Chamberlain, Versailles and Appeasement (Again)

Since your point is clearly wrong your conclusions are very suspect. There's an old saying to the effect of "if you want to get out of a deep hole the first thing you should do is stop digging." You need to stop digging.

 

And the LW was stronger in 1939 than in 1938,thus ....

 

??? Thus what? Certainly you can draw no conclusions about the preperation of the UK for war from that. Indeed you can't even draw any conclusions concerning the relative preperations from it.

Now if you want to do some compariisons lets we could look at production numbers of modern fighters of the time. For the Germans that's the Me 109:
Looking at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109#Production
Up until 1939 1,860 had been built with an additional 1,540 in 1939. Sounds pretty impressive except when we look at the British produced fighters we have the Hurricane and the Spitfire. The former didn't enter into operational usage until Dec of 37 and as we have seen earlier the latter August of 38. Now if we look at
look at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarProduction/UK-Civil-WarProduction-IV.html
Which shows 371 fighters delivered to the UK in 38 vs 1,324 in 39. Given the dates of introduction the relative strength of the British fighter arm would have increased more than that of the German (remember only a very few Hurricanes predated 38). When you couple that with Chain Home, the observer core, and the fighter control developments in 39 it's clear that Britain both in absolute and in relative terms was better prepared.

 

With hindsight yes, but the original plan was to conquire Russia in a couple of weeks and then turn back arround to finish the British Empire. Colonies were part of that Empire.
You may say now, and I would even agree, that the collonies were worthless and not worthy efforts but the efforts obviously have been made by the people who knew better.

 

There is no need for conclusion. Britain was preparing for the war.

 

it's clear that Britain both in absolute and in relative terms was better prepared.


Not correct : if Britain was producing more Spitfires than Germany Messerschmidt,this does not prove that Britain was better prepared: it does even not prove that Britain was better prepared in the air .Defeat of victory in the air war did not depend on the number of available fighters/on a fighter superiority.

Britain producing more Spitfires than Germany ME is not proving a superiority in the air in 1939,because, afaics, there was no big air battle in 1939,neither in 1940,unless you think that the BoB was won because Britain produced more Spitfire than Germany Me .It is perfectly possible that Britain would have won the BoB if it had produced less Spitfire than Germany Me ,or that Germany would have won if the British production was higher .

The same for Radar:Britain could have won without Radar and Germany could have won against Radar .


Besides:you can't prove that Britain was better prepared,unless you can calculate how much Britain was prepared in 1938,and,as there was no war in 1938, I don't see how you can calculate this .

Other point: the situations were different


In 1939,while the LW was attacking Poland, the RAF was not attacking Germany,because it had not the means.

In 1940,the LW was attacking Britain and the RAF was in the defensive.

In 1938,if the LW attacked CZ,what would have done the RAF ? the same as in 1939.

 

Amazing simply amazing. Don't let facts or logic interfere with your beliefs you might actually learn something and be able to make a contribution other than comic relief to a discussion.

 

Given that the prevailing viewpoint of the time was "the bomber will always get through", and you have the Germans using WMDs...all it would take would be a few to get through to cause damage to British cities. So, is this even a valid argument?

 

Yes : in 1939 ,Britain was not better prepared against an attack with MDW than in 1938,thus it was not better prepared for an airwar .

In 1970,US were not better prepared against a nucleair attack than in 1960,nor were they in 1980,or in 1990.

 

Britain certainly wasn't prepared to deal with the German army or air force in Greece, France, Norway and it took three years in North Africa. Britain certainly was not ready for the U boat campaign Im amazed that you think not lifting a finger against Germany after promising to do so to the Czechs at Munich, after promising the Poles help case of invasion in 1939 If Britain didn't need allies why were the British begging so badly for US help. Unless you can prove to me that Germany could have beat the French,
Polish and Czech armies in 1938, one must conclude that British preparations for war were negligent compared to what the Germans did

 

Amazing,he still refuse to understand basic facts : he thinks that by giving the military more money,they will be better prepared,he thinks that success/defeat of the BoB depends on the number of fighters,and I would not be surprised if he believed that success/failure in the Battle of the Atlantic depended on the number of ASW,maybe he also thinks that success in the air battle against Germany depended on the number of Bombers,or that success for Rommel in NA depended on more trucks and fuel .
Amazing,amazing .

 

Unless you can prove that if there was a war in 1938,Germany should be opposed by the French,Polish and Czech armies,you are telling irrelevant things .

 

Because they were so afraid of the Wunder bomber no one ever bothered to consider if the Germans could actually reach London.

 

One more question, why didn't the Wunder bomber wipe out London in 1939 or 1940. Or did it finally occur to the RAF that they were frighten by the Boogie man.

 

Is this a Homer "Doh!" moment?

Defeat or Victory in the air does depend on the number of fighters/fighter superiority. Daylight bomber losses to flak were sustainable, daylight bomber losses to flak and fighters were not sustainable. Once Germany lost the ability to put up a credible number of fighters to intercept Allied bombers, she had lost the air war.

It's not just Spitfires, but also Hurricanes. By the time of the Munich Crisis, there were only two fully equipped Hurricane squadrons, by September, 1939, the were some 18 squadrons with more converting. I don't know about you, but given the choice of war in 1938 and having Furies, Demons, and Gladiators as my fighters, or war in 1939 with Spits and Hurricanes...I'll take war in '39 thanks all the same. And this is not even taking into account the poor state of Bomber Command in 1938, which only just saw the introduction of the Hampden and Wellington bombers into service.

I would hazard to say that the British were better prepared to fight and air war in 1939, than they were in 1938. Proving it is relatively easy...They had newer equipment and more of it. I don't think the Hawker Fury, Hawker Demon, and Gloster Gladiator were quite up to the task of tangling with the Bf-109 - although, of the three, the Gladiator would be the most likely to survive.

