Hatten and Rittershoffen January 1945

From the 42nd "Rainbow" Infantry Division Unit History, entries from Jan 9, 45:

"Defending the town of Hatten was the First Battalion of the 242nd Infantry. Behind them, only a mile away in the town of Rittershoffen, was the Second Battalion of the same regiment, which had just moved up after its engagements at Gambsheim."

"At 0500 on the ninth of January the Germans launched their first attack and the men of the First Battalion began the defense which was to win them a Presidential Unit Citation. The first assault, made by white-clad infantry and with white-painted tanks, penetrated the lines of Company B, but these men who were fighting their first real battle didn't think of retreat. Instead, they let the Germans pass and then Company C launched a counterattack whichrestored the original line."

"A new assault was then launched against Company A, which had taken up positions in Maginot Line pillboxes, and Germans by-passed them. The enemy then made their way into Hatten and began a furious house-to-house battle with the men of Company C."

"Shortly after 11 o'clock 18 enemy tanks followed by 18 to 20 personnel carriers attacked Company B, penetrated their lines and surrounded a large Maginot pillbox which a number of men of the company were defending. Still the men held their ground."
[SIZE=3]"Now, however, the enemy was well into Hatten, but they could not advance. Anti-tank mines had been laid cross the streets of the town and the men of the 242nd Infantry were covering these with fire."
[FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]"Meanwhile another German attack, launched about 1300, broke around Hatten and penetrated to Rittershoffen. The Second Battalion of the 242nd Infantry, supported by tanks, launched a counterattack and drove the enemy back into Hatten. There Company G took up positions in the west end of town."
[FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]"Back and forth moved the battle throughout the afternoon and night with the Germans trying desperately to drive the stubborn defenders from the town. At midnight, however, the 242nd held more than half the community and both sides were preparing to launch fresh attacks at dawn." [/SIZE][/FONT]Jan 10, 45:[/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]
"At daybreak the German tanks and infantry attacked from southeast of Hatten to gain the town and met an attack by men of the 242nd Infantry which stopped them cold. At 1030 the enemy tried another attack, this time from the north and northeast, with the intention of cutting the Hatten-[/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]Rittershoffen road. Once again they were repulsed, this time by the Second Battalion, 242nd Infantry, and the Second Battalion of the 315th Infantry, which had just been committed by the 79th Division."

[/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3]"Throughout the day the enemy continued to assault and throughout the day the First and Second Battalions of the 242nd Infantry stopped the attacks. At 1730 the Second Battalion of the 315th was ordered to relieve the battered First Battalion of the 242nd, but not until 0200 on January 11was the relief accomplished."

All information obtained from pages 21-24 of the above referenced unit history text.[/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE]​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

 

Thanks for that report, Steve. It looks like I'll have to correct the first location for 2/242d Infantry.

For such a long battle, accounts of the early fighting are rare where combatants that survived the whole battle are few. Engler's Final Crisis had a few descriptions of being on the receiving end of the Deutsch Pioniere but nothing of the dangers of getting to that position of advantage. Any additional detail is welcome at any time.

Since my maps rarely go without revision I'll post this for review. I suspect "KG von Luck" is a better description of the combined panzer and panzergrenadier battle group that entered Rittershoffen. Note the 2/315th Infantry relieved the 1/242d and 2/242d Infantry in Hatten. While 3/315th Infantry was tasked to defend Rittershoffen the day before the 21.PzD struck early on 11 Jan 1945.

I'll be out of town again so it may be weeks before I post more sketches.

 

During the night from 8 to 9[SUP]th[/SUP] of January the german units pulled into the operation sector on the north side of the Forest of Hagenau, eastward the village of Hatten.

The attack instructions for the combat team (KG) Pröll called exactly: „The combat team Pröll attacks, with Pz.Gren.Rgt.35 on the right side, along both sides of the road Niederroedern-Hatten conquer the pill-boxes of the Maginot-Line - the „Casemates de Hatten North-South “- after capturing the pill-boxes breaks through the line, continues the assault in western direction till the northern parts of the village of Hatten and then continues the assault southwards. The assault will be supported on the right side of combat team Pröll by the 21. Armored Division, on the left side II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 119.

