Germans doomed to failure

Sorry about my failed attempt at "humor" on the last line, I meant the German mindset wasn't focused on machinery for construction or road repair/improvement as a priority. As to the second part, when it comes to moving snow with a blade it should be remembered that the weight of snow itself varies greatly. Light fluffy snow may only weigh about seven pounds per cubic foot. More average snow may weigh 15 pounds per cubic foot and drifted compacted snow may weigh 20 pounds or more per cubic foot. That said, the average density of most non-graveled topsoil dirt is about 120 pounds per cubic foot.

Obviously moving snow by a blade, angled or straight is going to be much less of a challenge for the machine than moving dirt with the same blade. As to the Germans having snow-blades or not, I wouldn't venture a guess. But, I would be surprised if they didn't employ such items; if for no other reason the area in which they live. Snow removal by blade is a much less strenuous affair for the machine than moving dirt with same.

 

With the proper equipment one can build new parallel roads and have little impact on the road in service. As for reparing roads in service gravel and a road grader can affect a repair pretty quickly in many cases.
Here are some links to the AlCan highway for reference:
web.mst.edu/~rogersda/umrcourses/.../Alcan%20Highway-revised.pdf
Alaska Highway - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Note that it's about 40% longer than the distance from Berlin to Moscow.

 

The real qualifier here is "with the proper equipment"... I don't think the Germans had anything near the equipment used on the Alaskan route. They certainly didn't have near the heavy earth moving equipment the US could field in that instance.

 

By the time a new road is constructed and in operation it will be superceded by rail transport. The construction of new roads in the Soviet Union during Barbarossa was not a feasible plan and also one that wasn't going to aid the advance where it was needed. The front moved too far forward too fast for any kind of new construction to even hope to keep pace with. As impressive as the ALCAN Highway is it wouldn't have been large enough to supply but perhaps a single corps. Considering the massive effort with engineers and equipment working from both ends simultaneously, no traffic or threat of combat it still took far longer than the time the Wehrmacht had to take Moscow in 1941.
The Wehrmacht needed the rail for its heavy lift capacity in the short term, not better roads that could be produced after the fact.

Repairing roads along the Brest-Minsk-Smolensk axis would be problematic at best. Where does all of the gravel, trucks to haul it and fuel for them come from? Besides, like I mentioned above the road surface wasn't what was destroying Wehrmacht trucks prior to the Rasputista it was the dust.

 

Indeed. That's why I've always tried to say US level of resources and not just trucks. I was trying to make it clear that construction equipment (both road and rail) were included as well and the money to buy enough of them whether or not to include a population base on the order of the US is a bit open.

Really? You certainly haven't given us enough numbers to be sure of that.

Not with German construction equipment. I'm not convinced that's true of a better equipped force however.

Well let's see 1,300 miles in a bit over 8 months. that's about 150 miles a month. That means it take from June through Novemeber to build a road from Berlin to Moscow. But of course one could build shorter ones as well. Indeed if it was part of the op plan the roads could even be built to act as rail beds when no longer needed as roads. Certainly additional rail lines would have been very useful. The rail lines didn't run every where either so road spurs would still have been useful.

Or not. How far was it from the Polish border to Moscow? How many mountain ranges did they have to cross? A bit of pre planning and they could avoid things like marshes and swamps as well.

Indeed it needed rail lines but it could have used more roads and trucks as well.

Dust can be dealt with by water or oil or indeed additional gravel. As I mentioned above and in previous posts when I refer to US equipped forces I'm not just talking extra trucks although trucks help as in the above.

 

One additional problem is enemy action, US style small highly mecanized work teams would not survive in the USSR unless protected by other forces, the German large manpower construction units had a self defence capability.

Found this nice therad on the axis history forum that seems to show buldozers were not in production, using a conversions based on a heavily armoured tank chassis would make little sense is a purpose built design was available. Even snow ploughs were apparently pretty rare though they used a number converted from captured tankettes (Renault UE and carriers).
Axis History Forum • View topic - Engineer Panzers? Snow Plows?

