German superiority, myth or fact?

About the Germans having the most well-trained soldiers,half of the German soldiers only had a few weeks training,and 25 % were older than forty.Of 4.5 millionmen (may 1940),only 2 million were fully trained .

 

Thats correct LJAd! A fact of starting the war to early but it was the situation that every Army of the WW2 nations had. Not a advantage for the Wehrmacht but not a disadvantage too. More a equal standing with the others.

 

OTOH,in 1914,Germany had 40 classes of trained reservists,in 1939 ..5
In 1939,the french army had 39000 active and 90000 reserve officers,while there was a big shortage on German side .
My guess is that in 1939,Germany was weaker than in 1940.
And,on starting the war to early,I am sceptical :in 1942-1943,Germany would also be weaker/inferior to the Allies :already in 1940 ;it was loosing the armaments race to the combination of B +F .

 

I don't buy the superior/inferior technology trope that has become so ubiquitous as to be conventional wisdom. Germany was certainly ahead in many areas particularly in certain regions of aerodynamics, for example Germany had the only functioning transonic wind tunnel during World War II so information about the performance of airfoils etc. on high-speed jets was certainly in advance of work being done in the United States and Britain, this is why Alexander Lippisch was such a valuable catch for the Operation Paperclip boys. Also the Germans had a definite advantage in jet propulsion because they had chosen to develop the more efficient axial flow turbojet instead of the centrifugal flow engines that were in production in the United States and Great Britain. However in other important military areas Germany lagged behind United States and Britain. Nuclear physics immediately comes to mind, as well as radiation physics and electronics (Germany said nothing like the VT fuse, for example), and computer science in both the digital regime (Colossus, ENIAC and others) and analog computers as well. A good example of this is the submarine TDC used in the Gato, Tench, and Balao class boats of the United States Navy. While it's true that US torpedoes were defective in design (a defect that was eventually corrected however) there was nothing at all wrong with the TDC analog torpedo fire control system which had no equal in any navy in the world including the Kriegsmarine where submarine warfare was a highly technical specialty. I will cite you an example. On May 10, 1944 USS Cod fired nine torpedoes (six bow shots and three from the stern tubes) at seven targets in a single setup and scored hits with every one of the shots, sinking a Japanese destroyer and a transport, and damaging two others. No U-boat could have managed that. Another example of computer technology unrivaled by Nazi Germany: the remote-controlled gun turrets of the B-29 which could be handled individually or in any combination by single gunner/observer in the crew with the fire control system automatically computing and laying in the correct deflection for the speed and approach angle of the attacking plane. The gunner/observer merely put his pipper on the plane he wanted to shoot and the computer did the rest. The Luftwaffe had if few aircraft types with remote-controlled guns, but nothing as sophisticated as the B-29's defensive system.

While it is true that Germany did have the first practical jet fighter, it is also true that the Western Allies did not make their jet aircraft high-priority projects. Instead they concentrated on mass production of the very capable piston fighters that were available. It's useless to speculate what would have happened to the Eighth Air Force in the unlikely event that Germany was able to mass-produce the Me-262 because alternate history is a two-way street. While hundreds of B-17s fall the guns of hundreds of Me-262s the Allies wouldn't be sitting there twiddling their thumbs, there would've been a response. If one can posit a scenario where Germany has the resources and the fuel and the trained pilots to launch mass jet attacks on the B-17 formations, one can also posit in the same scenario the Americans getting their P-80 Shooting Star into mass production and squadron service by D-Day to shoot down the German jets in droves; not at all likely I will admit, but Me-262 avenging horde scenario is even less likely. The prolonged development of the P-80 was a result of an administrative choice, whereas the maturation of the Me-262 into a viable weapon was fatally hampered by circumstances out of German control, such as the shortage of pilots, raw materials, fuel, and most importantly time.