The II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 119 starts the assault down the forest area south of Niederroedern, attacking the pill-boxes of Maginot line eastward of Hatten (here the „Casemats d´ Esch), breaks through them, encounters the south part of the place (Hatten) , rolls this up northwards and unites with the Pz.Gren.Rgt. 35. “ This was the german planning for the assault.

Still before midnight, under the guidance of Lt. Ritter von Molo, the forest-area was cleared up by 2 german combat-teams (each 10 soldiers) and announced enemy-free. Already around midnight, two combat teams (F-company of II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 119 under guidance of Cpt. Ernst and a group of engineers of Pi.Btl. 25) creeped as carefull as possible, avoiding any kind of noices till the edge of the forest eastward Hatten. There was a check belt, a coverless area with no possibilities to hide, barbed wire and mine-fields - till the pill-box line and the edge of Hatten … The night was bitterly cold (-15 dgrs Celsius) and there was a lot of snow on the fields.

The combat team of engineers of PiBtl. 25 (equiped with mine detectors, flame throwers and explosives weapons) vacated the mines and cutted the barbed wire to open a small lane for the very young guys of the infantry unit. Many of them had here their first employment. They crawled loudless under the barbed wire till they reached a position nearly 300 feet from the pill-box “Casemates d´ Esch”. Loudless a small combat patrol (engineers of 25. PiBtl. under guidance of Lt. Ritter von Molo) reached the pill-box and in a fast action the completely surprised shelter crew of the pill-box was overwhelmed. The first POW´s were made. (I will post a more detailed report about this action later). This happened between 4 and 5 am.

But this action naturally caused some noise and also the fights in the intermediate area alarmed the US troops. Immediately the US- artillery shot a defensive fire at the shelter line and the area up to the edge of the forest.

Hatten was defended by 1. Btl. 242 US IR TF Linden (the 1. Bataillon defend a sector of 4-5 km distance from road crossing eastward Oberroedern till the edge of the Aschbruchwald (Aschbruchforest). The front line followed the Maginot-Line and there were 9 pill-boxes of different size. The pill-box “Casemats d´Esch was N[SUP]0[/SUP] 1. The B-company was located with command post in one of the last houses at the eastern edge of Hatten (the company was left of this place). The C-company was in reserve-position. Nearly 20 guys of the company were in out-post positions under command of Ufz Merl Todd. A group of anti-tank cannon of 242. US Infantry-Rgt., a group of 813. US Tank-destroyer Btl. and the A- battery of 79. ID were allocated to the 1. Bataillon of 242. US ID, TF Linden.
On the right side of the 1. Bataillon was the sector of 3. Bataillon, 242. IR. The sector was located from Aschbruchwald till Koenigsbruck.
The 3. Bataillon, 313. US IR was located between Hunspach and Hoffen – after this unit had to give up their positions in Aschbach and Stundwiller.
In Rittershoffen there was the 2. Bataillon, 242. US IR – or maybe better - the small rest of this unit.

At 07:00 am the complete assault of combat team Pröll was running …

(more detailed reports soon)

@ Earthican: the map 11RitterAttack is very good

 

Great details Nordwind511, looking forward to more.

Since Nordwind511 referenced the casements of the Maginot Line I'll cross link this image for clarity.

Found here:

http://www.lignemaginot.com/ligne/esch/index.htm


View attachment 14939

 

While re-reading the 813th TD Bn AAR I realized this passage appears to describe actions in the Hatten sector. It is possible that the coordinate 187363 is in Stundwiller, as found on the attached map (which is just north of the previous map). And coordinate 158338 might be Rittershoffen.

I'll note that the 827th TD Bn is a Black (African-American) outfit in their first action. They were attached to the 813th TD Bn for command and control.