 

Seems to me your wandering off topic to abstract thoughts of US capabilities from actual Wehrmacht capabilities in 1941 within the context of whether or not the Germans were doomed to failure or not.

By the time a new road is constructed and in operation it will be superceded by rail transport.

No I haven't, they are common, in several sources and I'm sure you've seen them (lets give each other some credit here, we're not new to how German rail conversion progressed during Barbarossa). Otherwise the "numbers" I'm talking about are fact, not a hunch or guess I need to prove. For example: The rail line to Minsk was opened on 5 July and recieved supply trains the same day. Once the main railhead is pushed sufficiently forward the roads behind it are of secondary importance with the primary roads now emanating to and from the railhead to support the advance.

From your source- "The official start of construction took place on March 8, 1942 after hundreds of pieces of construction equipment were moved on priority trains by the Northern Alberta Railways to the northeastern part of British Columbia near Mile 0 at Dawson Creek. Construction accelerated through the spring as the winter weather faded away and crews were able to work from both the northern and southern ends."

Seems apples and oranges to me.

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Water on dusty roads as a solution in Barbarossa? Its a waste of the very few tanker trucks, water and fuel necessary to even attempt it and I highly doubt its success considering the nature of the Ukraine's roads and dust.
Oil? seriously? There really wasn't a drop to spare for this.
Gravel is also out of the question considering the sheer volume needed for just a few miles let alone several hundred on two main arteries. Thats 10's of thousands of tons if I'm not mistaken.

 

That's certainly not true (that US engineers needed protection). They did quite well on their own in the Bulge for example. SeeBees were well known for working on islands in the Pacific under gunfire and, armored bulldozers were a common sight in engineer units by 1944. US engineers were if anything better armed than German construction units as well having a fair number of .30 and .50 machineguns along with small arms and the occasional "aquired" extras US units seem to have picked up.

 

that the Germans could or not repair-construct roads is not that important,because the importance of the roads for the supply of the German troops was NEGLECTABLE,all was depending on the railways :the normal (thus without an offensive) DAYLY demands of AGC in november 1941 was :32 trains,=128OO tons .The possibility to do this by road is inexistant .

 

The issue is not working under fire, that's a combat engineer not construction engineer role and SeeBees were definetly combat engineers, or operating as emergency troops following an enemy breakthrough, it's having the manpower to setup a reliable defensive perimeter day after day when you don't know when or if hostile forces will appear. For that you need the ability to absorb continuous "attrition" losses without loosing effectiveness, something a small unit of highly trained specialist lacks. Based on current or Vietnam performance US troops have as much trouble as anyone else operating in "contested" rear areas, AFAIK the German construction regiments did double duty as garrison troops, US style units are just too small for that and will need more manpower.

I would tend to agree the railroads were all important, punshing the railheads forward faster would yeld much greater benefits than any road construction work as the scale of the eastern front required rails anyway, diverting effort to road construction looks more like pouring water into a bottomless pit, the scale is just too big. Even today, in peacetime and with the benefit of modern construction equipment, the average state of russian roads remains poor.

 

In general, while not denying the importance of logistics, I want to say that:
1.Vermaht had a limited resource (gasoline, rubber, all kinds of metals)
2. Limited resources we have to choose priorities.
3. I think that, in combat conditions and limited resources, the tank is more important than a bulldozer.

Nevertheless, reading the Halder`s diary, I was surprised how much attention paid Vermaht to logistics and other supply problems. This is very much in comparison with the Red Army. And it is not enough when compared with the U.S. Army.
Nevertheless, in the middle of last century, the basis for the army were men. Ability to fight depended on their abilities and habits. Russian soldier was less spoiled and dependent on welfare. This led to heavy casualties. That's bad. But they eventually won.
Thus, in that time the logistics, equipment and supply were not decisive factors.
There were fighting men, not technique.
Now, in the 21 th century, all is not so))

 

Exactly...

