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Hitler/Stalin and the conquest of Europe

Discussion in 'What If - European Theater - Western Front & Atlan' started by Ron, Sep 10, 2002.

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  1. dasreich

    dasreich Member

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    Lets say Mr. S was a serial killer, and planning to ice the whole block, but Mr. G slapped him up too much for him to take out Mr. U and his buddies, which includes Mr. West G.

    Now if Mr. T was Turkey, maybe he could have done something...he would seriously pity some fools then. :D (I got it crazy)
     
  2. AndyW

    AndyW Member

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    Hitler on a meeting on July 31, 1940:
    "Englands hope is Russia and America. If hope on Russia fades away, America will fall off , too (...)
    Once Russia is defeated, Englands last hope is gone. Then Germany will be the master of Europe and the Balkans.
    Decision: During this confrontation Russia had to be terminated. Spring 1941..."

    German Operational planning for the attack on the USSR was on the way since late July 1940 without a stop. The war machine was working at full speed towards this nest target.

    On Nov. 12, 194, the very day when Molotov arrived at Berlin, Hitler signed Directive No. 18:

    "Political negotiations with the target to get a clear picture of the position of Russia are talking place. All mutual orders already given so far regarding the East have to be carried on, no matter witch result this conferences will have. Further orders in this regard will follow as soon as the first operational plannings by the Army is presented to me and had been acknowledged by me."

    Emphasis are mine.

    The four power pact was not a serious attempt. The decision has been made.

    Cheers,

    [ 12 September 2002, 07:29 PM: Message edited by: AndyW ]
     
  3. AndyW

    AndyW Member

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    So you're reading in Stalin's intent and mindframe? OK, I just don't see that as a strong argument. Clearly, much of what you say makes sense- Stalin would certainly want to firtify his own country, and his rule thereof. But to say that those were his only intentions- I need far more evidence to make that kind of jump.</font>[/QUOTE]So what was the Soviet interest in parts of Poland, Baltic States, Finnland and Bessarabia in 1939-41? Eliminating the military or economic danger of those countries? Colonizing and exploiting those "rich" countries? Gaining huge amount of land and food? Sorry, I just see one benefit in possesing those countries:
    Strategic relevance. Finnland and the Baltic states were neccessary to be able to "use" Leningrad and to "shut" the northern door to the USSR. Bessarabia was needed to have control on the Danube River. Bulgaria was the key to the Black and Mediteranian Sea. Eastern Poland was a "buffer" to Germany.

    Come on, CrazyD88, you know the answer. German invasion was the worst nightmare the Soviets had faced so far. They wanted to be pretty damed sure that no German soldier will ever enter Soviet soil again. Additionally it was a fine forward glscis, too.
    Why did you think the U.S.A. occupied Japan after 1945?

    Exactly! And when Stalin did do this, we see intense expansion. And this is the whole point here- For Stalin to "secure" himself and his country, he had to defend it against the attacking germans, correct? And this used men, material, and diplomacy, right? If Stalin had NOT been required to expend all of this fighting the germans, he could have turned it towards Europe once he finished "securing" his own country.
    </font>[/QUOTE]He could have. But I guess he would have used his power to influence Europe without risking war. You don't start a war for fun if you can get what you want by diplomacy and "machtpolitik" (sorry, don't know the english word). So there is a scenario in which the USSR might have grabbed her hands out to Eastern, maybe even Western Europe from 1943 onwards (not military but politically).

    Bad enough, but actually he tried the very same from 1945 onwards, with the difference the he already HAD a firm hand on Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Baltic States due to Hitler's politics and war.

    So was it really worth 33 million dead and "inviting" (Hitler and Chamberlain), later "forcing" (they had to cross those countries to get to Berlin) the Soviets into Eastern Europe, sacrifying those countries because this MIGHT have saved Western Europe from a hypothetical scenario of invasion?

    Nope, sorry. :(

    Cheers,

    [ 12 September 2002, 08:18 PM: Message edited by: AndyW ]
     
  4. AndyW

    AndyW Member

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    Wrong analogy. Mr.S did terrorize his own family in his own house (just as Mr.G), but he didn't do any harm to anybody in the street until the time when Mr. G invited him to kill Mr.P.

    So no signs that Mr.S was a serial killer to his neighbors or that he planned to kill Mr. G, Mr. F or Mr. U (in that order). The time when Mr. U, A, and F, were entering Mr. S' house without being invited was almost 20 years ago at the time when Mr. S was about to move in.

    Cheers,
     
  5. dasreich

    dasreich Member

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    Mr. S abducted some of Mr. Fin's family, and would be looking for payback against Mr. U, F, and B. Mr. S was driven by political doctrine to take over his neighborhood, dominate his city council, and spread his influence in general.

    (im enjoying this ww2 abstract)
     
  6. Jumbo_Wilson

    Jumbo_Wilson Member

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    I'm glad someone mentioned Socialism in One Country because this was the policy Stalin clung to throughout the 20's and 30's. It has often been said that Stalin never wanted Germany or France or Soain to become Communist pre-war becuase there would have been another "centre" of Communism: fearing what later happened in Yugoslavia and China. A Communist Germany, with it's great industry and central position would have been a great rival. The Presence or threat of the Red Army postwar allowed Stalin to create "mini-Stalins" across E.Europe but before the war that would not have been the case. Stalin had enough trouble against Finland never mind how he would have fared against Poland.

    Jumbo
     
  7. Friedrich

    Friedrich Expert

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    Well, I see Andy's point here: Stalin wanted to seccure the USSR after it had been raped by Germany in the most dreadful war in History. But it is quite sure that Stalin also wanted to avoid any attack before it happened. How to do this? By controlling strategic positions, become stronger and warrantee its own security. All Molotov and Stalin's claims in Finland and Romania are because of that!
     
