"Armchair" General - Change a Battle

They could have produced the Hydrogen-Peroxide powered variant. Cud stay under water for long time I think... Cant remeber what I read on it!

 

Under water for longer would not have been strategically affective. The allies new where they were, Enigma, how to target them, Radar and how to kill them, depth charges!

 

I thought the majority of U-Boats were destroyed while recharging their batteries on the surface..

 

The various Wather boats like the Type XXVI, were all coastal submarines with relatively short ranges and very limited torpedo loads. Additionally, they had somewhere between 30 minutes to an hour's worth of H2O2 fuel. Also, if the problems the British (they made two of their own H2O2 / HTP boats and tested one German one) and the Russians (Zulu class) are any indication the Germans would have had lots of problems (like boats blowing up, fires, personnel casualities etc) with these boats in service just as the British and Russians did.
What really did the Germans in was simply the Allies designing and building better and better detection devices. Sonar / ASDIC, radar, ESM like HF/DF, MAD, and sonobouys to name a few ensured that submarines once detected were quickly hunted down and sunk. Failing to sink a U-boat and simply driving it deeply submerged to escape attack was often almost as effective as sinking it outright. Yes, the boat lived to fight another day but it failed to be able to deliver a successful attack in most cases and was unable to maneuver after coming back up into a new firing position the convoy having moved too far in the interveining time.

 

Moscow was indeed the centre of the Soviet government and the most important rail-junction in the entire USSR. Its loss would have been apawling, not only because of its morale value.

However, it is doubtful that the Germans had actual capacity to capture the city and destroying the remaning bulk of the Soviet Armies in the process.

By the late stages of 'Barbarossa' the Wehrmacht was facing logistical chaos and its units were down to 50% of their original strenght, being the remaining 50% completely exhausted, and that's without considering the loss of irraplaceable equippment.

Having pushed these forces further would have exposed them to almost sure stalemate, attrition fighting and ultimate annihilation, just exactly as it happened at Stalingrad a year later.

Without enough men, machines and supplies the Wehrmacht couldn't destroy the Red Army at Moscow.

German strategic planning was meant to reach the line Archangel-Astrakhan along the Urals, but as always happened among the German General Staff, during the battle they simply and stupidly forgot about the strategic general goal whilst trying to reach tactical opportunities.

No, they didn't. Leningrad was not captured and it managed to draw two German Armies and a Finnish one that could have been deployed elsewhere. Moscow didn't fall and the Soviets kept their capital, their government, their main rail and communication junction. Khárkov and Rostov fell but were re-captured. The whole German line was blattered in almost its entire lenght causing horrible unreplaceable losses to the Germans.

Yes, the Soviets lost millions of men capture, wounded or killed. But they could replace them. The million experienced soldiers the Germans lost, couldn't be replaced.

But also this reluctance to capitulate and obsession to counterattack caused the Germans heavy losses and great delays, fatal for their ultimate strategy.

I think reality is exactly the opposite.

The Siberian divisions were considered élite, or at least they were the thoughest and best-leaded ones.

Which perfectly shows how hard it was to break the average Iván. But many of the losses in 1941 and 1942 were due to the Soviet winter offensives.

This couldn't be done. Army Group 'Centre' might had reached the outskirts on Moscow by early October, but still didn't have enough strenght to capture the city, so we would have reached a stalemate in the exact same way as it happened on December 1941 in reality. And the Soviet winter offensive would been devastating if the 650.000 troops destroyed at Kíev would have taken part. These five Soviet armies would have hit Army Group 'Centre''s over-extended southern flank. I might have developed into a new 1812…

This is true. But the short-term effects of these policies in 1941 would have not been decisive.

Which reminds me another proof of the 'innocent German non-nazi foot soldier' myth… During the hardest of the Russian winter, most German frontline troops slept in Russian Izhbas or huts, and farms, kicking inhabitants out and confiscating their food. Can someone tell me what happens to these millions of villagers and peasants if you take them out of their homes with no food in the middle of the winter?

