Canada's Role in World War II

So according to "A Generals Life" Bradley confirms that he, not Montgomery stopped Patton, and then blames Monty for not reaching his objective, which he didn't.

Whether he [Bradley] should have then done something about it is a moot point, Patton as usual thought Bradley to cautious and that he could have done the job, Bradley thought he didn't have the forces to keep it sealed.

Guess we'll never know.

A question.......

Does Rohmer in his book cite the German numbers to have escaped to be 200,000 - 250,000 and with them went enormous numbers of tanks, vehicles and huge volumes of war material?

 

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In decision in Normandy , Carlo D'Este imply very strongly that the reports of man shortage in the british regiments were humbug ,
He strongly dangle the suspicion of the british command conspiring to minimise their casualties at the expense of other allied and commonwealth troops

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Bradley only says he stopped Patton from advancing beyond the agreed boundary. On finding that Patton had "ordered Haslip [commander US XV Corps] to push on slowly in the direction of Falaise, he says:
"I was furious. In ordering Haslip to advance beyond the Allied boundary, Patton had knowingly and willfully violated an Allied agreement. He had placed his troops into 'no man's land,' where they were exposed to Allied air attack. He He had extended Haslip's vulnerable left flank even further, knowing full well that Ultra had forecast a Germans atack on that very day. An advance to Falasie would leave Haslip thinly strung out over a forty mile line with troops that had not yet proven themselves in a difficult situation. Collins was only then beginning to move north to cover Haslip's left; we still had not closed the gap. No formal procedures had yet been arrived at for joining the two armies.
Falaise was a long-sought British objective and for them, a matter of immense prestige. If Patton's patrols grabbed Falaise, it would be an arrogant slap in the face at a time when when we clearly needed to build confidence in the Canadian Army."

Bradley seems to take a lot of pride in forcing Patton to stick to the plan, he even uses the famous Patton quote: "Let me go on to Falaise and we'll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk." to which he says he replied: "'Nothing doing. You're not ot go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up on that shoulder.

Bradley's concern, as stated in his book, was not so much the number of troops, but their seasoning and quality. Of the four division's in XV Corps, he apparently only had faith in the 79th Infantry Division. The 90th ID was on it's third CO in three weeks and had performed poorly up to that point. The US 5th Armored division and French 2nd Armored were "among our least experienced", to which he adds: "His [LeCLerc; CO French 2nd] sole ambition seemed to be the liberation of Paris ..."

Yes, that's a direct quote from the book.
It's been a long time since I looked at "Decision in Normandy" by Carlo D'Este (which I think is a truly excellent book). His book came out after Rohmer's and he directly challenges Rohmer's "facts", conclusions, and motivations, stating that Rohmer had no real evidence, other than a phone interview with Pogue in which the William's quote came up, regarding Monty's role.
I think the generally accepted figure for the Germans that escaped is around 50,000, with almost no heavy equipment.
I think D'Este actually has it right: "... it [the Falaise Gap] does not appear to have been the great tactical misjudgement that some have claimed."

 

Canada's role in WWII

You might want to check out this old thread on Canada's contributions in WWII (s well as the usual off topic digressions!).

http://www.fun-online.sk/forum/viewtopi ... sc&start=0

 

Yep, D'Este is certainly scathing in regard to Rohmer's book, and Rohmer saying that up to 250,000 Germans escaped with most of their armour, then I guess he has every right.


Some good posts on that thread.

 

I honestly hadn't read the Rohmer book carefully, I had just skimmed through it and I totally missed that part. I had never heard so large anumber used before.
His reasoning goes as follows:
The gap could have been closed on August 13th if Patton had been let loose and allowed to drive on to Falaise.
He uses an estimate from Canadian miltary historian Col. C.P. Stacey that 740,000 Germans were deployed in Normandy south of the Seine.
German Army Group B reported 158,930 casualites up to August 12/13.
740,000 - 160,000 = 580,000

Approximately 200,000 Germans in Normandy to the east of Caen.
580,000 - 200,000 = 380,000

Leaving (per Rohmer's accounting) about 400,000 Germans opposite the allied Armies in Normandy during the first two weeks of August. According to Rohmer, Hitler approved the withdrawal on August 12, which is when claims the gap could have been closed pocketing the 400,000 Germans.

