Germans doomed to failure

A good book to look at would be Panzer Operations, by Erhard Raus. Raus, and Austrian, did not feel the need to protect the fatherland as many German generals did and spoke openly about the lack of preparedness of the German army for a campaign of this magnitude. He pointed out their inability to effectively move men, material and artillery.

I would also suggest Wikipedia as a good starting point. Reading their articles can give you a good general view as well as good resources for you to check and delve deeper.

David Glantz, a writer of great depth on the Soviet Union and WWII on the eastern front, wrote When Titans Clashed. It is a good book to get a general view of the four year struggle between the two countries.

My own opinion is that Germany was not prepared for any type of war beyond the short burst fights that it waged in '39 and '40. During Barbarossa they were still relying on grossly inferior armor, much captured material, and a limited supply of the necessary motor transport (trucks) necessary for modern warfare. Germany was in no way prepared for what she bit off during WWII and Barbarossa was the beginning of the end for them.

 

the tanks were only an exemple
Well,I don't think it would matter if the Germans had gotten further by 1 september,because the plan was not to reach a certain point on 1 september,but to have destroyed the Red Army,and the nearer to the frontier,the better .If on 1 september,the front was 100 km more to the east or to the west,was not that important:the important thing was that on 1 september,there was no more front and the Germans could advance to the A-A line ;the longer the fighting would continue,the worser for the Germans .If ,after 1 september,the fighting was not over,that would mean that the chances to finish the war in 1941,were becoming insignifiant .And,this depended not on the Germans,but on the Russians .That's,IMHO,the mistake of Barbarossa:the whole thing was very unstable:success or failure depended not on what the Germans could-would do,but,on what the SU could-would do,and,the forecast of what the SU could-would do,was ,of course,influenced(as in every hierarchical structure),by the decisions of the top:no one would look after things that would prove that the decision of the top was impossible.
The 2 big problems-uncertainties were
1) would the Red Army engage the battle on the frontier,or would it retire to the hinterland (a bad thing for the Germans)? The forecast was:it would engage the battle on the frontier,it had to be,otherwise;it was very bad for the Germans :thus:wishfull thinking
2)could the Germans destroy the Red Army,before the force generation?The forecast was :yes;it had to be,otherwise,it was very bad for the Germans:thus:wishfull thinking .
On the German behavior:it was important,but,IMHO,the importance for the success or failure of Barbarossa has been overestimated.
1) the effects of an other occupation policy were important only,if they were influencing the campaign,before september:the decision had to fall before september,if Russian soldiers were deserting after september,would not influence the war .
2)was there a possibility of a mass surrender before september ?The problem is that,while we know how much Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner between june and september (1.5 million,if the German sources are reliable),we don't know how much of them surrendered voluntarily (we know of some units from the Baltics) .The fact that there was a spreaded discontent in the SU,does not mean a massive surrender or desertion in the army .After all,there was a lot of discontent in Germany (millions had voted communist or socialist),but I think that only an insignifiant part of the German POW surrendered because of hostility to the regime .
About the resistance behind the lines:while it was influencing the outcome of the war,it was not important for the success or failure of Barbarossa :the first resistance groups were acting only in 1942.

 

Broadly (!) speaking,I agree,under the following reservation:Germany was not prepared for Barbarossa,but,it could do no better .
On the sources :a good book ,and,IMHO (!),a must (for the German side) is :
The Wages of destruction by A. Tooze

 

I'd say Germany was not prepared for WWII (duh!). They did not use their industry, scientists, or civilian population effectively. Their air force was ill suited for anything but tactical army support. Clearly any fighting that necessitated a major effort would drain them beyond their capacities.

I look forward to the day when I can read Wages. It will sit on my shelf until I can tackle 700 pages and I get my head out of armor.

