German vs. Russia - No England.

The USAAF did bomb Dresden and in an episode covered in detail by Max Hastings, they admitted that Dresden was of no military value iand the bombing was a terror mission in an internal report. However, outright bombing of civilians like Dresden represents the deviation not the norm of American strategic air war strategy. Precision bombing against key factories in daylight was USAAF's prefered type of mission.

As I have said, David Glantz believed that the Russians could do it alone, but with signicantly more losses and it would take more years.

 

The USAAF did bomb Dresden, however, it was believed that Dresden was a significant rail and communications center and that disruption of that center would have a very real and important negative effect on Germany's war effort. Therefore Dresden was a legitimate military target.

 

If it takes more years it's not at all clear that the Soviets could do it. Again food alone becomes very problematic unless something radical happens in 45. If the Soviets haven't advanced as far then they have even worse problems in that regard. I strongly suspect failure to win the war by the end of 45 means exhaustion sets in for both nations.

 

Exactly, this was the only time in history when Lenin's corpse had been disturbed, and the destination was Kubyshev, this would be the new HQ from where the war would be fought if Moscow had fallen. Everyone including Molotov had already fled to this destination aside from Stalin.

But it is very clear, for it is this reason alone for which historians such as Glantz, Erickson, Jones and others, claim that Soviet Union alone would be able to succeed, but at a higher cost and in a longer time. Besides, the Germans would have far greater problems then the Russians by this time.

After Stalingrad, there was no stopping the Red Army, perhaps only slowing it down.

 

I'm not convinced Stalingrad will happen as history without the Tunisia air bridge drawing away a lot of the German air transports or if you add some 100.000 replacements to the early 1942 rebuilding of the 1941 losses and a couple of panzer divisions to the German reserves which would be available for the relief effort if not sent to North Africa. And with the Gemans still on the Volga in Spring 1943 will the soviets survive? IIRC the soviet "steamroller" relied on recruiting from the liberated territories to make up for the losses incurred in the liberation, the soviet manpower pool from the territories East of the Volga is not bottomless.

 

I suspect you have forgotten that the USA did operate out of Britain, if Britain is out of the war, the closest base that the USA had was in Iceland, could the American Air Force bomb Germany from that far out with adequate fighter cover, i suspect not.

Also all sorties by both RAF and USAAF against Germany and German targets numbered about 950,000 and dropped approximately 2.1 million tonnes of ordnance wreaking havok amongst Germany's ecconomy, it also had the effect of diverting huge amount of men and war materiel in the west and in North Africa and Italian campaigns.

v.R

 

Is it? I'd like to see some quotes to that effect. My impession is that they were looking at mostly the effects of decresased logistics capability as well as ammo shortages if that during the period before Berlin fell. Now I haven't read much by the above authors but how deep did they look into the effects of the Soviets fighting alone? For instance it's easy to miss the full impact on the explosives production.

 

But until 1943.... The Soviet Union pretty much did fight by herself and not only against Germany and after two horrendous years began to turn the tide. Yes the Red Army would suffer more from logistics and other factors without help, but they would be far better off then the Germans and their allies.

 

In disagree with this statement. It denigrates the value of Lend-lease aid which became significant in the latter half of 1942, and underestimates the importance of Allied activity in North Africa, the Med, and the blockade of Germany.

However, I believe the Soviets, without any Allied help, would still have eventually overcome the Germans after an extended period of stalemate in Eastern Europe and Western Russia. Germany just did not have the horsepower to conquer the Soviet Union.

 

I think one of their main problems was too much horsepower I think the sheer ammount of materials the SU was churning out would enable them to win eventually. I don't think a huge stalemate would occour. I mean, i 42 Hitler had to go South in order to avoid the Russian armies... I think Barbarrossa was doomed from the start being the SU alone or not.



Cheers...

 

Not my intention at all Devilsadvocate. I give all the credit in the world to the brave men and women serving on all fronts and in factories in order to defeat the Axis powers.

While not "denigrating" the value of Lend Lease, it became significant in the latter half of 43' not 42'...

And until the Allies landed in mainland Italy, the Red Army, did in fact face 80% of the German might. This is what I meant by "most"

It was not until the Italy and Normandy fronts opened up which finally relieved some of the pressure from the east... Even then the Red Army still 60% of Germany's forces.

 

No, Lend-lease saved the Soviet Union in the latter half of 1942, although it's probably true that more military supplies and equipment flowed to the USSR in 1943.

