From the outside the German attacks look extremely well planned and executed. On one hand this could be expected from a country with strong military traditions and an advanced system for combat leadership. However by 1945 Germany was at the end of her resources, both human and material. For PzD 21, its panzer regiment was missing a battalion and its grenadier companies were well under strength. With only brief conversion training, infantry replacements were being drawn from the KM and LW. This placed a heavy burden on the experienced leaders to be up front which resulted in many casualties to the unit cadre. The attack by KG von Luck on Rittershoffen in the pre-dawn hours of 11 January 1945 represented a shift in effort for PzD 21. The attacks north of the Seltzbach had not succeeded to the degree required and a renewed effort there would likely only bring an advance to where the stream branched, short of Hoffen. But to the south, in the zone of PzGD 25, an attack on Rittershoffen could carry up the high ground to Kuhlendorf and beyond. The method of the German attack is unknown to me. To the Americans, soldiers appeared outside their positions. Since they knew there were friendly troops in the next village there is some claim that they withheld fire until too late. Later the GI's report tanks, moving out of the darkness and supported by foot troops, attack to break-through their lines. I will observe that foot troops in front of armor tends to limit the use of all the firepower available to the tanks. Unless the German devised a more complicated attack plan, which they were well capable of, it is slightly suspect that foot troops led the tanks to Rittershoffen. But I'll leave it at that unless further information comes to light.