8 Jan 45
...
During the day one destroyer of Co B again fired at the church steeple at coord 187363 and the enemy operating the OP were driven from the steeple. Later in the day, one destroyer moved to 191317 to coordinate with the 827th T.D. The 2nd plat destroyed an enemy MG nest at 187363 and forced the enemy troops into the open where they were effectively dealt with by our own infantry. The platoon was relieved at 1500 hr by the 827th T.D. Bn destroyers and went into reserve at 158338. At 2200 hrs, the plat moved into position at 177362 coordinating with other elements of the 827th. ...



View attachment 14945

 

This seems as good a time as any to start using my vector tracings of the above maps. I was very excited to find those detailed contemporary French maps. Especially since they also cover a very intense battle between the US Army and German Wehrmacht. I feel fortunate that my skill with drawing software has progressed to the point that I can make a decent homage to the original French cartographers.

So for a closer look at the initial German attack on Hatten in the early hours before daylight on 9 January 1945, let's start with the US positions. Contrary to my earlier assumption, it appears the green 242d Infantry (and the veteran 314th Infantry before them) made extensive use of the Maginot bunkers. I am not sure what the intent of the Maginot fortifications were to serve but perhaps they were to be the backbone of a WWI type trench system. If so, the US troops were too few and less inclined to make such a defense. At best I suspect they dug foxholes around each bunker to make a strong point surrounded by wire and land mines. As noted above Able/242d Inf. held the northern sector above the railroad while Baker/242d Inf held the southern sector. In Hatten itself, Charlie/242d Inf. was in reserve except for a platoon size outpost led by TSgt Merl Todd. I suspect this outpost was located at the edge of the forest just north of where the railroad enters. There may have been other small LP/OP's at the edge of the forest but it is such a very long distance from the Maginot bunkers that I have some doubts. Also in Hatten would be the battalion mortars (six 81mm) and the battalion Anti-Tank Platoon (three 57mm guns). The eight water-cooled Browning machine guns of the Heavy Weapons Company (Dog Company) would be spread among the rifle platoons. The 1st Bn/242d Infantry was also supported by approximately a platoon (four SP guns) of the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The TD's would be best positioned in town or on a reverse slope and hull down.

Personally I think the Americans would have been better served to have outposted the bunkers and fortified the town itself. The bunkers tend to serve as a magnet for the GI's in the open foxholes to retreat from armor and heavy artillery (who can blame them). Once trapped inside the bunker they become vulnerable to isolation and the handiwork of the Pioniertruppen (?).

 

Hello earthican,

the general positions of 242 US IR you mentioned on the map are correct. The sector of the A-company/242d Inf Rgt. began to the north of the railroad (although the railway embankment was already part of the sector of B-company/242d Inf). The command post of B-company was in of the last houses on the eastern edge of Hatten. Nearly 20 soldiers of C-company were in "outpost" under command of Merl Todd. Three tankdestroyers were also in outpost position - in northeast direction of Hatten. The first german assault was between the bunkers 4 and 6 on the eastside of Hatten. TSgt Raymond E. Hodde, leader of a machine gun course told about the situation on 9th of january: "In teh morning at 5 o'clock hell seemed to be loose. " They´re coming" a canonier called. He took position behind its cannon. White, ducked shapes came over the snow-covered area. The snow which was fallen during the night covered their progressing, until they were still in our proximity. Shells whistled over us and krepierten behind us, the shells came from two tanks shooting very close range from us. The projectiles of the light weapons let the snow spray on around our positions. A shell fragment fell exactly on our position."

I will post more detailed information of the German units and their operation but I am very busy at the moment - so please be a little patient.

 

Take all the time you need, Nordwind511, this is suppose to be a fun activity!

I may rush to share new sketches or information, but I am not in any hurry to finish this project.

In the The Final Crisis, Engler uses a numbering system for the bunkers that starts from south to north. Bunkers 4, 5 and 6 are between the direct east road and the next northeast road which appears to be “Casemates d´ Hatten" as labeled on the French maps. This appears to be the attack zone of KG Pröll using Pz.Gren.Rgt.35

 

With better maps we can look at the previous descriptions with more detail. The attack by PzGR 119 on B Company / 242d Infantry to the south of Hatten looks interesting. As Nordwind noted there are differences in the German accounts and we will find even more discrepancies when we look at the accounts by the Americans.

