Finland had captured Leningrad

Hi there!

I guess everybody´s been on weekend holiday..reading about the WW2?? me too!!

Anyway, that JG 302 sounded interesting! Have you got more details on that? I´d love to hear about it!

All the luftwaffe planes in southern Finland I know is the Flight squadron Kuhlmey, which flew from Utti to help us fight the russians during their great summer attack of june 1944 in the karelian isthmus.It included some 50 Focke Wulfs, and 38 Ju 87´s. They flew non-stop flights and abled us to keep the russians away. This squadron was part of the deal we made with Germany named " the Ribbentrop deal" and as well we got loads of panzerfausts etc. Thanx to all of this in just one battle of tali-Ihantala we smashed some 600 russian tanks! Some 50 000 finns fought 150 000 russians, and as such it was even bigger a fight than el Alamein by finnish history writers. I can send the site if interested.

See ya !

 

Capturing Leningrad early on in the 1941 campaign would have had several consequences:

1. Nobody could have had the idea to divert tanks from HG Mitte to HG Nord. In fact, relatively quickly Panzergruppe 4 could and would have joined the attack on Moscow.

Since we are talking about a very rapid capture, this must already take place in August 1941 or at the latest September. This absolutely means that Panzergruppe 4 could make a serious contribution to the Moscow effort and quite possibly the movement of Panzergruppen 2 & 3 into the Ukraine would not be undertaken. Instead a channeling of all groups would seem likely towards Moscow instead.

2. Even if this does not happen, the fact that PzGrp 4 and in fact most of HG Nord is freed up after the capture means that it is possible to sever the rail link to Murmansk, and perhaps (given time) even to Archangelsk, cutting Russia off from lend-lease aid.

3. In any case, the whole lot of troops, heavy artillery and aircraft used for and in the siege of Leningrad would be freed up for other duties, a very welcome reinforcement to the front.

 

Agree, Carl. But wars are not about mathemathics. If a finish killed 70 Russians do not matter, because you must take on account the proportions of both countries:

USSR, population = 190.000.000
Finland, population = 3.500.000

USSR's casualties = 300.000
Finland's casualties = 30.000

Percentage of population
USSR = 0,18%
Finland = 1,7%

Well, it is actually the same numbers, BUT Finland would have very few men reserves, some 200.000 men more to engage, while the USSR would have had 25.000.000 young men to fight, beside the huge industry and resources...

[ 05 August 2002, 02:49 PM: Message edited by: General der Infanterie Friedrich H ]

 

Indeed Friedrich you are right as you point out to the vastness of the reserves of the russian army.Finland gained the big victories through major defence battles, and attacking is always a much harder job, many times more lives are lost unless you totally surprise the enemy. And even then the clock is ticking against you if you don´t take your chances on the russian bear that´s waking up.

As to my country it would be crazy to think we could beat the russians on our own.Only when total confusion and shock would be among the russian troops.That´s what happened when Germany attacked Russia in 1941. In southern Karelia our troops wouldn´t go further than the old border, but in northern parts all the way to Petroskoi and further, as no resistance would appear. Actually I don´t think those villages meant strategically anything, there´s plenty of villages in Russia, and just having more border line to protect would mean less men per kilometer to defend.Anyway, I mean that during the chaos of july to august 1941 the surprise element should have been used. Now as Germany closed in on Leningrad there was actually only one front while the finns stayed back. Two fronts-two armies might have met like in 1945 russian and U.S. armies...think about that! That would have made a nice picture in the front pages!A german and a finnish soldier shaking hands for victory in Leningrad...and Goebbels probably would have been close by, I think.

OK, I know, but it´s nice to play with thoughts.

 

First of all, I am wrong with a number there: the percentage of population lost by the USSR during the winter war is 0,18% not 1,8%...

Beside, Finland would have needed a tremendous material and men support to take Leningrad ONLY during the confusion in August-September 1941. But the city was a hard one. There was needed a tremendous air-support, a HUGE heavy artillery support (including all the fleet's guns) and a lot of infantry divisions to sweep it... It is like a bigger Stalingrad...

