German logistics and railroads

that has been my point that the idea of defeating the Soviets in a quick campaign was simply impossible, unless the Soviets system did completely fall apart which it self not a reasonable idea. The Germans probably did destroy as much of the Soviet army as they could have.

 

Two things trouble me with this thread.

One, the repeated claim that better intelligence would or could have no bearing on the conduct of the war in the East. A proper understanding of an enemy is critical to the development of any plan, but especially one aimed at an opponent you know going in out numbers you. Granted it is no garruntee you will alter your plans, but unless you are a fool, you will make some changes.

Two, The not so subtle inference that the Germans were inept at intell gathering prior to Barbarossa. Whatever you might say about the Soviet Union, one thing they have done exceptionally well is to mis-lead any potential adversary as to their real capabilities. The US for 30 odd years consistantly mis-judged the capability of the USSR, despite having the aid of several western nations, deep overflights by U-2 and SR-71's and of course satallites. In our case we over estimated, whereas Germany under estimated.

Sadly in the case of Germany, they had all the intell they needed to realize a six-week war was impossible.

To this point Germany had attacked small (relatively) nations that were either democracy's or a close cousin to the same. In attacking Russia Hitler was for the first time targeting a nation like his own politically, A totalitarian nation. He should have counted upon Stalin and the Communist Party to act as he and the Nazi Party would have in a similar situation.

No surrender until the utter exhaustion of the attacked nation. This was what Hitler would and did do and he should have respected Stalin to to the same.

 

The fact is that the Germans started Barbarossa not because of the informations they had,but,notwithstanding these informations :they knew that Barbarossa only had a small chance to succeed:Barbarossa could only succeed if a) the Soviets would be that friendly to go west and accept the battle b)if behind the standing army there were no other forces,c)if in the summer the Soviet state would fall apart ..
The Germans knew that the chance that this would happen,was infinitesimal small,but,notwithstanding,they were going east .

Now,the truth was worse,much worse :excepted for a miracle,they had no chance ..In the OTL,the chance to succeed was 1/100,in the ATL,the chance to succeed was 1/10000.

If they knew what was waiting for them,the only alternative was to cancel the operation,but,this never was an option .

 

Now,about planning and logistics:the 2 following exemples prove that logistics are determinating plans


1) A well known :Typhoon was delayed a month(from beginning september to beginning of october)because the needed forces,supply,etc were not available .


2)An unknown :

The fact that not all the forces consigned for deployment in Romania were able to arrive in time (=22 june) created an awkhard handicap for the Barbarossa plan .In the end,with only seven divisions available there for 11th Army,AGS haf to forgo an encirclment from Romaniaof the Soviet forces in the Western Ukraine and make do with an "one-armed" attack from southern Poland.Because of the changed situation,the OKH had also to cancel the deployment of an armoured corps in Romania....

Source:Heinz Magenheimer:Hitler's War P82

 

Two other ones(about intelligence) :it has been claimed that the desaster of Stalingrad was caused by bad intelligence of FHO .

This is more than questionable ,because,it presumes that the 6th Army would have been able to retreat before Uranus,it presumes also that there was a line where the Germans had been able to prevent a Soviet encirclment .

The same for MG :intelligence was not the cause of the failure of MG::MG was undertaken,not because of intelligence,but notwithstanding intelligence :it could only succeed if the Germans were weak enough(which was very questionable),and,the truth was worse (as for Barbarossa):there was no chance for success in the ATL.The alternative was to cancel the whole thing .

 

Belasar's observation regarding the path of this tread is correct.

I've read recently a historic study "The German Campaign in Russia Planning and Oprtations 1940-1942" (Dept. Of US Army, 1955). The authors just mention logistics/supply problems on page 72 but they maintain that the reasons for the German defeat at Moscow were different. Not logistics/supply problems.

One more thing: After the Yelnia setback in August Hitler said "Had I known they had as many tanks as that, I'd have thought twice before invading." Why?

Hitler and his generals have pushed their soldiers far beyond their psichio-physical limits and they've broken. Meanwhile the Russians were learning how to oppose the Blitzkrieg. The break-down point was approached in front of Moscow.

 

I have read that Hitler cancelled the attack out of Romania because he was worried about the Soviets reacting too soon. The attack on Yugoslavia was over before the tank were scheduled to deploy to Russia. The campaign finished in mid April and Barbarossa was scheduled for late May so it had no bearing what so ever on the delay. The 2nd army was not scheduled to activate until after the marshes were passed by and it was their troops that were used in Yugoslavia, so again the Yugoslavia attack did not affect the delay.

 

I understand what your saying, but you are still using your own logic and more or less speculating as to what the evidence you reference actually means. The German Army's doctrinal planning process isn't a mystery that requires deductive reasoning or logic to decipher because it is clearly stated and enunciated in Truppenfuhrung. In the planning process the quartermaster is subordinate to the operations section who builds their plan based upon the information provided by the Intel section. Of course in the chain of events in any operation there will be unavoidable constraints of a logistical nature, this does not mean the operational construct is changed but more or less means more stress for the quartermaster (in the world of the WWII German Army). This may seem illogical and backwards, but remember who won/lost and why. Also consider that the Bundswehr maintains many historic traits of the old German Army, but this planning process isn't one of them (lesson learned shall we say?)