 

LJ;
Well the smashing German successes of 1941 should have caused a collapse of morale in the Soviet camp that should have made the question of reserves a moot point. It did not, and the reasons why are as complex as humanity-but if you look at the old photos you will see a steely determination on the faces of the defenders of Moscow and all along the front. They set down their tools and picked up the guns and were killed in numbers incomprehensible to us Westerners. They stopped NAZI in it's tracks.
Why? Well it had a lot to do with the ancient Russian concept of Rhodina-but there is also the fact that Hitler INC was heavily obsessed with genocide.
JeffinMNUSA

 

If we accept the premiss that Germany inflicted losses on the Soviet Union that would have destroyed or demolished any other nation, and failed to use either their industry, science or civilian work force wisely and employed a race policy sure to stiffen Russian resistance, then it begs the question that perhaps had Germany done the things they did not and framed their invasion as a true act of liberation, then perhaps a different outcome was at least marginaly possible.

 

In regard to better Intelligence I'm suggesting that they needed to have knowledge of the Red Army formations that made up the 2nd strategic echelon (and dispositions), some idea of actual Soviet force generation capability (deep areial recon), provide better maps to the mobile formations and also to take heed of weather/seasonal data that was available (they did fight there from 1914-1919 after all; Freikorps in 1919).
With a better overall picture of the Red Army the OKH operational planning staff could have adjusted their plan in such a way as to account for the Red Army's strategic depth. I'm sure the shock of the data would give Hitler and his staff pause, but considering the relative strength of the Axis to the Soviets at the time and the Nazi agenda I'd say that Hitler would likely go for it just the same. In order to gather the necessary additional strength Hitler may have taken a different stance on the Yugoslavia issue and not invaded that country (which was going to join the Axis anyway) as well as Greece. The Italian position in Albania was embarrassing, but stable where it was. By foregoing the Greek/Balkan campaign the Axis could start Barbarossa slightly earlier and with more strength. The objective would still be to destroy the Red Army before it could gather its full strength, but that initiative would now take on Moscow as the primary means to disable Soviet Force generation.
With a modified operational plan with dual emphasis on the central axis to Moscow through Smolensk and through the South via Kiev, the logistical support plan would be modified to support major operations beyond Smolensk which is a departure from the original/historical Barbarossa. Bear in mind that the main reason for the pause at Smolensk historically was because that is where the logistical support plan for major offensive operations basically ended (based on pre-campaign assumptions of enemy capability and the subsequent operations request for that level of support). In the scenario I'm suggesting, preperations are made to support major offensive operations through Smolensk to perhaps Vyazma/Briansk to wait out the Rasputista and gather strength for a November envelopment and capture of greater Moscow. The operational tempo of major operations beyond Smolensk in August/September would have a very negative effect on Soviet Force generation because the armies that the Red Army used historically in November were still forming in September. What I am suggesting has great potential to delay the culminating point of the campaign for the Germans to mid-December which would allow them to consolidate greater Moscow, thus displacing and retarding Soviet communications, transportation capacity and ultimately force generation.

Its certainly no slam dunk, but its a better scenario that what they faced historically.

 

I agree to a point. However if the Germans can advance further faster then they are going to encircle more Soviet formations. Whether it's enough to destroy the Red Army is an open question but this sort of thing can feed on itself especially if their more rapid advance lets them sever Soviet logistics and comunication links.

 

In all written history about the WW2 it is mentioned that the German Generals were very good, very professional, brilliants, military genius etc. men like Manstein, Guderian, Rommel, Heinritsi, Zeitzler, Von Kleist..and thousands others, top rank and top level officers.​

It is very difficult for me to believe that they planned the beginning of a lost campaign and took part also giving all their energy for the victory in vain.​

Otherwise we have to accept that Hitler and all of them were just not realized reality and they lived in another planet, in another world. O.K. this happened in the end (for Hitler) but not from the beginning.​