In 1939, Bomber Command was, IIRC, under orders not to attack German cities, less the Germans reply in kind by attacking British cities. Thus, Bomber Command had to content themselves with dropping leaflets, bombing German shipping, and the occasional military target.

In 1940, the RAF was on the defensive because they had to be, since France had fallen.

As to 1938, I highly doubt that there would have been a "war" over CZ, as both the British and the French were quite unprepared for a war with Germany, or anyone else, and their respective military leadership admitted as much. The only way such a "war" will start is if Germany directly attacks Britain or France.

 

So, by "arbitrarily" picking an attack for which there is no defense, except, of course, gas masks...with which to mitigate any casualties. Not to mention the many ARP preparations throughout 1938-39 to deal with bombing raids and gas attacks.

WRT nuclear war, the best, and likely only, defense is what was practiced "Mutually Assured destruction{MAD}. Although some would argue that the introduction of MIRVs "enhanced" our preparations, by allowing one missile to hit several targets at once.

Still, the concept was the same in 1939-early 40, when both the British and Germans restrained themselves from conducting "terror bombing" of each others civilian populations. Of course, this did not help Warsaw or Rotterdam, but then the Germans did not expect a continued attack in kind.

 

And what about Coventry, London ,liverpool : were these proofs that Britain was better prepared in 1940 than in 1938?

There was no such thing as being better prepared against air attacks : Baldwin was right : the Bomber always would go through,at Hamburg,at Dresden,at Lübeck,....

Now that we have the proof that in the air Britain was not better prepared,notwithstanding it had more Spitfires,let's look at the Army ,which had an offensive function : in 1938,Britain warned France that if it attacked Germany it could expect only 2 British divisions .Was the situation better in 1939? the first British division arrived at the front at the end of the war in Poland .

Not a significantly better preparation. IMHO.

 

Not that you'll admit it, especially since your are wrong but, perhaps that's because it does? Since you don't think so can you produce a single substanceive case where it doesn't? Especially a modern one?

Now here's a surprise straw man and a very obvious one at that. Perhaps it's just your ability to read and comprehend English that's the problem, I doubt it though. Here is a clue we are discussing British prepairedness not the results of any particular battle. Of course while it's irrelevant it is true that the number of fighters available on each side was of considerable import in the course of said battle.

"number of ASW"? That really doesn't make much sense even for you. However again the number of ASW assets was of some import in regards to both Britains prepairedness for war and in winning the battle in question. The relative strength of British ASW assets and the German uboat waffe would also be of considerable import both to the relative prepairedness and the results of the battle.

Irrelevant to the topic at hand but certainly a factor, are you suggesting that it wasn't?

Again irrelevant but are you arguing that trucks and fuel were irrelevant? Or are you trying to create another strawman so you can continue to avoid the perfectly valid points and critiques I've made of your post. I'll assume the latter as it's pretty clear your assumptions/beliefs/opinions are consistently of little or no merit when evaluated against real world facts, reason, and logic.

Individually of course not. Individually they are almost completely irrelevant to the topic at hand. The course of the BoB on the other hand rather obviously benefited from the extra year the British had.

What an absurd thing to say. Look at the early British and American bomber raids or even the German bomber raids during the BoB. They were unsustainable. And how about the Ju-87 being pulled back from operations over the channel because their losses were unsustainable. And an absolute classic would be the Battle of the Philipine Sea.

What ever gave you that idea? Not only do you have no such proof the weight of the evidence is in the opposite direction.

And your poiont is? When would the first division have arrived if it had been 1938? Britain didn't even plan to committ that much force before 38. You are presenting only one side of an equation and trying to draw conclusions from it as you have done numerous times. It is a procedure that is lacking completely of reason or validity.

Given your record to date that almost guarantees that they were. Which of course is where the facts, evidence, and logic point as well. At least you are consistent.

 

The "proofs" are that after losses were nowhere near as great as the pre-war expectations, Germany lost her attritional air campaign against the British Isles - sustaining more losses to her aircraft and air crews than she could afford.

And that is where you fail...There is such a thing as being better prepared against air attacks. The US air campaign against the Japanese Home Islands for instance...

The bomber will always get through, that is a given. But where Baldwin was wrong, is that strategic air warfare is attritional, and not necessarily offensive in nature. If you can make the enemy pay more in losses than he is willing or capable of sustaining, then you will "win." As the British did against the Germans in 40-41, and the Germans came close to doing to the Allied strategic bombing campaign against them.

I still have not seen this air "proof" of which you so speak? I have not yet seen it.

As to the British Army, all it had was 2 combat capable divisions, but with their rearmament underway, hoped to have four divisions and one armored division ready by 1940. IIRC, France had 20 infantry divisions, 8 colonial divisions. 3 cavalry divisions, 2 mechanized divisions, and 6 tank brigades. Also, IIRC, British intel gave the Germany Army as 36 regular divisions, 18 reserve divisions and 24 landwehr divisions. It was also expected to add 9 divisions from the former Austrian Army. Not to mention the forces of Italy and Japan, which were expected to come in on the side of Germany. On the face of it, it paints a very dim prospect for a successful war against Germany in 1938.

Of course, British intel was off, but that was what they had to go on when it came to deciding as to whether or not to go to war.

 

IF Britain was so unprepared and the Czechs and Poles were so irrelevant, then why fight Germany at all, just roll over again and let Germany control Europe. You keep ignoring the obvious point, that with the Czechs and Polish armies as allies, Germany did not have the means to beat the French armies and bomb England. he radar chain failed to keep the Germans out of Norway, Greece and it certainly did not help against Rommel. If the radar chain is all you have to fall back on then Britain did a worse job of preparing for war then stopping it at the start.