Germans doomed to failure

Of course,the US divisional slice was much bigger,but ,I don't think that the US would be able to have a 2.7 million army in the east,of whom 2 million belonging to the combat units;that should mean for the US (if one assume that 50 % belonged to the non combat units) some 4 million men ,and , I think this would be unlikely .
The comparison (between the Germans in 1941 and the US in 1944) is also faultly for the following
a) the western front was much smaller than the eastern one
b)the infrastructure in the west was much better
c)the proportion of non US troops(British...) was much bigger than the troops of the German allies
d)the role of the air force in the west was much bigger than in the east
e)the US troops had to be supplied from the US by transport vessels
f) while the Germans could concentrate the main part of their army and airforce for Barbarossa,the US had a war against Japan,a war in Italy,the air offensive against Germany,...
g)if one should compare 22 june with a date in 1944,which one ? 6 june,1 september ?
my conclusion :both armies were fighting in totally different situations (geografic,infrastructure)against a totally different enemy(that should be point h):the US could not have an army of the scale of Germany (quantitative )and Germany could not have an army as the US (qualitative),thus arguing that the fact that the Germans were not motorized as the US was a fault of the Germans and a proof that they were neglecting and disdaining logistics,is ,IMHO,wrong .

 

I am not sure if Hitler's order from 20 june 1941 was that important,
1) I know that the general content was that the army production should be diminished to the benefit of the LW
2) but,i have been unable to finf the precise content of that order
-the diminution should be how much ?:5 %,10 % ?
-should the diminution be the same for ta

 

I was suddenly interrupted
continuing
should the diminution be the same for tanks,artillery,weapons,ammunition,...?
when would the new armaments program start?
and,what were the results of Hitler's order ? :to oblige the war economy to change fromdirection would take time,much time (there were also a lot of orders from Hitler that had no results due to the bureaucratic resistance)
after the fall of France ,an increase of the tank production was planned,but it would take years to obtain the proposed numbers
3) what was the problem?Why was Hitler unable to give Guderian enough tanks ?
a) underestimation of the tank casualties
b) maybe a diminishing of the tank production,because of Hitler's orders,although I have my doubts
c)maybe that an increase of the tank production was needed,that even with the existing tank production,the demands from Guderian could not be realized
d)the transport problems:even if,without Hitler's order(?), enough tanks were available in Germany,they could not be transferred to the front
e)even if Guderian had received his tanks,IMHO,the result would be the same:the chances for a German victory in 1941 were gone (if the even existed)
Some informations (from Va Banque PP 89 and 90)
Nr of tanks in the East on 22 june 1941 :3721 (Stug and Bef.Pz included)
Losses till 3Oseptember:1502
Reinforcements : 116
Production (july,august,september):1023
Thus,the problem was not only the failing production,but most important,the transport problems
The same figures (for october,november,december)
Losses :1014
reinforcements:391
production:1252
Thus,curiously enough,in the 4th quarter,the situation was becoming better:less losses,more reinforcements,more production .And ,why was the production increasing,was there a new order fromHitler to increase the tank production ? But it would take any order months,to produce results (increase or decrease)

 

I think that in discussing this topic we have missed one important aspect. The Germans were doomed to failure because since 1917 Russia (USSR) had been preparing for war. «Preparing» - means in the broadest sense of this word. Why it was preparing for war? Because the purpose of existence of Russia was the World Revolution and building of Communism worldwide. The ideologues of communism believed that this could be done only during World War. How it prepared? The system of governance, ideology, science, industry, education, culture - all this was aimed (focused) on the military. I think that something like this was in Germany. But Germany was restricted by the Treaty of Versailles. Russia was no limited. In 1940, only the direct costs of military spending accounted for more than 30% of Budget.
Yes, 1941 was a bad year for the Red Army. (The reason of this - it's a topic of another discussion). But in Russia was laid a large military potential. People had mentally prepared for war. Pupils and students were able to handle weapons. Among young people advocated parachute sports, shooting sports and aviation. The system of recruitment was organized as well. And so.
Thus, Germany was doomed to fail also because the Soviet Union thoroughly prepared for war.

 

On the military side books worth having a look at are Erikson's companion pieces [with over four hundred pages of notes & sources alone] 'The Road to Stalingrad' & 'The Road to Berlin' which gives a minute account of the war in the East, and Glantz's 'When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler' although both are viewed chiefly from the Soviet side, both have been reprinted.

Plus just as important is the economics of WW2 & Adam Tooz's 'Wages of Destruction' paints a vivid picture showing how slim the Wehrmacht's chances were from the beginning, & how the Germans had underestimated the scale of Stalin’s crash industrialisation of Russia.


Tooze shows how the bombing offensive against the Ruhr in '43 flattened German production for eleven vital months, & the production revival in '44 was in part because of 8,000,000 mainly forced labourers from the East.

On some key production lines up to 50% were foreign workers, & even higher at times, Milch joked that the Stuka was being 80% built by Russians.


