German logistics and railroads

Outstanding! Wish I had a Salute to give here!

 

No,the Germans never could catch /match the Soviet mobilization :it still would be 3.6 million against 9 million .One should not accuse intelligence,because better intelligence(and maybe German intelligence could be better) is not making the difference between defeat and victory .To have an impact,intelligence must be followed by adequate measures:in this case,at least a million men more and more tanks,artillery,etc ,which was impossible,as the Barbarossa decision only was taken in december,and as there was thus no time to increase production .

In the OTL,the Germans committed units which were only cannon fodder(the SS Police division),because there was a shortage of operational divisions,in the OTL,the majority of the German units were equipped with French trucks/cars .
One of the reasons was that the German intelligence operations only started seriously after december.An other one was the efficiency of the GPOe.

Why should the Germans in the ATL have more divisions available,more trucks,more tanks,etc ...?
An other excuse for the FHO is that the divisions who stopped Barbarossa did not exist before Barbarossa:the Soviets had developped a complex system of hidden reserve divisions who could be mobilized very quickly,and,of course,the Gemans had no spy in the Kremlin who could blab this .
There is also the point of the timing of the revelation:if FHO had received ominous reports about the Soviet mobilization capacity at the end of april,it would be to late for the Germans to react adequately .

It is the same for Overlord :the story of Ultra and the decption measures is much exagerated .If the Germans knew more about Overlord,so what ? The only chance for the Germans was to repel the allies in the first days .The forces in Normandy could not do this .There were only a few German operational units in France,and they also could not do the job .Thus,Ultra or no Ultra,this would change nothing .

 

But they don't have to match it to stop the Soviets or even win. Looking at:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=132085&page=4
There's a post which list fatalities by quarter (post #53). It isn't until the second quarter of 44 when the Casulaty ratio even approaches 2.5 (9/3.6). If the Soviets couldn't reduce that ratio they couldn't win.

 

No,these are not based upon projected needs,they are depending on production possibilities .
The Germans did not attack with 17 PzD and 3400 tanks because of the projected needs,but because it was the maximum they could commit :if more PzD and more tanks were available,more would be committed .The same for aircraft,etc.

 

i'm with Poet....The 6 p's come and came into force with the invasion of Russia..Proper Planning Prevents....in the end....P.ss Poor Performance. No matter the vaunted Wermacht and the nice uniforms. The Russians did the business in the long run. Although the Germans were not planning on the long run...hence the 6 P's.

 

I knowthese fatalities,but,as such,they are not important .:in 1941,the fatalities were 750000 against 4 million,but on 31 december 1941,there were less Germans than on 22 june opposing more Soviets than on 22 june ..


Frankly, I can't follow the arguments of people saying :it all was the fault of intelligence :if the Germans had known that the Soviets were stronger than assumed,immediately,they would have taken the necessary measures :conjuring 10 extra PzD,2000 extra tanks,trucks,artillery,fuel,etc ....

There was a shortage of everything,the Germans were taking measures,but it would take a lot of time before these could produce the needed results .

Exemples :the planning for the 5 cm PAK ammunition was to be 1.5 million on 1 april 1941,the reality was a production of 700000.
In the third quarter of 1941 144 PzIV were produced,,while 187 had been lost

 

The only proper assessment the Germans made in Barbarossa was the size of the forces near the border. The failure of German assessment is like some one deciding they can make it to the next gas station and don't need to fill up at the current one. German army plans were based on two beliefs, they could take Moscow in one summers campaign and that taking Moscow would end the war. We will never know if the second belief was right, but since the first belief turned out to be absolutely wrong, then all plans made on that belief were also wrong. The German reality is that their logistics collapsed near Smolensk and the only way they made it as far as they did was a tremendous blunder by Stalin of not allowing any withdraws and the fact that the Germans shut down all their infantry units for a time. If the Germans had tried to advance across a broad front towards Moscow I seriously doubt they would have made it. The main reason for this is that the Germans vastly underestimated their ability to supply their units. The infantry units could not keep up with the PZ units and this forced the PZ to be involved in static warfare with the loss of mobility. Because the trains could not deliver the planned supplies trucks were used far more then planned, often going all the way back to Germany for supplies. This resulted in serious loss from wear and tear on the trucks which could not be made up.

