Erwin Rommel

Hold on Slipdigit, the case cited by brndirt is not at all the same circumstance as the idea of capturing Mideast oil.
If I'm understanding correctly, he is postulating what would have happened if Operation Sonnenblume had been a much greater priority from Jan/Feb '41, with Rommel able to drive deep into Egypt in the spring of '41.

The example cited by Brndirt is of Russia, which had advance knowledge of German attacks on Caucasus oil, and well-prepared Russian plans to destroy oil installations beforehand. Thus the Axis wern't able to extract any useful amounts of oil
In 1941 there are 2 oil pipelines from Kirkuk Iraq, the northern one running to Tripoli, in Vichy held Lebanon, and the southern one to Haifa in British held Palestine.

I've posted the rest of my reply in the alt-history section here: http://www.ww2f.com/what-if-mediter...n-middle-eastern-front-wwii-2.html#post506422

 

I don't want to reopen this issue,but for the Africa Corps,the problem was not the amount of supplies that were sent,but the distance from Tripoli to the front,some 2000 km,the railway infrastructure in Lybia was totally insufficient,not enough locomotives,waggons,wood,coal,water .
yy i in Lybia was totally insufficient:not enough locomotives,waggons,wood,coal,water,......

 

Rommel was a good tactician. He was brave, exhibited great leadership and a keen sense of what would destroy his enemy's mental equilibrium. His appreciation of strategy was flawed, however. Gazala was a tactical masterpiece, but by depriving Kesselring of the aircrafts necessary to take Malta, he sealed Afrika Korps' fate. Kesselring foresaw the disaster in the making, Rommel did not.

I have always been interested at the great "what if" of Normandy: would the forward deployment of panzers slowed down the Allies more than the Wehrmacht actually did? The 21st Panzer did prevent the British from taking Caen, in spite of heavy losses before the guns of the Royal Navy. That said, prehaps such actions would burn out the panzer divisions even faster.

Anyhow, Rommel wasn't a card-carrying Nazi, though his association with Hitler opened up his career, and he knew it. He never got his hands dirty, unlike von Manstein or von Choltitz.

I have been promising myself to read a book on Einsatzgruppen and German atrocities in general, and part of it discussed Nazi plans to wipe out middle eastern Jews, had they took Egypt. But more on that topic when I actually have solid evidence to talk about

 

Uh, there was no railway in Libya from Tripoli to Egypt. Are you thinking of French W africa?
There was only a small branch railway (from Benghazi) in Cyrenaica
Rommel's supply was by truck.
For the idea to succeed DAK's supply would have to be shipped directly through the ports of Tobruk & Benghazi. Difficult, but with LW support & aggressive Italian naval action, perhaps possible.

 

One of if not the best of all time tactitians. What i seem to find difficult to apprehend is how much luck he always has. even if you read infantry attacks, he himself shows how much luck he constantly gains, which is not much different to NA.

I find it interesting also how he always seems to be right. Evidently he can analyze situations very closely and act, often going against his superior's/Hitler's orders.

 

Well,that's my point :the supply problems were mainly caused by the primitive railway and road infrastructure in Lybia;if more supplies reached Tripoli,the problems would be bigger .
On the trucs:the Germans used all what was available,but using trucs,is an indication that the situation was bad:in september 1944,the Allies used trucks,but the Red Ball Express was a failure.
About Benhazi and Tobruk:theoretically,they could be used,but they were mainly fishing-harbours,and it would increase the burden on the Luftwaffe and the Italian navy .
Btw:thanks for the map.

 

about the utility of Benghazi :it was 5 times occupied and 4 times abandoned,with a lot of destructions,and,even in 1946,it was only accessible for ships with a draught of max. 4.5 meters.

 

I agree that Rommel was one of the greatest commanders of the war and history. He demonstrated many good qualities. I really like how he preffered being on the front lines instead of back. He was very good at co-ordinating his units and extremely well at moving his forces. Rommel was really good at using what he had. In France he was the first to reach the channel, he might have won the african campaign if more supplies had reached him, or if his commander in charge at HQ (George Stumme) had not died then El Alamein might have been different, Rommel was very good at using the 8.8 cm flak gun. The gun was good itself but rommel was really good at getting them in position to be most effective, Rommel was the only German commander who correctly predicted the D-day landings, and had rommel not been on leave during d-day he could have moved the 12th SS and Lehr divisions to push the allies back into the channel as he planned. With that said I think Rommel, however, would not have been a very successful commander of mass forces (say Bock of AGC). Rommel spent more time on the front and left 2nd in command at HQ. This would not have been as effective in commanding large armies. But as a field commander Rommel was one of the best if not the best.

 

Hi Guys, as I have posted before, I dont think in 1942 that Rommel could have breached the Alamein line, he may have been able to on 1941, but not in 1942 it was just too good a defensive position, made even stronger by the arival of the 6 pdr ATG.
Regards Yan.

 

yam im talking about the second battle of el alamein where rommel had laid the large minefield and set infantry and artillery behind it. I believe rommel had chosen to trap a bulk of the british army in the minefield and it would even the match. Rommel was on the defensive at this point. Stumme was supposed to move artillery up to attack the british army while it was moving through the minefield but he died so the artillery moved up late after most of the british had passed. There is no guarantee that this would have worked for rommel anyways but there is a good chance that it could have.

 

It may have worked Jager, because the British Armour was strung out like a washing line, while Engineers gapped the mine fields, they were only making a gap wide enough for one AFV to move through.