 

Hi Neal,

the Whermacht had like you said advantages in some points, Yes, but you have to see the whole thing and this includes all developments made through the war. There are some technologies that were used during the war and there were much more which weren´t in use for different reasons like to late, to less resources or they didn´t found their way to Hitler and others for the reason of internal struggling with some scientists and Generals. Indeed the allies had no reason to develop their jet fighters more than they did for one reason: they don´t need them for the few german ones. If the Luftwaffe has switched to the jets as soon as they had functional ones, the allies were in deep troubles and would have developed their jets faster. Any action causes a reaction!The P-80 was a good made one but we had some more good jet fighters than only the Me262. And of course this point is clear, you would have won the war no matter if we had the modernst jets or the best tanks or the newst subs, because you had more of all!

The german Submarines were good functional ones and if the Seekriegsleitung or more Dönitz has seen the need of modern ones earlier, we had the first subs with working hydrogen turbines, which are the same like we have it now in our newest subs. You know that this is equal with the nuke boats, no need to be on the surface and speeds up to 30knots under water.

The Germans did have atomic plants but they didn´t followed their development to the end for some reasons. So this would have endet up in a race nearly head tohead and i´m lucky that there was no need to drop some of them at our or your side.

As said correctly all of them were running into the big nothing for the lack of resources and men. And all of this could only happen through the wrong decisions of one men and his blind followers. So be happy that it went out this way because a other way would have cost much more lifes and who knows how the world were today? I´m lucky about this solution.

 

Not really.

There were no any soldiers with "only a few weeks training" serving in combat & field units of the Germany army in 1939 - 1941.

So called "weißen Jahrgange" ("white classes") of 1901 - 1913 (majority of whom were without enough military training because they didn't underwent normal military service when they should) were started to be mobilized to service not before 1942 and at the beginning only to spare units of Ersatz-Heer not to combat (or even rear) units of Feldheer.

Before that vast majority of the German army soldiers were classes 1914+ and Landwehr (classes 1901 minus).

And in August / September 1939 the German Army (not including Navy & Air Force) had something like:

- 1,31 million active service soldiers,
- 0,65 million fully trained 1st class Reserve
- 1,2 million Landwehr - veterans of WW1 after 3 months long supplementary training
- 0,8 million 2nd class Reserve

And even vast majority of 2nd class Reserve was after more than just few weeks training.

Landwehr and 2nd class Reservists were mostly in reserve units as well as in Spare Army (Ersatz-Heer).

Moreover - in a typical German infantry regiment in 1939, as many as 31% of all soldiers were (or had been before entering the Army) members of Nazi paramilitary organizations.

1/5 of all Wehrmacht soldiers from 1939, had been members of Hitlerjugend.

1/7 of all Wehrmacht 1939 soldiers were members of SA.

1/3 of all Wehrmacht soldiers were members of RAD.

Many members of Allgemeine SS also served in the army. In 1939 a total of 250,000 enlisted members of Allgemeine SS served in the Wehrmacht.

Considering that Reichswehr was practically training everyone to become officer, I don't think Germans had such a big shortage of trained officers.

Even if Reichswehr was just 116,500 (100,000 Army + 16,500 Navy) strong in 1920s, this still makes a vast number of trained officers (especially considering rotation).

It must have been much more than 5. Hitler introduced compulsory military service for everyone between 18 and 45 years old yet in March of 1935.

Already by that time - March of 1935 - German army numbered 480,000 regular soldiers.

Since then they were training at least several classes each year. Plus they still had many veterans of WW1 (Landwehr).

Moreover - yet before that Germans were secretely training future soldiers in paramilitary organizations.

Yet in 1929 Stahlhelm (aka Bund der Frontsoldaten) numbered over 500,000 "soldiers", in 1932 SA (Sturm-Abteilungen) had 480,000 "soldiers".

And this figure clearly means that the French army in 1939 had a large shortage of active officers...

Well, in German Panzer, Light, Mountain & Motorized divisions nearly 100% were active service soldiers (with some WW1 veterans from Landwehr added).

In German 1st Wave infantry divisions at least 90% were active service or 1st class reserve (78% active + 12% 1st class reserve) and 4% Landwehr.

In 2nd Wave divisions also 89% were active service or 1st class reserve (but this time 6% active and 83% 1st class reserve) and 3% Landwehr.

In 3rd Wave divisions 42% were WW1 veterans (Landwehr) and 13% were 1st class reserve or active service.

In 4th Wave divisions 30% were 1st class reserve or active service and 24% were WW1 veterans.