To elaborate on the waste of effort in upgrading roads during the advance:

"After a complex transition, their new rail heads were at various distances from the border in Soviet territory.{7} The Germans considered that the 60-ton (freight capacity) truck columns could bridge approximately 400 km between rail heads and the advancing field armies.{8} As the normal-gauge rail lines were constructed along the most important logistics routes into White Russia from Brest to Minsk, the Germans expected on 17 July to take off most of the 60-ton truck columns from the frontier to Minsk between 20 and 30 July 1941. The columns continued to run from the border in decreasing numbers until finally stopped on 5 August 1941. By then, the rail lines were completed beyond Minsk, and the Germans would be operating from rail heads approaching Smolensk."
(from Chap 11 of Hitler's Panzer East, I don't agree with the author's thesis but he does provide some good factual info).

Why would an army spend significant time, resources and displace priority traffic to marginally upgrade roads that would not be critical to operations after only 44 days?
By 13 August AGC was recieving 24 trains daily at the Smolensk and Orsha railheads which is 75% of the Army Group's needs and is located exactly where it was needed in order to support an advance East to Vyazma In Sept. Therefore I believe that this supports the assertion that the Wehrmacht did not need to improve the roads in order for Barbarossa to succeed. They needed to provide (precampaign planning) additional trucks and additional support to the rail conversion for AGC to support a continuation of the advance into the space where the Red Army was mobilizing its reserve armies for the defence of Moscow and destroy/displace them. This would have allowed the double track trunk line of standard gauge to be run in Sep/Oct to Vyazma and within 50-75 km of the front to support the final operation in Nov.

 

Well, my general opinion is that:
1) The Germans lost as they went for the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The Ukraine was the economica powerhouse of the Soviet Union (I'm going to refer it as SU for short). Hitler thought that he could cripple SU by destroying its economy, but in hindsight, he should have gone straight for Moscow, which was the political, morale, transportation (very important considering the later resuce by the Eastern and the Siberian units), economic (yes, Moscow still was very important to the economy as it was centralized) center of the SU. Hitler's want of quick victory ended with the battle of Kiev. As one German general put it, "Indeed we have won the battle, but the Soviets have won the war"
2) Hitler's expectation of a victory was 10 weeks. Therefore, there was inadequate supplies for the later course of the war. They had inadequate clothing, food, etc.. Most of all, that year's winter was the harshest one in decades. Also, the railroads which were principally used to supply armies in wars couldn't have been used as the SU railtracks were wider than German ones, which caused havoc on supplies
3) The Russians were at first inadequately prepared, with their defenses smashed, their air force completely immobilized, and morale low. However, their defenses depended on formations (instead of fortifications like France). This saved them from complete annihilation. Also, the later arrival of the Far East and the Siberian units gave much needed reinforcements. Also, the German tactic of Blitzkrieg which surrounded armies couldn't have been used in the rough Russian terrain and hundreds of thousands of troops escaped. Also, the SU had what Germany couldn't provide. Innumerable manpower. They could afford heavy losses which were resulted from street fighting (like in Stalingrad, Moscow, Leningrad, etc...). They had continual replacements, while the Germans were fighting a two front war (Actually three fronts if you consider Italy)

These were the main causes of Operation Barbarossa's failure in my opinion

 

I believe most of this is in response to the proposition raised earlier that US style mechanization wouldln't have helped the Wehrmacht. That is what I was taking issue with. Certainly the Germans couldn't afford to do it with their entire army and keep it anywhere near as big.

 

there is also the following:I doubt that,with better roads and railways,the Germans could force the decidion,because,the Germans had not enough(from men to bullets ) to replace the losses.
Ex:men :in 1941there would be 500000 men available for the Ostheer,but,that does not mean that on 22 june 1941,there were in Germany 500000 men chasing girls and drinking Munchen beer and waiting for a transfert to the east .Whatever,the first were leaving for the east in ...september and,it would take them 3 weeks to arrive .
Ex :tanks :in the 3th quarter (july,august,september) the tank production was :1001;112 tanks were leaving for the front,and,at the front, ..1453 were lost .
Ex:MG 34:losses in august 1941 :6186 ;production :5500
Ex:3.7 cm PAK:losses :817 ;production :50(!!)
etc,etc.

