F4F-4 Wildcat

You will not get an argument out of me on the effectiveness of the 'Thach weave,' my question was did it become an official USN/USMC tactic at Guadalcanal or not until later in 1943?

 

The wiki page here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thach_Weave
indicates that it was adopted at Guadalcanal but the wording is such that it might have been adopted a bit earlier. I suspect word of it got back to PH with the carriers and any Marine or USN fighter squadrons that staged through PH probably adopted it pretty quickly. When it became "official" is still an open question though. One of the sources listed on the page above may have an answer but I can't get to it right now.

Here's a link to a training film showing how to do it. If you could find a date for the film that would give you some idea:
http://www.virtualflight.net/content/usn-ww2-training-film-thatch-weave-combat-maneuver-part-1-3
Should be at either the start or the end. I haven't watched it though.

 

(1)That's what makes me confused about the whole subject regarding the 'Thach weave,' wikipedia says that it was used by the Marines at Guadalcanal, but on the "What was wrong with the F4F Wildcat" thread on ww2aircraft.net, one of the posters named "JoeB" said the tactic was seldom used in '42 aside from Thach and his flight at Midway, and didn't become official until '43, he seems to be a knowledgeable guy, here is his one post(Pg.2, post #17):

http://ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/wrong-f4f-wildcat-16142-2.html

(2)The 'Thach weave' was never mentioned at all in either of the videos(there are 3 parts), Commander Thach was just giving instructions on important elements such as teamwork and situational awareness. Still great demo videos though, thanks for sharing them.

 

The "Thach Weave" was taught on an ad hoc basis through 1943. One was either exposed to it or one was not. Case in point would be Jim Flatley, CO of VF-10. VF-10 went west in the summer of 1942. While waiting on their eventual assignment to USS ENTERPRISE in October, they were stationed at NAS Puuene on Maui. Here they were exposed to Butch O'Hare, CO of VF-3. O'Hare had replaced Thach after Midway and was his high priest of the Beam Defense. O'Hare and Flatley initially butted heads on tactics (VF-10 was still using a 3-2 set up, that is each division was made up of three sections of two planes each - all clearly spelled out by Flatley's instructions for the squadron - I've a period copy around here somewhere if anyone needs a quote.) Anyway, a long story short, O'Hare's repeated demonstrations of the superiority of the 2-2 set up combined with the efficacy of the Beam Defense made a believer of Flatley who reorganized his squadron as in the 2-2 set up and made sure all were versed in Beam Defense. It was Jim Flatley who coined the term "Thach Weave." The Beam Defense slowly infiltrated the bag of tricks, either in whole squadrons such as VF-10, or VF-11 (which also spent time in company with VF-3 at Puuene before going to the Solomons in April 1943), for that matter, or as individuals moved from squadron to squadron, or as in a training dust up where someone who knew what they were doing turned the tables, ". . . what the heck was that?"

Fast forward to the late summer - early fall of 1943. Flatley is Director of Training for ComFAirWest at San Diego, responsible for ensuring that carrier squadrons are prepared for their outings to the west. Each of the carrier types, VB, VT, and VF had a chief of training to deal solely with that type squadron. I could, with some digging in the files (unfortunately now boxed up in the garage due to some renovations which are taking far, far too long) come up with the name of the VB and VT chiefs of training, even their base phone numbers, but I know for sure that the chief of VF training was one Bill Leonard, who had served with Flatley in VF-42 at Coral Sea, as Thach's XO in VF-3 at Midway, and recently returned from a tour in the Solomons in VF-11.

An additional task laid on Flatley and his training chiefs was a re-write of the fleet instructions for carrier squadrons operations. Not to bore with pedantry, those new instructions included the Beam Defense (In those same boxes I have the original rough draft of the re-write in Flatley and Leonard's hands AND the hand drawn diagrams to accompany the text. Maybe someday I'll take them out and scan for viewing pleasure, but I frankly prefer not to handle 70 year old mimeographed pages any more than I absolutely have to. Oh, and when I say "boxed up" that means in sealed WP plastic containers, not cardboard.)