======================================

In the invasion of Poland, for example, vast majority of all German soldiers were either active service or 1st class reserve.

Since also several 3rd Wave infantry divisions participated in the invasion, there was also a considerable portion of WW1 veterans.

On the other hand, the Polish army after full mobilization would consist of only around 20% active service and 80% reservists.

 

Having 12 "classes" that had not undergone basic military training is a BIG handicap, only partly compensated by the sketchy training the the paramilitary organizations gave and having larger population base than France.

IMO the Germans won the earlier campaigns by gambling aggressively and superior tactics, operations like Narvik or the airborne attack on Holland would never have been authorized by the less risk prone allies, even the attack on Poland with a huge French army at their back was a big gamble, conventional wisdom made a short campaign far from a sure thing.
This approach initially dovetailed nicely with the high initative required by junior commanders in keeping their enemies off balance, but eventally failed when the logistics, which received a lower priority of first grade recruits than in other armies, failed to support the spearheads.

Unless you assume the Germans were really supermen the early successes can most easily be explained by the different priorities of the German army that gave them superiority "at the hot point" at the cost of a lesser ability to support a continued effort.
The differeces in equipment were marginal, in the French campaign the Germans had less and lighter tanks, less artillery though more modern, roughly the same number of fighters and more bombers, a comparison of the relative strengths at the beginning of Barbarossa is even more unbalanced, it was tactics and doctrine that acted as a force multiplier bringing about the early victories.

 

Of course it was not a handicap. But it became a disadvantage only later in Russia, when Germans started to run short of manpower due to casualties.

My point was that those classes which did not undergone proper military training, simply did not participate in combats in period 1939 - 1942.

Later the quality of training was decreasing due to attrition. In late 1944 and 1945 Germans were throwing into combats even children and old men.

The French army maybe was big (one should remember that in 1939 it wasn't yet as big as in 1940), but was not mobilized and was unprepared.

On the other hand, Germans left a considerable portion of their Army in Western Germany - over 40 infantry divisions. Mostly reserve divisions, but still.

The attack on Poland would be a big gamble if Hitler attacked without signing the anti-Polish pact with the Soviets before.

But considering that Hitler agreed with Stalin on attacking Poland together (even though Soviets attacked with 17 days delay) - it was not a gamble at all.

Waiting with invasion would only decrease the German superiority and / or increase the superiority of the USSR / Western Allies.

 

I agree that the Germans had to win quickly as time was not working in their favour, but what we are attempting to find out here is why they were that successful in the early years, most 1939 military analysts would have considered the historical outcome of the 1940 campaign highly unlikely. As the Germans didn't have material superiority, and better preparedness by a country that had been openly rearming for only six years against armies that had uninterrupted regular conscription is unconvincing, how did they do it?

AFAIK the divisions left west in September 1939 were understrength (many were still mobilizing) and at big numerical disadvantage against the French (no BEF to speak of yet).
Historically the French didn't have plans to advance out of the Maginot line and attack the Germans in Siegfried line but the Germans could not be sure of that. IMO the Polish campaign lasting as long as it did was not a foregone concluson at all, had the Poles concentrated their Army instead of speading it out attempting to defend everything the campaign could very well have lasted into 1940.

 

Yes the Poles could have resisted longer if not those mistakes - and provided that there was no early Soviet intervention. Even after historically accurate course of military operations between 1 and 16 September, the Polish army would still be capable to continue organized resistance for a good couple of weeks (well into October), if not the Soviet attack. But if the Soviet attack took place on 17 September, then even more successful (than in reality) resistance against Germany would not help much in prolonging the campaign.

Not really since the French army was also understrength and also during mobilization.

Germans started general mobilization on 26 August - much earlier than French - so how could they be less mobilized on 3 September?

France started general mobilization on 3 September if I remember correctly - over one week after Germans.

Even if the French carried out a full scale attack against the Siegfried Line - it is doubtful they would be able to quickly break the German defense.

Even German reserve divisions had considerable defensive capabilities. 3rd Wave divisions had more machine guns than 1st and 2nd Wave. They were "designed" as defensive divisions. Germans also had a quite considerable number of artillery in the West, contrary to some myths. They would be able to respond with fire.

