German logistics and railroads

My point was it was not just Hitler, but the generals who made plans based on the flawed assumptions and therefore the claim it was all Hitler is bogus.

 

The implication that because the plans were based on flawed assumptions,this was causing/ influencing the German defeat,is bogus .

That the plans were based on flawed assumptions is even totally irrelevant , unless you can prove that plans based on justified assumptions would have had better results ..

 

As long as you're aware that is simply YOUR opinion and that regardless of your convictions the facts are still debatable as are the implications. As far as providing facts, you tend to provide some fact, a lot of opinion and even more accusations. Is it necessary to make people defensive with accusations to have a conversation or debate a topic? Seriously....

You're reading too far into it. The Miami Heat lost game 5 of the NBA Finals. That seems like a fair statement, or in your world does it absolutely have to read that the San Antonio Spurs won game 5? Does the commentary have to read how great the Spurs played or is there room to look at the mistakes the Heat made en route to a loss?
The British Army was the superior fighting force in the American War of Independance, is it okay in your world to look at the mistakes they made in losing the campaign in the Colonies?
The Aztecs grossly outnumbered the Spanish and still lost, can we look at their mistakes or does that make us Aztec fanbois?
Can we discuss German mistakes in the Russian campaign, or will that make everyone a nazi?

Some people simply call it analysis and speculation, and there's nothing wrong with it. If someone has an interest in history, I really don't see an issue with it.

 

Really... So conversely the Soviet assumptions and flawed plans have nothing to do with the terrible losses of men, equipment and territory they endured in 1941? There's no room for debate regarding changed plans and how that may have played out? It could only happen in one narrow way, no room for deviation then?

 

The Soviet strategy in case of a German invasion had been defined before the war,before the purges : it was an offensive strategy:the Red Army would first stop the invader,secondly repel him,and finally advance to his capital .
The reason was mainly political and economic .The Soviets would not trade space for time .
I expect the reply : this strategy was flawed :my answer is :it was as flawed as the French strtegy in 1914 to expel the German invaders,as the British strategy if SL succeeded :Britain would fight at Dover,at London and in Argyllshire .
It was as flawed as the US strategy after PH of not abandoning the Philippines.


The Soviets could have followed an other plan: to abandon everything west of Smolensk and waiting there on the Germans .But,why would they have done this ? Nobody could expect that the Germans would be able to attack that suddenly with the main part of their forces ,and,nobody expected a German attack ..
The losses of men,equipment and territory were not caused by the assumptions and plans,but by the bad situation of the Soviet Army,for which the military also were responsible .

Of course,there is room for debating changing plans,but , curiously ,I have proposed such a debate several times,and,it always was evaded,probably,the results would be devastating for the Germans .
For some people,there is only room to debate alternative German plans,probably in the hope they would result in a German victory .

 

A lot of people ( who have read Manstein and the other members of the blaming brigade) have still the old picture of the Germans who had a royal flush,while the British had a full house and the Soviets a straight only .
and,than,they are asking :how was it possible that the Germans lost? Were they that stupid ?Who was the culprit (= what is the excuse)? Adolf? The generals? Weather,intelligence,logistics(very PC today),the railways (some one claimed that Adolf neglected the railways,and,as usual,as in a stampede,every one is parotting him);

But,the obvious culprit always is ignored : the British,the US,and here :the Soviets;some people are mentally unable to accept that the Soviets were able to defeat those who 10 years later were becoming the corner-stone of NATO.

The obvious culprit is also ignored at the other side : after the death of Stalin,the Soviet generals blamed him for everything:it was all the fault of Stalin,not of the Germans .

And,it is the same for the Allies :after MG,the airborne were blaming the ground troops,who were blaming the airborne,who was blaming the Air Force,who ...But,no one was blaming the Germans .

The Germans had no royal flush,at most they had a straight,at most.They knew that in a long war,they were doomed,they were not stupid.

Of course,they made mistakes (as the others),but,I challenge every one to cite a German mistake that costed them victory,or that caused their defeat .All alternative plans always will result with what happened on 8 may 1945 :the German capitulation .

 

You can never blame the enemy...because our army is always better than their army....simplistic I know...But none the less if we blame the enemy we say their forces actually were better in such and such a battle than ours. As in MG. they plainly were. or at least their tactics and experience...Now I'll get the airborne boys shooting me down. But it clearly, evidently, proved....true.

 

Gentlemen, this is your second avisory.