 

Like finnish generals said as russians suggested that Finland was armed by a bigger nation because Russia was losing battles in the winter war " Yes, we are armed by another nation. By Russia!"

Ok, that was a joke ! Even those long lines of tanks we captured from russians only limited objectives could be possible for finns. I mean we had less soldiers in the front in 1939 than the russians captured in Stalingrad...So it would either be exhausting street-to-street battle or one might try to crush the defences and rush to the city before the soviets. There´s alot of maybe´s here but I´m trying ...1. Major attack from the karelian isthmus woould force the russians to move troops in that direction, and the german front would be more open. Even if finns couldn´t open the lines it would mean more soviet troops to be bound there.2. If german forces couldn´t break through immediately as an attack would be launched towards Moscow Stalin would have to decide which city to lose while in september the road to Moscow was clear and new troops would have to be transferred from somewhere by then at the latest! 3. pressure in the southern front must be maintained as to stop the movement of soviet troops. The possibility of losing this agriculturally important area as well as the factories hopefully confuses Stalin and makes him let go of Leningrad.

This is fun! Did I just lose my southern front, what?!! And what would have happened to operation sichelschnitt if De Gaulle would have attacked the german spearhead in the Sedan area from both sides? ( I guess it was Sedan, right ? )

 

Quite so my friend--thats what I was attempting to do with my 70 in 1 references.

 

Kai, very good points about the Finns! That would have helped a lot to "Barbarossa".

And no, it was in Arras, where the BEF attacked the flanks of 7. Panzerdivision. It was supossed to be also hit in the South by French mechanised forces.

But DeGaulle, I think it was in... welll, I will check later. It would not have affected the "Sichelschnitt" in reality, but it would have worried much more the already worried high command (Von Runstedt, Von Kleist, Halder, Hitler)...

 

I cannot think of any other reason why they would have kept Me 109`s in Finland and Malmi, Helsinki.Anyway, this is a place to begin with, I reckon. Maybe more later on, hopefully.thanks for the tip, Erich!

http://www.jg302.de/

 

Kai :

thanks anyway for the link but I know it all too well. Burkhard's info is gathered only by one vet and that is Willi Reschke who I know as well. Thought maybe an archiv in Finland could be a quicker way to find things out.
Say have you heard of the Kriegsmarine activity in the Gulf of finland including Schnellboot's and their tenders.......1941 onward ?

E

 

My friend Erich,

I checked one finnish book in a store on Luftwaffe in the nordic countries, but nothing found. I asked one Bf 109 fan in the net, and he didn´t know a thin either. SO it is a bit mystery. BUT...this is what I found. English version on that squad, and also on finnish pilots trained for flying Me 109 for night fighter activity in Finland!

http://sci.fi/~fta/nightftr.htm

 

Actually in July-August 1941 Leningrad was wide open. All the russians had was a small blocking force gaurding the neva bridgehead. The finns couldve broken into the city.

 

NEED OF NIGHT FIGHTERS DISCOVERED
The city of Helsinki, being located on the coast, was a difficult place to protect, especially during night air raids. Before the advent of radar, the enemy, approaching from the sea, had a good possibility of surprising the anti aircraft artillery. The “Triple A” operated on the seacoast, and didn`t have depth for an effective defense.

Surveillance radars would have made it possible to detect approaching bombers in time, and radar equipped night fighters would have been able to attack them while they were still over the sea, and then continue the attacks during the bombers` return flights.

However, the Finnish Air Force didn`t have night fighters, and the first surveillance radars and anti aircraft artillery tracking radars weren`t available until April of 1943.

The idea of night fighter operations had been under consideration for some time, because an increase in Soviet night air raids, had been expected.

On the 7th of March, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Lundquist, gave the Commander of the 3rd Fighter Wing an order to begin training night fighter pilots. The plan was to use the Brewster day fighters for night fighter operations. The Brewster was easy to fly and had long endurance, so, it was better suited than the other fighters for the night fighter mission.

