Axis Joint Strike on the USSR

Dont hold your breath gentlemen, it seems GermanStrategist has not been on for quite some time??? Last activity, December 15th, 2010 04:31 AM....

One also can immediately tell his agenda by simply reading his name, had it been JapanStategitst, he would most likely not be trying to convince us of a "Northern thrust"

PS,
If the Germans were really cold in front of Moscow, I dont even want to know what the Japanese would have felt like in Siberia (getting goosebumps just thinking about it) and with no armor or mechanized infantry?!?! Napoleon anyone?

 

I realized this was a old thread, but with threads about no fly zones, islamic fundamentalist's, crazy Babtist's and such, it was nice to argue about WWII for a change.

 

It's been awhile since this thread has been active so I've refrained from posting, but now that I've spent some time analyzing this scenario I've come to a few conclusions:

Firstly, it is pretty unlikely that the Japanese will help the Germans if they are only given less than a year's notice before Operation Barbarossa begins. Most of their army is tied down in China, but their navy is essentially unused. If they helped, their impact would likely be limited to knocking out whatever Russian ships existed in the Pacific, ruining Vladivostok, capturing Sakhalin island, and perhaps advancing a few tens of miles into Soviet territory due to the initial surprise factor that they would have.

If the Japanese want to have a major impact in the east, I've come to agree that the POD will have to be much farther back than what I set it to. I actually made another thread on this possibility where the Japanese begin preparing for a USSR invasion much earlier and develop the tanks and artillery they will need.

The Japanese would have to be convinced much earlier (say 1936) that the USSR posed an existential threat to Japanese ambitions... I honestly don't believe this is that hard of a sell (historically the Russians had attempted to take their lands in the Russo-Japanese war only 30 years earlier and the Japanese spanked them). If the Japanese prioritize the USSR over China and shift their military strategy towards one involving war in the north, then they have ample time to set up heavy railroad lines in Manchuria, shift resources from the navy to the army, and develop stronger tanks.

All of this is possible because we assume the Japanese do not engage China and that this factor means the United States does not declare an embargo on Japan for at least 5 years. This will help Japan enormously in getting the oil, supplies and other raw materials she needs to ugrade her army so that it will be able to make a much larger impact against the USSR. When hostilities do commence in 1941, Japan will have had 5 years to prepare without any embargo limitations. In this scenario, I can imagine the Japanese making a much larger impact, taking much of the Russian Far East and causing an enormous psychological effect on the Soviets' will to fight. The USSR could find itself damaged so badly in 1941 by the combined efforts of the Germans and the Japanese that by 1942 it completely loses chain of command and collapses or sues for peace.

 

Why look who came back from the dead!

As im sure you are aware, Japan just like Germany suffered from the lack of resources. IMO, you would be very hard pressed convincing Japan to use the last of her resources for Germany's victory (with nothing to guarantee it or insure it....).

The way I see it, Japan had two bad options if she decided to side with Germany in her conquest:
1. Win and receive nothing in return.
2. Lose it all

Only guarantee is a tremendous lose of life and resources.

Japan needed oil and she wasnt going to get any from Siberia and Germany wasnt sharing.
Having very limited resources, Japan did not have the luxury of building a land and sea war machine; instead, she had to chose one. It was either going to be a navy or a land juggernaut. Considering that Japan is an island nation which needs to protect her fishing, fragile trade routes, protect her nearby islands, be able to retrieve desperately needed resources from other nations to her own and all this while supporting her army which was engaged elsewhere.... a navy was essential. A land army with thousands of heavy guns, tanks and mechanized infantry is a no go for Japan and her historical army would not exist with out her navy.

1936 wouldnt work for Japan because she already invested heavily in her navy and during this time Germany had better relations with Russia than Japan.

Curious. Why would the U.S. not issue the same embargo on Japan for attacking Russia as she historically had for attacking China?