Although vast majority of all bombers and 100% of dive bombers were in Poland, large portion of all German single-engined fighters were left in the West.

So Allied Air Forces trying to support their ground forces while attacking Western Germany, would encounter strong resistance of Luftwaffe.

Defending along strong fortifications usually favours the defender. The French would need considerable material superiority to break the Siegfried Line.

Germans had their intelligence service (Abwehra), which was pretty efficient. So I guess they more or less knew what was happening around.

Germans - who were very intensely rearming for six years (in fact even more), had a better preparedness than their enemies (except maybe for the Soviet Union).

Uninterrupted regular conscription could only mean that German enemies had larger amount of potential trained reserves than Germany.

But larger amount of trained reserves can only be a factor during long lasting wars of attrition - like World War 1 or Eastern Front of ca. 1942 - 1945.

It can also be a factor if a country has enough equipment & resources to mobilize 100% of its trained human reserves (Poland, for example - didn't have them). And even this advantage in number of potential conscripts is uncertain, since despite uninterrupted conscription, France and Poland had much smaller population than Germany.

Which means that number of available conscripts from each age class was smaller than in Germany.

If Germany had for example 10 classes trained, it equalled 20 classes of France - which had twice smaller population than Germany.

 

I have the same figures,but the opinion of the German military historian K.H.Frieser is :
in may 1940 ,half of the german soldiers had gone through only a few weeks of training (the Blitzkrieg Legend P 32)
on P 23f 4.5 million men (including 427000 men in construction units) ONLY 1.31 million men in the active duty units and 647000 in Reserve I could be graded as fully trained;808000 were classified as untrained.In addition ,1.2 million veterans of WWI had been mobilized,ALTHOUGH it was IMPOSSIBLE adequately to familiarize them with the weapons and techniques of a modern war .
on P 24:the officer corps had to be considered to a great extent as being unequal to the tasksconnected with its position .
About the officers :in 1935 the Reichswehr had only 4000 officers,of which 450 medical officers and veterinarians and 500 were transferred to the Luftwaffe ,resulting in an enormous shortage of officers :WWI veterans older than 50 were appointed compagny commanders .
On P 31:
The first wave consisted of the active duty divisions of the peace time army reinforced with reservists .
Wave two:mostly fully trained soldiers of Reserve I
Third and fourth wave:included soldiers of reserve II:members of the white age classes with a training of 2 to 3 months.
Landwehr forces :included veterans of WWI older than 40
Landesschutzen ersonnell older than 45 nly for guard duty and security missions in rear areas.A lot of them without steel helmets,boots,uniforms .Something as Dad's Army
Fifth wave :defense missions on the Western Front :training :8 weeks .
The combat value of the other waves was negligible .(my comment)
On P 33 :Combat value of the German divisions on 10 may 1940:
totally fit (for attack and defense) :10 Pz,6 Mot,61 ID
partially fit :29 ID
only for defense :28 ID
partially for defense :9 ID
9 Landesschutzdivisions nly for security missions
5 divisions which were not builded .
Thus only 106 divisions of 157 were operational .
An other point :that there were a lot of members of the Algemeine SS in the WM,is irrelevant,because these had as much ,or as little training as the other soldiers .
About the divisions :the following if from S.Mitcham :Hitler's Legions 29:
German mobilization waves for Infantry Divisions :
1 34 -38 :39 divisions eace time army
2 aug 1939 :15 :from reservists
3aug 1939 :22:Landwehr(older personnel)
4 :aug 1939 :14:from reserve units
5 :september :11 :reservists
6ctober 1939 :6 :disbanded in 1940
7:december 1939 :13:from reserve units
8:march 1840 :10 +:mostly older personnel,some disbanded in 1940
9:april 1940 :9 :mostly 1940 draft class .
Last point:after the campaign in France :
6 divisions were converted to Oberfeldkommandanturen :365,372,379,393,395,393
19 divisions were disbanded :209,228,331,358 (Landwehr) and 15 ID .(271,272,273,276,277,307,310,311,317,341,351,380,555,556,557)
By courtesy of The Dupuy Institute:German "demobilization" after the campaign in France 1940 ? A post by Richard Anderson .
the fact that these divisions(25 on 157) were disbanded -concerted is indicating that their combat value was negligible .

