Barbarossa is well planned & executed, much like the sickle cut was.

GB=Great Britain(?) declared war on 6th Dec 1941 because Churchill wanted to give Finland a chance to pull out of war for some reason.

 

Fact:
Britain declared war on Finland, Hungary and Romania on 5 December 1941, following the signing of the Tri-partite Pact and Finland's alliance with Germany.
Question:
Did Churchil want to pull also Hungary and Romania out of the war by declaration of war or Finland was granted a preferential treatment? I have always though that declaration of war drags a country into the war rather than pulling it out of the armed conflict.

 

if you ask about Finland I believe they wanted ( WC,FDR) to make a hole in the axis line. FDR for instance sent a message that if Finland cuts the Murmansk line they will get very tough treatment when the war is over. For some reason WC had some sympathy for Finland, I am not sure why. I think he had given an ultimatum that by this time period you retreat or...then again Germany would have conquered Finland if we had given in, so not a choice ,really. Your guess is as good as me why all these countries were not considered true enemies until Dec 1941.

Interesting is that many British did use Finnish medals on their chest for helping Finland in Winter war even after this because they did not realize it was a Finnish medal...

 

So FDR does not want Finland to fight gallantly against the Soviet ?
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About this topic, when Barbarossa was planned, Manstein had already been known to produce that game winning Sickle-cut operational stroke. Only Leningrad was the target where no major benefit was to be captured east of the city. Why not stay Manstein to Army Group North instead of transferring him to Ukraine and the Crimea. Maybe before the year 1941 had ended, he would have produced another game winning stroke to take the city, like he did for Sevastopol.

With Leningrad and neighboring lands in German hands, Finland and Germany would be free to use or repair at least its railway system and relieved much of the Panzer Group 4 and one of the Armies to join the attack on Moscow or around Stalingrad. Also, given that Italian troops would be better in second-duty or static defense that quell partisans, Italians troops would be deployed in Leningrad. Axis co-belligerents fought better in defense and armor vehicles for defense would be easier to mass manufactured. If Italian tank destroyer Semovente 75/18 could shot Shermans, Grants and Stewarts, and Romanian Mareșal inspired the German Hetzer, Co-belligerents deployed in defense would have allowed these TDs in greater use.

 

What if instead of three Army groups making thrusts, they have two giant thrusts Sweeping North and South converging with a Pincer on Moscow, and spread the Troops from the third Army Group that isn't in existence anymore to cover the Flanks of the two main thrusts?

 

This was investigated but considered to be impossible .

 

Why is it considered to be impossible?

 

Because it was obvious that it was not good to go AFTER the Soviets and that it was impossible to advance more than 1000 km triumphantically in a few weeks /months .

A comparison would be that the Allied strategy would be to land on 6 june in Normandy and to be in Berlin on 1 september . This was out of the question, as would be a same strategy in the SU .

That's why the Germans chosed an other strategy (which depended on the Soviet goodwill to do as the Germans proposed ) : they would attack and the Soviets would come to the border,and there the Soviets would be defeated. The rest would be a piece of a cake . A small one .

This strategy was adopted,because it was the only who could have a chance to succeed .

 

General Marcks presented his concept of operations on 5th August 1940. Although sources vary on the subject, it can be assumed, that Marcks made Moscow the primary objective (with Halder's approval) of a two pronged operation. This plan divided German forces into two operational theaters, one north of the Pripyat Marshes and one to the south.

The northern wing would strike toward Moscow through White Russia, while the southern would take Kiev, cross the Dnepr and then turn to the northeast to protect the northern wing's southern flank if required.

The Marcks' plan contained several characteristics which were to seen again. First, the emphasis on Moscow was a principle which Halder would maintain well into the initial execution phase. Second; the plan took for granted the optimism for a relatively quick victory which was shared by the majority of the German military leadership. The entire operation was anticipated to last only 9 to 17 weeks.

Alternative plans were of course proposed, such as the Lossberg study, and other's tweeked various aspects (Paulus, Halder, etc). Basically, there were two thoughts; one, the race to the political center (the center for all command and control); Moscow, and two, the economic breadbasket (Ukraine) while protecting AGC's flanks. All hinged on the envelopment and utter destruction of the Red Army.

Subsequent war games in December brought to the fore the need for an operational pause to resupply the armies. The war games also reinforced concerns about logisitics, as well as the time-space problem confronting the Germans; they needed desperately to crush the Red Army before it retreated. Further, they showed the difficulty the German army would face in reaching their operational objectives in good order. One game apparently had the German Army severely depleted, reaching Moscow with no reserves, and unable to re-supply. So already in December 1940, the war games were showing a terrible toll would have to be paid for crossing Russia in time and space.