 

Welcome to the forum PSK,

The debate between capturing Kiev vs going straight for Moscow has always and perhaps always will remain a hot topic of discussion.

I myself am of the same opinion as Glantz and Erickson; they state the following:

Originally Germany's foundation for victory in the East lay in the destruction of all or as many of the Soviet Armies in the field as possible NOT Moscow; Kiev alone held 4 Soviet Armies. If Germany was to stick to her original plan, Kiev was the correct choice. Had Germany not invaded Ukraine and instead of Kiev went straight for Moscow, the 4 Soviet Armies consisting of more than 600,000 men would have escaped and plagued Von Bock's flank. Also, Ukraine served a number of important objectives for Germany which are commonly overlooked. The first is that Ukraine being the "bread basket" of Soviet Russia, and virtually fed the entire German war machine in the East while simultaneously denying the latter to the Russian troops. The second is that had Ukraine and Kiev not fallen, than the Romanian oil fields which were critical to Germany, would have been within the range of the Russian Air Force. To a country who was counting virtually every drop of oil from the beginning, this was simply unacceptable. Luckily the Germans who invaded Ukraine faired much better in the winter than the men of Halder in Leningrad or Bock's in Moscow as they stripped the population of anything they could and needless to say the civilian population suffered greatly for it.

 

Agree. The German diversion to the Ukraine was on its own merits strategically the correct thing to do. I've never understood why it is referred to as a 'blunder' because it made sense to have Army Group Centre and Army Group South converge on the main concentration of enemy force still in the field. And taking an entire (Soviet) army group prisoner in the Ukraine does not constitute 'failure' in any language.

But in the final analysis Barbarossa was doomed regardless of which choice Hitler made during his deliberations in August 1941. In fact it's hardly surprising that he took so long to think about switching the priority from Moscow to the Ukraine because Barbarossa was disintegrating before him. Shortage of numbers prevented Germany from advancing on a wide front to seize all three aims of Barbarossa, i.e. (1) as much Russian soil as possible was to be occupied. (2) Vital political and economic centres like Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine etc were to be occupied and (3) the Russian army was to be destroyed.

In other words Hitler had to figure out how to enable four panzer groups to perform tasks that required at least six, operating simultaneously. So it did not really matter which way Hitler turned in August 1941. There was no formula that could correct the fundamental flaws at the heart of Barbarossa.

 

Agreed. The forces employed by the Axis for the execution of Barbarossa were inadequate to complete the objectives they were tasked with, therefore Kiev was a great target of opportunity to do the most damage for the least amount of sacrifice. The first half of Taifun was outstanding as well and they probably should have stopped in early November after Vyazma and Bryansk and dug in until spring.

 

Agree that it would have made sense to have dug in until spring. But that would have carried its own potentially serious risks. After all it would have given the Russians the opportunity to solidify their positions in the temporarily quieter fronts. Whatever low opinion Germany still had about the Red Army's operational effectiveness - which was reinforced by Vyazma and Bryansk - there is no doubt that the ferocity of Russian counterattacks did shake their confidence somewhat.

In any case a winter pause was totally out of the question. The Wehrmacht's ethos were steeped in all-out offensive, and who could argue that every single campaign since Poland 1939 had proved the virtue of this mindset? Little wonder then that the idea of a winter pause held no attraction for so many German command echelons. Meanwhile OKH chief Halder still had enough influence at this time to fill Hitler's head with ideas that Barbarossa's original deadline was attainable (though in the privacy of his diaries Halder was already getting very worried about Germany had let themselves in for).

 

According to Halder's Diary there were quite a few generals advocating a pause for the winter, consolidating the lines, withdrawing the mobile divisions for rehabilitation and getting their troops out of the elements. It seems von Rundstedt was fired for advocating some of these ideas. Fedor von Bock was one of the few that still wanted to attack right up until the Soviet counterattack made it clear that the Red Army wasn't exhausted. There was some consternation at OKH (according to Halder) that the Soviets might be planning something, but no one had any idea of the scale of it.