The training was started in autumn but it didn`t lead to the establishment of a night fighter system.

The Chief of the Air Force Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Pajari and the Commander of 26. Fighter Squadron, Major Carlson, visited Germany in the spring of 1943, to familiarize themselves with the German night fighter system and its special arrangements.

On 4th of June, 1943, the Air Force Commander sent a letter to Finland`s Supreme Commander, Marshal Mannerheim, requesting a decision to be made on the establishment of a night fighter force, and the approval of a list of fighters and radars to be ordered from Germany.

Soviet bombers flew night air raids on Helsinki, on the 7th, 17th and 27th of February, 1944. There had been some initial negotiations about a temporary peace between Finland and the Soviet Union, but the Soviet`s terms had been totally unreasonable, and the Finns rejected them. Soviet reaction to this rejection came by those air raids.

On the 12th of February, five days after the first Soviet night air raid, a strengthened night fighter flight 1./ JG 302 from Germany, commanded by Hauptmann Lewens, landed at Malmi air base, with a mission to protect Helsinki.

The German pilots flew Messerschmitt 109 G-6 fighters, and used the Wilde Sau tactics which demanded either bright moonlight or the support of searchlights.

The unit flew interception sorties against the next two Soviet air raids and achieved some night victories. But, the main burden for the defense remained with the anti aircraft artillery which used effective barrage tactics, enforced by special phosphorus artillery rounds. Fortunately, the majority of the Soviet`s bombs fell outside of the city. Later, Finnish bomber squadrons secretly joined the Soviet bomber formations flying over the Gulf of Finland and then bombed the illuminated Soviet air bases while their bombers were landing.

Anyway, the Soviet air raids against Helsinki caused the final go ahead for the establishment of night fighters.

DECISION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NIGHT FIGHTER SQUADRON
When the paper work was done and the negotiations with the Germans successful, the final decision for the establisment of a Finnish night fighter squadron was made. The first pilots would be trained in Germany.

It was estimated that the squadron would be operational by the autumn of the same year, before the year`s next dark season. The plan was that the pilots trained there, would fly the newly purchased night fighters home.

Sorry about that. If the site doesn´t work on JG 302, here´s the text!

 

Kai :

With reluctance do I even look at the sites, JG 300, 301 or 302 since Jg 300 has some many errors as the way of text and photo captions.
Willi Reschke's book on JG 301/302 would be good book to have as it covers JG 302's events in finalnd. Also Gebhard Aders classic German night fighter force 19-14-1945 has some info.

The useage of searchlights is not Wilde sau by Helle nacht, and will be covered at length in our double language volumes/ Moskito-jagd über Deutschland.

E

 

Very good, on those tales about the air-war over Finland...

And how would four finnish infantry division would have captured the huge city of Leningrad alone?! No way... Even if there were few Russians to defend it. There is a little thing called reinforcements and the USSR could provide quite a lot. Finland could not.

 

Erich, here´s to you on that Finnish gulf. I´ll send later the site, as the pictures are missing here.

During World War II at least 46 different types of mines were detected in Gulf of Finland. These had about 10 different systems for triggering, including two magnetic and one acoustic types. The belligerent powers laid about 51 600 mines and 12 700 anti-sweeping devices during the War. Germany laid approximately 28 100 mines and 9 350 obstacles. The rest was half and half by Finland and Soviet Union. In addition, Sweden laid almost 4 500 mines on its own territorial waters. In Gulf of Finland majority of mines in 1941 were laid on the mouth of the Gulf and off Juminda in Estonian waters. Later the mines were laid for anti-submarine purposes east from Suursaari and on the Porkkala-Naissaari line. Some offensive barrages were laid between Kronstadt and Lavansaari 1942-1944 and defensive barrages along coast of Karelian Isthmus, Koivisto islands and Bay of Vyborg in 1944.

