Germans doomed to failure

Btw :it was not as soon as the mud came:it was a gradual process.The Germans destroyed the Russian army in the West,but in september they were facing a new one ,and,(with hindsight) one can say that already they were defeated,but,they tried again,they destroyed the Russian armies defending Moscow ,and,the result was the same as in september,it was all useless :there was again a (bigger!) Russian army ,and the Germans were that weakened (till september,they had lost 400000 men,between september and december a further 350000),that they gave up :it was over .

 

The German high command was panicking by August. Halder was scared. I don't remember who said it, but the quote goes that he "wore an impassive mask of manliness but behind it he was frightened." In the light of that, it does not seem fair to argue that the Russian army was not fighting effectively until weather intervened.

 

The argument that the weather would decide everything is a logical fallacy. Basically, one change a historical variable in favor of one faction without supposing the other faction would adjust its strategy to the change. I for one don't think Stalin would stay in Moscow if he didn't think he could hold it.

If the Germans occupied Moscow, the Red Army would still have prepared its counteroffensive. That doesn't really leave the Germans in a stronger position than they did historically.

 

If we follow the logic of the presence and the absence of mud and frost, it is probably that the Wehrmacht could take the U.S. or the UK. There are good roads, no mud.
But I doubt that this could happen. In my opinion the United States has large resources. And the UK was distinguished determination to fight against Nazism. All countries, enslaved by Hitler, fought bravely, but had fewer resources and opportunities.
Perhaps, only France had similar resources. But probably France had fallen what they were insufficiently prepared for war.
USSR:
- had a large and managed resources
- bravely fought
- preparing for war (perhaps not good enough, but coming soon).
Why they stop just in front of Moscow?
At that time there was such a propaganda slogan: «Great Russia, but we can’t retreat any longer. Behind us - Moscow! » I can`t say better.

 

I agree, my question was borderline to a rhetorical one. The point is that I don't think anyone can say that the Red Army was suddenly able to defeat the Wehrmacht because it had found its resolve and will to fight as if all of the other factors you just listed didn't exist. That's a pretty silly proposition to me.

 

I don't think anyone is making that argument, however given the particular tactical situation as it concerns the Wehrmacht directly after the Vyazma and Briansk battles the weather certainly did deny the Germans the operational mobility to exploit the tactical advantage they had gained. In the absence of mud it is likely that the Wehrmacht takes Moscow after Vyazma and Briansk regardless of any change in strategy by the Red Army in the brief window of time we're referring to.

Agreed, but it does leave the Soviets in a weaker position strategically speaking having lost the rail hub of Moscow which served as a vital staging area for the whole Moscow counter-offensive. So relatively speaking, the German position is stronger. Even if the Germans were able to take Moscow in a scenario like this, it doesn't appear as though it would be near enough to force the Soviets to capitulate.

 

I don't think a few miles or less really matters given that
1. Gorky was operational as alternative capital and RR transport center
2. Soviet counteroffensive was launched with units and resources gathered in Asia
3. Wehrmacht still weakened by combat and cold casualties

As one retired NATO colonel (S-2 in 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade) put it--if the Germans actually went further, they would be in Siberia for counterblow. LJAd had alluded to the German evaluation that Moscow was of no particular importance except powerful concentration of Red Army units existed there.

 

I thought the German plan was to surround and isolate Moscow prior to assaulting it. This means that while they may have got within 20 miles of it they probably had 60+ miles to go in two seperate thrusts to surround the city. Then prep for and assault it. This is not somthing that going to be quick nor is it particularly quick taking a city that is well defeneded. Futhermore the requirment to have both interior and exterior lines defending the encirclement would render the Germans somewhat exposed to counter attacks locally. Then there's also the possiblity of counter attacks further west that might cut off the whole thrust. I'm not all that convinced that what you suggest is sufficent to insure the fall of Moscow. Certainly the examples set at Lenningrad and Stalingrad don't tend to support it either.

 

Gorki is also as far away from Moscow as Smolensk in in the other direction and therefore no more support to the Red Army as a transportation hub than Smolensk is to the Wehrmacht.

