Germans doomed to failure

I watch one lousy movie, and they accuse me of being a intellectual!

 

To be fair, it doesn't require a classical education to twist a line from "Julius Ceasar"...it's taught in schools for Chrissake.

If the SU got so much credit for beating the Germans, why do sour attitudes linger?

I don't mind critique of Russian leadership, but suggesting that the Russian people themselves deserved the Cold War as a reward is not my cup of tea.

This thread, and the direction thereof, has been illuminating.....and we discovered an educated man in our midst!...(prolonged cheer)

 

The Gods from on high have spoken, so I do not want to wander too far off topic, but I suspect that 50 years of cold war are difficult to allow people to alter or evolve their beliefs in less than a decade. For that period the Soviet perspective was that the west sat on the sidelines while the USSR won the war on facism. The west saw the war only from the perspective that their effort was the more important. I would like to hope that we can now acknowledge the truth lies somewhere in the middle

 

You know what they say about war....there's our side, their side and the truth. Volga when has Communism ever been in close ties with Captalism? I don't see how you can think that the 'West' and SOVIET Russia could have been best of friends when Soviet Russia was preaching world-wide revolution.

 

Gentlemen, the cold war debate has no place in this thread. Please continue the discussion elsewhere.

Anymore rambling about the cold war in here will result in the post being edited by me to the following: "Slonik is brilliant and im a dummy"...

You have been warned.

 

Well at least I am still a gentleman

 

*points finger at General Mud and General Winter*

 

EDIT - double post (by accident)

 

general mud ,maybe,because one could argue that the mud was influencing Typhoon,although,IMHO,Typhoon had few or no chances to succeed,mud,or no mud.
general winter:no,because,in 1941,the winter did not stop Typhoon:it was already stopped when the winter was beginning .

 

Fair enough, had mud not been a problem at all would the Germans still be doomed to failure? How much momentum did the mud cost the Germans?

 

Mud and Winter do not fight on anyone's side. It is the military leader's responsibility to calculate climatic factors. Additionally, mud might have impeded German mobility but Soviet logistics also did a number on Russian mobility. The Germans did not have the combat power to punch their way to Moscow.

 

that's the big if.
Personaly,giving the weaken German situation,I think,mud or no mud (and mud was hindering on both sides,although more the advancing side),the chances for a successfull Typhoon were minimal .
OTOH,some authors (Magenheimer :Hitler's War P 110 )are claiming the opposite (Magenheimer:...it was primarily weather conditions ........which caused the German advance more or less to become bogged down during these critical days in October .
To these,one can reply that a German break-through in October would not necessarily mean the fall of Moscow,and that the fall of Moscow would not necessarily mean the fall of the SU.IMHO,after the fall of Moscow,the German advance would be bogged down a few miles east of the city .
The big problem is that we have insufficient informations,especially (as usual ?) for the Russian side .The only thing I have is a general survey for the Soviet strength on the WHOLE front (for 1 december),although I have read some where that the Soviet strength for the Moscowfront was some 250000 men .

 

Gentlemen,

Was'nt the second phase of Typhoon set in motion again after the mud by the fall of temperature below freezing, hardening the ground for a continuance of the attack?

I am also aware that the muddy 'pause' for Typhoon also allowed a resupply of no small importance to enable the lunge for Moscow to occur at all in 1941. After all, they only had this one chance.....and they blew it!

 

Actually they did, after they had destroyed the Soviet armies defending Moscow in early October (Vyazma and Briansk pockets) the road to Moscow was almost completely undefended (only 90,000 troops remained). Those two pockets were mostly contained and being reduced and there was a wide open gap on the southern axis in front of Guderian Pz Group at that time. The saving grace for the Red Army was the fall rains and Hitler's insistance of a broad envelopment as opposed to a direct thrust. The mud paralyzed the Wehrmacht's ability to push supplies forward between 8 Oct. and 15 Nov. which ended up being the critical time that the Red Army needed to recover. Without the mud its likely that the Germans could have driven into a lightly defended Moscow around Oct. 16-20th roughly.

 

The muddy pause was no pause at all, it was actually referred to as the snail offensive because they were still pushing forward. The supply lines were considered strained at best, the attrition rate on vehicles, weather and the pace of operations made it impossible to bring forward ammunition, fuel, food in sufficient quantity and there weren't any vehicle or personnel replacements left either. Typhoon was done as soon as the mud appeared in the first week of Oct.

