German logistics and railroads

7 July, 9th army was complaining that it was only receiving 1/3 of its supply allotment and the next day its rail use was cut off to supply PG3. This meant that it had to use horse transports to haul materials 400 miles. This is just two weeks after the start of the campaign. On July 16 Lemelsen commander of XXXXVII PZ div reported his unit was no longer fully combat ready. His tank strength was down to 40 tanks from a start of 169 on July 17th. 7th PZ also reported its tank strength down to one third on July 21. Again this is just one month after the start and the Germans had not even reached Smolensk yet. July 23 Halder reported some infantry divisions were leaving had to leave part of their units behind due to the losses in horses. later July, Hoth reported some units had already lost half of their officers. July 22 Guderian reported his munitions supply as critical. 18 July 18th PZ div had 18 tanks total available for combat. Of which 1/4 of losses were total, replacements were 30 new MK 3 and 4 tanks.
Guderian in "Panzer Leader" stated that even when rail had been converted it was very limited in its capacity, which meant either trucks or horse had to travel hundreds of miles which resulted in heavy losses. 263rd infantry division received 1000 shells a day, which meant each gun in the division could fire one shot every 30 minutes.
These are from Stahel's book. Does this sound like an army that was fully ready for occupying to the Volga?
The Mongol army is irrelevant because they could live off the land and didn't have haul supplies hundreds or thousands of miles.

 

Occupying? Perhaps. Not enough information to tell reall. Taking it against determined opposition no.
As for the Monguls hauling supplies actually they did. Not as much I'll grant you but then they didn't have trucks or trains either. So yes it is relevant.

 

The Mongols did not have any where the needs of a modern army. A Mongol group could live for months off the land.
As far as the resistance you just agreed with my point the German army was as responsible for underestimating Soviet capacity as Hitler was.

 

I think you are exagerating their capabilities and then there's the question of what the needs of a German army of occupation would be. Artillery and armor wouldn't be high on the list IMO.

???? I didn't disagree with that point although I didn't agree with it either. Indeed I'm not exactly sure what you mean. "as responsible" seams rather problematic to me. Certainly they underestimated the Soviet capacity how do you assign relative responsibililty?

 

The Mongols were hunters so they would live off what they could find and plunder from places they hit. YOu have to be able to occupy a place first before and that is what I say was beyond German capacity.

 

The Germans underestimared the Soviet capacity,but ,this was not important .

 

why not.

 

Well,this is an traditional mistake ,saying :the defeat of Barbarossa was caused by failure of intelligence and planning :this was not so .Even if the Germans had not underestimated the Soviet capacity,Barbarossa would still fail.

The German strength was limited (3.6 million were available in 1941) and it was a given .The only way these 3.6 million men could defeat the SU was,if the SU could not replace its standing forces,and this,immediately after 22 june .But,they didn an average,the SU was sending in 1941 1 million soldiers to the front,the Germans :80000.This was making the difference . Without these 6 million,the Soviet front would collaps,followed by the Soviet state .

The Germans knew this,and started from the natural assumption that the SU could not .
The failure of Barbarossa was not caused by what the Germans were thinking the SU could do,but by what the SU could do

It is the same for the Pacific War :Japan" underestimated " the US:they were thinking that the US would not have the stomach to sacrifice billions of $ and a half of a million men to revenge PH,they were wrong,but,that's not the reason of the Japanese defeat :the reason was that the US were willing to spent all this money and to sacrifice all these men ,to revenge PH .

What Japan assumed was irrelevant,what was important was what the US could do.

What Germany assumed was irrelevant,what was important was what the SU could do ..

The whole thing is the usual claim :normally Germany would have won,but,someone (Adolf,intelligence,planning,etc) was spoiling everything.And,this is wrong .

 

Agreed LJAD!

As the matter of fact the Germans had no better option than to attack the USSR because amphibious operation against Britain was too risky. They knew that by the end 1942 the British, the Americans and the Russians would be ready. This means simultaneous conflict with all counterparts ready for war - on two fronts. In 1941 they could defeat one, perhaps the most dangerous, of the potential enemies and provide an outlook a war on just one front.

That decision was logical but still miscalculation. The Germans have made the best possible choice and yet they've lost.

 

Actually the standard Russian gauge is wider than the standard German gauge. 5 feet vs 4 feet 8-1/2 inches. 4 '8-1/2" is the standard gauge in western Europre (including Germany) , Great Britian, the USA/Canada/Mexico.

 



Would it? Let's see if you can make a case for that.

But does this not show that the Germans underestimated the capcity of the Soviet? I.e. if the Soviet capacity to produce and rebuild units, provide resistance to the German advances, and survive the intial blows was correctly percieved by the Germans would they not have made different plans? Your conclusion about the only way they could have defeated the Soviets is at best untested by the way. Probably incorrect as well but we'll see what developes.