​

I think we must see the facts not with today’s mind but trying to understand the situation of the things in 1940-41.
1) Spain was neutral with possibility to follow Axis
2) Turkey was neutral with possibility to follow Axis (imagine the difference in the East Front if Turkey attacked Russia from the South).
3) Japanese could attack Russia from the East so the Siberian army will be engaged.
Just the above 3 factors could change the situation.
4) USA was neutral and there were a big propaganda for stay out of the European war.
Hitler thought and acted like Napoleon. He was the leader of Central superpower (Germany) which was surrounded by Peripheral Superpowers (England and Russia).
It seems that Hitler like Napoleon was afraid of England (or at least had great respect) so he chose not to attack them and preferred to attack Russia. In Hitler’s mind if he had defeated Russia, maybe England would asked for peace and cooperation because they will be alone with no help in Europe.
Germans has in mind WW1. Russia asked for peace after a revolution against a cruel regime. They waited the same situation to happen. Stalin has executed maybe 35.000 Russian officers so army was in not good condition, they could not even have any success in the war against Finland. People were just a step away from the revolution against Stalin.
The only factor which was critical was the time. Time was limited.
Everything should be finished in 3 months, till middle of Autumn.
The Germans had chances if Barbarossa were a real Blietzkrieg. They had to win the Red Army before River Dnepr.
But for a Blietzkrieg you need to have superiority in air. This was not achieved 100%.
In the beginning, the situation was good for them but as the resistance of the Red Army was harder day by day, they started to slow down and to delay to follow they time schedule.
Also Germans did not have any specific target to achieve. In the beginning they focus to Leningrad and generally to Moscow directions. Then Hitler split the force to take the agricultural Ukraine and the Industrial South Don area. Then he could not leave the Mass Red Army around Kiev without defeat it, not only because it was a good opportunity but also in order to secure the South side of the attack force to Moscow.
Much time passed and all the chances lost. The German angry flood was almost frozen just out of Moscow.

So I believe that the Germans were not obligatory lost from the beginning of the campaign because of lack of supplies etc. They had many weak points and it was matter of time these points to become critical.

 

I rarely entertain alternate scenarios, too much to learn about the history that occurred. I would point out that Germany invaded the USSR because they thought them an inferior object of conquest so your question necessitates a drastic change for Germany. In addition at what point during the destruction of the Soviet army and air force, the conquest and destruction of Soviet cities and the stealing of resources would the Soviet citizenry feel liberated?

 

I disagree. While at the time the outcome may not have been obvious it seems to me that the point of this thread is that looking back on it from today it's clear that Germany had little chance to win especially after they attacked the Soviet Union.

 

You make a fair point that when dealing with alternate/counter factual history you cannot work in a vacume. Any change affects the things around them. That being said, I must respectully disagree that while they may have been drastic to Nazi's, it was well within the capacity of Germany. Germany accepted Craftsman/piecework aproache to production rather than mass production as applied by Russia and the Allies. Germay could have rationalized what they produced, moving away from wonder weapons and concentrating on practical ones. Germany was also far too late to fully employ their civilian workforce in productio, relying on slave labor who had no interest in Germany's victory.

As for people of the SU, Germany could have left the Einsatzgruppen in Poland along with their racial policies. They could have actively supported the creation of local anti-communist governments, with real power and own army, in the Ukraine and Bylorussia. They could have held off presenting their true nature, and steal everything in sight, until they had achieved there goal. There would be plenty of time to crush the puppet governments once the SU collapsed. Granted hard for Nazi's, but not impossible by any means.

Whether this would be enough, thankfully we will never know. I am uncomfortable with absolutes like 'they never had a chance'.

 

I'll give one example of how deficient the Germans were in critical areas related to logistics. That being construction / civil engineering. The Germans entered Russia and found very quickly nether the road nor rail system sufficent to sustain their advance properly. Their own construction troops were virtually non-motorized and had to work with little more than hand tools on their various construction and repair projects.

A single 1000 man (give or take a few) US Army combat engineer battalion with a equipment company attached or, a single 1000 man US Navy CB battalion had more construction capacity than an entire Corps' worth of engineer units that would typically be present. One battalion versus roughly 10,000 German construction troops and the US is out performing them.
This makes a huge, huge difference. If the Germans were equipped in just engineering equipment to US standards they wouldn't have lost masses of equipment to abandonment when it became mired so badly it couldn't be economically recovered. They would have had their trucks last far longer even on dirt roads as the availability of rollers, graders, bulldozers and, dump trucks would have kept these smoother and improved them faster.
On D+2 in Normandy the US had landed a mobile rock crushing plant to make sand and gravel for cement, road beds, and other construction uses. US-like engineer units could also haul in and set up massive camps of Quonset huts and other portable buildings that would have made a tremendous difference in the frigid winters encountered. How many fewer troops would have succumb to weather given adequite shelter built by engineers?