PS,
Japan's signing of the non-agression pact with Soviet Russia can be compared to Hitler signing one; "Secure peace with one while going for the other". Japan was very aware of a growing problem across the Pacific....

 

About the embargo:if Japan had attacked the SU,there would not be a lot of missionaries spreading stories about the poor Russian peasant,persecuted by the bad Japanese ,and there also was no myth about 500 million of Russians waiting to be civilised by the US and waiting on the possibility to buy US products (for a lot of people,the same thing as being civilised)

 

OTOH,there is the fact that only in 1940 (thus 3 years after Nanking,and after selling during 7 years war materials to Japan,making it possible for Japan to do bad things in China)the man in the White House was saying :no more business with Japan.

 

about Japa,;China,Russia :what German Strategist is forgetting is that China was the old enemy of Japan,Russia was a newcomer(after 1850).There also was no benefit to attack the SU ,only a lot of Siberia,with nothing to steal .
OTOH,there was Manchuria with a lot of raw materials,and there were 500 millionof Chinese.What Japan needed were raw materials and 500 million of people willing to buy Japanese products,and,these raw materials and these 500 million of people were not available in the SU .What Japan wanted was a weak and friendly China,willing to be dominated by Japan and willing to buy Japanese thingummies (a word I did not know),thus,some good (for Japan) old (neo) colonialism.
Of course,you can argue that the possibility for Japan to have a weak and friendly China was very remote .
But the point remains :Russia was strong,and there was nothing to steal,while China was weak,and there was a lot to steal . Thus,the choice was obvious (already in WWI) .

 

I don't think I'd catagorize China as "the old enemy of Japan". In any case if Japan was convinced that removing Soviet influence from the region was necessary for securing her empire then a different strategy might arise. If they are convinced of this in 36 then preventing a war with China becomes important and assures them continued access to resources both from the US and the rest of the world up into 41. As the Chinese communists were a threat to the nationalist during this time period they might even gain some ground diplomatically and economically with the Chinese. I would expect a US embargo in 41 once they attaked the Soviets but that doesn't mean that Japanese ships would be prevented from bringing in resources from else where. The question is could they build up a mechanised force equal to the task of taking the Soviets on in the Far East between 36 and 41? The navy probably wouldn't be happy about it but might well see the necessity.

 

The Japanese had close to 3,000 Type 95 and Type 97 tanks in their inventory so I don't think its a stretch to say that they could mass around 700 at least for the invasion that I mentioned previously on pg 1 of the thread. I think the IJA would need about 10-12 months out to plan and prepare for an invasion in support of Barbarossa, the next to impossible task would be maintaining secrecy. The Soviets likely had effective intel gathering in Manchuria which makes any major buildup problematic. The Japanese would need to upgrade their rail capacity to a degree in order to support major operations to the North as well as prepare forward supplt depots while maintaing secrecy. The troop deployments could come later within months and weeks of the actual start date.
I don't think its out of the realm of possibility for the Germans and Japanese to have some joint planning and a basic economic agreement in place in order to ensure success. If the Japanese conquer Siberia, what's to say that their appetite for conquest isn't satisfied at that point?

 

Stalin had pretty good intell coming dirctly from Tokyo. So I agree security is a problem.
Looking at wiki at Type 97 Chi-Ha - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia it looks like about 600 type 97's would be available to the Japanese forces. The type 95s are best viewed as tankett's armed only with mgs. the Type 97's look like they wouldn't be a bad early war tank but defintily not up to a T-34. Then there's the question of Japanese doctrine and communications.

 

Already in the 13th century,the Chinese Emperor Kublai Chan twice tried to conquer Japan,thus the hostility between both was very old,while the problems between Russia and Japan were recent .

 

A bitter rivalry to say the least.

 

I agree with one of the other posters. Yes, Japan would see the Soviet Union as a big threat to her imperial ambitions in China, but I think that Japan couldn't be convinced into striking first since there was only frozen tundra to be gained.