 

Frieser's book is not bad but there are many misconceptions in it. This would be one of them.

And his numbers (1,31 million active service, etc.) are for August/September 1939 not for 1940 (according to B. R. Kroener, "Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches").

By the way - what about training of French soldiers? Why didn't he mention that the time of training in the French Army was drastically shortened in 1930s.

No - the white age classes were not mobilized to the German army before 1942. There were no white age classes among "Reserve II" members in 1939 / 1940.

Regarding Landwehr - in infantry divisions of 3rd mobilizational Wave, veterans of WW1 (Landwehr) were more numerous than 2nd class reservists.

Some of the veterans of WW1 could be 40 and 39 or even 38 years old in 1939 / 1940. They didn't have to be over 40 years old.

This is only what Reichswehr had "on paper".

While in fact General Hans von Seeckt transformed Reichswehr into the "forge of cadres".

Every soldier in the Reichswehr was prepared to serve at least two levels above his actual "on paper" rank.

For example - each Leutnant of the Reichswehr was trained to serve at least as Hauptmann.

Each Feldwebel of the Reichswehr was prepared to serve at least as Leutnant. Etc.

And selection of soldiers to the Reischwehr was very harsh. Only the best of the best could serve there.

Reichswehr was a "Wehrmacht in a nutshell". Each company was well prepared to quickly transform / expand into regiment when the proper time would come.

Actually some 136 divisions took part in the invasion in May / June (not all of them for the entire timeframe of course).

And actually 4th, 5th, 7th and even 9th waves divisions were commited to tasks such as assaults against the Maginot Line in June 1940...

For example 554., 556. and 557. divisions (9th wave), 168. and 198. (7th) and 93. (5th) participated in operation "Kleine Bar" (against the Maginot Line in Alsace).

554., 556. and 557. were officially "divisions for static duties" (!) - yet Germans used them as "cannon fodder" (?), attacking the Maginot Line with them !!!

During operation "Tiger" on 14 June (another attack against the Maginot Line - but in different part of the front) also "far waves" participated:

Map showing dislocation of forces before operation "Tiger" (as you can see Germans used mostly 9x and 2xx divisions in this operation):

 

Ulrich my friend, I agee with this if we're talking early war. There is no doubt that in 1939, 1940 and 1941, the Germans were the best trained and overall best technologically. A great deal of this can be explained by the Germans starting to gear up for war several years prior, and the allied countries burying their heads in the sand and ignoring the threat. When the allies did start gearing up and training up they closed the gap. By early 1943, IMO, the allies had reached parity. Mid-1943 onwards because German resources (manpower/industrial) were so strained meeting the requirements for fighting the war the quality plateaued or began to slip. The Luftwaffe's situation is a perfect example. Early war they had the most technologically advanced fighters and some of the best trained, highly skilled pilots. The technological advantage they enjoyed in 1940 had slipped by 1944 to the point that they were fairly impotent. Allied advances in engines and airframes, plus the ability to produce huge quantities gave them more aircraft of equal or better performance. Pilot training programs had provided masses of skilled pilots to fly the aircraft while Germany was left to fight with a few outstanding pilots and a mass of ill-trained replacements. The German aircraft had been continually improved and German technology had squeezed every ounce of performance out of them but it was in an effort to maintain parity, they never again enjoyed the early war superiority. That's why in my initial post, when I started this thread, I theorized that Germany did not have some intrinsic military or technological superiority. It's just that early war they were better trained and better equipped, with superior doctrine, because the allies had not trained up and mobilized for war. Once they did, in most cases, the German advantages disappeared. Furthermore, in many areas they were actually inferior technologically, these areas have been well stated in posts by other rogues so I don't feel it necessary to restate them.

Agreed my friend.