Two sides of the same coin. If the Germans knew what the Soviets could do then they would realize their plan wouldn't work and come up with a different plan.

No. It was vitally relevant. If enough of the Japanese leaders had realized what the US could and would do then obviously a different plan was called for. Options existed. Perhaps not good ones, or not readaly acceptable ones but they existed. Of course Japan may have committed governmental suicide any way but that's a different question.

That line of reasoning implies the Germans had no influence on what happened when clearly they did.

 

No. It was vitally relevant. If enough of the Japanese leaders had realized what the US could and would do then obviously a different plan was called for. Options existed. Perhaps not good ones, or not readaly acceptable ones but they existed. Of course Japan may have committed governmental suicide any way but that's a different question.


Reply :there were no ther plans :Japan had the choice between leaving China or PH.

The Japanese military never would leve China :they preferred to perish fighting,than to capitulate .
Japan's situation was desperate ;

 

Germany's situation also was desperate :Adolf had the choice between killing himself or Barbarossa .

About Barbarossa,Adolf and the generals were opting for a quick campaign,because they knew that they had no chance in a long war .Everything was decided in the first weeks,already after a month,Adolf was almost desperate ..
And,with an other plan,there still would be monthly 1 million Soviets arriving at the front,against 80000 Germans .
And the result would be the same .

Wars are won by those with the most bayonets,not by military geniuses:Napoleon won at Austerlitz,but finished at StHelena,Hannibal won at Cannae,but ended suicided .

 

There could have been other plans. Look at the itelectual exercise thread. Other options were there. The same is true of the Germans.

 

BS. All along he had other options. How likely they were to work and how palitable the out come varied over time but they existed.

It's clear you believe that. It's not so clear that it is true. Indeed all we have is your repeated statements to that effect.

This thread is long on your opinions but short on facts and logic. For instance you ignore that the Soviets were also scraping the bottom of the barrel by wars end.

That's why the Persians conquered Greece. .... Oh wait they didn't.

 

You keep repeating that there were other options for the Germans, without of course giving ONE,and without of course indicate that these options would give the Germans a better chance .
All your other options would still be faced by the same situation :the Soviets sending in 1941 monthly ONE MILLION men to the front,while the Germans only could send 80000 men .

These are givens .:saying that there were other options is the usual hand waving argument .

Saying that the Soviets were scraping the bottom of the barrell at the end of the war is irrelevant : so were the Germans (and they were scraping much more,using the Volkssturm and the HJ),but,it also isquestionable:

Soviet operational forces (stavka reserve included)
june 1941:3.35 million

december 1941:4.55 million

november 1942:6.8 million

june 1944:7.4 million

january 1945:7.2 million

 

No. Saying there were only two options is hand waving and ignoring reality. Depending on the time there were always other options. How acceptable they were and what the costs and probability of success were could vary but the options were there. To refuse to acknowledge they were is to ignore reality. If we want to get into details of these options then a time frame would be necessary.

No it's not irrelevant. It points out that not only were other options available some of them might have made significant changes in the outcome. Consider that war is a chaotic system. If the Germans could have decreased their losses and increased Soviet losses in say 42 to any significant extent then the potential impact is significant.

I will point out that you are the proponent of this "no other option" position and by the general rules of discussion on these boards it's up to you to support that position. So far you have failed to do so.

 

In order to make corrections the Germans would have to make proper assessments of the situation, which they never did. It was not just Hitler who underestimated what the Soviets could do at Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia 1944.

 

Those figures are given in the original timeline and were based upon the original Intelligence estimates. The German ability to produce new replacement personnel was not at maximum potential prior to Barbarossa, it was operating at PROJECTED NEED (which was based upon??????)

So again; if the Intelligence estimates are correct, then the subsequent planning parameters will be different than the OTL as will the replacement pool of personnel, equipment, stockpiled logistical support and the underlying production of all which is based upon PROJECTED NEED. Don't confuse projected need driving production with accepting the production in the OTL as the maximum available, that would be a fundamental misconception of things.

 

Proper assessments:
Rhineland
Sudetenland
Austria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Norway/Denmark
France (Outstanding Intel effort)
Balkans/Greece/Crete
Barbarossa until Smolensk

It would seem that in the proper conext of Summer 1941 that German Intel had been quite good at its job. The work done on Barbarossa was actually very poorly handled though and the staff in both size and scope was to blame for this. Had the Germans dedicated sufficient personnel to this task (similiar to the effort put in prior to 1914) the outcome of Barbarossa may have been significantly different. The assets were available to do a much better job, I believe it is Halder's fault for not being thorough (IMHO).