Hitler's strategy

Er, no. He had parts of an armored reconnaissance battalion, an infantry machine gun battalion, and an antitank battalion. Panzer Regiment .5 landed in Tripoli between 10 and 12 March. Most of the bits and pieces of units assigned to 5. leichte arrived during March in dribs and drabs. 15. Panzer Division did not begin arriving until May.

 

In a book I have it said he arrived with a Panzer division and a light motorized division, which is why I said that.

 

Then the book was wrong. Rommel's force was originally Sperrverbande Rommel - a "blocking force". As such, it was a hodgepodge of elements culled from the Panzer division reorganization that was wrapping up in early 1941. Panzer-regiment 5. was free, so was thrown together with some other bits and called 5. leichte-Afrika division. It wasn't officially 21. Panzer Division until 1 August.

 

I'll have to double check and see what it says, I could be remembering wrong.

 

Gun slinger, why do you discount the effect of trying to cross the Caucasus. look at the difficulty the allies had with Italy and multiply that by 4 or 5 times and you also ignore that Turkey did not have the road and rail structure to support such an effort. Finally you also ignore the other items Hitler wanted for his war effort that they did capture in the Ukraine.

 

That is why I asked the question, because that seemed like it could have been a reasonable operation on paper, but as you all explained, there was more that would have made that type of operation difficult.

 

Then why take Poland, Baltic States, Belarus and drive towards Moscow? I'm not stating that Hitler wanted "all of Russia" but certainly more than just Ukraine...

"They would have stopped if the USSR agreed to stop"
Was there ever such a request from Germany?

 

In 1943, Mussolini, himself in danger of an imminent invasion by the Western Allies, implored Hitler to seek peace with the Russians.

During April of 1943 the Germans and Soviets met in Sweden, where Germany was supposedly ready to make peace in return for a satellite Ukraine and for economic concessions in other parts of the Soviet Union, whereas the Russians insisted upon the frontier of 1941. Who initiated the talks is uncertain, it may well have been the Russians feeling out their options: with no second front forthcoming, the British had previously indicated that the Curzon line was possibly acceptable. With FDR's insistence on the Atlantic Charter, this is a case where the British attitudes may well have unknowingly rescued the alliance.

In August 1944 the Japanese had hinted that they were prepared to try to broker a separate peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin put the suggestion directly to Hitler at a meeting early in September. Hitler rejected the idea out of hand.

https://archive.org/stream/MastnystalinAndProspectsOfSeparatePeaceInWorld/Mastny--StalinAndProspectsOfSeparatePeaceInWorldWarIi_djvu.txt

 

My friend I'm afraid that my question was only in reference to prior to the battle of Moscow. Once the Germans had been beaten in November all attempts at peace were futile. No peace would be signed once it was evident that the USSR could win especially after all the crimes Germany had committed on Soviet soil.

By 43' the idea was almost laughable. By this time it was evident to most in Germany that the war in Russia could not be won... Any attempt to sue for peace would have been done from a position of weakness the Russians knew this. The tide had turned. It was time for revenge. All in Russia wanted it and it was well deserved. Stalin knew this.

 

Even those feelers prior to the battle in front of Moscow, the Russians were adamant on returning to the '41 borders.

Even if Moscow fell, it was still more than 1700 km to the Urals; IOW there was still an enormous chunk of European Russia, greater than what had already been conquered, and with the German's supply lines growing thinner by the day.

 

Stalin was paranoid and never trusted his allies. His intention after the Ribbentrop treaty was to let Germany exhaust against France and Great Britain and then achieve an easy victory in Western Europe. So he assumed that his allies had the same intention now and were delaying the invasion therefore all the time or halted the convoys via Murmansk.
And Stalin knew that there were planned french attacks on the russian oilfields in 1940, when the Soviet Union was still neutral but supplied Nazi-Germany with oil.

Manstein promised Hitler a possible REMIS in the east in early 1943 and he wasn't known as a dreamer. He routinely defeated superior russian forces with his elastic defense tactics and hoped he could produce some more Charkows with the recreated forces.
Not impossible that an always suspicious Stalin would accept a negotiated peace then with minor losses of territory. The Soviet Union had enough of it.

 

Sorry but you lost me. IMO, any chance at a seperate peace between Hitler and Stalin was prior to the battle of Moscow. Are you claiming otherwise?

 

Read the link in post #48.

 

By 43' it was clear to many in the Soviet Uniom and even in Germany, that Germany (aside from winning maybe a few battles) was unable to subdue Russia. The Germans blew their load in 41' and 42'. Why would Stalin want anything other than the complete destruction of the 3rd Reich after the tide had been visibly turned? Would the US want a peace treaty with with Japan after the battle of midway?

 

The whole story of a separate peace between Germany and the SU is a post war invention from a nazi who claimed that if one was listening to him ,there would be such a peace and that the Third Reich woust last in eternity.

 

Even in 1941 there was no chance for a seperate peace .

 

Translation : the Soviets routinely defeated Manstein : look on the map where was AGA in march 1943 and where in march 1944.

Besides: Manstein was not Federer.

 

Read the link in post #48.

Prior to Kursk, there was no certainties, other than it was going to be a long, bloody, expensive war. There was no second front. Stalin suspected his allies of the same duplicitous attitude he himself had displayed.

Look at the communication between Stalin and Churchill in the Spring of '43. There is considerable irritation at the Western Allies' lack of progress:

"It appears from your message that the date-February-which you had fixed earlier for completing the operations in Tunisia is now set back to April. There is no need to demonstrate at length the undesirability of this delay in operations against the Germans and Italians. It is now, when the Soviet troops are still keeping up their broad offensive, that action by the Anglo- American troops in North Africa is imperative. Simultaneous pressure on Hitler from our front and from yours in Tunisia would be of great positive significance for our common cause and would create most serious difficulties for Hitler and Mussolini It would also expedite the operations you are planning in Sicily and the Eastern Mediterranean.