I think even earlier. If admiral Dönitz could have deployed 120 U-boats in the Atlantic in 1939 and 1940, Great Britain would have been isolated and forced to seek for peace.

Not in 1939, 1940 or even 1941, because the British were lacking enough escorts.

Maverik, the 110 XXI-Type U-boats already built and in training in April 1945 could have made a mess in the Atlantic. Please read this article: The new U-boats 1945

 

I do agree on the subject that German army would be facing a huge risque, however, the main point seems to be that Hitler did not have any real objects planned after the reached lines in mid July. It seems Hitler was expecting the Red Army and Russia to crumble which it did not. After that it was Leningrad, Ukraine or Moscow one after the other. By concentrating in ONE place the end result surely would have been different and more favourable to the Germans. I do think Hitler was gambling everything on one card from the beginning and even then did not how to play after the first huge victories. For example I do believe von Bock for example was quite shocked in his memoirs that they did not have a "goal" to go for when they were some 300 kms from Moscow ( already earlier on as he noticed what they could do ) and I´m not just talking on this because of the so-called "Moscow obsession" that von Bock was mentioned to be suffering from. They just did not have a plan to follow and that is quite startling I think. Whether it would be Moscow or Ukraine or Leningrad they should have had a clear view of what to dnce they decided to go for Kiev I think it was all over for the Moscow push and probably they should have kept going in the southern front if possible(?).

Time table:

June 28. The Wehrmarcht captures Minsk, having advanced over 200 miles in a week.

July 15. Smolensk is taken

July 27. Hitler orders Guderian's Panzers to turn south.

September 19. Hitler's drive south nets the city of Kiev.

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/BARBAROS.HTML

October 2: operation Typhoon begins. Colonel General Heinz Guderian’s Second Panzer Group, along with the Second Army, turns back north to assist in the drive to Moscow.

http://home.wanadoo.nl/cclinks/abtf/typhoo~1.html

Map:

http://www.geocities.com/sonzabird/typhoon.html

So the Russians had over two months to strenghten their postions after the Germans took Smolensk!

 

The problem here was the lack of an overall strategy, in the tradition of the German General Staff, Von Moltke, Von Falkenhayn and Von Ludendorff all suffered from the same decease… "to-hell-with-strategy, let's do 100 annihilation battles and win the war"…

The plan for 'Barbarossa' was: once we reach Smoliensk we'll see what we'll do next. And Hitler's mistake here was letting his subordinates to hesitate and argue, losing a tremendous quantity of precious time.

But even with a concrete strategic goal, the Wehrmacht didn't have the means to achieve it. Without a full-war economy, lack of technology and irrational wasting of man power there was no way the Germans could have won.

'Barbarossa' is the exact opposite of the 1944 campaign in Northwest Europe. There, Allied generals were more concerned about capturing and liberating territory than fighting the Germans, whilst in the east, the German High Command was onsessed with destroying the enemy.

The war only saw Patton in the West and STAVKA in the east playing for a destroying-the-enemy-AND-gaining-territory operational art, the perfect combination of both schools.

We could say that in the German High Command only marshal Von Runstedt was aware of this. Once he saw a map of the Soviet Union and the state of the Wehrmacht he immediately said: "We must do this in two separate campaigns, one in 1941 and one in 1942".

 

Wasn't Moscow within reach when Hitler transferred a large # of troops to the south as progress was slow in southern sector denying a possible capture of Moscow? An encirclement of Moscow might've prevented the level of destruction that occurred at Stalingrad. With many buildings left standing, soldiers would be out of the cold. Of course troops defending outer perimeter of city would not be protected from cold, & counterattack has to be considered as well.

U-boats did not lose until april 43, which gave Germans from 39 til then to maximize U-boat campaign & production.

 

Yes it was, and there was virtually no army between the Soviet capital and Smoliensk. However, Army Group 'Centre' was just facing its first major logistical crisis and most of the troops had to be re-grouped, rested and re-fit to continue the advance.