The US defenses around the Maginot pillboxes are well documented but if these were the only positions southeast of Hatten then there was a serious weakness in the American line. Given the ground was almost completely flat and without cover (trees or buildings) this was a hard place to defend against armor. With little information the German commanders chose their attack ground well. What may have benefited the Americans is that the ground was low and perhaps crossed by ditches (many of the minor roads on the map may be in fact ditches, it is hard for me to tell).

American accounts describe initial German attacks being disrupted by US artillery. Still through these actions the Germans appear to have moved grenadiere and pioniere into assault positions which drove the defenders into the Maginot forts and virtually neutralized them. At least two occupants of pillbox #1 (Casemates d´ Esch) are reported to have moved by mid-morning (~0900hrs) to the B Company CP in Hatten. Then the American accounts cite a loss of contact with their supporting artillery and the movement of 18 German tanks (or assault guns) and 20 halftracks past pillbox #1 and to the edge of Hatten.

The attached map is a rough sketch of the above description. The exact maneuvers of combat teams von Molo and Ernst are speculative. Note also that Leutnant von Molo is credited with the assault on pillbox #1.

 

My previous posts got me thinking about US defensive positions. While it is speculative, I think some insights can be gained by trying to put oneself in the position of the US Battalion Commander and his Heavy Weapons Company commander.

Attached is an attempt to look at the fields of fire that could be obtained from the pillbox strong points. Now since these sectors are so wide, some would require two machine guns to use them. But I think it is possible when one considers the eight heavy water-cooled guns and the combined four light MG's of the two rifle companies.

While machine-gun bullets can reach out to one to two thousand meters, battle ranges at man-sized targets is about 200 to 300 meters. These are represented by the blue cones. When firing at larger area-targets ranges can go out to the maximum. These are represented by the yellow lines. But when things turn bad it is military practice to have Final Protective Fire on your own positions. These are shown by the red lines.

In theory this would make a pretty good anti-infantry defense. However, on the ground, small dips in the terrain can make large gaps in these fields of fire. A number of squad or platoon size rifle positions might be required between the strong points. Also, each rifle company had three 60mm mortars to help cover such gaps that were in defilade.

Since this is a green unit one might assume they have not realized the potential of their numerous M2 .50 Caliber machine guns. One gun is provided for each vehicle in the battalion for anti-aircraft use. Veteran units, like the 3d Infantry Division, are recorded as making extensive use of "Ma Deuce" to prep town size targets before attack. Its defensive potential was probably not lost on these tired veterans looking for any edge. But the green Rainbow Soldiers had much to learn.

 

I am less practiced at the study of anti-armor defense but for the sake of completeness I'll give it a try.

Per the AAR of the 813th TD Bn, one reduced platoon (1/B/813TD) of M-10 SP TD's were in Hatten on the morning of 9 January 1945. From this report it appears the infiltrating grenadiere got the jump on the three remaining TD's and they did not get a chance to engage German armor outside of town. The 2d Platoon of B Company was to the north around Oberroedern. The 3d Platoon had been detached to support the 314th Infantry. The attached 2d Platoon of C Company appears to have been operating to the northwest around Hunspach.

In US doctrine, Tank Destroyers were suppose to have powerful guns capable of penetrating enemy armor at distances beyond the less powerful Tank gun. However German armor, in the form of the Panther (Panzer V) and Jagdpanther, had progressed to the point where kills at range were difficult. Nonetheless many older types of German armor were vulnerable and the American TD's served well.

In all forms of combat one is seeking an advantage and for anti-armor defense one would like to surprise or ambush an advancing opponent. If possible one would also prefer to fire from the flank of the advancing forces where thinner side plate armor is exposed and groups of vehicles can be engaged by enfilade.

In hindsight it appears the woods to the south of Hatten would have been ideal to inflict damage on the flank of the southern German attack. If such a disposition of forces was contemplated it could have been squashed by the demands of the infantry for close protection. Such is the human dimension of warfare where the best technical employment is overruled by the psychological needs of the combatants.