They had an entire year to perfect their plan. They gamed out various aspects. They prepared to the best of their abilities. They achieved near total surprise at the start of the operation. And they still failed.

 

Yes, they failed. But preparations were far from adequate. They did know almost nothing about their enemy besides the experiences from the spanish civil war and the winter war. They didn't even had proper maps of some regions of Russia. Their equipment wasn't suited for the russian territory and was basically the same they used against France. Even though they knew at least about some soviet heavy tanks the still didn't have useful ATGs in reasonable numbers.

Hitler admitted that they underestimated the Red Army completely and had no idea about her strength.
Goebbels admitted, that the behaviour of the Wehrmacht and SS in the occupied countries was a big mistake.

We will never know, if a german victory in 1941 was possible at all, but the Wehrmacht made mistakes right from the start. Not as much as the Red Army, but there is still room for speculations.

 

Most of the existing Soviet tanks were eliminated /lost in 1941.

The behaviour of the WM and SS became a mistake (not that big ) after Barbarossa failed .

About the equipment : there was no special equipment needed for Barbarossa, the SU was not Mars .


The "underestimation " of the Red Army was irrelevant for the outcome of the war;without the "underestimation " the outcome would be the same .

 

That's an excellent comparison, yet the Germans were facing that gigantic task under even much worse conditions compared to the alliesat the west: Germans had literally to steal food and winter clothing from civil population, there were no adequate plans and means for supply, infantry had to follow tanks on foot etc... German military elite knew that but have refused to hear warnings. They "knew" better.

 

Who warned them?
They saw the poor performance of the Red Army in Finnland, knew about the reduction of soviet military leaders, saw their equipment in East Poland, they knew what happened in 1918 (with soldiers who had to walk).

 

No they haven't got a warning from Bletchley.

It was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation that the army could not be sufficiently supplied for prolonged combat, but their warnings were disregarded.

 

Their equipment was perfectly acceptable for the plan they had. There was nothing "special" about Russian territory during the summer / autumn of '41 that would've required some other kind of specialist equipment. Soviet heavy tanks were not a insurmountable problem. The Germans were not halted at the gates of Moscow by heavy tanks. These are making minor tactical excuses for what is a strategic failure.

The Red Army of June 1941 was basically destroyed during 1941, as planned. The problem was the rate at which the Soviet Union was able to mobilise new divisions (a strategic issue); This was unforseen. It had nothing to do with weaponry better suited for "Russian terrain", nor heavier tanks. No amount of war gaming would've revealed this. It was unprecedented. "Better Maps" might solve a tactical, or even operational problem (however unlikely), but were not the answer. Maps do not solve the political problem.

It was purely the Soviet rate of mobilisation, and the fact the Soviet Union didn't suffer a political collapse as Imperial Russia had, that defeated the Germans.

In order to have a hope of succeeding, the Germans needed three things; the destruction of the Red Army (military goal - didn't succeed), the capture of Moscow in '41 (political - didn't succeed), and the capture Ukraine (economic - partially succeeded).

There was no way to succeed with all three. Giving Germany better maps and better/more ATGs does not help. Neither do anything to combat the rate of mobilisation, nor force a Russian political rethink.

The Germans gave it their very best shot, and came incredibly close (IMO) when panic was spreading in Moscow.

 

The Economics of World War II: six great power in international comparison p. 12-18

To paraphrase about the mentioned the partially succeeded economic goal on Ukraine, "Allied naval supremacy limited Germany and Italy to overland trade with their neutral neighbors and the neutrals adjacent to occupied Europe. Together these constituted a zone with a prewar conditions of population and GDP but was little more than the half the size of the bloc available to the Allies... Again trade with neutrals principally benefited the western Allies, and was turned to Soviet benefit only indirectly through the medium of Allied aid to the USSR.

p.6 -- "Using 1938 indicators, ... by 1942 the Axis power s were no longer economically inferior to the Allies, and were on more or less equal terms in overall GDP of 1938"

p.9-12, -- "Looking at the changing economic strength of the great-power coalitions as they existed in 1942... the Axis economies expanded while the resources of France, knocked out of the Allied coalition in 1940, became available to Germany. In 1941, Soviet GDP was also beginning to fall under the impact of German attack. 1941 was the Allied low point. From 1942 onwards, the [favor] moved steadily [to the Allies]... in 1942 and 1943, the great-power economic balance moved strongly in favor of the Alllies and even befor the economic collapese of Germany and Japan... in 1944.

p.11 -- Only on the eastern front did the Allies not possess the advantage... by 1942, a rough [economy] parity [between Germany and the USSR] had been transformed into a substantial German advantage...With recovery in 1943 the Soviet economy was able to reestablish a narrow advantage, but it remained a finely balanced thing until 1945"

p.12 and p.18 -- [On both main fronts the Allies held an even greater advantage] in munitions and weapons than in men, by far the great part of this vast flow emerged from Allied factories and shipyards, reflecting the higher level of equipment per soldier of the Soviet, British and United States armies.
-----

