German miscalculation of Soviet unit avaialbility

I think he blinded himself with his own ideology. Once you go too far with fantasies you cannot see. Göbbels, for example indoctrinated himself to that extent that he assassinated his six own children of fear from "Russian Barbarians". You cannot understand them if you aren't crazy as they were.

 

He should have read von Clausewitz`s comment to the conquest of Russia:
"Das russische Reich ist kein Land, das man förmlich erobern, d. h. besetzt halten kann, wenigstens nicht mit den Kräften jetziger europäischer Staaten. Ein solches Land kann nur bezwungen werden durch eigene Schwäche und durch die Wirrungen des inneren Zwiespalts."

"The Russian empire is not a country to conquer formally and keep it occupied i.e., at least not with the forces of present European states. Such a country can only be subdued by his own weakness and the tribulations of inner discord."

That means a lot of work with some agent de provocateur to the different ethnic groups would have been more successful.

 

Otoh,what were the alternatives for Barbarossa?
Sending Rommel with a few PzD in NA to chase the mirages of the oil fields of Irak (some 3000 km away)?
Or waiting,till the Britons would do to the German cities what the Germans had done to coventry,etc ..,and,till the Yanks were coming ?

 

Not to set up Barbarossa would have given enough time to follow more successful targets like securing the Italian cost and giving Rommel a few more Divisions and supply for example.
But this is only born out of our nowaday guess.

 

Perhaps the most significant miscalculation was assumption of German superiority in military doctrine and strategy. Initially Germans exploited surprise and the lack of Soviet combat preparedness in 1941/1942 and they were truly successful. But after the reorganization, Red Army introduced novel strategies and has defeated Wehrmacht by military excellence. Operation Bagration is good example of dominance through professional excellence of Red Army generals.

 

Did Stalin want to have more. Probably, but only later, I guess:

Stalin had this program "Socialism in one country ". However he also had Communist International, or Komintern (1919-1943).This was "ended" in 1943 due to Roosevelt saying he did not like it. Komintern´s task was World revolution.

 

While the Red army certainly improved and excelled in some areas I simply can't justify such terms as "military excellence" or "professional excellence" to an organization that continued to take the losses the Red army took.

 

I agree that there is a certain degree of exaggeration in my statements. Unfortunately, the price of victory was far too high.

 

I doubt the importance of superior generalship:there was not that much difference between German and Soviet generals (qua military knowledge)

 

Correct, they´ve learned from each other some years ago! And than there was no strategic or tactically intelligence at work, there was only a leading a huge amount of troops into a weaker enemies direction as often enough reported from soldiers of both sides.

 

I am still surprised (or not )that there are still people who are wasting their time with arguing who was "better":Rommel,Montgomery,Patton,Eisenhower,Zhukov,and blah blah,while nothing is easier than to replace a general by an other;some were better than an other one,but,this never was decisive:replace Patton by an other one,and the result would be the same .There were few bad generals,only some were the wrong person on the wrong place :exemples:Worochilov and Budjenney,but,if they had been replaced in may 1941 by Rokossovsky and Malinovsky,the desaster of the summer would not have be avoided.
Keitel as army commander in Russia would (probably) be a bad choice ,but,OTOH,I have my doubts for Rommel as minister of war .Etc..

 

The problem is that the Germans excelled at tactical leadership that the Soviet system did not allow for.

 

I very much disagree.

Would it? I don't think so. Some generals might have done a bit better in places but I'm not sure any would have been as well prepared for the counter attack during the Battle of the Bulge. In WWII it may have been less critical than other wars but as you go back in time it is harder and harder to make your case. Look at the German campaign in Africa in WWI for instance. Or some of the campaigns of the American Revolution. Generals can and do make a difference.

 

Glantz and other wrote that Stalin issued orders that enabled the civilain population to receive at least basic boot camp training (men). There was no way for German intel to pick this up. As a result when war broke out, these very same civilians were quickly called upon and numbered in millions.

 

About Patton,Wacht am Rhein already had failed before his counter-offensive started,if it started a week later,nothing would change .And,if it started that soon,was it due to Patton,or to his logistic officers ?
Another exemple :the commander of the 101 AB was M.Taylor,but,when Wacht am Rhein started,he was in the US,and McAuliffe replaced him :the 101 held Bastogne under the leadership of McAuliffe,the same would have happened under the leadership of Taylor,or another one .
While individual generals COULD (exceptionally) decide the outcome of a battle (during WWI/WWII) ,they could not decide the outcome of the war .
And,in the past:while Napoleon was winning some battles,he still ended in St-Helena .

 

A former teacher of mine who was with the 101st at Bastogne would disagree with you about that. If you mean Germany would still have lost the war. Then of course you are right but it would have cost the allies considerably more casulaties and probably allowed the Germans to extricate more men and equipment.

Patton was the one who asked his subordinates to come up with the plan before the offensive took place. Certainly it wouldn't have worked as well without a good planning staff but it wouldn't have happened without Patton.

That is an unsupported and unsupportable opinion. As a counter example look at the German commander of Paris. He was ordered to hold out to the last and burn Paris to the ground in the process. Instead he chose to surrender. Some other generals would have done the same, while others would have fought hard but not gone out of their way to destroy the city, undeniably there were German officers though that would have done exactly what Hitler ordered. Clearly the general made a difference.

Indeed the sheer size of WWII rather limited the effect of anyone of flag rank but some could still have considerable impact on the course of the war. Of course the impact was more likely in the planning, logistics, and political areanas than on the battlefield. however that's a bit difference from syaing they had no impact.

Indeed but that was due in no small part to his own activities and those of generals on both sides.

 

And,if it started that soon,was it due to Patton,or to his logistic officers ?

Patton was the one who asked his subordinates to come up with the plan before the offensive took place. Certainly it wouldn't have worked as well without a good planning staff but it wouldn't have happened without Patton.

Don't know that much about it myself, but someone at the time - Bradley? - said Patton could get more good work out of a bunch of mediocre staff officers than anyone he'd ever seen.

 

Look at how easily the Germans over estimated western troop availability in contrast.

 

Well,take Gott and Montgomery :IMHO,with Gott,8th Army also would arrive at Tunis in may 1943,or Rommel and Stumpf:if Rommel had been present at the start of Alamein,would there be any difference ?
Or Barbarossa ut Rundstedt as commander of AGN,Leeb in AGC,Bock in AGS :any influence on the operations ?
Or exchange in the autumn of 1944 Bradly with Devers,or make Marshall commander of Shaepe and Eisenhower chief of staff

 

Montgomery is an example of an individual general making a difference. Prior to his arrival, the British in North Africa had consistently failed to use their full combat power effectively. They had the strength to decisively defeat Rommel in both Crusader and Gazala but spread their brigades around the desert for Rommel to defeat in detail, whether on offense or defense. Most of what Monty did was simple common sense - divisions, corps, and the entire army to fight as coherent wholes, coordination of all arms, central control of artilllery, close cooperation with the Desert Air Force, proper training and rehearsal - but he got it done where his predecessors had not.

Gott was never in top command, but he commanded at corps and division levels and was part of the deficient tactical system that led to successive humiliating defeats. I'm not aware of him ever protesting that his 7 Armoured Div or XIII Corps were being misused. There seems little reason to think Gott or anyone in 8th Army would have suddenly started doing things right if promoted to army command.