German logistics and railroads

4 points should be mentioned:

1)The Barbarossa decision


2)The estimation of the Germans what forces would be available


3)The planning (which was depending on point 2)


4)The results and the German reaction

 

1)the Barbarossa decision n 31 july 1940,Hitler firstly was mentionning Barbarossa as Plan B,if the current operations against Britain would fail.
The problem was Britain :it was continuing the war because it was certain of the US and hoped on the SU.The only way to prevent the intervention of the US was to eliminate Britain .
First was plan A :to eliminate Britain with military means(see Hitler's order of 19 july 1940:all available resources must be given to the LW). There was talking about a quadrupling of the strength of the LW.But,plan A had also a defensive part (which IMHO) was even more important than the offensive part :the quadrupling of the LW did not meant a quadrupling of the number of aircraft,it meant an enormous increase of the Flak to protect the German cities against British/British-American attacks .
Meanwhile,the planning/preparation of plan B would continue,while plan A still had priority.

On 18 december 1940,Hitler approved the planning for Barbarossa ,it still remained plan B:Weisung 21 ended with the words:I expect further reports about the preparations of Barbarossa.Because it became obvious in december 1940 that the chances of plan A were minimal,plan B become prominent .

The fact that Barbarossa was plan B would influence the points 2,3 and 4 .

Any objections?

 

I imagine the following scene :Fraulein Merkel,secretary of Fromm,is rushing in the office of Fromm,yelling er F¨hrer!,and,is fainting . Der Führer is entering,gives anxiously Fraulein Merkel a brandy,Fraulein Merkel is coming round,sees der Führer and is fainting again .Adolf gives up ,is turning to Fromm and says : Fromm ,the strength of the replace,ment army must be doubled . Let it be done .,and is leaving.Merkel is coming round again,falterser Führer,and is fainting again .

What would be the results of the order of der Führer? Would it be done ? .

 

If it was possible ,why was it not be done ?

 

Objection? Yes....

Wehrmacht planning started with an overall assessment of the situation to include a strength estimate of the enemy's forces and most probable course of action. This is followed by an examination of the weak points of the enemy's forces and course of action, a recon of the terrain and an optimal operational plan is developed. After that plan is developed, the Personnel and Quartermaster sections are tasked with supporting the plan's execution from build up, to initial stages and long term sustainment. At no point in German WWII planning (Major Army operations) is the operational construct dictated by the troops and equipment available at the time of planning unlike what you posted above. Your post may seem like logical analysis, but it is historically incorrect and a fundamental misunderstanding of the planning process of the German Army.

If more accurate Intel changes the base assumptions underlying the plan, the whole plan will change as well.

Objections?

This is not to say there weren't limitations to how much the Germans could do obviously, but increasing the replacement army and improving the rail portion of the logistics plan through the involvement of the DR beyond the frontier of Poland are very possible in historical reality. Adding a second shift in key industries to ensure a strong supply of key spare automotive parts stockage is also very much in the realm of possibility.

The Germans didn't need a thousand new tanks, they needed to maintain the ones they had and add a few replacement tanks and crewmen as needed to maintain the current formations. They didn't need new Infantry divisions, they needed enough Infantry replacements to maintain their current strength. They didn't need thousands more trucks, they needed tires, filters, POL and carburetors for the ones they had. The performance of the "Gray Suitors" (quai-military rail personnel) was very inferior to what the "Blue Suitors" (actual DR personnel) could have done. If the DR had been in charge of the rail conversion and operations past the Polish Frontier many of the problems of the rail sustainment plan for the field armies would have been greatly reduced due to much better efficiency (assuming requisite manpower was allocated to the DR for its tasks).

 

It wasn't done because according to the Intel estimate of the Red Army that would be encountered during Barbarossa, the replacement army built a pool of replacements based upon the expected attrition rate that would result from the operations required to sustain heavy combat for the period of time projected to destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper.
This is how the replacement army's strength was derived, from projected need. If the projected need were higher, the personnel strength would increase incrementally to achieve the strength required in the projections.

Obviously military Intelligence on Enemy strength and capability means quite a bit....no?

 

The Germans were able to find some replacements in 1942 by combing the rear and mobilizing troops from production, but the main method of troops replacement was taking a battalion from most divisions and using them to rebuild others. The actual strength of the Heer was not really increased. The classes of new troops drafted were not of significant numbers.

 

Thats not my understanding of it, as backed by "Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy 1918-1941" http://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Legions-German-Infantry-1918-1941/dp/0275902358
and also the data here: http://www.wehrmachtbericht.com/page14.php

The point is not increasing front strength of personnel, but maintaining it (aka fighting strength)

 

Here is an example of the disconnect by the generals. Guderian made a huge point of saying that if only he had been allowed to move forward he could have won the war. The problem is that he hides the facts that his tanks could not hold territory and need infantry support. The infantry could not keep up with his tanks due to the terrain, resistance and a lack of mobility. This problem meant that there were large numbers of troops in his rear that wrecked havoc on supply. These factors resulted in a dramatic loss of combat power for Guderians tanks.

The main point I have been trying to make about logistics and the railroad is that the supply situation could not keep up with the demand of space and time. Even the Americans had a difficult problem supplying their troops after 400 miles and that was with a fully motorized army on good roads. How could it be expected that a horse bound army with awful terrain could cover up to a 1000 miles to just a few months.

