Battle of the Bulge

Yes. That is true. They have chosen soldiers who could speak English and they had American uniforms. Some of them took some critical crossroads pretending the traffic control units and directed the allied soldiers to wrong directions. Others made sambotages to military material.
The biggest problem was that nobody was sure that the other of course English speaking soldiers with the same uniforms were Americans.
So they made questions which only an American could reply correctly, relative to the baseball for example. Even Generals needed to prove their origin to military police units which looked for the German who pretend the Americans.

 

Here is something about that, even though it did throw many American units into disarray for a time the Operation was not only limited in scope, but limited in effect.

Operation Greif

During the last days before the great offensive which would send the German armored spearheads plunging west, Hitler belatedly set about replicating the winning combination of rapid and deep armored penetration, paratroop attacks in the enemy rear, and infiltration by disguised ground troops which had functioned so effectively in the western campaign of 1940 and the Greek campaign of 1941. To flesh out this combination, a special operation named Greif (or Condor) was hurriedly organized as an adjunct to the armored operation assigned the 1st SS Panzer Division.

The plans for the ground phase of Greif consisted of three parts: the seizure intact of at least two bridges across the Meuse by disguised raiding parties, the prompt reinforcement of any such coup de main by an armored commando formation; and an organized attempt to create confusion in the Allied rear areas through sabotage carried out by jeep parties clad in American uniforms.

Later it would be rumored that a feature of Operation Greif was the planned assassination of Allied leaders, notably General Eisenhower, but there is no evidence of such plotting in the plan.

The idea for the ground operation was probably Hitler's and the leader, Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny, was selected personally by Hitler. Skorzeny had achieved a considerable reputation as a daring commando leader, had rescued Mussolini from the Italians, and had seized the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós von Nagybánya Horthy, when the Hungarian regime began to waver in its loyalties. For Operation Greif, Skorzeny formed the special Panzer Brigade 150 (or Brandenburger) numbering about two thousand men, of whom one hundred and fifty could speak English.

Captured Allied equipment (particularly tanks and jeeps), uniforms, identification papers, and the like were hastily collected at the front and sent to Skorzeny's headquarters. The disguised jeep parties did go into action with varying degrees of success on 16 December, but the Brandenburger Brigade would be engaged as a unit only in a single and abortive skirmish near Malmédy five days later.

Goto:

Chapter 11-THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE

As an aside, the Operation Greif participants who were not shot outright on the front were found NOT guilty of "breach of the rules of war" when using enemy uniforms by an international court, post-war.

 

When interrogated by his captors after the war, Alfred Jodl, head of the Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab (WFstab), who was responsible for working out the offensive plan, compared the operation with a last desperate sally from a besieged, starving fortress ... how much he was right.

 

They even tried to make a Panther look like an M10 Tank destroyer, by adding armoured plates to the turret.

 

It's obvious;it's the men.!.But weapon?,I would say the American M10 gmc,the American M18'Hellcat'gmc',the American M36'Jackson',and the SG44 assault rifle.

 

What if the Germans did reach their objective of the Port Of Antwerp ? They would of been cut off and smashed within weeks or more likely days. With no supply lines or lines of communication they would of been doomed.

Just think how much men and equiptment the allies had in western Europe after D-Day. We could of used equiptment and troops backed up on the docks waiting to be deployed without removing the fighting frontline troops.

I'm thankful for Hitler's stupid plan. It meant less troops to halt our advance into Deutschland.

 

Absolutely. Every professional soldier on the OB West staff knew the plan was as doomed as a three-legged horse, but they also knew it was futile to argue with Hitler. So the Wehrmacht duly expended its strategic reserve in the snows of Belgium and Luxembourg, leaving Germany virtually defenseless. The only way Wacht am Rhein could have captured Antwerp was by VIII Corps disintegrating the way II Corps under fell apart at Kasserine under the feckless command of Lloyd Fredendall. However Troy Middleton wasn't an incompetent and the men of the US Army had by December 1945 had gained a professionalism more than equal to that of the German Army of December 1945, else how could those under-equipped and outnumbered men stop Army Group B cold, and hold them to be chewed mercilessly by counterattacks from the north and south?