We are not here to attack personally the members, but to argue politely over their arguments.

Carry on.

 

Thanks for the head's up, but I don't think anyone is offended here. LJad?
We've been discussing topics for years across multiple forums, I always enjoy his posts (especially the humor regarding Laguna Woods )

 

LJAD, all plans go wrong, that is a given, how ever if your assumptions are flawed and the objectives of the plan are not achievable then it is difficult if not impossible to make adjustments to the plan. Compare to Normandy, things went horribly wrong, but the allies were able to make adjustments that worked because the overall plan was sound and based on achievable goals.

 

As far as the failure to capture the rail lines, it had the effect because the Germans had to make adjustments to their supply chain that they had not planned for.

 

View attachment 18961 Nothing like a good argument...But why wasn't I invited....What did I blunder into...Two good posters...I'm sending you details of the 2013 arm wrestling world championships....My money is on the Brit cos.....he's a Brit...

This might seem a silly question, but as I freely admit and have many times...I'm learning where the Eastern front is concerned...Did the Russians not destroy all rail track and engines etc when they retreated..Or were the tracks mainly left in use?

 

Look it otherwise : Barbarossa was a plan to defeat the SU in a quick and short campaign .
There were 2 obstacles:

a ) the Soviet standing forces ,concentrated in the Western part of the SU,,but far away from the border: the Germans were convinced that they could eliminate them in a quick short campaign on the border,and,they were right,because,they eliminated them .But,the result was that they were exhausted,and would have to stop at Smolensk

b ) the Soviet reserves(millions of them) :they would arrive while the Germans were eliminating the standing forces ;the hope that they would arrive later,was idle ;not,that it was that importantnce they arrived,it would be over for the Germans : they were convinced that they could not eliminate them in a short and quick campaign,and,they were right : they were unable to do it;

the only possibility of success was if the Sovjet mobilisation could be prevented. How ? there was no SAS to be teleported to the Kremlin,the Germans could not be in Moscow in july .The only possibility was the good old Deus ex Machina :the quick defeat of the standing forces would result in some shooting during a meeting of the politbureau,which would have as result that the mobilization would be blocked,,which would have as result that every one would go home (as in 1918) and in civil war number 2 :the mobs would go after the communist and the Jews .And that would be that .

All was depending on the assumption that the regime would collaps after a few weeks ;in such a case,the importance of the railways would be less than marginal ..If the regime did not collaps ,it

would be over

The regime did not collaps,but,Adolf collapsed and was wondering if an other Deus ex Machina would save him : the intervention of the fire brigade of Tokyo ;he must have been very desesperate to hope for this to happen .

All was depending on the Soviets,not on the Germans .
In his foreword of "the Soviet High Command",professor Ericson wrote the following : a Soviet general told him n 22 june at 7.30 am, the Soviet High Command received ENCOURAGING news :the Red Army was fighting back,the worst nightmare had already been overcome:Red Army soldiers had gone to war. "The system" had responded and would respond.

With hindsight,it was the end for the Germans ..

While the assumptions were flawed,there was no alternativenly if these assumptions became reality,could Barbarossa succeed .And thus can one not reproach the Germans for using these assumptions.It was the only way;if there was something with more chances to succeed,they would have used it .

Some will say that after the failure of Barbarossa,the railways became important,because only the railways could supply a fighting army of 3 million men east of Smolensk .They are right,but,it is irrelevant,because the Germans could never eliminate the millions of Soviet reserves who went to the front : an average of a million monthly .
The Germans had gambled (because there was no other solution) and had lost .

 

You are conjuring up the devil .

 

I have to look,because,as usual,the sources are differing .I think it depended : sometimes ,everything was destroyed,sometimes,they had not the time .And,,how quick could the Germans do the repairings? This also wa varying ..
There were problems in the autumn,but,were they caused by the railway destructions?Or was it because there were production problems ? Or both ?

 

Again my point is that it was not just Hitler that had overly ambitious expectations.

 

The city of Pskov at 661 km from Köningsbergen ,was occupied by the Germans on 9 july 1941 and the first train arrived on 24 july,whicg would indicate that the Germans were able to repair /convert from narrow to normal gauge,some 20 km per day .

 

Cheers LJ....that shines some light on it then..

 

A good source,and,if I am not wrong;the only available on the net ,is :

Comments on Russian railroads and highways by lieutenant general Max Bork .

 

The Baltic states were not of the Russian narrow gage and did not need the conversion, just repairing, Pskow is on the border.