Historical views of Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan

Hello,

I'd like to know if there's other historical views of this conflict rather than the at least majority it caused the Japanese to expand southerns.

 

Marcelo, try the following link. A wealth of information to be found in it. Combined Arms Research Library

 

Thanks, but I already know that one.

What I'd like to know is if there's other historical views about the Nomonhan Incident, something different from the traditional "the Japanese were beated and never wanted to come back again". Because I don't agreed much with this view. In fact the Imperial Army was inferior in theory, I don't have any doubt about this, and the own Army knew this, but what I don't agreed is people saying the Japanese defeat was so horrible because I think it wasn't. If the battle is usually overlooked, than the poor conditions the IJA operated there in contrast to Zhukov's forces are as well. And the Japanese fared very well in my view, inflicting heavy casualities to an enemy with superior equipment and in much better conditions. I really belive they could have won if were as well equiped as the Soviets, despite their "crap" equipment.

If the Soviets had managed to hold a full Japanese attack, than I would change my view about this battle. Otherwise I simple think the judment from most historians in unfair.

 

What do you mean by full attack?

Regards,

 

I ask the same question as Chi-ri.....

 

So you are saying that the Japanese should have attacked before Zhukov did?

It must also be mentioned that the reason the Japanes flanks broke with relative ease was due to the fact that Zhukov mustered vitually all his armor and mechanized units on his left and right flanks. The Japanese center was helplessly pinned down due to Soviet artillery and a combination from both fighter and bomber units from above (first in Soviet history).


Guderian suffered his first defeat in Tula in a similar fasion (minus the encirclement).

 

Already during the Incident the Kwantung Army become aware of the Soviet capability. After two failed offensives they digged in and started preparations for a much greater offensive with the lessons learned after the winter. That's when Zhukov surprised them, in part because the underestimation of the Soviet logistic capability.

The Kwantung Army in the conditions it was operating along the Khalkhin Gol was not capable of attack the Soviets first, as I already mentioned about the two failed offensives. They also received little support from home, which further deteriorate their situation. Their only hope was if support from the rest of the Army come, with preference of support from the Navy aircraft, despite I think this would not be very welcomed because of the great rivalry of the two branchs.

I belive that if such support come and the Army managed to attain it's objective, this may have resulted in total war. Stalin would never let the Japanese humiliate Russia again. For example, the VVS was with an bomber force ready to strike Tokyo. If this happened, total war would be really very probable. For such reasons that Tokyo put brakes in the Kwantung Army forbidden the Air Force to conduct operations in the Soviet airfields for example. Tokyo didn't have wish to start a full scale war in that momment, even if the Kwantung Army was sucefull against Zhukov's forces. The "China Incident" already started in a similar way and another war was not desirable at the momment.

 

Hello Marcelo,

I too am under the impression that Japan did not want a full scale war with Russia. I am, however; slightly confused as to your premise... "Japan might have a chance had she been reinforced with the main force but that couldnt happen because she did not want a full scale war?" How can you have one with out the other?

By 1939, Japan had established herself as a naval super power and acquired an impressive resume of victories. In my opinion Japan was curious (and perhaps a bit arrogant due to her recent victories elsewhere) to see how a Russia might react this time around in case of war with her or her allies. The skimishes with the Mongols quickly escalated and Russia quickly came to Mongolia's aid. By 1939, I also believe that Japan was fully aware of who she might have to go to war with soon, in large part due to oil. Russia was not her solution. Japan could not and would not risk a war with Russia; the 23rd was going to get no reinforcements.

It is for this reason why I believe that the moment Zhukov gave the order for the attack to commence, the Japanese soldiers' fate was sealed. The 6th army at Stalingrad suffered the same double envelope that the Japanese had.


PS.

I believet that Japanese were actually going to attack but Zhukov beat them to it only a few days in advance?

 

A major problem for Japan is that they were still fighting the last Russo-Japanese war as far as tactics and such. Japan had been fighting the Chinese but that was no preperation for a fairly modern, well equipped force like the Soviets had. One reason for the SOviet casualties is the Japanese refusal to surrender and Zhukov's approach of assaults to pin the main force down and then launching attacks on the flanks, his approach later against the Germans.

 

Bringing this back to life.

Simply the Soviets were up to the expectations.

I will not discuss the politic causes. Just gonna repeat that I find general judgment of the IJA in this conflict is very unfair. The Japanese were not as well prepared as the Soviets, and this was because the IJA didn't have an idea of superiority the Soviets had in several areas. True, this was arrogance of the IJA underestimating the enemy, but is no reason for crucified the combat capability of the institution. They were not a higly advanced Army, but neighter they were the hopeless 19th century Army usually pointed.
.

 

The Japanese doctrine of infantary incircliment tactics was a estrategical decision, not a "deficiency" unknow to them. They adopted it because the Army didn't have much resources to acquire heavy equipment, and to deal with the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces they knew that could never cope. Another factor was the Japanese belived in the superior spiritual strenght of their soldier. And I will not laught of this as most, because a soldier with a fanatical determination is very dangeours. This was pointed out by the Soviets during the Nomonhan conflict, and is well know during the Pacific War.

The infantary doctrine of the IJA was not bad, it had worked fairly well in Lake Khasan (if equipment was everything, the IJA should had suffered another "Nomonhan" there). The problem was when the Japanese needed to be stuck in the defensive and without proper air support. This is what just happened in Nomonhan. Add by inadequated conditions. To make the things worse, the enemy was unexpectedly stronger in artillery and logistics. It couldn't have been different. But in no way this meant the IJA was hopeless and couldn't have learned lessons with this. According to the frequent thought about the IJA performance in Nomonhan, the Soviet Army was also a hopeless institution against the Finns. Of course, it is totally unnecessary comment the incomparable differences in material and industrial output between Finland and the USSR.