Myth.... Opeartion Barbarossa: Siberian Division Myth

True, but these casualties were a product of the Soviet counter-offensive and not something that would have been a major issue without it. The Germans would have been better served with the Moscow rail hub in their hands and not the Soviets. The city of Moscow played a hugely important role as a staging area for the counter-offensive. If the city is in German hands the Red Army's ability to even launch an offensive is significantly diminished. Bear in mind that just like the Wehrmacht, the Red Army has to support large formations in space without sufficient logistical assets. If you take Moscow out of the equation as the logistical base for the counter-offensive I find it hard to believe that the Red Army would be able to project enough force and provide sufficient field sustainment to be nearly as effective as they were historically.

 

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and if there was no counteroffensive,would this change anything ?

 

I totally agree with you. Moreover, it is an indisputable fact. I quote:

«PART FROM THE ORDER OF CONTINUING OPERATIONS
Command of Army Group Centre Operations department ¹ 1960/41 Top Secret
Headquarters of Army Group 14.10.1941g.
1) The enemy in front of Army defeated. Remnants of retreating, going places in the counterattack. Army Group pursues the enemy.
2) The 4-th Panzer Group and the 4-th Army without delay a blow to Moscow, which aims to break with Moscow are the enemy and firmly grab the surrounding countryside to Moscow, as well as tightly surround the city…….
2-th Panzer Army, to this aim should go to the area southwest of Moscow-waste so as to make it under the guise of the East, came from Moscow to the south-east, and later, also from the east. Of importance for the supply of industrial districts Stalinogorsk, Tula and Kashira should be captured as soon as possible and well covered.
4-th Army, with its subordinate 4-th Panzer Group, with separation on his right flank, motorized units must meet the environment or the coverage of Moscow from the south, west and north, under the cover of the north and northeast. It is possible that in future there will need to strike motorized units in the direction of Yaroslavl and Rybinsk.
Dividing line to encircle Moscow from the north and south between the 2 Panzer Army and the 4-th Army will be installed in accordance with the development of the situation. Encirclement of the city will eventually be narrowed down to the District Railway. This line, on the orders of Hitler, should not step over any German soldiers. Any surrender shall be refused. Otherwise, the behavior toward Moscow will be announced in a special order. »

And another document:
«DIRECTIVE of OKH
Army Group Centre
Operational department
¹ 1968/41 Top Secret
Headquarters of Army Group, the 10/15/1941
Headquarters of the German Armed Forces ordered:
Fuhrer once again decided that the surrender of Moscow should not be accepted, even if it will be offered to the enemy.
Moral justification for this action is quite clear in the eyes of the world. As well as in Kiev, as a result of explosions in slow motion, our troops have extremely dangerous, and therefore must be an even greater extent with those in Moscow and Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will defend to the last soldier, announced on Russian radio.
Should be considered a serious risk of epidemics.
Therefore, no German soldiers should not enter into these cities, and anyone who tries to leave the city against our lines, should be fired and drove back. »


In Russia, these documents are published in this book (it consists two parts): http://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/4561775/
Original of these documents is kept in the archives of the Ministry of Defence: the fund 500, inventory of 12,462, the case 114. These documents are available to all comers.

So, when I say that the Germans wanted to capture Moscow, I mean their strategic goal. They wanted to achieve this strategic goal by tactics of encirclement and isolation (like Leningrad). But they have not even reached tactical result.

Now it's very funny to read the German newspaper «Volkischer Beobachter», wich wrote on Oct. 18, 1941:
«It is not necessary to explain in detail the strategic significance of the battles at Vyazma and Bryansk. The whole world has realized that the operation destroyed the last fully operational Bolshevik troops - Army Group Tymoshenko - and thus decided the fate of the Eastern campaign. »

 

Yes, frostbite would not an issue since German troops are not forced out into the elements to engage in combat operations. They were deficient in proper winter gear, but without being forced to engage in combat out in the elements there wouldn't be much of an issue. There would also not any major loss of heavy equipment if there wasn't a retreat. Armored units could sent to the rear and rehabilitated for Spring 1942 operations.