 

I'm not so sure that it was unreasonable. If one looks at the history of the USSR in the period between the wars a certain amount of disunity is there. Combine this with Nazi vew of the Communist and the purges and the performance vs the Finns and at the time suspecting that the Soviet regime was not all that stable may not have been all that unreasonable. The problem of course was that the German attack and subsequent actions sealed most if not all the cracks within the Soviet system. That potential should have been addressed but I'm not sure that the Nazi high command could admit the possiblity much less adress it reasonably.

My view is that logistical problems were not THE cause indee I don't think there was a single cause of any type. On the otherhand supply and logistics were important both before and after Moscow.

 

Agreed, yo can not ascribe the German defeat to a single cause. Its an old one, but none the less true, the side that makes the fewest mistakes usually wins.

 

In this case I think the causes played on each other as well. For instance if there had been no Soviet resistence would the Germans have had a logistical problem? Or if the distance had been 1/10 what they were could the Soviets have mobilized in time?

 

I agree that you can't pin success or failure on a single issue, but I do believe that we can identify significant factors and the most decisive of them with a good deal of accuracy. Some single issue is likely to stand head and shoulders above the others and be intertwined in the basis of many other issues that would otherwise have been more of a minor or normal occurance. To me, that issue is the failure of the Intelligence section of the German General Staff.

 

I disagree :success or defeat was depending on the Soviets :it was Landon against Roosevelt (1936):Landon only could win if FDR was making blunders,or if there ws a bis scandal about FDR.(not to be partisan ne also could say:it was McGovern against Nixon).

The first condition sine qua non was that the Soviets would accept the battle :if on 22 june,the standing Soviet forces were not going west,but were going east,Germany had lost .

 

But of course. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough: I wasn't downplaying importance of logistics and supplies but there were other, more decisive reasons for the later defeat. Supply, Logistics, shortages, weather and other similar reasons were later exaggerated to hide errors and misjudgments of the German generals.

 

But those actually highlight the errors and misjudgements of the same IMO.

As for Landon vs FDR it was over 2+ years before the war started. In any case Hitler could have marginalized it by not going to war with the UK. Furthermore Landon wasn't an isolationist from what I've read. He may have been more reluctant to help the Soviets though.

 

Logistics were not the only factor, but the fact that the German army was unable to carry out the mass movements that their plans required to win in such a short time is a direct result of the failures of logistics. The failure is something that did not take the Germans by surprise, but was known to be a looming issue and it was still ignored. The drive south by Guderian was carried out at the expense of stopping movement by AGC. To me there is serious doubt about AGC ability to sustain its logistics if it had continued east after Moscow, especially since the mud and winter were nearing
To clarify logistics is not just how many tanks and such built, but the ability of the army to get the required materials needed to the front line troops and this is the basis for the failure.

 

Maybe,I was not clear enough :Barbarossa had as much chances to succeed as Landon against Roosevelt :Landon had only a chance if FDR was making big blunders(ex:antagonizing publicly the South) or if there was a big scandal.Barbarossa had only a chance to succeed if the Soviets would do what the Germans expected they would do,and if they were that weak the Germans expected they were .And,the Germans knew this .A few days after 22 june,Halder noted ,triumphantically and relieved (IMHO:especially relieved):the Soviets accept the battle =they are coming to us=we have not to come to them .

 

On 27 july 1941,all programs of the Deutsche Rundfunk were interrupted,someone was saying as OKW gibt bekannt:Tout va très bien,Madame la Marquise (in German : Die Operationen verlaufen planmässig,in English :everything is going following the plans of Gröfaz).

But,the owner of the chateau,a certain Adolf,was anxious(=desesperate):the building was old,and there was some repairing on the roof.he heard the building cracking and there was fire on the roof (roofing never is without danger) .

And,as always when there is a fire,they all were running like headless chickens :the butler (Franz) was yelling :call the neighbours (Romania and Italy),the steward (Hermann) said :I will extinguish the fire ,but,there was no fire-extinguisher. The owner was sighing:if only the fire-department of Tokio was here,a ruffian yelled :we are doomed,and was sent to Dachau .

And,as always when things are going badly,they were accusing each other:the architect :it's the contractor ,who replied :I told you that roofing is dangerous,but the butler said that following the informations,there was no danger.The butler :I have informed the architect,who answered :I know nothing :I am from Barcelona.

After the destruction of the building and the death of the owner,they all agreed :it is the fault of the owner:he ordered the reparations.

 

Agreed and great points. What I've been saying all along is that the plan was to destroy the known Soviet forces west of the Dnieper/Smolensk area, and in that regard the German plan worked to great effect only to fall apart later (due to bad a faulty plan based on poor Intel).
To me, the real question is if the Intel was accurate and the (ATL) plan was to continue past Smolensk to disrupt Soviet force generation closer to Moscow; could the Wehrmacht (with full support of the German military-industrial complex) logisticaly support force projection with the requisite mass to accomplish this if they had 8-10 months to plan for it prior to 22 June?
My educated guess is yes... (does this guarantee a different end result, no...)

 

I like a good Dr. Seuss story fine, but lets try to keep this thread on topic.