Bombing of Dresden--and for what?

Perhaps you would care to comment on my list of industrial targets present in Dresden, posted on page 5?

 

There were also other occasions of course. Just to liven up the thread with a picture, here is a Lancaster force striking German troops near St. Vith, during the Ardennes offensive, for example.

 

Teaching the Germans a lesson? Yes. Shortening the war? Not so sure. The Red Army was on its way there, bombing or nobombing. And some thousand artillery pieces were with them. I see no difference, since the Dresden war industry was not that substantial.

 

Industrially Dresden had moved anything of importance out by january 45. This as one city caused the movement of the Luftwaffe almost enmasse to the Ost Front on 15 January 1945.
If we consider the Meissen cermaic works to be a threat to the Allies war effort then so be it. All the bombing did was stiffen up the lips of the Germans to resiest even more, especially against the Soviet forces.

two cents for the bucket.

 

Perhaps you would care to comment on my list of industrial targets present in Dresden, posted on page 5? </font>[/QUOTE]Erich had this covered already long ago. If there would have been so much important technology in Dresden, the Germans would have cared more to defend it.

 

I suppose this is possible, my source for the industrial targets is the "Liste der Fertigungskennzeichen für Waffen, Munition und Gerät" (Heereswaffenamt, Berlin 1944), so slightly earlier. I would still like to see some printed source on the move of these industries, so if you can point me in the right direction I'd be grateful.

Anyway, if that is indeed the case, I suppose the Germans were also considerate enough to notify the Allies about moving the industries out of the city...?

 

Found a clip from The Guardian dated February 14, to show how Dresden was viewed without the benefit of hindsight and post-war analysis.

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Triple raid on Dresden

Blows by Over 3,600 R.A.F. & U.S. 'Planes Ahead of the Red Army

Wednesday February 14, 1945

Dresden and Chemnitz, both lying in the direct path of the advancing Russian armies, and Magdeburg, about seventy miles south-west of Berlin, were the main targets for devastating blows by the R.A.F. on Tuesday night and the Eighth United States Air Force in daylight yesterday. Altogether over 3,600 'planes took part. Raid warnings broadcast by the Germans last night showed that the assault was being continued. Gorlitz reported "strong air formations between Leipzig and Dresden flying east" at 12.40 this morning.

The city of Dresden had not previously suffered a major raid and huge fires started by the R.A.F. on Tuesday night were still burning when the Americans arrived at mid-day yesterday. Fortresses and Liberators from Italy attacked oil targets and communications in Vienna, while other formations of heavy bombers pounded the Maribor railway yards in Yugoslavia for the second consecutive day.

650,000 incendiaries An Air Ministry communiqué said that the R.A.F. went to Dresden twice on Tuesday night. Both attacks were highly concentrated and large fires were left burning. Another objective was the synthetic oil plant at Bohlen, a few miles south of Leipzig. Two attacks were made on Magdeburg, and Nuremburg, Bonn, and Dortmund were also bombed. Night fighters and intruder aircraft of Bomber Command supported the bombers and attacked airfields, destroying at least two enemy aircraft in combat.

Only six bombers are missing from the force of 1,400 sent out. The great industrial town of Dresden is of immense value to the enemy as a base for the defence against Koniev's armies. In the first attack, which began soon after ten o'clock, there was cloud over the target, but around it and along our route the sky was clear. By the time the second force reached the city over three hours later the cloud had gone and crews were able to see the effect of the first attack. A meteorological officer said that the heat of the fires started in the first attack probably dispersed the cloud over the city.

Nearly 650,000 incendiaries, together with 8,000lb H.E. bombs and hundreds of 4,000-pounders, were dropped, and crews reported that smoke rose to a height of 15,000 feet.

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Further notes on the target value of Dresden from "Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden", prepared by USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University. Note particularly how the list of industries in February 1945 indeed match the list compiled by German sources during 1944.