 

A dissenting opinion:the Germans planned a war which could be won only if the Soviets would do as the Germans expected.

The war would be decided by a short fighting at the border,which would result in the destruction of the standing Soviet forces,the Soviets would be unable to mobilize new forces,and meanwhile, the Soviet state would collaps and German occupation forces would advance without serious opposition to the A-A line .

All was depending on the 2 following assumptions:

1) The Soviet forces in western SU would move to the border to repel the Germans and would be defeated:if they did nt and were retreating to the east ,the campaign was lost .
Here,the Germans guessed correctly

2)Meanwhile,the Soviets could not mobilize new forces :this was a wrong assumption and this (not the assumption,but the fact that the Soviets could mobilize new forces) caused the failure of Barbarossa .


One can consider point 2 as something stupid,underestimation,wishfull thinking,..the fact is that.:the Ostheer was not capable to win the war in a long campaign,thus it had to be a short campaign.:it would happen as assumed,because it had to happen as assumed.
The WM had 208 divisions /divisional units,of which 122 were ready for a war in the east,,44 were questionable,and 42 were useless .

Thus,the claims that better intelligence would mean a stronger army ...........

 

The claim is not that better intell would result in victory, but in how the German army command was just as responsible as Hitler in the failure of the campaign. I believe that unless the political system of Stalin did completely fall apart there was no chance for the Germans to win.

 

Unimportant? 3/4 a million fatalities? Which implies what 2 million or so casualties plus POWs. Seem like pretty important numbers to me.

This is typically what is known as a strawman argument. No one has suggested conguring up extra divisions that I have seen. One thing that might have worked in the Germans favor which they could have done was in August when it became clear that a quick collapse might not occur generate plans for a September offensive designed to put the Germans in a good defensive position including preperations for winter quarters. In the mean time various offensive plans for 42 would be designed which would maximize Soviet losses. Which were chosen would depend at least to some extent on Soviet actions.

Would this "win" the war for the Germans? Probably not. It might however mean that the war ended without the Red Army in Berlin. Indeed it's even possible that the USSR would not have survived the war at least as it was configured at the beginnning.

 

I am saying ":as such" ,the loss relation was benefiting Germany in 1941,but,at the end of 1941,from the manpower POV,the situation was better for the Soviets than in june 1941.

It was the same in 1942,where it was 1/6,and the result was that eveything was in vain n 31 december 1942,there were more Soviets and less Germans .

 

Post 130:
"What the Germans produced was based upon their assumptions of how Barbarossa was going to go and that was based upon terribly flawed intelligence..
If better intelligence was provided,the plan for Barbarossa would have been considerably different

This implies :the outcome of Barbarossa would have been different,which means:with an other plan?germany would have won .


Post 151:"If the Germans knew what the Soviets could do,then,they would realize their plan wouln't work,and they would come up with a different plan ."

This is only relevant,if they could win with another plan .


Post 159:The German ability to produce new replacement personnel was not at maximum potential prior to Barbarossa,it was operating at projected need.

This means the following :the Germans could have a better Ostheer on 22 june 1941.

Post 160::Had the Germans dedicated sufficient personnel to this task,the outcome of Barbarossa may have been significantly different .


This means :If the Germans had better intelligence,they could have won .




All this remembers me on the scene of" Allo,Allo",where Helga is opening the door of the office of colonel von Strumpf,yelling :general von Klinkenhausen.Von Klinkenhausen is coming in,is giving his orders to von Strumpf,and concludes :"Let it be done".

Thus,in november 1940,Fraulein Schmidt (secretary of Paulus) would open the door of the office of Paulus,yelling er Führer,and Adolf would enter,saying:"Paulus;following new intelligence,the Soviets are stronger than assumed .Thus,the existing plan is for under the bus .Make a new plan .Let it be done.!