So, bottom line, until the issuance of the revised USF 74B, the beam defense was not formally taught. Afterwards, it was. It was not, however, particularly taught in flight training or operational training after one was selected for fighters. It was pretty much an item of curriculum for squadrons working up before going west. It is a measure that works best when done with folks you know and with whom you've spent some time flying. By late 1943, one might expect a working up squadron to take up to 8 months before deemed ready to go. The ComFAirWest folks traveled up and down the west coast visiting these squadrons at their home stations to observe, comment on, and offer training tips. Leonard always complained about be stuck in Seattle with only khakis as all his winter uniforms, stored on the east coast since YORKTOWN departed in December 1941, had not yet arrived.

Flatley left ComFAirWest in the summer of 1944 to serve as Ops officer for VADM Mitscher in TF-58. Leonard stayed on until the autumn when Thach came around plucked him to be his assistant in the Ops shop for VADM McCain in TF-38.

 

Depends what you mean by "official". IIRC, Thach had made the maneuver "officially" part of his squadron' doctrine early on. Butch O'Hare, whom Thach had mentored, later took over command of VF-3 and continued the practice. O'Hare passed the maneuver on to Jimmy Flatley. Flatley passed the basics of the maneuver to Joe Foss and some of his marine fighter pilots during their transfer to Guadalcanal.

Here was the disconnect...while the "weave" is often simplistically described as a "scissors" maneuver, it is actually a fairly complicated maneuver. The Marine pilots could not be expected to become fully proficient in, and understand the nuances of the "Weave", but they got the basics and used, to their understanding, the maneuver to some effectiveness at Guadalcanal.

However, the maneuver would not enter into the training regimen of new pilots until late in 1942, and it would not be until 1943 that those pilots, now trained, would put the maneuver to good use.


Edit: Looks like R Leonard has beaten me to it, with far better detail.

 

Mr. Leonard, a question if I may.

Do you have any information on a similar maneuver called the "Enterprise Scissors"?

It was mentioned in "Thach Weave" by Steve Ewing, but there seems to be conflicting accounts as to if there was such a maneuver.

 

Any relation?

 

I thought you knew that Admiral William N. Leonard was his father.
http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=12110820

 

You made me go look up the passage . . . `course the hard part was figuring out which stack in which room the book had been stashed. When the renovations are done it will take me forever to get everything back the way I want it.

I, too, had never heard of the “Enterprise Scissors” until seeing it in Steve’s bio of Admiral Thach. It is, in fact, the only place I’d ever seen any reference. Breezing through it quickly, I do note that one of the reported participants, Gordon Firebaugh, specifically said, and here I quote the passage from Steve’s book referring to the “Enterprise Scissors” story: “. . . ‘contains adverse information.’ He continued, ‘I too, have never heard of the ‘Enterprise Scissors’ until (Commander Howard S.) Packard wrote me a few weeks ago.’ Firebaugh also wrote that there was no question in his mind that John Thach and Jim Flatley were responsible for the weave.” As Steve further noted on the matter, “. . . it was Jim Flatley who coined the phrase ‘Thach Weave.’”

By the time ENTERPRISE got back to Pearl in the fall of 1942, Flatley and company had already been exposed and converted by O’Hare.

My take is that there was a lot of scissoring going on . . . the RAF, early on had a “weaver” who would weave back and forth over the rear of a fighter, to use a USN term, division. They rapidly found that this gent usually ended up being the first to go. I do know that VF-42 in the summer of 1941 also experimented with that concept and determined that whoever was assigned that task was going to die, all by himself, with no mutual protection. I believe that the AVG briefly flirted with the concept of weavers, plural, over their formations, but also discarded it as asking for trouble. A scissors is generally a one-on-one move when engaged. The Thach Weave was nothing of the kind, it was a controlled, essentially head-on run at your teammate abeam of you with the intent of converting that run into a near zero deflection shot at whomever was on his tail. The teammate(s) under attack did not initiate the move, rather, the unengaged initiated when he observed his teammate about to be under attack. The attackee, when he saw the initiator make his move, would then turn directly towards the initiator setting up the head on shot at the attacker. A scissors movement, by definition, would result in a much wider angle of deflection. There seems to be a belief that here are all these USN fighter types casually and continually weaving back and forth across the Pacific . . . not so, the Thach Weave, Beam Defense, was only initiated when it was observed that an attack on one teammate or section was coming in and the unengaged were the initiators.