During World War II the Gulf of Finland was the most heavily mined area. After the war, by the order of the victors, clearing of the mines was Finlands duty. After the Armistice in 1944 some of the most important sea lanes were sweeped. These were mainly routes that Soviets needed to attack Germany. During a 40 days period over 700 mines, drifting mines and anti-sweeping devices were destroyed. Three vessels were lost. Twelve men were lost and nine wounded. During the main cleaning operation in 1945-1950 over 35 000 km2 was sweeped. 9276 mines or anti-sweeping devices were destroyed, about 10% of these were drifting. 28 men were lost and 37 wounded. This sweeping force was second largest in the world with 2 000 men and 200 vessels. Only Japan had a larger force.

It has been estimated that during World War II Finland had at least 46 different mine types from almost ten countries. Most of these were anchored contact mines, but there were also magnetic and acoustic types. Anchored contact mines had two methods for triggering, electromechanic and mechanic. Horned mines were electromechanic. They were triggered by the so-called Hertz device. When a lead horn was bent, a glass ampoule with acid broke creating a battery and electric current triggered the mine. Some of the electromechanic mines had also mechanical horns that closed the circuit. Mechanical mines were triggered when the mine was moved and a lead pendulum was dislodged. A spring actuated device then triggered the mine.

Horned mines could have surface antennas tied to horns. They were lengths of rope suspended by a float. When a passing ship was fouled in the rope, horn was bent and the mine exploded. For antisubmarine mines there were several types of antennas. Some of them were based on galvanic currents. These antennas were made of copper wire and copper buoys. When a steel structure touched copper antenna, a galvanic cell was formed and resulting current triggered a relay and mine detonated. Copper antennas could extend both up and down. A hose trigger was installed around mooring wire. When submarine or sweeping equipment touched the trigger, it moved upwards, closed an electric circuit and mine exploded. To counter these mines Soviet submarines moved very slowly not to move a hose trigger and they were protected with wooden covers to prevent galvanic contact in copper antennas.

I left the winter war part away here

Continuation War
Six German minelayers had arrived in Finnish waters on 14.6.1941 and were disguised as islands and rocks. Upon the codeword "Dortmund" they would start the first naval operations of Barbarossa on 22.6. at 03.15 hours. The minelayers sailed on the evening of 21.6. and laid two mine barrages:
"Apolda" with 581 contact mines and 673 anti-sweeping devices in the mouth of Gulf of Finland
"Corbetha" with 400 contact mines and 700 anti-sweeping devices in the Porkkala - Naissaari gap.

At the same time German Schnellboots laid magnetic mines in Soela and Muhu Sounds on the west coast of Estonia. Later these barrages were strengthened with 200 mines and 100 anti-sweeping devices.

The Finnish submarines laid under strong secrecy mines in Estonian waters on 22, 24 and 26 July. After the Finnish Government had decided that Finland was at war against Soviet Union on 25 July, the minelaying operations were done more openly. The new minelayers Ruotsinsalmi and Riilahti laid 200 mines southeast from Hanko on 26.6. and 200 mines northeast from Osmussaari on 27.6, the "Kipinola" and "Kuolemajärvi" barrages. On the night of 29/30.6 these minelayers laid 200 mines off Juminda peninsula on the Tallinn-Kronstadt sea way. This "Valkjärvi" barrage was the nucleus of the massive barrage off Juminda peninsula. The "Juminda" barrage with 1700 mines and 700 obstacled caused heavy losses during the evacuation of Tallinn 28/30.8.1941. On the night 22/23.6. the minelayers Marti and Ural laid first mines on the Hanko-Osmussaari line. This mine barrage was to include finally over 3000 mines and almost 500 anti-sweeping devices.