 

this is a good read on this subject (although not perfect);

Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

it does give some good ideas of the military issues at least...

edit: sorry just seen was already posted - still worth adding here again i think though as answers many more recent questions..

 

It's worth noteing however that he was the Mongol emperor of China. Furthermore significant aspects of Japanese culture were imported from China. The Mongol invasions of the 13th century hardly substantiate China and Japan as being ancient enemies.

 

From the historical numbers I've looked at... the Japanese army had 51 divisions totalling 1.7 million men in 1941 and the navy had 300,000 personnel with 1,500 pilots. The navy possessed 1750 battle-worthy planes and the land-based air force had 1500 planes.

Had the switch to a ground-based army been made in 36 I can imagine a lot of changes being made to Japan's military.

Ship production could be scaled back dramatically considering that Russia's navy in the Pacific was somewhat of a joke by 1936 alone. If Japan had focused her efforts on tanks and aircraft I can imagine her being able to produce tanks resembling the early German panzers (the Japanese did effectively copy German aircraft using their blueprints). Had tank numbers been increased (it's hard to find numbers on these can someone tell me what a realistic increase would be?) by a significant amount then I'm sure the situation in Manchuria would look far more serious to the USSR.

I know the Germans fielded about 3,600 tanks for Operation Barbarossa. The Japanese would have been able to field close to maybe half of this? Stalin might've fortified the far east somewhat more, but he was fairly incompetent and would probably underestimate the Japanese.

By the time Barbarossa rolled around, it is realistic that the Japanese could have fielded 2 million men for their northern strike and far more planes than they historically had due to a reduced navy. Something close to 2,500 aircraft. Now coupled with a much better rail system in Manchuria that would've presumably developed from 36-41 how far could the Japanese push forward with this kind of force? It seems to be within the realm of possibility that the Japanese could've taken over the Russian Far East or at least tied down tens and tens of divisions that would've otherwise seen action on the German front.

 

But that's a very optimistic indeed an unrealistically optomistc date for the change. If the Japanese are convinced in 36 that it is necessary to defeat the Soviets then it's going to take most of 36 at least to decide how to reconfigure the Japanese military. Remember that the Japanese governement is essentially a triumverate where the army is one leg, the navy the other, the third being civilian. Such a drastic change is not going to come easy to them.

Also while Stalin wasn't the greatest military mind he was when pushed willing to listen to his military people. Given a Japanese build up of this nature he might just decide that instead of purging the officer corp he would station those he considered most dangerous in Siberia. This could leave the Red Army in much better shape overall in 40 and 41.

 

Good points, but I don't think a fundamental reallocation of the Japanese military's industrial effort was necessary. Like I mentioned previously, the extent of Japan's involvement should be dictated by what set of circumstances would best support Barbarossa. I think that cutting the Trans-Siberian railroad and moving in the direction of Lake Baikal while taking Vladivostok pretty much sums up the extent of what the Japanese could do to have any strategic effect on Barbarossa. In order to support that they would need to cease any offensive action in China and not attack Pearl harbor (invade everything in the pacific either).
I think the critical year would be 1942 when the USSR relied upon Lend Lease for critical supplies in order to survive. Most of those came through Vladivostok, so with that port eliminated and an active front in its place I think the Soviets don't survive 1942.

 

That's all well,but,what would be the benefit for Japan ? Meanwhile,it would be ,without a navy and airforce,helpless against the US .

 

This is exactly the problem for Japan, it gains them nothing while going up against a foe which had beaten them badly twice in the late thirties, and had a larger force in the Far East in June of 1941 than the one which had handed them their hats. They knew full well they couldn't win against the Soviets, and the Soviet supplied Mongolian troops, and they had NOTHING to gain, no resources, nothing.

They had also signed a "non-aggression" pact with the USSR after their military losses to the Soviets, but unlike Hitler and the Nazis they honored their pacts to the end, and their pact specifically stated that if either nation were attacked by a third party/nation, the signatories would remain neutral in the conflict.