All of this plays back to keeping the troops at the front fighting effectively. It also is a force multiplier. How much more effective would the Germans be if they could throw a bridge over a major river like the Don in a matter of hours instead of days? The US did that at the Rhine. The 281st Engineer battalion threw 3 bridges across that river in a mere 24 hours by themselves.

3000 or so engineers in three regiments built the Alcan Highway in less than 6 months.

If the Germans were capable of even half these sorts of feats they would have made the difference between defeat and victory in 1941 - 42. But, the Germans paid scant attention to such things. Construction units often got the least capable troops. They were way down the list for issues of equipment. Logistics and engineering in modern war are ignored at the peril of the army doing so.

 

I have some objections:
as the road nor rail system in Russia was sufficient to sustain the German advance,the problem that the German construction troops were not motorized,was irrelevant :motorized troops without roads would not be useful
you also overestimated the possibility of the Germans to motorize their army:the German,nor the European economy could do this .(a good source is Tooze)
there is also the problem of
a) how to supply the motorized troops :fuel,spare parts,..
b)how to supply a whole army :the only possibility is with railroads
I doubt that a motorized army would advance in the rasputitza .
Last point:I am not convinced by the theory that a motorized German army could advance faster than a non motorized army:my assumption is that the German problems were due principally to the resistance of the Russian army .

 

I see Germany as a mid sized country which had geared up and trained for war but was completely incapable of sustaining a war the size of WWII. The good tactics,high training and armaments on hand led to quick victories but the end would always, in my mind, have been the same.

 

I say this only once (....censored:I am talking as Michelle of the Resistance )
1) on 22 june 1941,Germany was faced with a 2 front war:a lot of Europe was to be occupied,there was a naval war with Britain:construction of more submarines,a lot of the LW was committed in the war against Brittain,in one year the LW losses were enormous,a lot of resources were committed in the strengthening of the LW and in the Air Defense of the Reich
2)The plan was :defeat the SU in 10 weeks,because a)Germany would be weakeningb)the SU would become stronger:the success of Barbarossa depended as much,or even more on the assumption that the Red Army would not be stronger ,as on the German possibilities
3)the comparison with the US army in France in 1944
a)the US army was more motorized because it was smaller :some 30 divisions against 120 German ones(later 150)
b)the non combat units of the US army were very strong,it would mean for the Germans1 million extra,and,this was impossible
c)what was the prestation of this motorized US army?:after the break out from Normandy,there was an advance not hindered by the exhausted Germans,and ,then,the whole thing stopped (any chance of finishing the war in 1944 was lost),because the logistics failed.And why did the logistics fail ? Because ,during the outbreak,the army could not be supplied by trucks:were needed:working railrods and the port of Antwerp.And,the whole infrastructure of Western Europe was thousand times better than the one of Eastern Europe.
Conclusion:I don't think that the US army of 1944 would have done better in june 1941than the Germans.

 

Hitler was also so obsessed with the idea that the USSR will crumble to pieces in weeks that he actually was lowering production figures of ammunition etc before the Barbarossa when he should have done just the opposite. "He had won before the first shot was fired." So that´s why Hitler was only able to offer 200 new tank engines to Guderian when the latter went to see Hitler and demanded more new tanks to replace the lost and worn ones in August/September 1941.

 

We will have to respectfully agree to disagree on this.

Best reguards, Belasar

 

3)the comparison with the US army in France in 1944
a)the US army was more motorized because it was smaller :some 30 divisions against 120 German ones(later 150)

I just wanted to point out that Germany did indeed have more divisions but looking at this number alone is misleading, no? The US built a huge strategic air force to fight in two theatres, a huge military navy to fight on two theatres, a huge merchant navy two supply two theatres, and provided armaments to a number ofallied countries involved in the war. Looking at those production figures and comparing the number of trucks might be more...accurate? Remember that many of Germany's divisions were not full strength, some not even close, btw.

 

To you as well.