As to the opening of a second front in Europe, in particular in France, it is planned, judging by your communication, for August or September. As I see it, however, the situation calls for shortening these time limits to the utmost and for the opening of a second front in the West at a date much earlier than the one mentioned. So that the enemy should not be given a chance to recover, it is very important, to my mind, that the blow from the West, instead of being put off till the second half of the year, be delivered in spring or early summer.

According to reliable information at our disposal, since the end of December, when for some reason the Anglo-American operations in Tunisia were suspended, the Germans have moved 27 divisions, including five armoured divisions, to the Soviet- German front from France, the Low Countries and Germany. In other words, instead of the Soviet Union being aided by diverting German forces from the Soviet-German front, what we get is relief for Hitler, who, because of the let-up in Anglo-American operations in Tunisia, was able to move additional troops against the Russians."

-Stalin to Churchill February 16th 1943





"Your message informing me of the successful bombing of Hamburg received. I salute the British Air Force and welcome your intention to increase the bomber attacks on Germany.

Thank you for your congratulations on our capture of Rzhev. Today our troops have taken Gzhatsk.

I look forward to a reply from you and Mr Roosevelt to my message of February 16."

-Stalin to Churchill March 6th 1943




It appears from your communication that Anglo-American operations in North Africa are not being hastened, but are, in fact, being postponed till the end of April. Moreover, even this date is given in rather vague terms. In other words, at the height of fighting against the Hitler troops, in February and March, the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa, far from having been stepped up, has been called off, and the date fixed by yourself has been set back. Meanwhile Germany has succeeded in moving from the West 36 divisions, including six armoured ones, to be used against Soviet troops. The difficulties that this has created for the Soviet Army and the extent to which it has eased the German position on the Soviet-German front will be readily appreciated.

For all its importance 'Husky" 45 can by no means replace a second front in France, but I fully welcome, of course, your intention to expedite the operation.
I still regard the opening of a second front in France as the important thing. You will recall that you thought it possible to open a second front as early as 1942 or this spring at the latest.
The grounds for doing so were weighty enough. Hence it should be obvious why I stressed in my previous message the need for striking in the West not later than this spring or early summer.

The Soviet troops fought strenuously all winter and are continuing to do so, while Hitler is taking important measures to rehabilitate and reinforce his Army for the spring and summer operations against the U.S.S.R.; it is therefore particularly essential for us that the blow from the West be no longer delayed, that it be delivered this spring or in early summer.

I have studied the arguments you set out in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 as indicative of the difficulties of Anglo-American operations in Europe. I grant the difficulties. Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, in the interest of our common cause, of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in France is fraught. For this reason the vagueness of your statements about the contemplated Anglo-American offensive across the Channel causes apprehension which I cannot conceal from you.

-Stalin to Churchill 15th March, 1943




Last night I saw, with my colleagues, the film Desert Victory, you have sent us, and was greatly impressed. It splendidly shows how Britain is fighting, and skilfully exposes those scoundrels-we have them in our country too-who allege that Britain is not fighting but merely looking on. I eagerly look forward to another film of the same kind, showing your victory in Tunisia.

-Stalin to Churchill 29th March, 1943


"2.President Roosevelt and I have, therefore, decided with the greatest reluctance that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the next Russian convoy and that without such protection there is not the slightest chance of any of the ships reaching you in the face of the known German preparations for their destruction. Orders have, therefore, been issued that the sailing of the March convoy is to be postponed.

3.It is a great disappointment to President Roosevelt and myself that it should be necessary to postpone the March convoy.

Had it not been for the German concentration, it had been our firm intention to send you a convoy of thirty ships each in March and again in early May. At the same time we feel it only right to let you know at once that it will not be possible to continue convoys by the northern route after early May, since from that time onwards every single escort vessel will be required to support our offensive operations in the Mediterranean, leaving only a minimum to safeguard our lifelines in the Atlantic."

-Churchill to Stalin March 30th, 1943



Reading the messages between the allied leaders of early 1943, it is not hard to see how the Soviets felt about the British war effort.

Simultaneously, arguing about Polish Eastern borders, with the Polish Government in Exile and then there was the quarrel that erupted about Katyn.

There were all sorts of reasons for the Soviets to accept a return to the borders of '41, in '43.

 

I am familiar with these messages. Thank you for sharing, it's been a while since I have seen them. They, However; only show that the Soviets wanted a second front. This was necessary to speed up the war and more importantly take pressure off the Red Army saving more lives. These messages in no way, however; somehow hint at a possible seperate peace being signed by the Soviets if a second front Wasn't going to be opened up.

There was no need for a seperate peace treaty as Red Army was winning. If in 1941-42' the Germans were unable to achieve victories (arguably their best years in Russia) 43' is a none starter..... After Stalingrad everyone knew of the final outcome swing front or not.

These requests weren't one sided either. When Germany launched the Ardennes Offensive Churchill asks Stalin for increased pressure as was the case in Balkans. So to alleviate pressure from allies in other parts.

While rumors of Germans trying to reach out (possibly without Hitlers knowledge) the Russian side was never interested. Nothing but total and complete destruction of the 3rd Reich would do.

 

I afraid none that I have seen are Russian concerns but mostly American and British. Kleist is also in there proposing things but all this was prior to Soviet Archives being examined.... Best chance the Germans had was prior to Moscow.