Again, in hindsight, an ideal compromise solution might have been to split a four gun platoon between the north edge of the woods and the southern edge of Hatten. Once the southern pair open fire and the enemy vehicles turn to engage, the northern pair could open fire on the now exposed side and rear armor plate of the enemy.

But rarely are combat plans so well executed. Combat is mostly desperate, head-on fights where nerve, or bravery, can count as much as tactical advantage.

 

So much for my speculations. Here's an excerpt from the AAR for the 813th TD Bn.

Where the attached C Co. platoon destroyed a Panther, there is a possible typo in coordinate 160308 which appears to be the middle of the forest south of Rittershoffen. But coordinate 160380 is just north of Hoffen where the attached C Co. platoon was operating.

Jan 9
...
Co B: Early in the day enemy infantry infiltrated into our position and threw a hand grenade into one of the destroyers of Co B’s 1st plat, wounding the entire crew and capturing the destroyer. The platoon then moved into HATTEN 180336, and as a result of an enemy counter attack the platoon was temporarily cut off until reached by 1st Lt. KOLHOSS. Lt. KOLHOSS organized an infantry defense, returned to the plat, maneuvered a destroyer to a position from which he burned a German tank which had been immobilized previously. Later in the period another destroyer was surrounded by infiltrating enemy foot troops and the crew was captured. Amid all the confusion, our artillery poured a heavy concentration upon the town which resulting in the remaining destroyer being knocked out and burned. At dawn, as the situation cleared somewhat, Lt. KOLHOSS tried to devise some method of retrieving the surrounded destroyer but was informed that it had been booby trapped. Co B’s 2nd and 3rd plats remained at their present locations, see overlay of same date on Battalion dispositions. The 2nd plat of Co C attchd to Co B moved to vic of 160308 [160380?] from which point they knocked out a Mk V tank. The plat lost one M—10 during the action. The remaining destroyer went into reserve at 337159. Total casualties for Co B with plat of Co C attchd for the day were 1 officer and six E.M. wounded, six men missing.
...

 

This excerpt is from Steven Zaloga's Nordwind book which was cited in the third or forth post of this thread. As it turns out this book has a Google Books preview which provides a characterization of the German attack on 9 January which differs from the previous descriptions found in this thread.

While the excerpt provides no identifiable time or location for the assault technique described I choose to use this because it may match an attack that von Luk (sp?) described on an American hold-out position that was not reduced until 10 January. What I thought was significant is the German use of Flammpanzer which seemed rare in France.

More here:

Operation Nordwind 1945: Hitler's ... - Steven Zaloga - Google Books


Operation Nordwind 1945: Hitler's Last Offensive in the West
page 68

The advance by Kampfguppe Feuchtinger towards the Hagenau forest was blocked by a string of Maginot Line fortifications built by the French Army in the 1935. Hatten had several casemates (1) on its eastern side, as well as observation bunkers and personnel shelters behind the town in the direction of Rittershoffen. When 25. Panzergrenadier-Division was given the assignment of breaking through this line on January 9, they began their preparations by calling forward their divisional Pionier units (engineers), who were equipped with man-portable flame-throwers and explosive charges. In addition Panzer-Flamm-Kompanie 352, equipped with ten Flammpanzer 38(t) tanks (2) had been attached to the Kampfgruppe specifically for these contingencies. The usual tactics for dealing with these pillboxes was to attempt to cut through any barbed-wire obstructions in the pre-dawn hours, as well as to make a preliminary sweep for mines. Minefields posed an unusual threat in the January fighting as the autumn rain has thoroughly soaked the ground, and the sudden frost that arrived in the third week of December 1944 solidly froze the ground and the mines along with it.

The US Infantry defenses on the outskirts of Hatten did not rely on the casemates alone, but on infantry trenches and emplaced 57mm anti-tank guns. These were suppressed in advance by German artillery, and there were often assault guns or tanks present to deal with any surviving defenses outside of the bunkers. Once it appeared that the exterior defenses had been suppressed, the bunkers would be attacked either by a Pionier team, or in some cases, by a Flammpanzer 38(t) as seen here. The Flammpanzer 38(t) in the background has a Pionier team (3) accompanying it as it was often necessary to use explosive charges to pry the American defenders out of the bunkers, even after being hit repeatedly by flame-throwers.