Within two weeks the Gulf of Finland was practically cut off from the rest of the Baltic Sea. The mouth of the gulf was infested with more than 5200 mines and 2000 anti-sweeping devices. These mine barrages were to cause substantial losses:23.6.1941 Soviet cruiser Maksim Gorki and First Destroyer Flotilla sailed into German "Apolda" field. Maksim Gorki lost its bow and had to be towed to Tallinn and on 27.6. to Kronstadt. Destroyer Gnevnyi was sunk.
23.6.1941 Soviet minesweeper T 208 was sunk by German magnetic mine in Muhu Sound.
25.-26.6.1941 German Schnellboots S 43 and S 106 were lost in Soviet mines between Hanko and Osmussaari.
1.7.1941 Soviet submarine M 81 was lost at Lainematala.
6.7.1941 Soviet submarine M 99 was lost at Worms.
2.8.1941 Soviet submarine S 11 was lost in Soela Sound.
13.9.1941 Finnish coast cefence ship Ilmarinen was sunk southwest from Utö, probably due to two Soviet mines.
4.11.1941 Soviet destroyer Smetlivyi was lost in "Corbetha" during evacuation of Hanko.

The Finnish submarines laid several small barrages off the Estonian coast and between Estonian coast and the outer islands. These mines caused some losses:30.6.1941 Submarine chaser MO–143 was lost on emerged mine from barrage laid by Iku-Turso on 22.6.1941.
5.7.1941 Latvian steamer Rasma (3200 tons) was struck by mine at Mohni and had to be beached close to this island. German Schnellboots destroyed the ship later. This barrage was laid by Vesihiisi 22.6.
7.7.1941 s/s Everolanda (3379 BRT) badly damaged on barrage laid by Vetehinen on 22.6. Steamer hit sweeped mine not detected and destroyed by minesweepers. Simultaneously in sweep of minesweeper T-202 Buj another mine blow up. Buj received insignificant damages.
7.8.1941 s/s Aksel Karl (3500 BRT) was lost because left sweeped waterway through barrage laid by Iku-Turso on 22.6.
11.8.1941 Soviet destroyer Steregustshi and passenger ship Vjatsheslav Molotov were damaged at Ruuskeri and towed to Tallinn. Vjatsheslav Molotov was damaged in barrage laid by Vesihiisi on 24.6. Explosion was a result of attempt to clear paravane from sweeped mine.
28.8.1941 Soviet submarine Shtsh 301 was lost at Pien-Tytärsaari.
8/1941 Estonian steamer Marija was damaged in the coastal sea way and had to be beached.

Later in the sailing season 1941 the Soviet navy lost in mines several warships and merchantmen:11.8.1941 Mine sweeper T 213 sunk off Tallinn.
14.8.1941 Mine sweeper T 202 sunk in "Juminda" barrage.
24.8.1941 Destroyer Engels, mine sweepers T 209 and T 214 and three steamers sunk in "Juminda" barrage.
28.-30.8.1941 During evacuation of Tallinn in "Juminda" barrage:
Destroyers Skoryi, Jakov Sverdlov,Kalinin, Artem, Volodarski
Submarines S 5, Shtsh 301
Corvettes Sneg, Tsiklon
Guard ship Saturn, patrol boat MO 202, motor torpedo boat TK 103
25 large and 9 smaller merchantmen, most of them by mines
17.9.1941 Submarine P 1 that was transporting supplies to Hanko.
24.9.1941 Submarine Shtsh 319 somewhere in the Gulf of Finland.
10/1941 Submarine Shtsh 322 somewhere in the Gulf of Finland, probably by mine.
21.10.1941 Submarine S 8 somewhere in the Gulf of Finland.
25.10.1941 Mine sweeper T 203 north from Keri, while enroute to Hanko.
30.10.1941 Submarine Kalev (former Estonian) at Keri lighthouse.
11/1941 Submarine Shtsh 324 near Hanko, probably by mine.
11/1941 Submarine M 103 near Hanko, probably by mine.
4.11.1941 Destroyer Smetlivyi while evacuating Hanko.
11.11.1941 Passenger ship Andrei Zdanov (3 800 tons) sunk while returning from abandoned attempt to evacuate Hanko.
14.11.1941 Minesweeper T 206, destroyer Surovyi and submarine L 2 in "Juminda" barrage.
Submarine M 98 somewhere in the Gulf of Finland.
3.12.1941 Passenger ship Josif Stalin (7 645 tons) was hit by at least two mines. More mine hits and/or 12 inch coast artillery hits are possible. The crippled ship drifted two days before it stranded on Estonian coast.