Yes, I was aware of this. They even used them for medical evacuations. The American military didn't really pursue the employment of helicopters, except in rare cases, until Korea, even though they had the first mass produced helicopter, Igor Sikorsky's R4. Sikorsky (Russian-American) came up with the antitorque tail rotor, which is still a feature found in most helicopters today. If you look at the development of helicopters you have French, Argentinian, Spanish, Italian, Russian, and German inventors involved in the early development. Because Germany fielded the first military helicopter is not an indication that they were the most advanced, they were just building on the work of scientists of many nationalities (nothing superior here). Sikorsky's R4 fielded in 1942 was much more advanced than any of the helicopters Germany built during WWII.

Agreed.

Once again, I'm not saying that Germany didn't develop aircraft that could have been strategically important. I have never said German engineering, or science were inferior. What I have stated and do believe is that it wasn't superior. If you look at virtually any innovation the German's had, they were based upon theories, inventions, concepts, etc. developed by scientists of all nationalities, including German.

Even if they had been able to reach the U.S. it wouldn't have been a game changer unless they had better targeting abilities and carried an atomic payload. Otherwise it would just be a terror weapon.

This my friend I consider a pipe dream. Even if Barbarossa had not gone off, the Royal Navy had enough power to disrupt any proposed German landings in Britain. The German's did not have a sufficiently powerful navy to protect the troop and cargo transports from British surface, air or submarine attacks. The German's had insufficient merchant shipping to carry the troops equipment and supplies to land a sufficient force and to support the assaults if they successfully established a beachhead. The German's didn't have LCVP's or LST's and all the myriad of specialized amphibious vessels the allies had. They also had neither the training, doctrine nor expertise to execute the landings. The U.S. had spent nearly twenty years in developing the ships, specialized craft and doctrine necessary for this type of warfare, because they thought one of their most likely opponents if war once again broke out would be Japan.

See here's where we disagree. The allies were not technologically inferior, for every German innovation, I could give you an allied one. It wasn't mass that won the war, though on the Eastern Front is was a bigger factor, it was a combination of mass, technology, training, doctrine, etc. On the western front, Germany enjoyed the huge advantage of being the defender, with shorter lines of supply and interior lines of communication. It could be argued that the Germans after their initial sucesses were not a well balanced force, while the allies became increasingly so.

This would never happen with me. You're my friend and even if you weren't, I know you to be a well read, experienced, thoughtful, well reasoned individual. A man whose opinion I always consider and highly respect.

 

Hi USMCPrice,

first, thank you for your kind words, i only can give them back to you!!!

Even if they had been able to reach the U.S. it wouldn't have been a game changer unless they had better targeting abilities and carried an atomic payload. Otherwise it would just be a terror weapon.

That is correct! It wouldn´t have a influence on the rolling battles except it has that atomic payload!

This my friend I consider a pipe dream. Even if Barbarossa had not gone off, the Royal Navy had enough power to disrupt any proposed German landings in Britain. The German's did not have a sufficiently powerful navy to protect the troop and cargo transports from British surface, air or submarine attacks. The German's had insufficient merchant shipping to carry the troops equipment and supplies to land a sufficient force and to support the assaults if they successfully established a beachhead. The German's didn't have LCVP's or LST's and all the myriad of specialized amphibious vessels the allies had. They also had neither the training, doctrine nor expertise to execute the landings. The U.S. had spent nearly twenty years in developing the ships, specialized craft and doctrine necessary for this type of warfare, because they thought one of their most likely opponents if war once again broke out would be Japan.

That point goes to you! It is more than correct what you´ve said but take the British situation as the submarine blockade reached their highest point. The Brit´s were running out of resources in any way and setting up a fake invasion and a really one would have given the Wehrmacht a chance to set up a beach head and to make it with a support by submarines and battleships. Ok, this must have happened at the British westcoast for the lack of long range Bombers and fighters. The eastcoast or some places at Scotland would have been better but nothing without air support. So it could have been made, with some higher losses and with a complete different planning to the other actions.

See here's where we disagree. The allies were not technologically inferior, for every German innovation, I could give you an allied one. It wasn't mass that won the war, though on the Eastern Front is was a bigger factor, it was a combination of mass, technology, training, doctrine, etc. On the western front, Germany enjoyed the huge advantage of being the defender, with shorter lines of supply and interior lines of communication. It could be argued that the Germans after their initial sucesses were not a well balanced force, while the allies became increasingly so.