Given above, Germany would take Ukraine as the economic goal to compensate for the discrepancy in weapons. So destructing Red Army fighting capability would be the main goal with taking Ukraine as an almost most goal. Is destructing Red Army in 1941 meant destructing fighting capability or capturing Moscow meant so ? For example, some ethnicity and population did not go well with Stalin management, would making the Red Army deal with partisans. Could One or few of Finland, Italy, Romania, Hungary and Japan make the Red Army deal with multiple fronts? So separate thrust to Ukraine with Romania, Hungarian, Slovak troops and Leningrad with Finnish, Baltic troops

 

It is an economic paper, showing a remarkably poor grasp of some of the real aspects of the war, making on at least one occasion a flawed assumption based on common myths. A few valuable insights mean it has ideas that warrant further investigation. Some of its conclusions rest on rather shaky assumptions (economic comparisons between states of the time are not easy nor straightforward). Which is only to be expected given the nature of the study, but it is something the reader needs to be aware of, and definitely an area that allows one to easily question many of the statements you have quoted.

Indeed, the whole paper is itself more concerned with examining the economic effects of the war on the post WW2 world, than actually focusing on the economics of the war itself, as such, I find its title misleading.

 

What if Hitler had all of his horses replaced by caterpillar trucks like the Raupenschlepper, Ost trucks?

If he had been more aware of the conditions inside regarding the poor/non-existent good roads, and had Germans ration for the war economy like the US, wouldn't the rate of advancement be much faster, since the Germany Army doesn't have to worry about horses and poor roads in the replacement of caterpillar trucks?

What if Hitler had made every German citizen work a free hour at the factory every sunday? Would the tens of millions of extra hours might have helped? If the Germans had kept their morale when they were losing battles in 1943/44 and were getting bombed daily, surely no German would stand against these new laws would they?

What if Germany had made mass production applicable to military goods where craftsman goods would be applicable to only consumer goods?

If Germany had made these changes pre-war and pre-Barbarossa would it have helped a lot?

I understand this is a lot of hindsight but if it had been done, would it have helped? I just want to know what could have been possible, specifically pre war economy changes.

 

What if Germany had done everything right, and no German ever fired a bullet that didn't hit it's mark, would that've helped?

Seriously, how likely is it? You need to think of context, in that events never just exist in a vaccuum, that there are precedents and logical reasons that nations take the decisions they do?

If Germany is going to produce masses of trucks, given their limited manufacturing capacity, what are they not going to produce instead? Because you are posing questions akin to having your cake, and eating it too.

What about modern studies that show that beyond a certain point, increasing the amount of labour (number of worked hours) per worker actually reduces efficiency, especially over longer time periods? Down time, and recreational time are vital. When was the last time you put in 60 hour weeks for 4 years? Another case of having you cake and eating it too...

Mass production vs craftsmanship has already been explained to you. While they were winning, there was no incentive to change. When it became apparent they were losing, it was too late to change effectively. These are sweeping generalizations. They did adapt. They did start to change. New factories and practices come online that vastly improved resource use. But they couldn't catch up in the two years remaining to them.

 

I think you're exaggerating my questions. I am talking about the huge error of logistics they had during Barbarossa. I understand the Germans made dozens of tactical and strategic errors. I understand they liked craftsmanship, but what if there was emphasis for mass production in terms of military weapons, while sticking to craftsmanship for consumer goods?

Also I guess they shouldn't produce weapons like the schwerer gustav, karl gerat and any other heavy railroad artillery, it would have been good to take all that metal into airplanes and caterpillar tracks.

I didn't say that Germany should have made workers have ten hour workdays on Sunday, I'm just asking if they all went to the factory and worked there for an hour. If there are a million Germans working an extra hour over 50 weeks it will provide 50 million extra hours of military goods to be made. I don't think a German worker adding an extra hour to his workweek would severely deplete him of his working ability, he wouldn't like it, but it wouldn't hurt him.

Also, I just want to know if my questions can be answered. Let's just propose, could they have won if these conditions were available to them:

-Adopt mass production techniques over craftsmanship for all military armament after Hitler takes power
-Have Raupenschlepper Ost(Caterpillar trucks) in the placement of horses, and have the oil to fuel them
-Not make any heavy weapons like the schwerer gustav or karl gerat

I do understand they didn't see this coming to them, but if they foresaw the Russian mobilization of military and poor roads, could Barbarossa have been successful under the conditions I mentioned

Also, I would admire if you leave out your sarcastic comments for this response. Thanks.