Continuation War - 1942
To counter the Soviet submarine offensive Finland and Germany had agreed on 12.3.1942 for building of two large mine barrages. These were to be laid north and south from Suursaari and in the Porkkala-Naissaari narrows. Finland had suggested laying a submarine net in the Porkkala-Naissaari line, but suitable nets were not available and German command considered this to be unnecessary. Finnish navy would took hand of the barrage north from Suursaari, while Germans would take care of the rest. The main German mine barrage east from Suursaari was known as "Seeigel" and the second one at Porkkala-Naissaari narrows as "Nashorn". Between these mine barrages light naval forces would hunt down enemy boats. Suursaari and Tytärsaari islands were corner stones of the mine barrages. Monitoring of enemy submarine movements were done in these islands and Someri.

The "Nashorn" barrage was laid 9-10.5. and it contained at first 650 mines but it was later increased to over 1200 mines.
The massive "Seeigel" barrage was laid in five events between 20 and 24 May. This barrage was also increased during the sailing season and hit had finally over 3000 contact mines, 244 bottom mines and 1630 anti-sweeping devices.
The Finnish part of the first defence line, the "Rukajärvi" barrage was laid east from Suursaari-Haapasaari line on 23-27.5. This had 619 mines in four rows at different depths. In June it was strenghtened with 160 mines and 123 anti-sweeping devices and later with 476 antisubmarine mines in seven rows.
In addition there were following mine barrages:

"Seehund" west from Lavansaari, 200 mines and 250 anti-sweeping devices. To prevent Soviets clearing routes through "Seeigel"
"Palkjärvi" at Kalbådagrund had 100 mines. It was assumed that enemy submarines would load batteries at this area.
Smaller offensive barrages, "Sauna", "Peninkulma", "Tiger" and "Brummbär", were laid in sea ways between Kronstadt and Lavansaari.
German air force dropped 200 mines in the Kronstadt area.
The "Seeigel" and "Rukajärvi" barrages were protected from sweeping operations by small naval units. For example the Germans used M-class sweepers, converted trawlers (VP, Vorpostenboote) and auxiliary gunboats (SAT, Schwere Artillerieträger).

Soviet Union lost probably five boats in mines, three boats were damaged.

Continuation War - 1943
The Soviet submarines had broken through the mine barrages in the Gulf of Finland too easily in 1942. To keep Soviet submarine force away from Baltic shipping stronger efforts were planned. The barrages would be larger and in addition a double submarine net would be laid from Porkkala to Naissaari, operation "Walross". Reconstruction of the "Nashorn" mine barrage began on 24.4. and it continued till the end of June. The barrage had more than 8 400 mines of which 838 were bottom mines against submarines. The "Rukajärvi" and "Seeigel" barrages were also improved and they had now more than 10 000 mines.

Baltic Red Fleet sent Shtsh and S-class boats to attack trade in Baltic Sea. Not a single one succeeded. Three boats disappeared and were probably lost by mines. One boat was damaged by mine and had to be scrapped.

New purpose-built minelayer Riilahti was lost 23 August off Tiiskeri. It was surprised while searching enemy submarines, and sunk by motor torpedo boat TK 94. 24 men, including commander, Knight of the Mannerheim Cross Osmo Kivilinna were lost. 10 survivors were picked up by patrol boat VMV 1.

In the end of summer "Hurja" class boats of the second MTB flotilla dropped mines in the areas of Diamant shallows, northeast from Seiskari, northwest and southwest from Lavansaari, the "Salpa" barrages.

Continuation War - 1944
The operational plans of Finnish Navy in 1944 included protection of trade, prevention of landings, defence of outer islands and mine warfare. The repair of "Rukajärvi" and "Seeigel" barrages began in March. In addition Finns laid mines east from Suursaari and new "Siili" field with 131 antenna mines on the east beach of Suursaari. The antisubmarine defences were as large as previous year. The "Seeigel" barrage had again over 10 000 mines and anti-sweeping devices. In May operation "Walross" (the submarine net) was done again and the "Nashorn" barrage was repaired.