The Flammpanzer 38(t) had been ordered by Hitler specifically for Nordwind on November 27, 1944. It consisted of the usual Jagdpanzer 38(t) but with a Kobe Flammenwerfer fitted in place of the usual 75mm gun. It was fed from a 185-gallon tank inside the vehicle which was enough for about 60-70 flame bursts (4) and it had an effective range of about 50m. The Hatten attack was the first use of these vehicles by this company, which took heavy losses during the Hatten-Rittershoffen fighting and several were later used in street fighting in Rittershoffen where two of them were lost to American fire.

 

The following is the MOH citation for, then Private, Vito Bertoldo. Along with the 42d Infantry Division history, this provides some insight into the fighting within Hatten itself.


BERTOLDO, VITO R.

Rank and organization: Master Sergeant, U.S. Army, Company A, 242d Infantry, 42d Infantry Division. Place and date: Hatten, France, 9-10 January 1945. Entered service at: Decatur, Ill. Born: 1 December 1916, Decatur, lll. G.O. No.: 5, 10 January 1946. Citation: He fought with extreme gallantry while guarding 2 command posts against the assault of powerful infantry and armored forces which had overrun the battalion's main line of resistance. On the close approach of enemy soldiers, he left the protection of the building he defended and set up his gun in the street, there to remain for almost 12 hours driving back attacks while in full view of his adversaries and completely exposed to 88-mm., machinegun and small-arms fire. He moved back inside the command post, strapped his machinegun to a table and covered the main approach to the building by firing through a window, remaining steadfast even in the face of 88-mm. fire from tanks only 75 yards away. One shell blasted him across the room, but he returned to his weapon. When 2 enemy personnel carriers led by a tank moved toward his position, he calmly waited for the troops to dismount and then, with the tank firing directly at him, leaned out of the window and mowed down the entire group of more than 20 Germans. Some time later, removal of the command post to another building was ordered. M/Sgt. Bertoldo voluntarily remained behind, covering the withdrawal of his comrades and maintaining his stand all night. In the morning he carried his machinegun to an adjacent building used as the command post of another battalion and began a day-long defense of that position. He broke up a heavy attack, launched by a self-propelled 88-mm. gun covered by a tank and about 15 infantrymen. Soon afterward another 88-mm. weapon moved up to within a few feet of his position, and, placing the muzzle of its gun almost inside the building, fired into the room, knocking him down and seriously wounding others. An American bazooka team set the German weapon afire, and M/Sgt. Bertoldo went back to his machinegun dazed as he was and killed several of the hostile troops as they attempted to withdraw. It was decided to evacuate the command post under the cover of darkness, but before the plan could be put into operation the enemy began an intensive assault supported by fire from their tanks and heavy guns. Disregarding the devastating barrage, he remained at his post and hurled white phosphorous grenades into the advancing enemy troops until they broke and retreated. A tank less than 50 yards away fired at his stronghold, destroyed the machinegun and blew him across the room again but he once more returned to the bitter fight and, with a rifle, single-handedly covered the withdrawal of his fellow soldiers when the post was finally abandoned. With inspiring bravery and intrepidity M/Sgt. Bertoldo withstood the attack of vastly superior forces for more than 48 hours without rest or relief, time after time escaping death only by the slightest margin while killing at least 40 hostile soldiers and wounding many more during his grim battle against the enemy hordes.

 

Good stuff Gary! It's incredible that M/Sgt. Bertoldo survived these attacks!

Seems like I read, maybe in the 42nd ID history, that the troops didn't like the Maginot bunkers much due to the limited firing angles from inside and they dug in outside them? I'm on the road and can't check to confirm this right now.

 

The back story on Vito is that he was working in the company kitchen (perhaps HQ Company) when he was tagged to help defend the Bn HQ. Other than the Mess Sergeant, cooks were usually men from the battalion who either had food preparation experience or volunteered to get out the drudgery of infantry training or irksome stateside NCO's. It appears that when Vito was presented with the opportunity to direct his own fight he turned out to be an outstanding combat soldier.