  8. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Back to the negotiations between Russia and Germany in 1940.

    Indeed Andy. Good point! I for myself had trouble believing that these talks between Molotov and Hitler existed etc. Yet Hitler had time to make those talks, which seems quite odd considering the back thought he had on Russia later on.But it´s nice to see through these articles that they did have discussions going on as previously I thought that Russia just kept sending supplies to Germany and nothing else happened.

    Some parts from Warlimont´s book "Inside Hitler´s headquarters"

    " Meanwhile a development had occurres which more than any other single factor was destined to put paid to the plans for a landing in England:Hitler´s thoughts turned suddenly against Soviet Russia!The rapidity with which this frightful decision was taken was equalled only by the immensity of its consequences, some of which are still with us today.

    The Hq had spent a short period in Berlin and after Hitler´s speech to the Reichstag of July 19, in which he held out little hope of a peaceful agreement with England, had bit by bit collected together again in the area of Berchtesgarden;Section L was in tis special train ATlas in Bad Reichenhall Station. During the sitting of the Reichstag, a number of military honours had been conferred, among them the promotion of Jodl to full General straight from Major-General. We were surprised therefore when, on July 29th, he indicated that he wished to speak to the senior officers of section L.We all imagined that, although we had not done very much, this unusual visitation must be concerned with some special recognition following our victory in the West.Four of us were present sitting at individual tables in the restaurant-car. Instead of what we expected, Jodl went round ensuring that all doors and windows were closed and then, without any preamble, disclosed to us that Hitler had decidec to rid the worl "once and for all" of the danger of Bolshevism by a surprise attack on Russia to be carried out at the earliest possible moment, ie in May 1941.

    The effect of Jodl´s words was electric.Our consternation was even greater when we realized that the struggle against England was not necessarily to be concluded first but that on the contrary, victory over Russia, the last "force on the continent" was supposed to be the best method of forcing England to make peace if this had not proved possible by other means

    Jodl countered every question and had an answer to everything alhough he convinced none of us.Two of his answers stand out in my memory:first, when he repeated Hitler´s view and probably his own also, that the collision with Bolshevism was bound to come and that it was better therefore to have this campaign now, whne we were at the height of our military power, than to call the German people to arms once more in the years to come; secondly, when he said that at the latest by the autumn of 1941 the full strength of the Luftwaffe, brought to a new pitch of efficiency by further victories in the east, would once more be vailable to employment against England

    What was the background to this sudden reversal of all our planning? Shortly after Jodl´s disclosure, we happened to discover that Hitler had originally been determined to launch an attack in the late summer 1940.The most urgent representations from Keitel and Jodl,set out in a memorandum which I have myself seen, had been necessary to convince the Supreme Commander that the time and space factors alone rendered this plan totally impracticable.

    To complete the picture, it is woth mentioning certain other developmetns of which I only became aware after the war.
    Hitler hinted at this possibility to his immediate circle as early as the spring 1940.In a conversation with von Rundstedt on June 2nd 1940 recorded by late general von Sodernstern who was present, Hitler said that now that he imagined England was ready for peace, he would begin to settle the account with Bolshevism.

    Halder´s diary of this period:

    "22 May 1940.The Fuhrer thinks if he insists Russia eill limit her demands to Bessarabia.
    3rd July The most pressing problems at the moment are England and..the East.As regards the latter, the main question is how to deal Russia a military blow which will force her to recognize Germany´s preponderant role in Europe.
    13th July The question in Fuhrer´s mind is why England is still unwilling to make peace.Like us, he thinks that the answer is that England still has some hope of action on the part of Russia."

    Finally-31st July 1940 some of Hitler´s statements in the Berghof:

    Russia is the factor by which England sets the greatest store..If Russia is beaten, England´s last hope is gone.Germany is then master of Europe and the Balkans.Decision: As a result of this argument, Russia must be dealt with.Spring 1941.

    These extracts show unmistakably that Hitler´s determination to turn against Russia was from the outset an unconditional and "unalterable" decision.It is also clear thet the decisive period during which he was froming the decision was approx the middle of July 1940, ie about the same timeat which the military managed to get him agree the orders for the landing in England.

    On 12 November 1940, the day before Molotov´s arrival in Berlin, the Famous OKW direktive No 18 was issued.

    "Political discussions for the purpose of clarifying the attitude of Russia in the immediate future have already begun.Regardless of these conversations all preparations for the East for which verbal orders have already been given will be continues."

    Like you said, Andy!

    One of the more remarkable facts in the hostory of German Supreme HQ is that from the end of July to the beginning of December 1940 the highest-level staff of the Wehrmacht ans its Supreme Commander played only a very small part in the preparations for the greatest campaign of WW2. There was no carefully thought-out plan as basis for action against Russia. Moreover as opposed tothe period prior to the western campaign, Hitler´s views on the conduct of operations were confined merely to a few passing remarks. Halder´s diary of 31 July 1940 merely says:

    Destruction of the power of Russia.To be achieved by:
    1.A thrust towards Kiev with flank on the Dnieper
    2. Thrust through the Baltic states in the direction Moscow
    Finally , pincer operation from north and south.Later a seperate operation against the Baku oil fields.We can see the extent to which Finland and Turkey are involved.

    The workkingt out of the entire plan of campaign together with the move forward and initila objectives was left completely in the hands of OK; they included the Luftwaffe and navy in their planning at the appropriate time. The Operations Staff of Supreme HQ was entirely on the touchline. General Jodl was never once invited either as a visitor or an onserver to the large-scale war games which the Army Staff held in the autumn 1940, nor, as far as one knows, did he make any attempt to play any important part in the planning, as he should have done in view of his job and position.

    ;)
     
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