Bismarck vs. Yamato

If you are speaking of Yamato's spotter plane, it must have reported a hit, otherwise why would Yamato have claimed a hit on the first salvo? Clearly the spotter plane's pilot was in error, so I discount any observations from that source. The case for Yamato's first salvo accuracy is very weak since we don't even know if the shells observed by US sources were from the Yamato, and Yamato's spotter plane reported something that never happened.

Yes we do. Yamato first became Yamamato's flagship in February, but he was so disgusted with her gunnery that he ordered more training for her gunnery crew, and went back to the Nagato for a flagship. It wasn't until May, 3 months later, that Yamamoto considered Yamato fit for service as his flagship. Obviously, Yamato's initial gunnery exercises were a failure and it took 3 months to rectify them.

Bismarck spent the winter after she was launched in the Baltic doing her workup. Her initial gunnery trials were satisfactory and she shot pretty well in her first battle against Hood and PoW. And yes, there is a record of Yamato shooting poorly later in the war; Samar.

That's true, but how can you divorce crew training from the performance of the FC system itself?. If the crew can't use the system effectively, it doesn't matter if the FC is the finest in the world, the ship won't be able to consistently hit anything.

They may have, but all the observers on both sides at Samar agree that visibility was poor to begin with and rapidly got worse due to stack, gun, and chemical smoke, haze, and rain squalls. The fact that Yamato's crew probably relied on optics and that conditions for optics were very poor, supports the idea that Yamato probably wasn't able to hit anything at Samar.

Well, if you're relying on optical devices it is. If you can't see anything how can you fire your guns and expect to hit something?

I don't know the exact number of rounds, but I know it was low compared to the number fired by Kongo, for example. The fact that she didn't fire nearly as many rounds as fired by Kongo and the Japanese heavy cruisers tends to indicate YAmato didn't have a firing solution much of the time, which, in turn, may indicate her FC wasn't as effective as other Japanese ships engaged.

Well, what is your position then? I see no evidence from Samar, or anywhere else, that Yamato was a better than average, or even an average, gunnery ship. I agree there's not much evidence about the Yamato's gunnery, but what little there is, is almost uniformly negative. A battle ship engages an enemy fleet for more than an hour and produces not one conclusive hit on a single target, while her consorts (Kongo and the heavy cruisers) produce hit after hit, sink four enemy ships, and damage several more.

I'll have to do some research, I can't remember the source on the German information, but the data on the RN is in one of Friedman's books.

Yes, it was postwar, but the US ships and the FC systems that were tested were war time developments. And if a ship can hold a firing solution while maneuvering radically, as the US ships proved able to do, it will still be able to hit it's target; that's what a "firing solution" means. Therefore, any ship with that capability has a tremendous advantage over a ship with a lesser FC system.

I don't think so. Gunnery control radar had a limited range and if you are in a training area you are out of range of any enemy receivers. If you install gunnery radar on ship it means you expect to be able to turn it on when in contact with an enemy. I believe the reason the Japanese didn't allow the Yamato to participate in gunnery exercises was because the very limited barrel life of her tubes and the fact that there were insufficient spares to replace them.

 

That's rather a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater isn't it?

Not quite. There was a problem with the fire control crew in the trials that Yamamoto observed and additional training was required. It's not at all clear it took 3 months to rectify them. In any case if you add in those three months Yamato took just about as long to work up as Bismarck. IE the Japanese may have tried to push the Yamato's operational status too much.

I have seen no good evidence provided that Yamato's main battery shot poorly off Samar. How many rounds did she fire? How many stradles did she get? How many of the salvo's were essentially opening salvos due to loosing targets in smoke and squals. What was the impact of maneuver forced by torpedos and arial attacks? If you can't quantify these you can't make hard statements eitehr way.

And implies that using Samar as an argument that her optical fire control was poor is off base.

Not really. From what I've read Yamato turned away from a spread of torpedoes and that turn away took her out of the action. Not a problem with fire control quality.

That hardware wise Yamato had at least some advantges over all other BBs as far as optical fire control goes. That operationally there simply isn't enough of a track record to say she was either a good shooter or a poor one.