 

You are partially right, I wasn't thinking of all the manpower of the Luftwaffe, but it was not made available to the army and separate divisions were made by the Luftwaffe and they were of limited combat value. The main problem with the numbers is that counts for all theaters and not just the east front. The fact that the Germans had to reduce the strength of many divisions and use their allied troops shows just how bad the manpower situation was.

 

In 1942 your assessment would be correct, but we are talking about 1941. There was every possibility to increase the size of the replacement army prior to Barbarossa (to continue during the months of the operation) in order to support sustained (replacement) operations past the point achieved in OTL.

 

They still had to get them to the front and keep them supplied. As I stated most of the German army was horse bound which meant they could only advance as fast as Napoleon could have.

 

And as I stated there was a solution available to greatly increase the efficiency of rail operations by giving the authority to the rightful organization (the Deutsches Reichsbahn) who were far more skilled than the quasi-military Gray Suitors that the Heer created and tasked with a job beyond their capacity to handle. This was rectified out of necessity in winter of 41/42 but could have been done prior to the campaign and may well have been done if the Germans knew what was required for sustained operations past Smolensk.

 

Nolanning will always adapt to what is available,and to logistics .


Rommel's orders in NA were depending on his strength :it is obvious that with 2 divisions,he could do less than with 4 divisions .

The German strategy for Overlord (the Panzer controversy) was dictated by the shortness on mobile forces .

The German strategy in Normandy was dictated by the weakness of the ID :the mobile divisions were forced to a defensive role:to stpo the breaches .

About the replacements army : an increase between the fall of France and Barbarossa was out of the question :every one needed more manpower :the LW,the KM,the field army,the industry . There was nothing left for the replacement army .
BTW:this was not that important ,as most replacements would arrive at the end of the summer,after the decision would have happened .

On 22 june 1941,the strength of the WM was

for Barbarossa:3.316000 (including LW ground forces and OKW reserve)

Norway:121000

West :509000

Balkans:167000

NA:83000

replacement army :966000

LW ,KM,and home forces not included,which were some 2 million .

Where would the replacement army get his additional manpower ?

Not from the industry who was already howling lustily if it had to give ONE men to the WM,not from the LW,not from the KM,not from the Barbarossa forces,...

 

Industry howling loudly? But was not one of Germany's war problems to do with industry...As in producing top notch items for the Armed forces in smaller numbers than they could have if they produced lesser items of lesser but more numerous quality? As they did later in war when arming the Volkstrum with that neat little shoulder launched item.

 

No, this is a fundamental misunderstanding of German planning


I can tell with certainty that is your opinion, your logic and is unsupported by source or fact. German planning is fundamentally different than Western Allied or Soviet in the area of Logistics and Personnel. It is clearly enunciated in Truppenfuhrung H.Dv.300.

As Halder stated in evidence of the operationalists perspective within the OKH- "According to our opinion the material has to serve the spiritual"

The operation was planned by the operationalists (based upon the Intel estimate of the enemy) and the Quartermaster and Personnel sections were told what to plan for, they weren't askedor given a lot of input. Those are the facts, not a logical opinion or assumption and this is how the plan for Barbarossa was formulated. It was not based on availability.

 

Black, do you really think it was feasible for the rail system to be increased to cover the ten of thousands of miles needed to supply the German army? The issue is not just the main lines but sub lines to reach the flanks. Germany already had a manpower problem and the need to man all those new rail lines would just aggravate the problem.

 

Thats a bit of a exaggeration don't you think Steve? The Army's railroad battalions were undermanned, under equipped and under prioritized in retrospect. They were adequate when the campaign is viewed from Brest to Smolensk, inadequate after. By giving overall authority to the DR, more personnel and assets are available as well as a voice at OKW that carries much more weight than a Colonel at OKH does. None of that has a negative effect on the German Army's combat strength.

btw- this isn't a guess or theory of mine, the details of the DR's role (or lack there of) in Barbarossa and the ramifications are in:
http://www.amazon.com/Most-Valuable-Asset-Reich-1933-1945/dp/0807825743

 

Yes to Smolensk is fine, but the German army was planning to go as far as Astrakhan to Arkangelsk in just a few months and that to me is just fantasy. They knew they couldn't count on their rail system to expand that much which is why they came up with the idea that they would simply take over the Soviet rail system.

 

Agreed, Astrakhan etc is fantasy stuff for the Stolfi crowd. There were Soviet lines that were captured intact and used as Barbarossa progressed, but it was very inefficient because the cargo had to be off loaded from the standard guage cars and reloaded back on the wide guage or in some cases to very small guage when those lines were used.

The main issues were with the weight of German supply trains and the quality of the Russian bridges, capacity of temporary German bridges and with the quality of the railbed/foundation of the railways themselves. The Army railway battalions were not up to the task of rapid conversion, upgrade and construction that was required to enable the system to handle the traffic necessary to sustain operations past Smolensk. The DR would have brought much added personnel, equipment and expertise to the operation and made a substantial difference.

Does any of this guarantee a German victory? Of course not, but it does rule out the Germans continuing operations past the culmination point of the campaign, over extending themselves and sacrificing personnel and equipment in the misguided thought that the Soviets are about to collapse and have no reserves. Having accurate Intel means the Germans destroy more of the Red Army in 1941 at a lower cost to themselves, blunt any winter counter offensive and set up 1942 as the decisive year of the campaign instead of 1941. The outcome of 1942 is beyond the scope of this thread I think and without a suggested course of action or scenario I can't begin to speculate.