 

Just to complete the illustration of American units in Hatten on 9 and 10 January I've attached a sketch.

Recall the 1st Battalion of 242d Infantry held perhaps the western half of town by the evening of the 9th. That evening the 2d Battalion was sent in with orders to clear the town but only managed to make contact with the 1st Bn. Advancing along either side of the Ritterhoffen road and with the assistance of A Company of the 48th Tank Bn, they perhaps shored-up the flanks north and south of Hatten. Later a tank destroyer platoon, equipped with M18 GMC's, led by Lieutenant Jones of the 827th TD Bn (Colored) relieved the tanks. By the time the 2d Bn of the 315th Infantry relieved the units of the 242d Infantry on the 10th, the perimeter had shrunk to a triangle along the main western road. Key to the defense were the tank destroyer's positioned to cover the main road and the open fields.

The troubled story of the 827th TD Battalion's training and commitment to battle can be read here, starting on the bottom of page 12. According to Engler the performance of this black officer and his platoon appear to be one of the bright spots of a tragic battle record crippled by bigotry.

African American Troops in World War II - Alexander M. Bielakowski, Raffaele Ruggeri - Google Books

View attachment 15240

 

Focus will switch back to the operations of Panzer Division 21 and since I provided the following for PzGrD 25, I feel obligated to do the same. Note the few SPW in I./PzGrR 125 are 'French conversions' of which I am not not familiar. If anybody has ready access to any images of these I'd be grateful.

The status report of 21. Pz.Div. dated 1.1.1945 shows the following strength and composition:

Div.Stab mit Div.Begl.Kp.

Pz.Rgt. 22
Rgt.Stb. u. Stbskp. (1 Bef.Pz. V, 3 Möbelwagen, 4 Wirbelwind)
I./Pz.Rgt. 22
Stb. u. Stbskp. I. Abt. (? illegible) Bef.Pz. V, (? illegible) Bef.Pz IV, 3 Wirbelwind)
1. Kp. (18 Pz. V)
2. Kp. (17 Pz. V)
3. Kp. (16 Pz. IV)
4. Kp. (14 Pz. IV)
Of these 9 Pz. IV and 31 Pz. V were operational.
II./Pz.Rgt. 22 not present (in Grafenwöhr, never returned to division)

Pz.Gren.Rgt. 125
I.(SPW) Btl.
4 Kpn.
II.(mot.) Btl.
4 Kpn.
10.(Pi.) Kp.(mot.) (just light infantry weaons available, no engineer equipment)
(Exact number of SPW in I./125 on 1.1.1945 not given but later report from 5.1.1945 listed just 3 with Stabskp., 9 in 1. and 3 in 4. Kp., 2. and 3. had none. All SPW were still French conversions. In addition one Somua with Pak 40 was also present)
Battalion had le. & s.MG, m.Gr.Wf., 2 cm Flak (towed and on French SPW) and one platoon with 7,5 cm Pak 40 mot.Z. available.
9.(s.I.G.) Kp. not yet present, but on the way (towed guns only)

Pz.Gren.Rgt. 192 ('extra' weapons in Rgt.Stbskp.: 1 - Marder II and 1 - Somua with 7,5 cm Pak 40)
I.(mot.) Btl.
4 Kpn.
II.(mot.) Btl.
4 Kpn.
9.(s.I.G.) Kp. (6 15 cm s.I.G. mot.Z.)
10.(Pi.) Kp. (mot.) (just light infantry weaons available, no engineer equipment)
Battalion had le. & s.MG, m.Gr.Wf., 2 cm Flak mot.Z. available, no other heavy A/T guns other than the 'extras' above)

Pz.Art.Rgt. 155
I. Abt.
2 le.F.H. and 1 s.F.H.(mot.Z.) batteries with a total of 9 - 10,5 cm le.F.H. and 4 15 cm s.F.H.
II. Abt.
2 le.F.H.(mot.Z.) batteries with a total of 10 - 10,5 cm le.F.H.
III. Abt.
2 batteries with a total of 8 - 15 cm s.F.H.(mot.Z.) and 1 battery with 4 - 10 cm Kanonen