"Seeigel" was repaired by German units: minelayers Brummer, Linz and Roland, destroyers Z 28, Z 35 and Z 39, torpedo boat T 30 and few M-boats. The mines were laid in seven occasions in April 14., 16., 19., 21. 24., and 26. Minelayer Roland was lost on the fouth trip in Soviet mines.

All the mines that Finns laid in the eastern part of Gulf of Finland were aimed to prevent massive Soviet landing to the rear of forces on the Karelian Isthmus. After the Soviet attack Finnish MTB's laid three small barrages "Möykky 1-3" on the coast 15-17 June. They used 15 German magnetic TMB bottom mines. Ruotsinsalmi, VMV patrol boats and MTB's laid barrages "Pistin 1-5" to protect Koivisto islands 11-20 June. The central area of Koivisto Sound was not mined as the enemy was already on the east coast. Even the old mining tenders were active.

The German mine transport ship Otter arrived evening 20.6. to Kirkonmaa island off Kotka in full load. Immediately 20 PE-2 bombers attacked the island causing heavy damage: Two mine barges exploded, the mine storage hall vanished, all wooden buildings on the shore caught fire and Otter sank by the pier. All the mines and torpedoes in the hall were lost and this caused much troubles for the planned mine barrages.

In Continuation War Finland laid seven times more mines and anti-sweeping devices than in Winter War:

Year 1941 2478
Year 1942 2933
Year 1943 1047
Year 1944 4923, of which 410 after Armistice 4.9.
Year 1945 240

After the Armistice Finland had to lay some mine barrages on Ahvenanmaa area and off Hanko. These operations were ordered by Russians and they started in October. Eight barrages were laid. These barrages included the following:

16-17.11.44.
Örö fairway 36 mines with depth 3 m. Codename of the barrage was Simo 1. It was laid by minelayer Ruotsinsalmi. The mines had mechanical hose triggers, so they were antisubmarine mines. Örö island had coastal artillery battery and west from it is deep water allowing sailing to inner archipelago.
18.11.44.
Barrage Simo 2 was laid 4-15 cable lenghts SW of Storgadden (75 cable lengths W of Jussarö lighthouse) 60 anti-submarine mines with depth 10 m. It was laid on the fairway to Lappohja anchorage by minelayer Louhi. The arrangement was probably 3 lines with 200 m between. Mine type was S/43, and mine distance was 60 m.
18-19.11.44.
The barrage Simo 3 was laid 2 miles S of Gråharu light (75 cable lenghts NE of Jussarö lighthouse) 80 anti-submarine mines with depth 10 m. It was laid by Ruotsinsalmi.
12.1.45.
South from Hanko peninsula 160 mines in two lines. The codename was Vantaa 1, code Vantaa 3 is also used. This barrage was laid by Ruotsinsalmi and Louhi together. The depth setting was 2.5 m. The eastern line had 100 mines of type S/43, the western had 50 mines type S/38, one type S/38 II and 9 mines of type S/43. Mine distance 70 m,distance between lines 50-250 m. On return trip from this operation minelayer Louhi was mined and sunk.
28.1.45.
Barrage Vantaa 2 (also used codename Vantaa 4) was laid by Ruotsinsalmi. It was located also south from Hanko, closer to coast than Vantaa 1. It had 80 moored mines in one line, depth setting 2.5 m. 60 mines type S/43 and 20 mines type S/41, mine distance 40-60 m.
12 January 1945 minelayers Ruotsinsalmi and Louhi had laid 160 mines south from Russarö. The return trip was done through a known Soviet mine barrage, but the Soviet officer in charge of the operation said that the mines were deep. Louhi hit a mine and sank in two minutes. The escorting Soviet MO-boats saved most of the crew, but ten Finnish sailors were lost.


In the end of Continuation War the Navy had five mine sweeper flotillas. Only one of them was capable to sweep influence mines.