The major food production areas of the Soviet Union were all in the western part of the country and almost all of these agricultural areas came under German control in the second half of 1941, just as the Fall 1941 harvest came due. Consequently, there were virtually no reserve food stocks under Soviet control in the second half of 1942, and no prospect of any Fall harvest in 1942. Thus Lend-lease food became crucial in the latter half of 1942, and significantly, enabled the Soviet Union to keep large armies in the field, something that would have been impossible without the LL aid from the US.

If it had not been for the Allied efforts in the Med and North Africa, the Soviets would have faced 100% of the Germany's resources, not just 60-80 %. This was a significant amount, although less than Stalin would have liked.

And without the British blockade of Germany, which took considerable effort on the Allies part, 100 % of Germany's resources would have amounted to a great deal more than the historical 100 % represented.

 

Lend Lease did not save the Soviet Union, to claim that it had, is to "denigrate" the Soviet effort.

The Red Army would have never faced 100% of Germany's might as Germany needed to garrison the countries in which she had already occupied. This was essentially the troops left in Europe. As for the 10 divisions in Africa, these were not enough to turn the tide.

While heroic, by the time allied troops landed in Italy, Germany had already been defeated at Kursk and her fate already sealed.

 

It is, in my opinion, impossible to denigrate the Soviet Union.

So at least, it seems you don't deny that American Lend-lease aid became significant in the latter half of 1942, not 1943.

No one is denying that the Soviets defeated Germany. But The Soviet Union would have faced a far stronger German effort without the Allied activity in North Africa and the Med, and the British blockade of Europe. To claim that the USSR fought Germany alone is simply wrong.

 

Here are some links to data for aid to the USSR. Like all internet sources they need to be taken with a grain of salt. But, in general they illustrate what was important in what year.

Lend Lease Effect on the Soviet Economy
http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/SovLendLease.html

More LL data, & photos
http://wio.ru/tank/ll.htm

LL Aircraft
http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/index.htm

Discussion of Allied contributions. This focuses on destruction of Axis combat units as a measurement.

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4551

 

Double post

 

If memory serves, it was an internal report about Dresden's value as a psychological instead of materiel target. Dresden's industrial worth was rejected in this report as of having much less import and probably irrelevant.

I do not think however the legitimacy of bombing Dresden depends on the city's worth as a military target. It seems senseless to me to be mired in such little niceties in a total war when the foundation for reciprocal morale codes is already gone. It offered a chance to victory and put an end to the madness. That is enough for me.

 

well, what part does italy play in this scenario. I know they got their asses handed to 'em in North Africa by the Brits, but its hard to imagine that they would be inferior to the sometimes poorly equipped and always poorly trained Soviet troops.

If Romania contributed at all, the Italians would definitely do so as well. Not to mention the Italians could muster a significantly larger force than the Romanians, especially with no real African campaign, aside from possible campaigns against South Africa.

Also, assuming the Germans met with more success than they actually did, the inhospitable terrain of Siberia would eventually strip away all advantages they possessed with their mechanized troops and quick armor. Of course, assuming they even got that far.

 

The Soviet troops were better equipped than the Italian troops, at least 1942 onward. And then, "poof", they are as well as equipped as the German in some instances.

 

Found a old note on this. A game buddy did some calculation on the German transportation capability in Russia 1942-43. He concluded that with the Soviet forces withdrawn beyond the Volga and incapable of serious offensive action west of the Volga the Germans still would not be able to accumulate the resources for serious offensive action to the edge of Siberia until mid 1943. He based this on A. Stocking artillery ammunition, the largest bulk item. B. Air force support on forward airfields, and rebuilding aircraft strength. C. Rebuilding the railroads to the necessary capacity.

There are a number of other factors he identified, such as rebuilding tank and automotive transport strength, but he did not crunch the numbers for this or any others. Any other German incursion beyond the Volga would likely have the nature of a raid until mid 1943. Unless the Soviet RKKA completely collapses. He then concluded that advancing much beyond the Urals would require another halt until the Spring of 1944 while the railroads were again extended & expanded to support the attack. His calculations did not include any damage from Allied bombing of German industry as he thought that insignificant before late 1944. So, he assumed the full historical capacity of German industry would be available to provide the railroad reconstruction, artillery ammunition, and German Air Force reconstruction, plus the other items not calculated.