 

http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Graphics/typhoon7.jpg

You can see how close the Germans came to actually surrounding Moscow, and this was after the ground froze in mid-November. Now if you factor out the mud and hypothetically give major elements of Pz Groups two and three operational freedom around 14 Oct instead of a month later I believe they would promptly complete the encirclement. at that time they were stronger than they would be one month later (historically) and the Red Army was much weaker with Moscow's defenses only just being raised.
Moscow was only lightly defended relative to Leningrad and Stalingrad at that time and never enjoyed any of the terrain advantages of either of those cities.
Then consider the following excerpt from " Terrain factors in the Russian Campaign" as it relates to German operational freedom in the brief time period we are discussing:
"On the highway between Smolensk and Vyazma in late October 1941, 6,000 supply trucks piles up, most of them loaded with ammunition, rations, and fuel for the forces advancing on Moscow."

I would add the rest of the quote but this site simply won't allow it. Is there some sort of copyrighted text detector that blocks cut and pasted material?

 

I would like to add another link where there is a map showing the planned attack by the Germans during Operation Typhoon, and the maximum result that was reached by them: http://rkka.ru/maps/moscow2.jpg

 

my point is the following :for the 1st quarter of 1942,the Germans lost 280000 KIA,WIA,MIA,the SU 1.6 million (a ratio 1-5.7) while this was for 1941 1-5.
The sickness (including frostbite) were for both some 270000,but the frostbite cases were limited,maximum some 100000,and,the number of amputations and dead due to frostbite also was limited,(there are few informations about frostbite cases),but,whatever,my questions are
1) was the Russian winteroffensive advantageous to the SU (from a military POV)?
2) if there was no winteroffensive,who would benefit more:the SU or Germany ?

 

Since the USSR fought a war of atrition rather than one of manuver I would say yes to question 1. But it could be argued that limited spoiling attacks during the winter would acomplish much the same atrition on German Infantry units at less overall cost to the USSR.

 

I personally believe Stalin´s main idea was to destroy the whole of Army group Center, not just make the Germans retreat. Zhukov tried to change the "attack on the whole front" strategy but was not able to. This time Hitler´s "not a step back" saved the front but personally I guess it was a close call. Perhaps with Zhukov´s attack ideas they could have made certain pressure points to break the front, encircle and destroy the whole of AGC. Think of that scenario...

 

Which goes to show that Hitler was not the only one to attempt to bite off more than he could chew.

 

Counterattack plan (text in Russian can be found here http://rkka.ru/docs/zhukov/zhukov2.htm) was approved by Stalin the November 30, 1941. It provided for the application of two strokes. The first strike had to be from a place north of Moscow. Second – from the south. Direction of these strokes was converging in the city Vyazma. In fact, the city Vyazma was achieved only forces from the area south of Moscow. Encirclement of German troops did not happen. There were only small "pots". Therefore, from a military point of view, this winter offensive could be called a failure or not performed until the end. But on the other hand it was the first such large-scale promotion of the Red Army back to the west and the liberation of its territory from the Germans. It was a lot of German POW. And all this happened near Moscow, which means a lot to all Russian. Yes, the Red Army suffered huge losses because the attack was being prepared in a hurry. Troops went into battle is not together, in parts, sometimes with very few weapons (because it has not yet come to a place of concentration).
If this offensive was no, Russian would have suffered more. The Germans already had the opportunity to fire at Moscow from the long-range artillery. They could move airfields closer to the front line and bomb territory close to the Urals (where unfolded factories for the production of weapons). And most importantly - it would break the morale. It is important to understand. Russian never prepared to fight in defense. They could think only of the offense.
When you read reports of the Red Army fighting for the period from June 22 to December 5, 1941, there is very little is said about the defense. It is constantly ordered to attack. And it is constantly informed about attempts to counterattack by the Red Army. This led to huge losses. But it delayed the promotion of the Wehrmacht.
Incidentally, this doctrine has almost destroyed Russia in 1942. There was a series of failed offensives (the largest is - the battle for Kharkov and Lublin operation) which ended in defeat the Red Army and the heaviest losses.