 

With the exception of the campaign in France where he commanded a single panzer division, Rommel lost every campaign he commanded in. Even in France his division was attacked at Arras rather successfully and pretty badly surprised and beaten up.
In North Africa he pushed his command well beyond the culmunation point of victory and in the end lost to the Allies there. In Normandy his defense measures failed to prevent an Allied landing and eventually the campaign was lost as well.
I would ask the question what can anyone point out in terms of his military record that really makes him an outstanding success in battle?

 

Rommel was very succesfull in all of his campaigns. He did not win the african campaign but nearly did and his odds werent very good. He barely lost to a larger, better equipped, and better supplied army. And in France he was the only commander who correctly predicted the allied landings and his plan was to move the 12th and lehr divisions to the beach once the attack started to push the allies into the channel. However on june 6th rommel was on leave and his second in command had gone to paris where the 20 June assasination plot of hitler was being planned. As a result nobody ordered the panzers forward and Rommels plan had not been executed. and like the post above said rommel had planned on trapping the british 8th in a mine field during el alamein but stumme had died and the order also was never given. Rommel was very successful his only downfall really being that he was always on the front lines and his second in commands usually failed to execute orders. Rommel was brilliant in terms of armored and infantry warfare. He managed great amounts of success with little to work with.

 

Rommel ignored his specific orders and over-extended himself. He was warned he was taking a risk but chose to gamble He lost.
He was blocked, crushed and completely routed. He can in no way be said to have 'barely' lost.
What is it with those who laud every small tactical German win but completely ignore the huge strategic mistakes they made.

 

If you back track to the beginning page, you will see many flaws in your opinion brought to the fore by many other posters, myself included (starting with #7) which clearly proves he was "foxy" when he knew where his opponents were going to be, and how strong they were there. Not very much so when that intelligence was removed from the picture.

He was a good battlefront commander, but perhaps a bit lacking in other areas. Blaming the flaws of his own plans on them not being carried out by his subordinates is pointless. His own plans were never followed by himself either (really) since he knew full well that no "plan" survives the first hour or two of engagement. Rommel could adapt quickly, but not always well.

I find it interesting that he was always "absent" from the action when things went down the crapper. Perhaps he knew full well that the whole idea was flawed and successfully managed to remove himself from the area?

 

Not sure what battles are being referenced, the only leaves that I know of were the ones he took during sickness and visits to other parts of the theater (although I don't know if he left a battle to do this). It doesn't really fit in with his character to run away leaving his men to fight the battle knowing is lost, a good example is perhaps the final days of Afrika Korps where he wanted to withdraw but keep the division relatively strong although a break in the Italian line and Hitler's refusal to allow for a withdrawl gave the Allies the opportunity they needed to do some major damage.

When it comes to Rommel I think the conditions he was working under should be examined, his plans usually suffered as a result of,

1. A lack of fuel and supplies, the Battle of Alam el Halfa is a good example where Rommel didn't even receive a fraction of the fuel required for the battle. If memory serves right the only constant stream of resources for Afrika Korps was via Italy and Commando Supremo but a good chunk of ships would be sunk before reaching them, the supplies that did make it to port took a while to get distributed.

2. Italian unwillingness to fight among other things. The Italians had a pretty good leader with Major Pardi who according to accounts was able to instill the same fighting spirit in his troops that Rommel was. He was critically injured in battle though sometime in 1942 IIRC, Rommel told them to do everything they could to save him (even flew out to see him) but it wasn't enough in the end.

Rommel like all commanders certainly had his flaws. If someone else was in Rommel's place could they have done better? Worse? Perhaps, but it's hard to know.

 

I am sorry if you thought I was inferring the man extracted himself from situations due to cowardice or something. What I was trying to get across was that the man could have very likely understood the situation he was forced into by Hitler, and that stress itself contributed to his health, or detriment of same.

Stress is a nasty contributor to overall health, the man was home for "health" reasons when the African campaign started to go into the crapper. The nurse who examined him wouldn't sign off on the official reason (Diphtheria), and she was transferred out, and Rommel went home.

 

Well Every commander makes mistakes and nobody is trying to say that the German commanders are way better than the allies. IT is simply saying that rommel was a great commander. He did many things that were great. He was heralded by friends and enemies. This does not mean that he was better. In fact I would say he is very similar to Patton and Montgomery. And both of them were great commanders in the war as well. I would not say rommel would be a very effective commander in charge of an entire army like AGC but as a field commander he was among the best. And it is simple fact that he had orders set up to do specific things that were never carried out and resulted in him losing the beachheads during d-day and losing the 2nd battle of alamein. However, with that said even if rommel had won at the 2nd battle of alamein he probably would not have gotten too far into egypt before he would of worn down and even if he had completely stopped the initial landings at d-day there were other beaches being stormed and he most likely would not have won there either. But as a commander he was very good.

 

Alot of people I talk to say that he was not in the best of health when he attacked the mareth line in 1943, and this was his biggest failure, but I think it was a mistake to attack this position, but having said that, fighting an enemy who has broken your codes and knows what your next move is, is allways going to fail, Rommel was not only lacking fuel in North Africa, he was fighting an enemy who not only was well suppied, but intercepted any orders for attack and when convoys were sailing, put this with the Torch landing (fighting on two fronts) and the best commander in the world could not win.
Regards Yan.

 

Yupper, the shoe was on the other foot by then. He had been reading the British formations and so forth like the morning paper until then. The American military liason officer in Cairo was sending back detailed information to D.C. of the British readiness in a code the Germans were reading.

Col. Fellers wasn't a bad guy, he just didn't think the Brits were up to the task in desert, and sent Washington the list of their positions, strengths, and weaknesses. As soon as Fellers was transferred out, the Desert Fox got less "foxy". Intell is a double edged sword in some cases, and now not only were Rommel's messages being intercepted (and in some cases broken), he was also being fed dis-information by the British.