During World War II the Gulf of Finland was probably the most heavily mined area in the world. About 60 000 mines and mine anti-sweeping devices had been laid during 1941-1944. Two thirds were German and a half of the rest were Finnish and a half Soviet. By the order of the victors, cleaning of these fell for Finland. About 200 ships and boats were ordered to work. A major problem was to fill the number of required vessels. Soviet Union had confiscated, for example, many of the larger and more seaworthy tugs as war reparations. Training of personnel was another problem as the mine sweeping force was three times that of the war time Navy. Some of the oldest tugs were totally useless in open sea.

After the Armistice in 1944 some of the most important sea lanes were sweeped. These were mainly routes that Soviets needed to attack Germany. During a 40 days period over 700 mines, drifting mines and anti-sweeping devices were destroyed. Three vessels were lost. Twelve men were lost and nine wounded.

In 1945 the sweeper force consisted of 14 flotillas with 228 vessels and over 2000 men. 3500 mines and obstacles were destroyed. Four vessels and five men were lost. Six men wounded.
In 1946 over 4000 mines and obstacles were destroyed. Three vessels were destroyed and two damaged. Two men were lost and 13 wounded.
In 1947 the most difficult minefields had been sweeped and the main task was to clear sea lanes. The number of destroyed mines was only slightly over 600. Still, three men were lost and one wounded.
In 1948 Soviets were not controlling the sweeping job anymore and so the sweeping force was reduced to 70 vessels. Less than 100 mines were destroyed, and only one sweeper was damaged and two of its men wounded.
Last two years resulted in destroying of 28 drifting mines and 11 deep sea (submarine) mines and anti-sweeping devices.

During the whole operation over 35000 km2 had been sweeped. 9276 mines or anti-sweeping devices had been destroyed, about 10% of these were drifting. 28 men were lost and 37 wounded. 10 boats were destroyed and several damaged. After World War II about 400 mine accidents happened in European waters, but not a single one in waters sweeped by Finnish Navy.

Ok.back to "normal" work. Bye!

 

Kai :

Temendous info ! thank you. Are you aware of the 1943 pub, Schnellboote Vor ! bei Hugo Bürger ?
A great bildband of early theater ops with the flotilla's in the northern sphere, this one primarily in the Finnish gulf during 1941. Great colour pics of S-booten and their two tenders. Wish I had a scanner, I would send you some pics.....

E

 

Of course there are nationalists who want more than what´s enough but I believe that the main part of population back in 1940-1941 would have been happy with the old borders. Especially the karelian isthmus was a question that hurt us. 500 000 people left their homes, and later on settled all around finland. There are still groups who want the karelia back, but after what russians have done ( or preferably not done: clean the cities, build road etc ) the government is not willing to have karelia back. A bit like the eastern Germany, it would take alot of money to return Karelia to our normal standards.

 

"some nationalists"?, Well...

it was no less than President Ryti who "inofficially" claimed the line Neva - Lake Lagoda - Svir’ - Lake Onega - White Sea with "Glacis in front of it" as the future Finnish border. The territorial claims covered not only Eastern Karelia, but also the peninsula of Kola. At least that demand was reported to the German High Command named as “Meeting Minutes Leningrad”. You can find it in the files of German foreign politics, volume 13. It says “The Finns declared that they like to have the Newa as frontier, but Leningrad need to disappear.”

Even Social democrat and minister Tanner pointed out that with a recapture of former finish territory Finland’s war objective was only fulfilled to “a certain part” (Vaasa speech Sept.14 ,1941). He claimed a frontier which “gives insurance that the Finnish nation is save of a new invasion of Russia for generations to come” (Tanner on his visit in Berlin, Oct. 41)

Mannerheim’s daily orders issued are full of phrases like “liberation of Eastern Karelia”, “creation of a great Finland”; “holy war against the eternal eastern thread”; “Crusade against the sworn enemy”; “final war against the danger of pestilence” etc... Propaganda, yes, but symptomatic for the other finish military leaders who wanted more territory than *just* the old frontier (see Paavo Talvela: “Muistelmat. Sotilaan elämä”, Vol. II 1977)

Cheers,