In these circumstances, and with a stiffening resistance to the south, it was imperative to clear the southern flank and capture Leningrad to release the sieging armies first.

And Army Group 'South' didn't have enough mobile units to clear its sector by itself.

Army Group 'North' was delayed in the capturing of Leningrad by strategical hesitation and Soviet resistance, thus allowing marshal Zhúkov to fly into the city and reinforce it. Now, marshal Von Leeb needed more artillery for the siege and more mobile troops to seize the Ladoga railway and definately isolate the city.

But U-boats couldn't win the war then. Not after the US' entry into the war.

Germany's best posibilities to isolate and neutralise —not defeat— Great Britain were during 1939 and 1940, when there were very few escorting vessels in the Atlantic. In 1941 the US gave 80 destroyers to the RN and very soon the US Navy started escorting British convoys too. It then became just a matter of time before the Allies won the build-up and matériel battle in the Atlantic.

 

U boats couldn't win war. True, however with a peace agrmt in the east, the Germans could make full use of millions of tons of steel & other war booty captured in east to boost U boat production.

Then Portugal & Spain would be taken to seal off Med. Simultaneously 10 panzer divisions are sent into Africa & push on through Egypt. Take middle east oil. Morocco is taken, Uboats are trasferred to Morrocco & bases even further south as buffer against potential allied landings on west side of Africa.Also Syrian landing at some point to move toward Iran for eventual drive to Baku. Germans spread too thin? Not if one considers 98 divisions were sent into Russia & only 10 would be needed to win in Africa. A few could be spared for Spain & Syria.

Would Germans win? perhaps not, as longterm they still face overwhelming allied material weight. Russians recover 43-44.Allies still land on both sides of Africa. Nonetheless, the above scenario increase Germany's chances to win or negotiate with allies from position of strength.

 

This two could fall, indeed. But then it would recquire more troops to garrison its shores and for anti-partisans duties. There would have upsurged for sure a partisan guerrilla as happened in the Balcans. Taking Gibraltar would have improved the Axis' strategic position, but could they take advantage of it? They had controll over the entire eastern Mediterrenean and, did it did them any good? No.

With Malta and Alexandria still in British hands, I doubt that the Italo-German forces, with their limited naval capacity, little co-operation and staff incompetence could have deployed 10 fully manned, equipped and supplied Panzer divisions into North Africa and kept them properly supplied. They hardly achieved that with 2 in North Africa and with 100+ in the east, even if in the latter there were rails, motorways and no air opposition.

Even if the Germans could have driven the British back to Suez and the back to the Middle East, it is doubtful that they could have kept going on and on all the way to India. The British still had naval supperiority and eventual matériel supperiority in any campaign they wished to focus their limited, yet efficient military might. Even with Syria in German hands, there would have been a mobile campaign in the Middle East, in northern Arabia and Iraq. But a stalemate would have been achieved until American equippment and territorial units would have turned the balance for the British's favour.

 

I never cease to be amazed at this mad rush for oil, and then getting stuck with no way to move it! I have argued repeatedly against this recently, and I'm not going to repeat myself, lest I become even more boring than what I already am.

As to conquering Portugal and Spain, all right, but remeber Napoleon and his Spanish Ulcer (and Portuguese Roosters and Arthur Wellesley...). This would take the same effect, drawing more and more security troops, so instead of one Balkan drain you'd have two, and this one even closer to it's traditional friend, Great Britain, and with a loooong coast with lots of pretty places for disembarking.

10 Pz divs in Afrika? All right, but they couldn't keep 2 supplied, so what were they going to do about these, I ask you? Build a tunnel? One thing I wonder is where did the Italians find so many merchant ships to be sunk!

"Syrian landing at some point to move toward Iran for eventual drive to Baku". Gee, that's complicated! If you had already taken the oil, why disembarking in Syria to go to Iran? But what oil are you talking about in the first place, so I can synchronise my geography with yours...

