Battle For Midway

The U S Navy's big carriers, were like the Grummen planes that flew off them able to take damage that would destroy their Japanese counterparts. Although there were losses they were hard to sink....

 

That's one reason why I started posting US Damage reports to my site. They may be a little dry but if you use your imagination to fill in the blanks you can get chills from reading them. Damage control became an interesting topic to me after reading a couple. Yorktown's Loss report is also an interesting read.

But what's also important about these reports is that they were spread throughout the US Navy (perhaps Royal Navy too). The Japanese, instead, hid their losses and never learned from them operationally. The US Navy was keenly interested in learning from its mistakes.

 

After the heroic attempts made to save her why was U S S Yorktown left basically dead in the water with only 1 destroyer ? Why knowing the value of these ships espically the carrier however damaged wasn,t additional escort vessels detailed to guard against a possible submarine attack? Having 2 warships basically stopped and alone would be a submariner's dream!!

 

The whole task force remained with the ship. The destroyer Hammann has pulled alongside Yorktown to lend a hand, but the other five destroyers in the force were running a ASW screen.

 

Scrounger,

Are you talking about the USS Hughes in the aborted first attempt to save the ship, or are you referring to the USS Hammann in the final second attempt?

If you are referring tho the USS Hughes. It was believed that the carrier would soon sink of her own accord, and without power or lights, salvage operations would be next to impossible at night. Thus, the Yorktown was left to her own, with only the USS Hughes to look after her.

However, with the USS Yorktown still afloat on the morning of the 5th, salvage operations recommenced with a renewed energy. The minesweeper Vireo arrived to provide a tow, and a salvage party reboarded the carrier and recommenced salvage operations. IIRC, the destroyer screen at this time was five or six destroyers, with the Vireo towing, and the USS Hammann, providing power and pumps, secured alongside the carrier. So, if you are referring to the USS Hammann, she was only tied up to the Yorktown, and there were several other US destroyers acting as escorts.

At the time, and throughout most of the war, it was not deemed acceptable, when enemy attack was likely, to risk ships and the lives of others to save a critically wounded warship. Therefore, you will find several ships that were scuttled when they might otherwise have been saved. This policy really was not changed until 1944

 

Hi; So there was an antisubmarine screen, I must confess I've not done allot of extensive research into this aspect of the battle. The way you hear it on various documentaries the destroyer was detached to help salvage THe Yorktown and the sub attacked the two sitting ducks..

 

Herrmann was providing power to help with the repairs. IIRC the Japanese sub did not intend to hit the DD but lossed 4 fish at Yorktown. It just happened she was in the way. Over caution by the Japanese commander attempting to get through the ASW screen caused them to get too close initialy, forcing the Sub to circle around and increase range before firing on the carrier. I guess it would be important to note that the ASW screen DID in fact damage the Japanese sub while it was trying to escape.

 

So it is more a skilled sub commander penetrating a destroyer screen and attacking a crippled carrier than just coming upon 2 nearly stationary ships alone in the Pacific

 

Yes, though she wasn't really stationary either. As Takao pointed out above, Yorkown was already under tow when I-168 fired. I'm not sure what kind of headway was being made though. It couldn't have been more than a couple knots.

 

TF17 originally included two heavy cruisers and five destroyers. After Yorktown was hit the first time, by Kobayashi's dive bombers, Spruance dispatched two more of each to her support - which incidentally illustrates how nearby TF16 was operating. Not sure exactly how many of these ships were still with her when I-168 attacked, but Tanabe had a challenging approach and an even more challenging escape, despite initially trying to throw off pursuit by passing under Yorktown. I-168 was heavily depth charged, forced to surface for air and to run away on diesels, engaged by gunfire from destroyers, and barely got away.

 

The torpedo bombers got massacred because they had gotten separated from their fighter escorts and were not part of a combined arms attack with the dive bombers , except for the final attack, in which the coordinated attack was purely accidental. But even then the torpedo bombers had no escort
and accomplished nothing except to spread the Japanese defensive fighter cover beyond was it could handle.

 

Hard to get separated when you not together, nor planned to be together, in the first place for VT-8 and VT-6 in terms of any fighter escort. The only VT squadron with an attached escort was VT-3 with 6 F4Fs from VF-3. They had to face some 30 plus CAP A6Ms homing in on both units . . . a little uneven, wouldn't you say?

Events were not exactly as you have portrayed them. Suggest some serious reading on the subject.

 

You obviously have little knowledge of carrier operations if you imagine that the US Navy meant to attack an enemy vessel with
only torpedo planes. Read the Shattered Sword and learn all about Midway and the carrier ops.

 

Easy there fellas...... arthur45 and R Leonard

 

No offense arthur45, but telling R Leonard to read up on the Battle of Midway and US carrier ops is akin to telling God to read up on the Bible.

You also want to read this brief biography on Lieutenant JG William N. Leonard: Carrier Pilot and Crew Bios - Fighting Three- William N. Leonard
pay close attention to the passage

Further Parshall & Tully's "Shattered Sword" presents mostly the Japanese side of the Battle of Midway. John B. Lundstrom's "The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway" pays far greater attention to the US carrier ops during the battle of Midway.

 

he didnt say they meant to, but the lack of experience resulted in the debacle of the TB's