On the other hand, apart from German Generals memoirs there's not much taking the opposite view, but American historian Russel H. S. Stolfi in 'Hitler's Panzer's East: World War II Reinterpreted,' is one who says but for one fateful decision, Germany could have won WW2 in 1941/42.

On.....
Hitler's panzers east: World War II ... - Google Books


Recently saw Stolfi rebut Glantz in letters to the Editor on The Journal of Military History, see if I can find it.

Agree morale & will power played a vital part.


In the end probably the only thing that could defeat the Soviets were......the Soviets themselves, & they were in it to the end.......

". . . If, as Hitler claimed to believe, the Will was all-important, the Germans had already lost the war. For what could they put against the Russians' grim determination to defend the Motherland? Greed for territory and "Sklaven", a contrived doctrine of racial "superiority", some muddled prejudices against "Bolshevism". These things were valueless against the deep patriotism of the Russians . . ."

"Barbarossa", by Alan Clark.

Pretty well sums it up.

Someone wrote & is probably close to the mark.........

I have yet to see a convincing statement that shows Germany could have won in the East without changing the whole German premise for the invasion and the building of German Armed Forces and industry in the late 1930's. To have succeeded would have required differences that the Nazi's and their leader would never have adopted.

 

I agree, but I also must admit it's a BIG what if, for example it's doubtfull whether a less ruthless regime than the nazi one could have achieved the massive rearmement (in just six years!) that allowed the early victories. Germany did defeat Russia in 1917, and while the central powers were fighting a a 3 front war, so a theoretical capability did exist. IMO the weak link were the nazi racist theories that, while greatly stengtheniing Germany's "national will", also prevented the undermining of it's opponents national will turning the war into an attrition affair Germany had no chance of winning given the relative industrial and population bases.

 

Well let's look at the demographics. If we use: World War II casualties - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia the population of the two countries in 1939 is ~69M for Germany and ~131M for the US. So the US has twice the population and since they used more female labor could in a similar situation afford to mobilize an even larger fraction of the male population. Now if we look at the number that served it's ~18M for Germany and ~17M for the US. So the numbers are roughly equal but Germany started the war sooner and with a larger military. The US clearly also produced a lot more equipment (in terms of dollars, or weight, or whatever) per person than the Germans did. Note also that the US was able to keep their fighting formations pretty much up to strength for the duration. Given all this it's not clear to me why one would think they couldn't. It's also not clear that the same tooth to tail raio would be necessary if the US was in Germany's place.

While the actual front lines may have been smaller the area was certainly not especially if the battle of the Atlantic and the Med are included.

In some ways. On the otherhand the road and rail nets had been pretty well savaged by allied TAC air in the west and the Soviets didn't need to build ports from scratch or try to get sabotaged ones back in buisness to the level that was required in the west.

But many of these troops were equiped with US supplied equipment.

Interesting I've heard just the opposite argued many times.

While one needs to be careful comparing it can be done. Remember the US originally planned for 200 divisions. As the impact of logistics became more apparent this was scaled back to ~100. Doubling the size of the US army would add ~11M more troops.

 

Hm,the German population in 1939 was some 80 million ,including Austria and the Sudeten Germans .
My point is that it is impossible to compare both armies,and thus to claim that the US would have done better in 1941 against the SU .
Let's recapitulate:
US (in 1944)
less manpower(even if one is including the British-CW forces)
more motorised
a better infrastructure in Western Europe :would a motorized US army be able to operate in the SU ?
a total superiority in the air
depending on maritime transport
the adversary :was the German army in 1944 a stronger opponent than the Soviet Army in 1941? Impossible to say
the initial commitment of the US in june was limited(because depending on the Mulberries)
would the US be able to send a 2.7 million men (this was the initial German strength )to Eastern Europe,and to supply it ?
Germany
more manpower
less motorized(depending on horses)
the infrastructure in Eastern Europe was primitive
the importance of the air superiority of the LW was much smaller(due to the extent of the front)
the adversary :I think that the strength of the SU army in 1941 has been underestimated,the Red Army was able to reinforce its manpower
the supplies :while the US army was able to continue to supply its forces,it was impossible for the Germans
the weather:would a US motorized army be able to operate during the Rasputitza ?
last point :the mission:the Germans had as mission
a) to defeat the Red Army in 10 weeks
b) to advance in the remaining 13 weeks (september till december) to the Wolga :the distance Brest-Litowsk to Kazan (on the Wolga is 1700 km,and the distance Archangelsk-Astrachan 2000 km)
the Germans failed,would a US army (the same that was operating in Western Europe in 1944)be able to succeed?