 

Not at all. A spotter which is either too far away or simply incapable of discerning between a direct hit and a straddle, isn't a reliable source of information.

Well, Japan had just launched a war, so it's unlikely Yamato's crew spent a significant amount of time learning how to anchor. It's reasonable to assume the three months was spent working mostly on the problem that had caused so much embarrassment for her skipper.

As for the Bismarck, it's my understanding that the winter of 1940-41 was particularly severe in the Baltic and the Bismarck was able to spend only October/November, 1940, and about six weeks in March/April, 1941, actually on trials there. Her actual gunnery exercises were even shorter. So no, the Yamato had much longer for her intial gunnery exercises overall.

As I indicated, I don't know the exact number of rounds the Yamato fired at Samar, but I believe it was far fewer than Kongo. At Samar, Yamato achieved zero hits and zero straddles, that can be established with conclusive evidence. As far as I know, there was only one "opening" salvo, just like in any other gunnery battle. The impact of maneuvering to avoid air and torpedo attacks was negative the same as it was for the other Japanese ships, which nevertheless achieved numerous proven hits and straddles. Now that we've quantified those issues we can say that Yamato's performance was far below that of the other Japanese ships which had the same conditions to contend with.

Unfortunately, Samar is the only instance in which Yamato ever fired her main battery at other than practice surface targets, And we know she had problems in her initial gunnery trials. I guess if you want to claim that, theoretically, Yamato would have done well under perfect conditions for her type of FC, I'm not prepared to dispute that. What I am claiming is that under real life battle conditions, Yamato was less than impressive as a gunnery ship.

That's not really relevant; Yamato was STILL within main battery range of the American carriers when she turned back after avoiding the torpedoes. Her FC was apparently unable to recover a firing solution, even though the Kongo and other Japanese ships were still in contact with the American carriers, and were still firing at, and hitting, their targets. That does indicate some problem with either her crew or her FC, or more likely both. Even with gunnery radar, Yamato was unable to re-establish a firing solution; that is NOT indicative of a good FC system.

But when Yamato had an opportunity to demonstrate those advantages in a real battle she failed to do so, while another BB in that battle did perform creditably. I'd say that throws justifiable doubt on Yamato's gunnery ability.

 

Perhaps. But especially given the timeing (ie the US ships were starting to produce smoke, the squals, the fact that thre were a lot of US planes in the air (I think I read that the opservation aircraft was shot down later) it seems quite reasonable that he might mistake close stradle for a hit.

And is it unreasonable to assume they became more efficient in that regards? Certainly there is no proof either way.

Only relevant if it's clear why they did so and that why was a fire control problem.

At this point it is supposition on your part and what evidence there is indicates she may have got a straddle and I've seen nothing to indicate she didn't get additional ones. On the flip side I haven't seen evidence she did either.

Depending on what you mean by the term it could be used to describe every time one fires on a different target or there is a substantial break in time between firings.

Only those that were being so atttacked. Yamato saw tracks headed for her and turned away this kept her running away until it was clear that the torpedoes had either passed her or run out of range. Did any of the other Japanese BBs face this situration?

Could she see them?

Or simply that her postion especially in regards to the smoke and squals and the distance to the US ships was such that she couldn't see them.

It's been stated that they didn't trust and at least implied that they didn't use the gunnery radar so it's presence was irrelevant. It's also not all that clear to me how good their gunnery radar was. If as is possible it gave a good range but had a poor asmuthal resolution then it wouldnt help much if they couldn't see their targets.

 

I did find some more info at:
Battles of the supership Yamato
In particular

Now there are obviously a couple problems with the above. The non existant hit and the US "cruiser" to start with. It does however suggest she fire 4 salvoes at the US CVEs.
More information may be available soon as the post at:
Tullys Port • View topic - YAMATO
states

and

 

Regardless of the reason, and regardless of whether it was understandable or not, the pilot/observer of Yamato's spotter plane was obviously reporting false information. It is therefore NOT a reliable source.

Whether or not the additional training made them more efficient is not the relevant point. The pertinent point is that Yamato clearly had more difficulty in achieving acceptable gunnery expertise than was normal for Japanese naval units.

