ROF 10-12rpm, wt.3100lbs.
German Pak 40 75mm/L46 gun-mv 2500fps, range 1968ydsDF/25190ydsIDF, ROF 14rpm, wt. 3140lbs.




Type 97 Chi-Ha Kai Shinhoto

 

we do actually have several divisions of tanks on paper, but they are broken up and the biggest issue will be the lack of proper doctrine and training in the use of tank divisions or larger.

 

Talking about armored units I'm assuming the plan is to use them in groups no larger then regiments? While I agree using armor in a cohesive force will improve the fighting ability considerably if they are put in to a too large a force then the commanding officers are bogged down by size and logistics across a wide front and having very little in the way of freedom of movement due to this. The fields of Burma are far different to those of NA or Europe.

Id personally make most armored units around 40 - 60 tanks with a mix between medium, light and scout vehicles giving the local commander options rather then having to wait for reinforcements but that's just me, They could very well be broken down then into smaller sub units of medium and light tanks etc etc.. (eg: For a 60 armored vehicle unit have 30 medium tanks, 12 light tanks and 18 scout cars?)

If it ever did come to the point of requiring division sized tank forces then it means we have either invaded NZ, Australia, India or the US most of which I find unlikely at best as we wouldn't want to over stretch our selves.

 

Type 1 Chi-He medium tank-We have prototypes of this tank on hand. I suggest we continue development and prepare to introduce it into production. (Historically production did not start until 1944 because the Japanese High Command gave it low priority until US medium tanks began to be encountered). I suggest we continue production of the 47mm armed (Type 1 turret) Type 97, until we get this tank up to full scale production then swap over. We should stop development on the 47mm turret, it will not be a waste as it is to be retrofitted on the Type 97. Begin development of a turret mounting the Type 90 75mm gun. The tank weights 17 tons in it's current configuration. It has ample horsepower and the frontal armor can readily be upgraded. (The next tank developed historically was the Type 3 Chi-Nu, mounting the Type 3 75mm gun to a Type 97 chassis. The Type 1 chassis was larger, heavier and had a more powerful engine. In our alternate time line I propose we mount the Type 3 turret to the Type 1 chassis, and start development now instead of when US medium tanks becan to be encountered in 1943. If we do we should start deployment of this tank in January 1943, based upon the historical time from seeing the need to fielding the tank).

An up armored version with heavier armor, increased horsepower and widened track we could designate the Type 1 Chi-He II, a casemated Stug/Hetzer type mounting our Type 99 88mm/L45, proposed designation Type 1 88/L45 GMC should be fielded concurrently.



Type 1 Chi-He (the picture is actually of a Type 3 Chi-Nu. Ours would look similar with a slightly larger chasis)

The Type 1 Chi-He II would have upgraded 101mm/4 in frontal armor and a 4" gun shield for a weight of 26.5 tons and when we develop the Type 4 75mm/L56 in 1943 (Type 5 75mm was the tank version) we can field it on the same chassis as the Type 1 Chi-He III. The tank would weigh in at 31 tons and the new gun had an increased muzzle velocity of 2800fps and increased armor penetration performance.

I do not propose we attempt to produce a heavy tank, our tank destroyers will fill this role.

To replace the light tank in the reconaissance role I propose we produce armored cars. Wheeled vehicles use less fuel and have lower maintenance requirements than tracked vehicles. They would also prove valuable in policing the rear areas of China, where high speed, low logistical footprint and improbability of encountering other armor will make them most usefull. The Germans have the SdKfz. 222 4 x 4 which I think would be a good basis for our design, but was hampered by poor off road performance. I suggest fitting wider tires (we'll have most of the worlds rubber supply) and our Mitsubishi A6120VD 6-cylinder air-cooled diesel producing 120 hp (90 kW)/ 1800 rpm vs the Horch V8 3.5 Litre petrol engine, producing 90hp as used in the German PZ 222. We will designate it the Type 41-1 LAR vehicle, it will be armed with 1 surplus Type 99 20mm cannon and 1 surplus 7.7mm Type 97 machine gun. Remember Mr. Prime Minister you asked what we were going to do with them? They will be augmented by the Type 41-2 which will mount a .50 cal HO-103 and a hull mounted 7.7mm Type 97, a third anti-armor variant mounting a 30mm HO-155 should also be produced.

 

The Burmese-East India front will need some armor both to secure a line deep enough to prevent western aid to China and to hold this line from inevetable British counter-thrusts. The question will be our logistic's to the area as it will be our longest and most vunerable LOC.

I agree that no serious effort should be made on a 'Heavy' tank design. Too costly for us. Our 'tank destroyers' and improved ground attack aircraft of the IJA will have to fill this need.

Are we sending any officers to observe German/Italian mechanized operations? Their reports could be of great value to the formation and training of our own forces.

 

You are correct General Terauchi Hisaichi, but as you said they exist on paper only. My suggestion is to reassemble the best regiments into new divisions with new TOE and keep them in Manchuko, training will take place there and these will be experienced formations and can develop doctrine based upon combat experience. We will have a need to defend against Soviet armored/mechanized formations and they will serve that purpose. If our expansion takes us into good tank country such as northern Australia or India we can redeploy them to where needed. IMO, we need to expand our armored forces as much as possible, forming new battalions as we can and deploying them to gain combat experience. We will also expand our allied nations armored forces, issuing them our cast off equipment, having their industry continue producing older types that are still effective and providing us with a pool of supporting forces.

 

In 1940, "General Tomoyuki Yamashita was sent in Germany to study Wehrmacht tactics and armoured warfare doctrine." He led a delegation of high ranking officers to study the techniques used in the early european battles. IIRC, General Yoshida Shin, later Head, Armored Warfare Department, Ministry of War visited Germany at the same time.

 

If at all possible we should keep a small observation presence so to keep abreast of the ever changing state of warfare. We can get a preview of Allied tactics and weapon systems they may eventually send our way.