 

I can agree that the Germans were doomed to fail in the context of the Barbarossa plan, but I definately don't believe that they were doomed without making massive changes years in advance or in occupation ideology either. The Germans had the administrative and planning capacity to refine and strengthen to the logistical support plan in accordance with necessary changes to the operational plan to carry the initial assualt beyond Smolensk. By carrying beyond Smolensk to Vyazma in August the Wehrmacht would disrupt Soviet force generation (the Armies that defended Moscow in Nov/Dec. were forming in this area and were highly vulnerable) and leave themselves about 100 miles short of enveloping Moscow before the Rasputista of early Oct. That leaves the entire month of November to finish the job against a smaller Red Army that was experienced historically and with far greater strength and support.
Some specific changes to the logistical and personnel support plan:
1) A comprehensive program to assimilate French/Allied military equipment into the German Army complete with spare parts/replacements as opposed to the haphazard and very limited extent that it was exploited (The BEF alone in 1940 left 2,472 guns, almost 65,000 vehicles and 20,000 motorcycles; also abandoned 416,000 tons of stores, more than 75,000 tons of ammunition). If properly collected and salvaged the Wehrmacht could have had hundreds more French tanks, thousands more French/Belgian and British trucks and thousands of military tracked vehicles. A consolidation of Allied trucks into specific trucking units with organic maintenance units with links back to France would have been very helpful.

2) Emphasis on the rail portion of the support plan AFTER the campaign started, unlike the weak effort the Germans made to convert the Soviet network historically. This would require first rate support from the Wehrmacht in the form of equipment along will full support and manpower from the German Railway service (DR).

3) As a longer operational duration and distance would reveal from better Intel on the Red Army, the Wehrmacht could project higher personnel requirements 6-8 months out and plan accordingly (Infantry replacements).

These are just a few general thoughts that come to mind "if" the Germans had a much more in depth Intelligance report on the Soviets prior to planning Barbarossa. The above suggestions do not require massive changes, they merely require a more timely use of existing resources that were available for use at the time. Hindsight is 20/20 though....

 

I think I had to start with the following interesting question
a)the Germans failed to defeat the SU in 1941
b) the US (AND their allies) defeated the Germans in 1944
c)if the Germans had owned the "same" US army of 1944,could they have succeeded? IMHO :very doubtful
d)if the same US-Allied army of 1944,had attacked the SU in 1941,what would be the result ? IMHO :impossible to say .

 

To what extent do you mean "same". Does this include the same level of tactical air support and materiel wealth?

 

And my point was that it isn't. Certainly it's not easy and one has to carefully state the assumptions but valid and worthwhile comparisons are possible.

 

yes:the same ,meaning the same positive and negative points .

 

well ,we have army A (Germans in 1941) that could not defeat army B(Russians in 1941)
and ,we have army C (US +Allies in 1944) that defeated army D (Germans in 1944)
now,could C defeat B ?
We have 4 different armies,that is making the comparison ,IMHO,almost impossible .

 

I want not to take sides,but I have seen some very negative critique on Stolpi (an "operationalist"),and,personally,I am not a big fan of Glantz

 

I'll certainly agree with you that Stolfi's work on Barbarossa has plenty of negative opinions about it (including mine), but I've heard/seen very little criticism of Glantz.

 

That's why we have to be careful in just what comparisons we make and what conclusions we draw. I thought the question was more on the order if the Germans had had resourcees equivalant to the US army in 44 when they launched Barbarosa could they have won? If we take your litterally your phrasing there's no way that the army of the wesern Allies in 44 could even incounter the Red army of 41. Note that the above is only sufficient to start frameing the assumptions/conditions of the question and not enough to draw any strong conclusions.

 

I have read (over on the axis history forum I believe) that some think he doesn't pay enough attention to the German works and was a bit too trusting of Soviet sources. That said I'm not sure there are any better common English language books that use the number and quality of Soviet documents as sources.

 

I think what lwd is trying to point out is two main points.

First, that the US produced an army to fight and win in Northwestern Europe that was scaled and formed to win that campaign taking into account the terrain, weather and enemy forces. Had the US planned to attack an enemy like the USSR, they had the capability, manpower and resources to fashion a larger army of 125 to 135 divisions at the sacrifice of either naval or strategic air production.

The second point is that the actual plan employed by Germany envisioned a lightning victory won in 10 weeks. They attempted this with an army, that while it was large, consisted mostly of strait leg infantry, relying heavily on horse drawn artillery and supplies. Less than 25% of Hitler's forces were mechanized or motorized. It was these mechanized and motorized troops that had to win this victory, not the infantry. The highly mechanized/motorized US army would be far better suited to win a quick (10 week) campaign than Hitler's 1941 army.

T.A. Gardner offered an excellent third point, the US effort in engineers and combat support formations would provide a significant combat multiplier to a US style combat force that Germany could only dream of.

If I may add a fourth point, the US standardization of equipment in armor and transport vehicles would greatly ease any attack.

 

Have you [or anyone else] read Stolfi's 'Hitler's Panzers East: World War II reinterpreted' or Glantz's 'When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler'?

Most of Stolfi's book here.........

Hitler's panzers east: World War II ... - Google Books

Interesting read.

Some very interesting letters to the editor including Stolfi's view on Glantz
& the letter by Robin Neillands on the Brits & their favorite beverage is a hoot, he goes on to say a few words on an Americans views of Montgomery.

Wonder what Lawrence Briskin actually wrote?

Letters to the Editor - Journal of Military History 67:1