At best the Ardennes offensive could have prolonged the war by a few months, in which case one may wonder where the first a-Bomb would have been used.

 

Those were Brandenburgers.

 

Not part of the original question but,do you think that during the counter offensive"The best attack is a strong defence",is very important.?And if so,is this where Montgomery"excelled"as a general.?cheers guys.

 

Should I start a new thread.?It's a serious question.

 

Ouch ! This could quickly descend into some hurt Nationel feelings and another round of 'Monty-bashing'.....

But personally, yes - Montgomery's counsel during the middle part of the Bulge was IMPO sound ; but then from the Alied point-of-view the Ardennes was all about the defence.The many small unit defensive successes in the early stages, and of course, Clark's use of armour in defence at St Vith were pivotal. I always like Clark's comment in a post-war interview : -

'I wasn't going anywhere - he ( Manteuffel ) was trying to go somewhere ; and fast...'

Montgomery was correct to 'clean up the line' by bringing the Fortified Goose Egg back : such a pity that his silly tactlessness soured relations with the Americans....

 

Certainly not meant to upset national feelings Martin,anything but.cheers

 

Krauts! I was correctly upbraided for making one reference to the Japanese as the Japs.

Not acceptable - I have German friends who would not like this.

 

Just a side note ,but who were all these"Reporters ,at the'press conferences",that the A/G commanders gave.?How much info were they giving these"Reporters".?Since when do we believe what's in the papers anyway.?cheers

 

The press Conferences were co-ordinated by SHAEF and most major British & American newspapers and news agencies were represented. I'm not sure of the exact numbers present, but certainly reporters of the calibre of Chester Wilmot & Cornelius Ryan were involved at the time, as was Hemingway's (then) wife Martha Gellhorn.

No 'live' radio and certainly no TV in those days of course, so the role of the Press Reporter was important - especially for the 'folks back home' in the case of the USA when heavy casualties were being sustained in far-off Europe instead of the Pacific.

SHAEF ( mainly in the form of Eisenhower's right-hand man, Bedell Smith ) in theory controlled what information was given out. But - as happens today - there were 'leaks' from insiders to favoured reporters and certainly both British and American news media were heavily biased in favour of 'their' forces......

Volume III Nigel Hamilton's biography of Monty ( 'The Field Marshal 1944-1976' ) devotes three full chapters to the Ardennes controversy surrounding Montgomery and the Press during the Ardennes Offensive.

 

Read the US Newspaper reports and wonder what all the fuss was about.



Teamwork Stopped Huns: Monty
By the Associated Press
Twenty-first army group headquarters, Jan. 8—Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery Sunday said Allied team work and especially the inherent “courage and good fighting quality” of American troops has halted the German drive into Belgium.

The battle is “far from over,” he asserted, but the Germans “have been halted, then sealed off, and we are now in the process of writing them off,” with the initiative in Allied hands.

At his first press conference in months, the colorful Briton, commanding four armies north of the German bulge told how Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt’s thrust developed, and how he moved to meet it.

Time and again he stressed that above all it was the fighting ability of American doughboys and their “tenacity in battle that makes a great soldier” that has really saved the situation by the stands at St. Vith, Bastogne, and south of Monschau.

He singled out two American armored divisions, the 2d and 7th, and two United States airborne division, the 82d and 101st, and the 106th infantry as doing a great job. He also lauded the United States 7th corps, and praised Gen. Dwight Eisenhower’s leadership.

“What was Von Rundstedt trying to achieve? I don’t know,” Marshal Montgomery said in an hour-long talk. “The only guide we have is his order of the day which told his soldiers they must go all out on this last big effort.
“One must admit that he has dealt a sharp blow and he has sent us reeling back, but we recovered and he has been unable to gain any great advantage. He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose, unless the prize is smaller than his men were told.