 

the start and the influence of the Rasputitza is still controversial
From 14-15 october onward,the onset of the season of autumn mud began to slow AGC .....(Hitler's war P1O9)The autumn mud period had already set in with rain and snowfall on the wek of 7 october,but the ensuing week had again brought tolerate weather conditions for mlitary operations . See Wagener,Moscow 1941,P 82 et seq.;Reinhardt P 73. Von Bock states that the first snow and hail fell within the sector of AGC on 10 october.(Hitler's War note 94 of Part II)

 

in october the German losses were(between brackets those of AGC)
1_10 :51000(29000)
11-20:28000 (18000)
21-31:36000 (16000)
in november
1-10:20000(15000)
11-20:36000(14000)
21-30:31000(17000)
Replacements:
1-10 october :45000
11-20 october:18000
21-31 october:15000
1-10 november:23000
11-20 november:10000
20-30 november:22000
Bear in mind that these replaceents started,ex;on 1 october,in Germany,that there is no certainty about the date they were arriving on the front :the journey could take weeks .
for tanks (replacements between brackets)
1_10 october:55(0)
11-20 october:84(0)
21-31 october:161(316)
1-10 november:200(49)
11-20 november:52 (0)
21-30 november:114(25)
Bear in mind that most PD belonged to AGC

 

Objectives of the Wehrmacht`s Typhoon operation:
1. Encircle and destroy the forces of the Western and Bryansk Fronts of the Red Army. These two fronts defended the Moscow area. Hitler believed that if you implement this Step, then the Red Army will be no more strength and he can proceed to Step 2.
2. Circumvent Moscow from the north and south.
3. Carry out the seizure of Moscow from the west, north and south.
Typhoon operation began on September 30. At that time, at the direction of Moscow was deployed 15 Russian Armies. This was 1million 250 thousand people. As far as I know, in that moment in that place the Wehrmacht exceeded the Red Army on the number of people and especially the number of tanks.
So, Step 1 was almost entirely made by Wehrmacht in the period from September 30 to October 16. There were encircled seven Russian Armies. Yes, I agree, it was the most dangerous moment.
However, following, some historians usually write that, at first the mud, and then frost, was not allowed the Wehrmacht to perform Step 2 and Step 3.
A small digression about the mud.
Mud in Russia was (and is) always. Already in July 1941, Haider began to complain of it. Mud was for both parties. It did not give any advantage Russian armies. The war came along roads. This allowed one side to concentrate forces for the attack. It allows to other side to keep the defense on the important directions. If they have any forces for defensive.
So. Someday I'll tell about the feat of Podolsk cadets who kept the defense on a highway leading to Moscow. 5 days. The boys were 17 years old. And behind them was empty. No mud prevented the Wehrmacht to seize Moscow. Only the courage of these boys. Or cavalry attack Oct. 16 on the Volokolamsk highway? There were killed nearly 4000 people, but they delayed the promotion of the Wehrmacht. I can give such examples are many. All the defense of Moscow - is a set of such examples. And heavy rains were in the period from October 19 to November 2. Then came the frost.
About the frost.
Through November and early December, the air temperature was minus 5-6 degrees Celsius. In November the lowest temperature (minus 15 degrees) was one day - Nov. 13. In December, the lowest temperature was on 5th of December (minus 24 degrees). Only in January the temperature dropped to minus 32 degrees (it was only one day, January 3). The average January temperature was minus 20 degrees. It was really cold. And in December, the average temperature was minus 11 degrees. I think it is not so cold. And it stopped the Wehrmacht to seize Moscow in Desember?
At least Guderian did not go to Moscow until he could take Tula. The defensive of Tula was from October 24 to December 5. It was by the remains of the 50 th Army and local residents. I have to clarify that in Tula was a major weapons factory and it has allowed to arm the population. But for example, in Leningrad, there was no such plant, and they began to produce peaks and swords. And, I think that if the Germans entered the Leningrad, they would also tested it for yourself.
And more.
I wrote that on 30 September the Red Army had 1,250,000 people at the direction of Moscow. On November 16, on the Western Front of Red Army were only 240 thousand people in eight Armies. Bryansk Front was completely defeated and disbanded (abolished). But in the rear the new Reserve and Kalinin fronts was began to form. And the period from September, 1941 to April, 1942 the completion of the Red Army outside Moscow was 3,5 million people (including volunteers).
So, IMHO, my opinion why the Wehrmacht was defeat outside Moscow (and in general in the war against Russia - as it called in the title of this theme) the next:
The first. In Russia, there were more human resources. Stalin`s Government was able to manage this resource. These resources are replenished army, fed and clothed her, build fortifications and shelters, produced weapons.
The second, main. These were not just resources. These people fought not sparing his life for the liberation of their homeland (Russians have a saying: «Ne zhaleya zhivota svoego». It means: «We must fight without sparing his stomach»). They were warriors, heroes and defenders of the Fatherland.

 

Just a logical question; If the Red Army had been unable to stop the Wehrmacht until the fall rains, then why is it as soon as the mud came that is when the Red Army suddenly became capable? Are we supposed to assume that the Germans were stopped by the Red Army and the weather wasn't a decisive factor?

 

I thnk that this is the logical answer:the Germans were stopped by the Red Army,a few days before the winter,although other factors were concurring :the mud,the distance,the logistic problems,but these factors were not determining .The Germans knew that the longer the war,the more they would become weakener,and the more the Soviets would become stronger:every day,there were fewer Germans (see my post on the German losses ans replacements) and more Russians .At the end of november,the Soviet defensive capability was stronger than the German offensive capability and the Germans gave up .
But the German defensive capability was not broken:they would prove it by resisting succesfully to the Soviet winteroffensive .