Was there scissoring going on, certainly, and not just in individual combat. No doubt in my mind that this or that USN aviator seeing a team mate under attack scissored around behind, or near behind an attacker for a high deflection, but successful counter. If it works, it works, but that does not describe the maneuver of the Beam Defense. The scissor was also a useful means of keeping pace with slower craft, the VB and VT types, when under escort. VF-42 escorts at Coral Sea scissored back and forth over their TBD charges coming and going, but solely as a means to stay with them. Brain trust on YORKTOWN were aware of the waste of fuel involved with this measure, thus producing the “running rendezvous” employed by the air group at Midway a month later. ENTERPRISE and HORNET fell back on the doctrinal “deferred departure” where everyone circled around the ship after launch and went off in one big gaggle (yes, I know, ENTERPRISE had launch problems and the VBs were released to go on their way, but their plan was for a deferred departure). Deferred departures required the VF to gently scissor back and forth over their charges; so, they wasted fuel waiting for everyone to form up, wasted fuel scissoring back and forth, and once entering the combat arena, were probably at a less than optimal speed. None of this scissoring was related to the Beam Defense.

Drawing, again, on Steve Ewing’s bio of Thach, in Thach’ own words referring to the USF 74: “There is one matter of nomenclature that would cause a great deal of confusion. I refer to Paragraph 411, sub-title “The Scissors.” The word “scissors” has been, for years, used to describe a maneuver that a single plane works into when attacked by a single enemy plane, each turning toward the other, trying to beat the opponent in the next turn to get on his tail. I think it aptly describes that particular maneuver and should not be used to describe any other. The maneuver used in Paragraph 411 and called the “Scissors” has been called the “Weave” and taught as a weave to the many thousands of students who have graduated from the Training Command in the past three or four years. All of our training films and pamphlets call it a weave and I would hate to see the terminology changed now not because I invented the d--- thing, but because of all the confusion that would result.”

Thanks for speaking up. Guess I can skip reporting myself as being guilty of being Bill Leonard's son. Kind of explains the presence of various odd documents.

much later corrected a one letter typo.

 

Sorry, but I'm all out of salutes, so it will have to wait until tomorrow.

Thanks for the information you have provided concerning the "Enterprise Scissors", as I was very curious about the maneuver and if it even existed, and I knew you would know about it more than anyone else.

Thanks again. Your knowledge and sharing, is much appreciated.


PS, I always get a good laugh watching those "How To" flightsim videos on the Thach Weave. They almost always open with a pair of Wildcats weaving back and fourth.

 

@R Leonard (Post 44),
That helps alot in answering my question, thank you!

Where I bolded is what I meant by the 'Beam defense maneuver' becoming an official tactic in the US Navy/Marines, with new recruits being trained into utilizing the tactic.

 

It would depend on what one would call being included in the naval aviator training program. Everyone went through a set basic and primary training. It was after the primary that one was assigned to a type (VF, VB, VT, VPB, VO) and went on to advanced operational training, For the VF types, this is where they would have been exposed to the Beam Defense. So, was it practiced in operational training? Sure, 5, 10, 25, who knows how many times, remembering though that most combat related training was offensive, not defensive . . . the name of the game was getting one's ordnance on target. Serious practice of the Beam Defense would not occur until assignment to a working up squadron . . . again, with this maneuver it pays extra dividends to be with folks with whom you have already spent some time in the air.

 

Thank you for posting this. This is fascinating, Does some US Navy archive have copies of the papers in your possession?

The point about nomenclature is well made. I understand from this that the USN regarded a "scissors" as being the same as a "weave". I am not sure this fits with other uses of "weave".

My understanding of the scissors is that it is a series of reversing hard turns with 45 -90 degree of bank. It is flown at full power and at a speed close to the sustained turn rate. It burns "E" - energy. It is a defensive manoeuvre and anything other than best turn rate might prove fatal. This is not a manoeuvre to execute while escorting bombers out of combat.