“Von Rundstedt attacked on December 16,” he said. “He obtained a tactical surprise. He drove a deep wedge into the center of the 1st army and split American forces in two. The situation loomed as if it might become awkward. The Germans had broken right through the spot and were heading for the Meuse.

“As soon as I saw what was happening, I took certain steps myself to insure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they could certainly not get over that river. And I carried out certain movements so as to provide balanced dispositions to meet the threatened danger.”

Marshal Montgomery at the time had command only of the British 2d and Canadian 1st armies, and on his own he shifted some troops south to meet the threat.

“Then the situation began to deteriorate, but the whole Allied team rallied to meet the danger. National considerations were thrown overboard; General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole northern front.”

“I employed the whole available power of the British group of armies. This power was brought into play very gradually and in such a way that it would not interfere with American lines of communications. Finally it was put into battle with a bang, and today British divisions are fighting hard on the right flank of the United States 1st army . . This is a fine Allied picture.

“We have halted the Germans, sealed them off, and are now writing them off. German divisions have suffered heavily, but I say this about a battle. It is a very great mistake to think it is over. The worst parts are over, but a great deal more must be done.

“There are two main reasons why Von Rundstedt was sealed off from achieving what he was after, The first of these is the good fighting qualities of the United States soldier, and- the second is Allied teamwork.

“I formed a very high opinion of the American soldier in Italy and Sicily,” Marshal Montgomery continued earnestly. “I have spent my life with the British soldier and I love the British soldier, but I have formed a great affection for the American soldier, who is a very brave fighting man who has that tenacity in battle which makes a great soldier.

“He is basically responsible for stopping Von Rundstedt from what he set out to do. “He held out at Elsenborn there south of Monschau (the 1st, 2d, 99th and 30th infantry divisions) when the great blow hit him and he stopped those SS panzer divisions.

“At St. Vith many United States troops were cut off and isolated but in little groups they fought and held on to those vital road junctions, forcing the Germans to halt. It was a very fine perform¬ance that the 7th armored division and the 106th infantry division borne division at Bastogne which put up a great performance.

“On December 20-21, I consulted General Hodges (Lieut. Gen. Courtney Hodges, United States 1st army commander) and suggested we must get those fine fighting men out of the St. Vith area and back in our lines

“The 82d American airborne division moved forward and got in contact with these elements and we pulled them back behind our lines. Then we ordered the 82d back to better positions but they did not want to come and they protested, but I assured them they had accomplished their mission and could withdraw with honor.

“I take my hat off willingly to such men.”

Discussing Allied teamwork, Marshal Montgomery said, “It was to me a remarkable thing how in the time of danger the Allied team rallied together. This thing of Allied solidarity is terribly im¬portant. Teamwork wins battles and battle victories win wars.

“On our team the captain is General Ike. I am devoted to him. We are great friends. We are all in this fight together and we must not allow any wedges to be driven between us. As an illustration of our friendship, the other day my plane was damaged, and I asked Ike for another, and he sent his own at once.”
In questions after the conference, Marshal Montgomery said the Germans still were “fine soldiers” and formidable enemies. He cited the January 1 attack of the Luftwaffe on Allied airfields as an example of German potentialities, saying “the enemy pulled a fast one on us.”
But this does not mean the German has air superiority, he con¬tinued, and “the biggest terror of the German soldier is our air force. On good days they shoot up every¬thing behind the German lines.”
The field marshal, in contrast with his press conferences last summer, declined to go into any predictions as to how long the war would last, or to estimate German capabilities.
But “in the balance, I don’t see how Von Rundstedt has gained very much.” he said