The following day,Fraulein Müler,secretary of Todt,would open the door,yelling ;"Der Führer"..Adolf would enter,saying :"Todt,the new informations are indicating that the Soviets are stronger than assumed ..The existing force of 208 divisions (145 will be committed) will be unable to defeat the Soviets . You must produce material and supplies for 50 divisions more . Let it be done .

Sorry,but things did not happen as such :
1) The planning of Barbarossa was based on what would be available (and that was less than assumed) and on what the Germans knew of the Soviet capabilities

2)As the available forces were limited and could not be increased,,good or flawed intelligence was unimportant .

 

The following is from Germany and WWII(Volume V,PP 986/987)

Strength of the Heer and WSS on 22 june 1941

1)20 Pz and 1 light division

2)10 Mot,4 SS (in fact 3) and 1 mountain division

3)1 cavalry and 3 mountain divisions

4)26 ID (first wave )

5)16 ID (2nd wave) and 14 ID (4th wave)

6)14 ID (7 wave) and 10 ID (8 wave)

7)10 ID (11 wave) and 10 ID (12 wave)

8) 5 ID (5wave) and 1 (SS) police division

9)15 ID (3 wave) and 4 ID (6 wave)

10)9 ID (13 wave) and 8 ID (14 wave)

11)15 ID (15 wave) and 9 security divisions


These divisions are arranged following their quality and readiness.
The problems started with the 7th group:these divisions had little training and no battle experience,group 8 and 9 were not better .
The last 2 groups were useless .
Thus from the 208 divisions,

122 were considered fit for Barbarossa (but :with big shortcomings)

45 were questionable

41 were useless

This was to low for a successfull Barbarossa,and ,it could not be ameliorated,because,the Barbarossa order was given to late,because the LW had priority,and because the German war economy was unable to produce weapons,material,etc for an army of 200 operational divisions .

 

No it doesn't. The details of the outcome could have changed significantly and Germany could still have lost.

Wrong again. A better plan need not insure victory indeed it could result in a worse defeat. Better simply means that it leaves Germany in a stronger position.

Or not. Better could mean simply keeping the Wehrmacht stronger or possibly even a chance taking the Soviets out of the war.
It doesn't necessarily mean that a German win is likely.

1) Was it? Are you sure more information wasn't availble that simply wasn't used? I would think for instance the Germans would have a fair idea of what the Soviet rail system was like and their engineers could have looked more closely at what was needed to maximize the efficiency of the transition. In any case the Germans could have made a greater effort to collect more and better data.

2) The Soviet forces were also limited. The German forces could indeed have been increased althouth without a better logistics plan to what end is a good question. Even if they couldn't be that doesn't mean intel is "unimportant".

The world is not binary. You seem to veiw it as such. The result is a flawed version of reality.

 

The one thing the Germans could have done was ignore their racism for a time and declare an anti Soviet campaign. (fantasy I know) But with all the discontent and if the Germans had been willing to let the Russians fight each other as in WW1 then they may have pulled it off. The point of the discussion is how even the Generals were suffering from false illusions and a lack of reality, not that they could have done things better. The generals also knew better then to believe that the plan would go with out any problems or adjustments, but they could not make any adjustments because they were not willing to accept they were wrong in the first place.

 

First of all, WHY would you assume that if the Germans had better Intel they would automatically pursue the same strategy as the OTL???

Secondly, the Germans don't need more divisions and a huge number of tanks, etc. either. What they needed was an expansion of the replacement army to be able to keep pace with the projected loss rate, of which they had accurately predicted for the first 6 weeks of Barbarossa in the OTL. They also needed spare parts, a few more replacement tanks and more personnel from the DR to support the rail operations. Do you feel it is out of the question for the Germans to properly replace their losses for another 6 weeks if that was what the planning staff projected? The Kiev operation and Typhoon were based upon the Intel estimate that the Soviets must be on their last reserves in the OTL. In the ATL the Germans know differently, so why would they go headlong for Moscow rather than chew up as much of the Red Army as possible at low relative cost to themselves and then retire to strong winter positions? Seems pretty academic really.