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"II. ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target
...9. In addition to its geographical position and topography and its primary importance as a communications center, Dresden was, in February 1945, known to contain at least 110 factories and industrial enterprises that were legitimate military targets, and were reported to have employed 50,000 workers in arms plants alone.8 Among these were dispersed aircraft components factories; a poison gas factory (Chemische Fabric Goye and Company); an anti-aircraft and field gun factory (Lehman); the great Zeiss Ikon A.G., Germany’s most important optical goods manufactory; and, among others, factories engaged in the production of electrical and X-ray apparatus (Koch and Sterzel A.G.), gears and differentials (Saxoniswerke), and electric gauges (Gebruder Bassler).9"

"Specific Target Objectives in the Dresden Area:
...Dresden became a military target as ... (2) as an important industrial and manufacturing center directly associated with the production of aircraft components and other military items, including poison gas, anti-aircraft and field guns, and small guns; and (3) as an area containing specific military installations... Further, the widespread area raid conducted by the British entailed bombing strikes against the many industrial plants throughout the city which were thus to be construed as specific targets within the larger pattern of the area raid.44"

"The Immediate Consequences of the Dresden Bombings on the Physical Structure and Populace of the City:
...A very large number of the city’s industrial facilities were destroyed or severely damaged,48 with perhaps a four-fifth’s reduction in the productive capacity of the arms plants.49 Later British assessments, which were more conservative, concluded that 23 per cent of the city’s industrial buildings were seriously damaged..."

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Comments on this, gentlemen?

[ 04. November 2003, 03:47 AM: Message edited by: Heartland ]

 

Well, but all these statements were made AFTER the bombing of Dresden. Of course justifications were necessary.

According to an analysis of historian Wolf Heckmann about the bombings, Harris' vice Sir Robert Saundby wondered that Dresden had not even been on the target list (already mentioned above). He also states that there were no reconnaissance pictures at the briefing before the bombing, as would have been usual.

 

And btw... when Churchill stated in his memorandum to Harris on March 28, 1945:

"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed.... I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle- zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction."

... what made him say so, if not Dresden?

 

The impending political realities of a post-war world made him say so. The memorandum was withdrawn on Portal's insistence and never sent to Harris - see earlier in this thread for a full discussion of this.

This was complete hypocrisy from one who, just a few weeks earlier ( pre-Dresden) , had demanded to know what was being done to 'baste the Germans in their retreat...'.

 

But what made him feel this hypocrisy to be necessary? What made him see so late that his brutal attitude might have disadvantages for the after-math of the war? What, if not Dresden?

 

The same sort of hypocrisy that made the Americans highlight Malmedy, but not Biscari, or the same sort that made the Russians blame Katyn on the Germans....

War is hell.

 

I understood this to be something that would more impress the Soviets than the Germans. Churchill certainly was cognizant of the fact that the war would end and that the western powers would face a communist threat, thereafter.

Dresden received only one main force attack by bomber Command. Cologne received 22, Berlin 24, and Essen 28.

It was one of many cities that were targeted (and had been on the 'list' for months) and the raid succeeded. Let us not minimize the responsibility that must also be shouldered by Spaatz who, in the dying days of the war escalated his area bombing campaign, seemingly in competition with Harris; or the fire-bombing exploits of Lemay's superfortresses against Japan before the atomic bomb eclipsed that event.

Area bombing was (and is) a nasty business. The bombing of cities was and still is a nasty business. But why single out Dresden for special attention? Political consideration after the fact should not interfere with historical analysis.

 

Alrighty then. That is a very convenient view to take when presented with documentation that does not match ones preconceived opinion.