There are two other uses of "weave." If a bomber formation had a lower cruising speed than that of their escorts, the escort might need to "weave" in order to maintain formation. The RAF 1939-40 "weaver" was a lone pilot who flew above and behind a formation of three aircraft tight "Vics", executing a series of gentle turns in order to monitor the formation blind spot in their "high six" These are both much more gentle manoeuvres, executed as a series of shallow turns, maintaining altitude and minimise fuel consumption.

Was the Thach weave just taught to F4F pilots, or for other aircraft?

It was not needed by aircraft which could outrun or out climb the zeke and might be fatal if undertaken in an aircraft less manoeuvrable than the F4F, such as the F4U. Nor would a tactic which relied on head on snapshots be as effective against aircraft which had more firepower or manoeuvred in the vertical plane, such as the German Fw190 or Me109s, or Japanese ki84 or ki61.

 

I was pretty sure but thought other newer members might want to know that the information came from someone very close to the events.

I've seen reports of it on line that mentioned it being used by Dauntless. May have been one reason they racked up as many kills as they did. I think it was mentioned in the previous page that it was taught to most navy fliers at some point. Here's the quote but it's not as explicit as I thought.

 

Maybe, maybe not. I have more than a few documents the USN or National Archives might have in one form or another, but they probably could not put their hands on them as fast as I can. Others, I’m pretty certain they do not have and can’t have until I’m done with them.

The point of Thach’s commentary, a “scissors” is a “scissors” and not to be confused with the “weave” of the Beam Defense.

Different terminology, I have heard numerous VF pilots specifically say they were scissoring back and forth over their escorted charges others used the word weave; in either case they are referring to a gentle back and forth from one side of the formation to the other. Note that this is not in a combat situation, but merely to remain in contact with the slower bomb/torpedo (and mostly torpedo) haulers. This, to reiterate, implies the back and forth over the formation, not the scissors that one might desperately employ in shooting situation or the weave one would expect executing the Beam Defense.

And as I understand it a pre-war thinking that was abandoned when it was realized that the ‘weaver” was merely an unsupported “target” and likely to be the first picked off. The AVG reached the same conclusion. So did at least one USN squadron before the US even entered the war.

Without getting into a major write up on US naval aviator training, the answer is, no it was not taught only to F4F pilots. The beam defense became part and parcel of the USN fighter pilot’s training. Once selected for fighter duty, as noted previously, one spent time in an operational training unit for approximately two months, NAS Vero Beach comes to mind. While most training was offensive in nature, the defensive side was also covered . . . it did not matter to which aircraft type fighter squadron one might eventually be assigned F4F, FM, F6F, F4U, the training was generic. The specific intensive practice of concepts and practices learned in the operational training units was repeated ad nauseum in squadrons readying for overseas deployment. One might note that the maneuver was also taught to the gents going off to VB and VT operational training units . . . not that they were expected to play fighter pilot, but that it just might come in handy one day.

I shall correct myself; maybe a digression into the training process is in order. There needs to be an understanding of the process. By the time the USN aviator training program was in high gear there was none of the “straight from Pensacola to combat” that one sees ballyhooed about. So, what follows is a brief treatise on flight training for carrier aircraft type aviators.

The training of Aviation Cadets (AvCads), as developed in the first year of the war, provided for selected applicants to attend a flight preparatory course for three months at one of 20 colleges across the country. This was an academic program preliminary to actual flight training. Upon completion, another two months was spent learning to fly light aircraft at one of 250 training centers operated by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Upon completion of this basic course, the AvCad then attended a pre-flight training course that largely consisted of physical and military training lasting about 3 months. This was followed by 2 months at a Naval Air Station or a Naval Air Reserve Base in Primary Flight Training. Collectively these preliminary training steps were referred to as elimination training. Prior to the war, should a student be eliminated he had the choice of continued enlisted service or separation, once the war started, if eliminated one was sent to other enlisted assignments. The Primary Flight Training portion was divided into six stages:

1. Primary Dual: in company with an instructor - basics of taxiing, take-offs, climbs, turns, spirals, glides, landings, stalls, spins and primary emergency procedures. Upon completion of this first stage, the AvCad performed a solo check flight.
2. Primary Solo: following a general review dual instruction, advanced tasks and techniques. With both dual and solo demonstration, covered in this phase were steeply banked turns, high altitude slips and spirals, spins, wingovers and reactive emergencies. Instruction included small field landings and slips to a landing, both dual and solo.
3. Advanced solo: both dual instruction and solo demonstration - loops, split-S, snap roll, pylons, precision landings with slips, spin recovery and field procedures.
4. Final: both dual and solo demonstration - General review stressing smoothness, reaction to strange field procedures with power, instruction in inverted stalls and spins and progressive spins.
5. Formation: Instruction and practice in formation flying techniques.
6. Night flying: Dual and solo night flying instruction.