Rohmer cites Pogue as reporting an estimated 125,000 Germans trapped on August 19. He then estimates that up to 35,000 escaped the trap on August 20/21 as a result of the Gereman counter-attack at Trun.
380,000 - (125,000 - 35,000) = 290,000
He then states that 50,000 prisioners were taken and 10,000 dead were found.
290,000 - (50,000 + 10,000) = 230,000.

By Rohmer's reasoning this means that 200,000 - 250,000 Germans who might have been trapped on August 13, escaped to fight another day. The claims for "enormous numers of tanks, vehicles and huge volumes of war material" also escaping seem to be based on his personal observations as a recon pilot at the time, when he says he saw long lines of Germans and their equipement exiting the gap.

The most obvious flaws I can see in this line of thought is that the 740,000 south of the Seine may have also included Army Group G, although these were obviously not in Normandy.
He also seems to have excluded at least a week of casulties between August 13 and Augst 19th, a period during which the Germans undoubtedly took heavy losses. Even at the rate of loss up to August 12 this would have been another 25,000 casulties and probably much higher given the circumstances.

I hope this makes sense to someone, because it doesn't to me.

 

The relationship between Monty and Bradley wasn't that bad during the Normandy campaign, it wasn't until the Battle of the Bulge, where Bradley had his northern forces taken off him by Ike and given to Monty, that the relationship broke down. Bradley thought that Monty had gone behind his back to get these forces, and never forgave him*

* The amusing thing is, it was probably one of the few times that Monty didn't go behind anyones back to achieve his aims, it was members of Ikes staff who proposed the command change, without Monty's knowledge.

 

If it was, the decision was made above Monty's level. He had to disband units in his 21st Army to maintain manning levels in other units

 

D'Este quotes Model.......

After Falaise, Field-Marshal Model reported that :
'All that remained of eleven armoured divisions when replenished with personnel and materiel amounted to eleven regiments, each with 5 or 6 tanks and a few artillery batteries'.

 

I believe even the most optimistic estimate I had ever seen fromthe German side was "less than 100,000 and with virtually no equipment".
I sometimes wonder if losses on the Eastern front weren't deliberately exaggerated (by both sides) to help explain the defeat of the invincible Wehrmacht and to also maximize their amazing powers of defense.
Maybe this was some of the same. "Let's tell everyone that no one got out of France because of Hitler's stupid orders and that we then pulled off a miracle by still being able to stop the allies defend at the frontiers of the Reich!".
Just to be clear the above is intended to be total sarcasim. I personnally think the 50,000 max escappes is the right number. What is often overlooked, and possibly even by Patton at the time is that teh German's still had some fight left in them, They also had a say in closing the gap and keeping it closed.

 

I think "wasn't that bad" is a relative thing, although you are probably quite right that it was only during the Bulge that it turned into a situation where they couldn't work together, and not just because Monty was given temporary command of the 1st and 9th Armies.
Most the US Generals, and more than a few British ones, had a great deal of difficulty with Monty. For Bradley and Patton (an Anglophobe anyway) this went all the back to North Africa and certainly Sicily.

 

Think your on the ball about the numbers that escaped [about 50,000]
less their armour, also about Patton being not being able to keep the gap shut, think there was the remnants of about 19 desperate German divisions [including SS] trying to get out, and what did Haslip have 3-4 divisions?

 

Yes there were originally only the four divisions of Haslip's XV Corps to close the gap. As mentionned, one was an infantry divsion with a poor reputation (the US 90th), one was a green armored division (US 5th), one was a seasoned infantry division (the 79th) and the last was a French armored division (LeClerc's 2nd) whihc, to put it politely, seemed to have another agenda. XV Corps was later reinforced by the green US 80th ID.
On August 12th Bradley decided to reinforce XV Corps with Troy Middelton's VII Corps "the best troops I had in my [Bradley's] command."
As things turned out, Bradley left three divisions at Argentan (French 2nd, US 80th & 90th IDs) and sent most everyone else northeast on August 14th.

 

had the net been closed , how many german troops would have been trapped ?