In short, the Germans don't need more divisions and more tanks, etc. They need proper support of the existing formations in order to enable continued and rapid major force projection beyond Smolensk. This is in the realm of possibility with the existing German assets of 1940 (1 yr prior) and the point of operations beyond Smolensk is to dislocate the Red Army reserve armies from their mobilization centers as they are forming (check the dates they formed, where and what the Wehrmacht was doing and why and you will see what I am saying). Therefore the target is the Red Army itself, the point of the operation is battle of annihilation on a larger scale than destroying the Red Army west of the Dnieper (as per the original plan). This plan is basically destroying the Red Army west of Moscow and has to be able to continue past Smolensk without the pause in the original plan.
To say that if the Germans act differently the Soviets will too is a non-starter. The Soviets for the most part cannot (mobilization centers are pre-designated) deviate from their mobilization plans.

 

No, they were based upon projected need and assets were diverted elsewhere that could have been put into the support plan of Barbarossa (overall projected needs of the army). The production figures were based upon need and subsequently production goals to that end were set, factories then had a production schedule developed to meet the demand. Don't assume they were at maximum capacity, its not correct.

 

The German planners before the campaign forsaw that there would be a need to divert forces both north and south, because there were not enough troops to cover the front. The Germans already knew they could not meet their production requirements for the campaign. They had to steal 1000's of trucks from the French civilian sector to make up the lack of trucks in the German army. They had to rely on PZ2 which they knew after the Polish campaign were not suitable for modern combat. The Luftwaffe actually had less planes after the French campaign then before. One of the worse underestimates the army made was the consumption of oil and fuel, which in some cases were hundreds of times more.

 

I'm not sure what you've read on the topic Steve, but the Germans assumed that the Red Army in the Western Districts was the main force AND...that they could destroy these forces before the Soviets could effectively raise reserve formations. The Red Army had begun mobilizing in secret (creep up to war) early in 1941 and its mobilization plans were already in gear. So in reality, German assessments of Soviet capability would have been much more accurate had the Soviets not taken the decision to begin mobilization.

German logistics were strained at Smolensk which is completely different than a collapse. In spite of strained logistics the Germans smashed all Soviet counterattacks at Smolensk and heavily attritted those Red Army units in the process. The Germans did not vastly underestimate their ability to supply their units, they underestimated the level of combat that would be experienced after destroying the Red Army units west of the Dnieper and upon reaching Smolensk (see the Barbarossa operational and support plans for clear evidence). What that means in regard to logistics is increased consumption of ammunition which requires a higher tempo of resupply which in turn eats up fuel, fodder, POL and increases wear and tear on trucks. This clearly leads to the Intel failure in projecting an accurate picture of enemy capability past Smolensk.

As far as Stalin making any blunders about withdrawls, that happend at Kiev. The other encirclements of 1941 happend too fast for the Soviets to react (Bialystok-Minsk, Smolensk, Vyazma, Bryansk).

The problems with the German plan more or less became real problems after Smolensk and not before. This is due to an unforseen level of resistance and operational tempo caused by the Soviet reserve armies. The question is what if those Soviet forces were a known quantity such as the French in 1940 or the Russians in 1914? All very much in the realm of possibility...

 

They weren't trying to form a continuous front, where did you get that from?

Many French trucks were substituted into the German civilian sector to release German trucks types for Barbarossa to alleviate maintenance, this does not include the captured stocks of French military vehicles.

You do not seem to be grasping the fact that the problems with logistics came after Smolensk when it was assumed that major combat for AGC would fall off to a large degree. The operational and logistical plans reflect this fundamental assumption. If this assumption is changed, so will the plans based upon it.

BTW- in regard to thr replacement army, in 1942 it increased from its 1941 level by 50%. This was entirely possible in 1941 and would have covered the shortfall in replacements for the entire Ostheer.