At each of these 6 stages the AvCad had to receive a satisfactory check off before proceeding to the next stage.

While all this was going on, there was also a ground training school which occupied about half of the AvCad’s time, including study of power plants, photography, gunnery, aerology, aircraft structures, navigation and communications.

Upon successful completion of his primary training, the AvCad moved on to Intermediate Flight Training. This training was usually conducted at naval air training centers such as NAS Corpus Christi or NAS Pensacola. In his intermediate training the AvCad flew service type aircraft (types in squadron service as opposed to simpler training aircraft). Students were given the opportunity to request the type of aircraft in which they wanted to specialize. These types generalized as carrier (CV), patrol (VPB), utility (VJ/VR) or scout/observation (VO/VCS). There was no guarantee that one would be assigned as requested.

Initial intermediate training consisted of a refresh of skills taught in Primary Training in order to indoctrinate the AvCad in the operation of heavier, more powerful aircraft. Instrument training was heavily emphasized with the use of Link trainers and “under-the-hood” flying. The instrument flying program began with basic familiarization with instruments and their part in trimming; straight, smooth flight; climbs, glides, spirals, stalls and spins; intricate patterns; recovery from unusual situations; and rough air procedures. This phase also covered radio ranging, beam navigation, and methods of orientation. The satisfactory check for this phase included demonstration of primary skills, instrument flight and navigation, and instrument guided landing.

The next phase of intermediate training was Specialized Intermediate Training based on the AvCad’s by now expected community assignment and centered on specific operational types. For carrier based types: VF training was 100 hours and included familiarization, acrobatics, formation tactics, primary and advanced fixed gunnery, combat tactics, glide bombing, navigation, night flying and carrier operations. VB and VT training was also 100 hours including familiarization, gunnery, as well as carrier operations and with the greatest emphasis placed on glide and dive bombing, navigation, scouting, communications and formation tactics. VT training was similar to VSB with the elements of the torpedo attack being the emphasis vice dive bombing.

Intermediate ground school subjects included engineering and maintenance, navigation, communications, aerology, survival, and organization and operations of squadrons.

At the completion of Intermediate Flight Training the Aviation Cadet was awarded his wings, was assigned a permanent Naval Aviator number and, except for a very small number of NAPs, was commissioned in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. By now, since the beginning of primary training, the new naval aviator has spent seven or so months in the training pipeline.

The next step in Naval Aviator training was assignment to an operational training unit of the Naval Air Operational Training Command, NAS Jacksonville (NAOTC). It was at the Operational Training Unit (OTU) level that air crews were established, with enlisted aircrewmen being assigned with pilots in VB and VT aircraft types. These personnel assignments generally continued through the OTU period and on into operational squadrons. Prior to the April 1942 establishment of the NAOTC, advanced training was accomplished at the Advanced Carrier Training Groups located at NAS Norfolk and NAS San Diego.
OTUs were where most of the newly designated aviators received their training associated with his type assignment. Between one third and one half of each intermediate training class were selected for carrier aircraft type training depending on projected needs. Focusing on training of carrier pilots, those of the VF, VB, and VT variety of the species, operational training exposed the new aviator to in-type training in an environment not dissimilar to an active squadron. OTUs were deliberately organized as nearly as possible along the lines of an operational squadron.

In carrier-type OTUs there were approximately 100 aviators, with a sufficient number of instructors and service type planes. Each OTU was commanded by a Training Officer with the rank of lieutenant or above. Among his training staff were a ground training officer, a flight officer, a navigation officer, and officers bearing titles and responsibilities similar to those typically assigned to aviators in squadrons operating from a carrier.