Here i have to agree with your thoughts. The russian front is a completely different topic as it has the points that you mentioned. For the western Front it is right that we had a advantage of the short supply ways other to the east Front. And we had an advantage that was in your internal affairs. You had some troubles with internal problems you had in consultation with the British, and sometimes even with your own generals see Patton in France. And NO, i won´t say that all of your stuff was 2nd class, i said it not so clear as i wanted,
lets say it this way: some of your stuff wasn´t of this technological standart the Wehrmacht had, but it was equal in use, hope this would describe it good. And the mass of your troops and all the equipment was a important point too. If you lost a company, it hurts you but you have a replacement company. If we lost a company it hurts much more and we had some replacement guys and not well trained too. And to make it much more worse if we replaced a company with some soldiers our high command has seen them as a full company not as a half one with less fighting value. And Yes, we´re talking about the early wartime. The Wehrmacht hadn´t a chance to win the war in later days. In my eyes they lost the war during the first days of Barbarossa. Thanks for your good points and i hope to discuss more topics with you! I´m always glad to learn some new things and see the topics from a other POV than before.

Dang, can you please tell me how to multiquote a post?

 

I also would be very happy to know how to multiquote a post .

 

I could tell you; but, it's gonna cost you....

I don't think you are ready for the multiquote technology.....you must only use it for good.

1. copy and paste the line you want to quote.
2. insert the word "quote" or "QUOTE" surrounded by "[ ]" at the beginning of the quoted section.
3. insert " /quote" or "/QUOTE" , again surrounded by "[ ]" , at the end of the quoted section.

Your quated passage should look like this: (quote) The Third Riech had no chance of winning once the United States entered the War (/quote) you need to replace "( )" with "[ ]" and you'll be golden the phrase should look like this when you post it:

or like this if you chose to capitalize the word "quote":

 

The salute is for this comment, your wit always makes my day. Humor as only Formerjughead can do it!

 

1) On the number of nco's that became officer in the Wehrmacht:I remain sceptical :no figures are available :some 100000 officers were needed on 1 september 1939:what was the % of former nco's?There also are 2 other problems:to become officer,a demand was to have passed the Abitur,how many NCO's had the Abitur ?Also,if a lot of nco's became officer,there would be a shortage of nco's (and,every one knows that the nco's are the backbone of an army).
A last point :there were 7 artillery regiments in april 1934,118 in november 1938,21 infantry regiments increasing to 142,7 batallions of engineers increasing to 91,22 pzregiments :this is 316 regimental commanders that were needed from a small pool (some one who was lieutenant in 1934 could not become batallion commander 4 years later ).
2)Now,I will quit and use my grey cells on the difficult problem of how to multiquote(the first problem being how to paste) using the informations given by an obliging Formerjughead ,for which I am thankful (these ..smileys :always there to trouble a person,but absent,if you need them :like the police)

 

Brad as this advice seem to work you´ll get the price! Its your choice to get this one " as much dishwasher as you can carry by using only your left hand" or this one " A spoonful of hot whipped cream"?

.... and for that, we have to talk about......

Come on Buddy the beer is cold and if you want, a good cigar is waiting too!

Thanks for your advice.

 

Establishing who was in charge of regiments or even battalions in the German Army in 1939 is not a big deal because there are more or less complete Stellenbesetzungen available. They are even available online - for example on this website (just type in "search this blog" the name of the unit you want, or search for it in the "blog archive"):

Gliederung und Stellenbesetzung

After seeing numerous Stellenbesetzungen for numerous German divisions / other units in 1939 (usually broken down to battalion level, sometimes even company level) I don't think there was a problem with this in the German army bigger than in other armies. Especially it seems that there was no problem with high ranking officers. There were probably more problems with lower levels - sometimes companies were lead by NCOs instead of officers. But battalions usually were lead by Hauptmanns or Majors.

For example the Polish Army in 1939 had much more problems with shortage of officers.

Quite often Polish infantry regiments were commanded by Majors or even Captains.

Colonels commanding Polish divisions were as common (or even more) as Generals.

Some of Polish high-ranking officers also lacked professionalism.