===================================================

Montgomery Says Doughboy Courage, Fighting Ability Halted Nazi Drive
Twenty-first Army Group Headquarters, Jan. 7 (UP)
Field Marshall Sir Bernard L. Montgomery today declared allied teamwork, and especially the inherent “courage and good fighting quality” of American troops, had halted the German drive into Belgium.
The battle is “far from over”, he asserted, but the Germans “have been halted, then sealed off, and we are not in the process of writing them off”, with the initiative in allied hands.
Time and again in telling how Field Marshall Karl von Rundsedt’s thrust developed, and how he moved to meet it, Montgomery stressed that above all it was the fighting ability of American Doughboys and their tenacity in battle that makes a great soldier, and that has really saved the situation by the stands at St. Vith, Bastogne and south of Monschau.
He singled out two American armored divisions, the Second and Seventh, and two United States airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st, and the 106th Infantry as doing a fine job, and praised Gen. Eisenhower’s leadership.
“What was Von Rundstedt trying to achieve ? I don’t know,” Montgomery said.
“One must admit that he has dealt a sharp blow and he has sent us reeling back, but we recovered and he has been unable to gain any great advantage. He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose.”
“When the situation began to deteriorate,” Monty said, “the whole allied team rallied to meet the danger.
“The battle has been the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.”
Formed Offensive Army Corps
“I formed an offensive army corps—the Seventh — under the very fine American Gen. Collins (Maj. Gen. S. Lawton Collins) and had to decide where to put it. It turned out that where I put it was not a bad place, although it was a large part luck.
Although he had placed the Sev*enth Corps there for offensive purposes, Montgomery revealed, Von Rundstedt tried a powerful left hook up the Manse towards Liege and ran right into the power of the American Second Armored Division under Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon. In a furious battle this division nearly wiped out Von Rundstedt’s spearhead—the Second Panzer Division.
“This changed plans and I bad to reform the corps again for an offensive and this time it was good business and the Seventh Corps now is attacking. You can’t hurry these things. You must get well balanced and have a tidy show.
We have halted the Germans, sealed them off and are now writ*ing them off. German divisions’ have suffered heavily, but I say this about a battle. It is a very great mistake, to think it is over. The worst parts are over, but a great deal more must be done.”

Now if anyone could find Brafdley's Press Release of Jan 9th where he all but called Monty a liar..........

 

I can't see what the fuss was all about really.? cheers.

 

I have never taken much interest in the Battle of the Bulge and this is a bit off subject with regard to weapons. However there are clearly some experts contributing to this topics so I wondered if the piece below which I came across this in Montgomeries Memoires is true and, if so, what exactly was said in the "german" transmission.

Monty:
"WhatI said was skilfully distorted by the enemy. Chester Wilmot (TheStruggle for Europe, page611) has explained that his dispatch to the B.B.C. about it wasintercepted by the German wireless, re-written to give it ananti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was thenin Goebbels' hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast wasmistaken for a BBC transmission and it was this twisted text thatstarted the uproar."

 

What did the 're-written' broadcast say,that upset Bradley,?and the other American generals.cheers.

 

A very vivid view of this whole ( now, admittedly, seemingly rather trivial affair ) is given in Bradley's second memoir, 'A General's Life' (1983).

It wasn't so much the actual wording as the tone in which it was delivered ; as Bradley put it ' The overall impression Monty projected was that of St George come to slay the Dragon'. (p.382 ). The most infuriating part to the Americans was the patronising 'The Battle has been most interesting, I think possibly one of the most tricky battles I have ever handled'.

The Press on both sides blew it all up : London's Daily Mail headlining with : -

MONTGOMERY FORESAW ATTACK
-
HIS TROOPS WERE ALL READY TO MARCH
-
ACTED 'ON OWN' TO SAVE DAY
​

While Ralph Ingersoll of the New York PM magazine wrote ; -

'Gentle Omar - for the first, last and only time in the campaign - got all-out right-down-to-his-toes mad'.

Interestingly, the book goes into little detail about the Jan 9 Press Release/conference except to say that Ralph Ingersoll and Chester Hansen basically 'ghosted' the statement on behalf of Bradley.