Operational training was eight weeks in length. The average CV type aviator would accumulate about 110 flight hours during this time. In the typical training day, aviators were scheduled for not more than 4 hours flying a day with the remainder of the day’s activities involving ground training activities.

In general, CV type OTU training instructions included five major points: (1) The use of the type’s primary weapon, (2) Tactics and formation flying, (3) Navigation, (4) Carrier operations – landing and launching, and, (5) Instrument-flying.

As training progressed, increasing emphasis was given to the employment of the primary offensive weapons of the type (VF, VB, or VT) to which the aviator was specializing; VF Fixed Guns, VB Bombs (by diving), VT Torpedoes and glide and level bombing.

The CV bound aviator, before assignment to a fleet carrier squadron, was required to demonstrate their mastery of taking off from and landing aboard a floating airfield. In preparation for that milestone, experienced landing signal officers trained the fledglings on airfield marked to resemble the flight deck of a carrier, using the same signals that are used in the fleet. Following this ground training the aviator students, usually as a unit, were normally sent to the Carrier Qualification Training Unit located at NAS, Glenview, Illinois. There, using the available training carriers, USS Wolverine and the USS Sable the prospective carrier pilot performed the required number of take offs and landing to be certified as carrier qualified. On some happier occasions, a regular line carrier might be available in the waters near the OTU base allowing carrier qualifications to be performed without traveling to NAS Glenview. By the end of the war, especially after the reduction of the U-Boat threat, it was not unusual for a CVE to be assigned this task in nearby waters on a regular basis.

Completion of OTU was followed by assignment to an active squadron or back into the training command as an instructor.

Assigned to an air group, the now carrier qualified aviator would find himself in a squadron working up at one or more shore installations with a targeted ready date firmly fixed on the horizon. From initial establishment or reforming from a previous deployment an air group might spend six to eight months working up for its next deployment. Working up means the constant, practically daily, repetition of what has been taught . . . gunnery, ordnance delivery, navigation tactics, etc., and not necessarily in that order. Once the air group is ready for deployment, presuming the availability of a flight deck, it heads off to combat aboard a carrier. It would remain in the combat theater until its scheduled replacement air group was ready for deployment at which point it would be withdrawn for reforming ashore. Replacement pilots and crews joining over the course of a deployment might, or might not, go ashore with the rotation; most did although there are certainly cases, though generally so unusual as to be remarked upon in the literature, of individuals being transferred to the incoming air group or to another in-theater air group altogether. Thus it is easy to see that once someone enters the pipeline, it could easily be 24 months before simply deploying, much less entering combat.
Once back ashore following a deployment there was usually a period of leave with the squadrons in a caretaker status until reformed. During that period as many as 60% of a squadron’s pilots and crews or more might be transferred to another squadron or activity. It was in these periods that one sees pilots moving back to the training commands as instructors or for additional training, or for the more senior, as commanders and execs of still new squadrons being formed.

Whew.

And, to go back to your original question, re the FW 190, remember the basis of the beam defense was for the unengaged plane or section to turn towards the plane or section being attacked first, as early as possible before the attack is fully set. With the attacker intent on his target, and he would expect his quarry to do something, such as turning away from the attack, he, the attacker, follows that turn and unwittingly, especially if he’s fixated on the target, a not unusual circumstance, sets himself up for the near zero deflection head on shot from the approaching plane or section. Doesn’t matter if the attacker is heavily armed or not, his guns are not pointing towards the danger of the approaching head on attack, he’s trying to get the deflection on his turning away quarry . . . he can’t shoot where he is not aiming and the approaching plane or section is already aiming for him. In fact, if you think about it for a second and visualize the situation, the attacker’s guns are most likely pointing slightly outboard of the turn, because he’s following his quarry and trying to horse around to line up a shot, and the approaching defender’s guns are, because he is initiating the defensive maneuver, are already pointing inside the attacker’s turn (or as they say, inside his decision loop) . . . oops, bad position, bad decision. And the bottom line, while it was always nice to come away with a victory from one of these encounters, the purpose was to drive off that attacker. In this, the maneuver was usually successful; either the attacker persisted and ended up perforated or he realized that he was not in a good place and breaks off (which, of course, was dangerous in itself) . . . either way, the threat to the section or plane under attack is, for the moment anyway, eliminated.