 

Then perhaps he should have been paying more attention at his work? Dresden had been a second priority target, from exactly 31 January. More from the study mentioned above:

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15. On 23 December 1944, President Roosevelt informed Stalin that--given the Marshal’s permission General Eisenhower would be instructed to send a representative to Moscow to “discuss with you the situation in the west and its relation to the Russian front in order that information essential to our efforts may be available to all of us.”19 On 26 December Stalin stated his acceptance of President Roosevelt’s proposal.20 The officer designated to confer with Stalin was Marshal of the RAF, Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander, SHAEF, and immediately responsible to the Supreme Commander for all Allied air operations. Among the topics discussed by Stalin and Tedder at their meeting on 15 January 1945 was the employment of the Allied strategic air forces in the forthcoming combined operations. Tedder outlined to Stalin the “application of the Allied air effort with particular reference to strategic bombing of communications as represented by oil targets, railroads and waterways.”21 There was also specific discussion of the problem that would face the Russians if the Germans attempted to shift forces from the west to the east and of the necessity of preventing this possibility.22

16. Therefore, on 25 January 1945, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the British War Cabinet, which was responsible for preparing such analyses for the Allied air forces, presented to Marshal Tedder, through appropriate channels, a working paper entitled “Strategic Bombing in Relation to the Present Russian Offensive.23 The findings of this authoritative body were as follows:

The degree of success achieved by the present Russian offensive is likely to have a decisive effect on the length of the war. We consider, therefore, that the assistance which might be given to the Russians during the next few weeks by the British and American strategic bomber forces justifies an urgent review of their employment to this end.24
It is probable that the Germans will be compelled to withdraw forces, particularly panzer divisions, from the Western Front to reinforce the East . . . . To what extent air bombardment can delay the move eastwards of these or other divisions destined for the Eastern Front is . . . an operational matter. It is understood that far-reaching results have already been achieved in the West by disruptive effect of Allied air attacks on marshalling yards and communications generally. These have hitherto been aimed at assistance to the Western Front and should now be considered in relation to delaying the transfer of forces eastwards.25

For the next several days these recommendations were carefully studied and evaluated by the appropriate authorities in the Supreme Commander’s staff, particularly among those immediately responsible to him for planning and authorizing air operations. On 31 January, the decision was made by the Deputy Supreme Commander Tedder and his air staff that the second priority for the Allied strategic air forces should be the “attack of BERLIN, LEIPZIG, DRESDEN and associated cities where heavy attack will . . . hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts.”26

[...]
19. Message, SHAEF 1659 WARX-82070, 25 December 1944. Supporting Document No. 5.
20. Message, WARX-82144 SHAEF, 26 December 1944. Supporting Document No. 6.
21. Memorandum of Conference with Marshal Stalin, 15 January 1945. Supporting Document No. 7.
22. Same item and Message 22378, U.S. Military Mission Moscow, 16 January 1945. Supporting Document No. 8.
23. J.I.C. (45) 31 (O) (Revised Final), 25 January 1945. Supporting Document No. 9.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Message, SHAEF SCM OUT 4025 1274A, 31 January 1945 . Supporting Document No. 11.
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Odd, about Saundby.

When was he interviewed by Heckmann ? Possibly age was affecting his memory, for in an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 1965, he clearly recalled not only the order of 31st January but also that the inclusion of Dresden was immediately queried by High Wycombe. Previously, Dresden had not appeared in any of the weekly priority target lists issued to Bomber Command by the Combined Strategic Targets Committee. Perhaps this is what Saundby meant ?

 

The bombing of Dresden is probably dwelled on because unlike many bombed German cities after World War Two, it was located in the Soviet part of Postwar Germany, thus they couldn't rebuild Dresden well.

 

(attention Friedrich: )


Hi Squirrel,

first of all a warm and nice welcome to the forum!

You made in an interesting point in this discussion, but let's not forget that

1) a lot of other heavily bombed major German towns were located in the postwar Soviet occupation zone (Leipzig, Mageburg, Stettin, Chemnitz , Rostock and of course BERLIN) and

2) the reconstruction of Dresden was a top prio prestige project for the Commies (akin: See, the Capitalists destroyed it, we rebuilt the "Venice of the Elbe River"); in fact Dresden and Berlin were rebuilt earlier and faster than most other major German towns located in the postwar U.S.-, French- and British- occupation zones, of course to the disadvantage of a several dozends of smaller German towns in the postwar Soviet occupation zone, who had been destroyed likewise or worde than Dresden, but hadn't the priority of reconstruction like the big prestige towns.

So, with all due respect, I disagree to your thesis.

Cheers,