H.Flak-Art.Abt. 305
1. Bttr. (2 - 8,8 cm Flak)
2. Bttr. (3 - 3,7 cm Flak Einlinge, 3 - 3,7 cm Flak-Zwillinge)
3. Bttr. (4 - 2 cm Flak Einlinge, 5 - 2 cm Flak Vierlinge)
All weapons towed, none sp

Pz.Aufkl.Abt.21
Stbskp., 1.-4.Kp. (fully armored with a total of 5 le., 8 s.Pz.Späh-Wg. (Sd.Kfz. 222, 223, 231, 232, 233) and about 70 le. and m.SPW (numbers partially illegible) including 250/1, /2, /3, /5, /7, /8, /9, /10, 251/1, /2, /3, /4, /7, /8, /9, /11, /20). Only about 2/3 of the vehicles were combat ready.

Pz.Jg.Abt. 200
1. Kp. (4 Jagdpz. IV L/48)
2. Kp. (0 Jagdpz.)
3. Kp. (9 - 7,5 cm u. 6 - 8,8 cm Pak mot.Z.)
17 new Panzer IV/70(V) were already on the way and arrived a few days later

Pz.Pi.Btl. 200
1. u. 2. Kp.(mot.)
3. Kp. (SPW) (numbers and types not given)

Pz.Nachr.Abt. 200
1.(Fernm.) Kp.
2.(Fu) Kp.

Pz.FEB 200
4 Kpn.

Versorgungstruppen

Total personnel strenght of division on 1.1.1945: 11987 O/NCO/OR, i.e. 2620 short of authorized strenght of 14607.

Martin Block

 

Recently I came across this reference to 21.PzD attacks starting on 8 Jan 1945. The source is questionable given the numerous errors for the US units involved, but the account of German units meshes with those of von Luck (Luk?), commanding 125.PzGR.

Panzer Divisions 1944-45 - Pier Paolo Battistelli - Google Books

Note this passage mentions II/125.PzGR leading the attacks on 8 Jan 1945. Then von Luck cites his I/125.PzGR assisting 25.PzGD in northern Hatten and 192.PzGR of 21.PzD attacking north of him. Finally von Luck cites his II/125.PzGR leading the attack into Rittershoffen on 11 Jan 1945.

Hopefully the attached sketch clarifies my interpretation. This sketch also has the grid coordinates that I have used previously with the US Army reports.

...In the bitter cold and falling snow, on 8 January Kampfgruppe von Luck (Panzergrenadier Regiment 125), with its II Bataillon in the lead and supported by Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 (with 20 newly arrived Jagdpanzer tanks) and I./Panzer Regiment 22, attacked Task Force Linden’s [313th Infantry] positions west of Stundwiller, on the Maginot Line fortifications. Although the element of surprise was missing, since the men of TF Linden [313th Infantry] had spotted the German soldiers approaching, the men of KG von Luck managed to break through the American positions with the help of armoured support, eventually reaching the village of Oberroedern. However, to the north Panzergrenadier Regiment 192 was unable to break through the American defences of 222nd Infantry Regiment south of Ingolsheim. Only early in the morning of the following day, 9 lanuary, did the men of 25. Panzcrgrenadier Division meet with success; they surprised the green troops of 42nd Division deployed in the fortifications around Hatten....


View attachment 15251

 

The fighting around Rittershoffen impels me to attempt to determine the location of a structure that the Americans identified as an "Air Raid Shelter". This was north of town and was used as the CP for Item Company, 315th Infantry. It would seem to be an undocumented structure of the Maginot Line as it does not appear in contemporary maps or later re-constructions.

I have found a tell-tail, faded rectangle in the Google satellite imagery. I believe these occur because the disturbed ground of a removed structure often leaves the top soil thin and vegetation faded. Of course any structure removed would leave such a mark but the location is about right.

The location is further north than I expected and that may have a significant impact in how the defense of Rittershoffen is interpreted.

If anyone has any concrete information (pardon the pun) on this structure please let me know.