And the Germans were spread thin all the time, even more if you are going to invade the Iberian Peninsula (how many more divisions?), plus 10 Pz divs plus all the support troops needed for Africa, plus syria, plus God knows what else. Hitler would have to award quite a lot of "Ehrenkreuz der Deutschen Mutter" to have enough troops for all these requirements

And also think for a while how and why Rommel was stopped at precisely El Alamein. It was not by chance or because it had a pretty name.

 

With aircraft free from Russian duties, the supply problem is largely solved in Africa. Britain would not have material superiority if Germans conclude Russian campaign & transfer forces to Africa.

 

I also recall when the Panzer 4 came out, a whole load of em were sent to Africa by air. I really think this should be studied before making supply suppositions regarding frica.

 

Why? Ju-52s? When is people going to understand they are not 747s nor C-130 Hercules?

Why not?

British industry + Lend & Lease = overwhelming matériel supperiority.

A whole?! Panzer IVs?! The biggest transport aircraft the Germans had was the Me Gigant, and there were very few of them and they were slow and awkward to fly. Besides, they weren't able to transfer even Panzer IIIs, just halftracks, medium guns and Panzers I and II.

The Axis did not have enough ships, lorries and trains to overcome their logistical situation.

 

A couple of points...

Did anyone realise the oil production potential of the Middle East in the 30s and 40s? Just a thought!

If not then why would they go there...

A Panzer IV by air? Really?

The Gigant was capable of transporting a 38t by air. But I didnt think there was a German aircraft big enough to lift a complete MKIV. All the MKIVs I have lists of came in on ships.

Hence why there was a panzer division on the Med seabed...

 

Oh my goodness, here we go again!

1 Pzkfw IV Ausf. F2 = 23.6 tons.

Load capacity for some cargo planes, taken ar random from Warplanes of the 3rd Reich, Wm. Green
(I know, not the best source, but that's what came to hand )

Gotha 244 = +/- 6,000 lb and this includes fuel and crew!

Ju 52 = (max overload) 10,500 lb again inc. fuel and crew

Ju 352 = 15,000 lb ditto

Me 321 (the glider) = 60,000 lb. Could the cargo compartment floor carry a Pz IV??? In July '43 they were supposed to ferry 2 parachute divisions to Sicily, and the tow planes (He111Z) couldn't handle the distance!

Me 323 = 35,000 lb

So in how many pieces do you want to cut your Panzer so it can be carried?

 

The number was 50 MK 4's that were sent over. I suppose they could send the motors seperate, chassis & tracks as well. good question, don't know exactly how it was done.

Axis did not have enough ships, lorries, & trains to overcome their logistical probs. Well with western end of Med sealed off, Malta is no longer fed from west end. & an attack on it would be a good idea which would solve much of their shipping problems. Remember, they were able to get hardware across to Tunisia. So with Gibralter & Malta in hand & peace in Russia which frees up transport aircraft, the logistical proplems are much more easily overcome.

Oil? well oil is not only good for keeping tanks running, but also if one takes away oil from the Brits, it becomes difficult to keep British navy moving.

 

Ah, ha,ha,ha,ha,ha,ha....On their best day the Luftwaffe couldn't supply a corps on the offensive! One only needs look at the Stalingrad airlift to realize the silliness of the Germans supplying any serious force anywere by air. The average airlift tonnage they could reasonably supply providing a maximum effort (eg., using every available aircraft even marginally suitable for the purpose) is maybe 250 to 300 tons. This means on a good day they might, and I emphsize might, supply a corps on the defensive.
Logistically, the Germans were literally screwed going anywhere without an already existing good infrastructure of roads and railroads. To put it bluntly, the Germans were amatuers at logistics and engineering.
They may have been past-masters at the tactical and possibly the operational art of war but, they were literally idiots in the fields of engineering and logistics....

 

Apart from coal fired ones...

50 MKIVs by air? Got any sources for that?

When were they flown over, what year???