They had targets in gunnery range, no technical problems were reported with the turrets or guns, other Japanese ships in near proximity were firing on those same targets. What possible other problems could there have been? The most logical problem seems to be Yamato's FC could not produce a firing solution under the prevailing conditions.

Other Japanese ships certainly got hits. I believe it was the Johnston that reported being hit by 14" shells. Yamatro of the other hand, expended fewer shells than other Japanese units, and no American ships reported being hit by 18" shells; that, in itself, is evidence though not conclusive, that Yamato's FC did not have a firing solution during much of the battle.

Well, you broached the question about Yamato's "opening salvo" without specifying any definition of the term. So if you don't like the definition I used, specify one that you do like.

That's kind of splitting hairs in my view. Every account of the battle I have read indicates that most of the larger Japanese ships were under almost constant air attack which included runs, either real or simulated, by torpedo bombers. In addition, the Nagato and Kongo both reported at various times seeing torpedo tracks near their positions. One of the Japanese heavy cruisers actually had it's bow blown off by a torpedo. So implying that Yamato was prevented from firing at the American carriers because it was busy avoiding torpedoes for the entire battle is rather grasping at straws.

That's the question; Japanese officers on Yamato's bridge testified that throughout most of the battle the positions of the American carriers and the other Japanese ships were confused and unclear, and that visibility was poor.

However, it should be pointed out that one of the purposes of an FC system is to sort out the tactical situation and produce data that tells the guns where to point in order to hit their targets. Obviously, the Kongo's FC system was able to do this. for some reason, apparently Yamato's was not.

I have made no implication, one way or the other, that the Yamato's crew did, or did not, employ her gunnery radar. It's presence was certainly NOT irrelevant in any appraisal of Yamato's FC system. If the crew did try to gain a firing solution using the gunnery radar, and that attempt failed, it is a negative reflection on the overall performance of the FC system.

You seem to be saying that poor visibility is an excuse for failure of the FC system produce a firing solution and the fact that radar was available but failed is irrelevant to whether the FC system was adequate or poor. I can't see how you can have it both ways. In any case, the particular conditions at Samar did not seem to make it impossible for the other Japanese ships to register hits; the obvious conclusion is that Yamato's FC was sub-par when compared to other BB's present.

 

The info you present in this last post really doesn't clarify the issues. I happen to have been a participant in the discussion thread on the Navweaps board, and despite a lengthy debate, no conclusive evidence was ever developed that pointed to the conclusion that Yamato ever hit anything.

I suspect the question will never be settled to everyone's satisfaction. I suppose if the wreck of the Gambier Bay is ever located and an unexploded 18 " shell found lodged in her hull, that would settle the debate, but barring that, there is no conclusive proof. My position is that the circumstantial evidence we have tends to point to the fact that either her gunnery crew or her FC system or both were deficient. It is certainly suspect to me, that a powerful ship like Yamato should participate in a gunnery battle for over an hour and no one seems to have noticed her shells impacting any enemy targets. Of course, it's possible that some of Yamato's AP shells hit and passed through the unarmored vessels on the American side, but again, there seems to be no evidence of this.

 

I am currently re-writing my notes on the subject, but would like to comment on just a few things.

First is the straddles of and hits on the Gambier Bay. If you look at the formation of the CVE's and course, 090T, you will notice Gambier bay is at the southern lead part of the formation. So, we can say, even if it was a straddle, that 1. Japanese sailors have incredible eyes to pick out, fire on, and observe splashes on a ship obscured by the trailing part of the US formation, or 2. Whoever wrote that web-site was informed incorrectly who the Target of Yamato's opening salvo was, the White Plains before she shifted fire toward the St Lo.

Either way I would not trust the information listed within that site.

As for a radar directed FC, Fading Victory: The Dairy of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941-1945 mentions that several times through the course of the battle the Yamato was able to track the US task force on radar and that the ship was prepared to fire once the American ships cleared the smoke screen. He also mentions that the Yamato commenced radar fire "from about 0822"

The only mention of hits scored by Yamato in this source is a short couple of sentences claiming "Anyhow, at 0658 the First Battleship Division commenced firing with the fore turrets at a range of thirty-one kilometers. Destroying a ship with two or three salvos, the target was changed to another one"

We know without a doubt that no ships were hit at this point, though several near-misses from multiple ships (yellow, blue, red, and green dye marked splashes) knocked out the steering control and electrical power for several minutes.

I have recently purchased a few more books on the battle and have a bit of a way to go before I can come to my own conclusions, which I hope to achieve within a month or so.

PS. Anyone have an source stating when the first float plane was launched. Fading Victory claims two were launched but both were at about the halfway mark of the battle to locate the position of the US fleet through the smokescreen.

 

Mike,

I agree, these are interesting remarks. If the Yamato's initial target was the White Plains, and her first salvo straddled a carrier, on the other side of the American formation, what does that say for Yamato's gunnery?

I wonder why, If they were tracking the targets on radar, it was necessary to wait for them to clear the smoke screen? Perhaps Yamato's gunnery radar was a "range only" set?

That's not an unequivocal claim of hits by Yamato; the "First Battleship Division" included both the Yamato and Nagato (with 16" guns).

The four different colors of dye would indicate that at least four different ships were shooting at the target. There were four Japanese BB's present; Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna

I'll have to do some research because I don't remember the source, but I clearly remember reading somewhere that a Pete was launched soon after the battle began and was shot down shortly after making it's first and only report, presumably about the "hit" on the American carrier. If I can find the reference I'll post it. It's odd the Yamato would launch a spotter plane(s) into such a hostile air environment to "locate the American feet", if they were periodically tracking them on radar.

 

Bruce,
Just wanted to say I remember that great debate on warships1.com especially you & Creeping Death. Tiornu says a new article is supposed to come out soon about this issue. it's written by Rob Lungdren.

 

Yeah, It would be nice if there were some new data, but from what I've heard Lundgren just rehashes the same old data and concludes with his opinion.

I'd like to see something concrete one way or the other, but I doubt we ever will. It's nearly impossible to prove a negative like the Yamato didn't hit a thing at Samar, but personally, I think that's what happened. On the other hand, I'd be just as happy if someone like Ballard found an 18" dud embedded in the wreck of the Gambier Bay and settled the mattered once and for all.

 

Right, though I was using it as an example of why I simply don't trust that website. Usually websites devoted to a single ship are biased to a degree. The White Plains was clearly the Japanese target for the first few salvos before fire was shifted to the St Lo. Where the fall of this initial salvo can also be disputed. C. Vann Woodward claims the first splashes fell in the middle of the carrier formation. The first mention of splashes from the TBS logs is from the Samuel B Roberts claiming "We have splashes falling astern of us". So you can see why my research is becoming slightly problematic in deciphering exactly where that first salvo fell.

I'm not entirely sure, but Ugaki's Dairy did mention that they were confident once the ships cleared the smoke they would sink them with the first salvo. Based on this and the claim of launching planes to assist in locating ships, I wonder if they were worried about phantom contacts. But this is my own theory that I haven't confirmed.

Correct, but with the Yamato leading Nagato, I think it would be a reasonable assumption that the Yamato fired the first shot of the battle. It would not be entirely out of the question that for the first couple of salvos Yamato was masking the fire from Nagato. But again, we are starting to assume a little to much where there is not enough information.

I have also seen accounts claiming a black, pink, and clear (no dye). I wonder if the fore and aft turrets each used a different dye color. Something similar to the Bismark at Denmark Straight firing the turrets separately to aid in ranging in on the target.

I thought I had read it somewhere as well. Yamato could carry up to seven float planes, but most had been sent off before the fleet sortied. I am curious as to how many she had retained for spotting purposes.

 

This is a problem with all phases of the battle; different eyewitnesses viewing events from different positions and angles and asserting different results. The one thing that emerges with striking clarity is that visibility was poor to begin with, and deteriorated throughout the battle, making eyewitness accounts unreliable.

That's a theory I hadn't considered before. I have heard from another amateur researcher that Japanese records contained hints that there might be some evidence that Yamato actually managed to accidentally hit a Japanese cruiser at Samar; perhaps they were concerned with making a positive visual identification of their targets? Concerning Ugaki's Diary; do you happen to know how long after the battle that he made his entries?

Yes, remember Kurita had just ordered the Japanese fleet to form a circular air defense formation when the US carriers were sighted, then, without waiting for the fleet to resume cruising formation, he ordered a "general chase", so, unless we have some specific evidence to indicate Yamato was actually directly in front of Nagato fouling her range, it shouldn't be assumed that Nagato's main battery was masked when fire was opened.

The dye was definitely to aid in spotting individual ship's salvos, but I hadn't read that the Japanese used different dyes for individual turrets on their ships, but I suppose it's a possibility. However, I would still think that that many different colors of dye would still indicate multiple ships firing at the same time on the same targets. The general trend of comments from both sides would also lead me to the same impression.

I am thinking it may have been Dull, but I've loaned out my copy and I need to get it back before I can confirm that. I seem to remember some conflict in different Japanese versions of the battle as to the number of planes carried by Yamato; I think some claimed one spotter plane and others two. I suppose, if there were two, it's possible, they were launched at different times. The one thing that I remember is that all the Japanese accounts were pretty unanimous that the spotter plane(s) were shot down pretty quickly.

 

I'm pretty sure that they only used one color per ship and I think (maybe on the IJN forum) I've seen what ships used what colors. As for the additional colors I believe the cruisers also used dye.

 

I think this is correct.

But I recall reading somewhere that colors used by each ship changed over the course of the war as new ships were commissioned and others lost. And yes, the IJN heavy crusiers also used dye to identify their shell splashes, but I believe light cruisers and destroyers did not.

 

where would you invest heavy armor, deck or superstucture-tower area?

 

I'm not the most qualified person to answer a question like that, but just from a common sense perspective, heavy armor in the superstructure imposes severe penalties in terms of stability, so deck armor almost always makes more sense than heavy superstructure armor.

What bearing does that have on the topic of the original thread?

 

from what i've gathered in battleship threads so far, deck armor seems to have less significance than turret, superstructure and waterline armor.

 

Not really. In order of importance it would probably be turret face and barbette, armored belt, deck armor, turret sides and top, then other armor. In the more modern battleships, superstructure armor was quite limited, because as a previous poster noted, the increased topweight had a negative effect on ships stability and decreased it's ability to carry electronic sensors and extensive AA battery.
Think of it like this, the side armor and the deck form the top and sides of an armored box to protect engineering and magazine spaces. You will also in most cases have a fore and aft transverse bulkhead that constitute the ends of the box. The ships structure forward and aft of the box, decks above the armored deck, superstructure, and the ships bottom and sides below the armored belt are regular structural steel. Naval artillery are rifled guns so have a very flat trajectory, except at extreme ranges they should strike the deck at a very shallow angle and be deflected. Insufficient deck armor allows these types of hits to penetrate vital spaces and is actually more dangerous than no armor at all. A penetrating hit by an AP shell would actually be detonated by striking the reverse face of the armored belt and the effects of the exploding shell would be contained within the armored box amplifying the damage. If the area were unarmored the AP shell would probably pass clean through with much less damage.
Armor above the armored deck, excepting the barbettes and turrets was normally limited to a series of armored tubes. One tube would normally contain the main fire control station and ship conning station. Other tubes would lead to main gun directors and electronics sensors.

 

Bismarck vs. Yamato
And my answer to this question. Yamato no doubt. Only 3 knots slower, bigger guns, better armor, 1150+ watertight compartments (as good as Bismarck), longer range guns, excellent optics (equal), excellent crew, Bismarck's only hope is to run away (or a lucky hit).
The only battleship that was really a match for the Yamato/Musashi were the Iowas. The 16"/50 heavy AP shell was close, performance wise, to the 18.1". The German and Japanese, large caliber, shells had a much higher dud rate than the Americans, and the Iowa's superior sensors and fire control would have allowed her to get more hits, quicker. Possibly before Yamato/Bismarck could even begin to range the Iowa.