But wouldn't a breathing spell have been very beneficial to him? Resumption of oil and grain shipments, time to build up the Wehrmacht (all branches), and time to wear Britain down to the point where they wouldn't have the will to continue the war? (I know this makes strategic sense and we're talking about Hitler here, but...)
My friend this is nothing but speculation. There is absolutely nothing that has ever been uncovered within the Soviet archives (a lot) that has ever reinforced such a notion. What Stalin thought about his allies and what the allies spoke off concerning a possible "separate peace" is irrelevant. It logically makes no sense. Would the United States sign a peace treaty with Japan after the battle of Midway? Ofcourse not the tide had turned. Meetings in Sweden were never taken seriously not even Germany. Again, by 1943 Germany had lost all momentum in Russia and was virtually in full retreat. To imply that Stalin wanted peace or was even considering it after Stalingrad is simply a non starter. Of course he was worried about more casualties and didn't want to fight alone but this doesn't mean that he would do the unthinkable with a man that was bent on Lebensraum and had stabbed him in the back. The "Man of Steel" was just that and would rather sacrifice millions more than concede defeat, especially when he was clearly winning.
Your comparison to the Battle of Midway is entirely erroneous; as indicated by the aforementioned messages to Churchill of the situation. In exactly the time frame I am talking about, as previously indicated the Spring of '43 the Battle of Kursk has yet to occur. Stalin is not certain the Western Allies are doing anything serious in Europe, other than a few bombing raids, and not sending convoys to Russia. A true Machiavellian, Stalin still fears the West will obtain a separate peace first. Kharkov has proved the Germans are still capable of significantly hurting the Red Army. At that moment in time, Stalin was not yet "clearly winning", no matter how you now conclude it to have been so, with the command of all the details you now have. A compromise peace is exactly that. Once again, the Soviet demands were the borders of '41. That would hardly have been a "defeat". The rest is pure speculation and wishful thinking on your behalf. The very fact they hadn't endorsed the unconditional surrender.They were hoping for at least a coup, which would lead to an amicable peace. That's how 'unthinkable' a compromise peace was. Two assassination attempts were made in the Spring of '43 against Hitler. The Soviets were still saying peace was still possible, even if by Spring 1943, they no longer believed Hitler was willing to compromise to their benefit. That doesn't mean the Soviets were unwilling to negotiate. As indicated in the documents referenced to by LJAd. There are many different possibilities. Trying to lean your conclusion on your conception of a Paranoid Machiavellian Pragmatist as a "Man of Steel" that has shared little of his thoughts even with his contemporaries and cohorts is rather audacious of you. The propaganda image and the real man are not one and the same.
I still don't und errand where you are getting the notion that Stalin was afraid of the allies not joining the war effort. They were already in Africa at this time. Even still, after Stalingrad no Western Front was needed. The war was lost before Kursk. Kharkov was peanuts compared to Stalingrad. Just because Churchill thought of a possible seperate peace between Germany and the Soviet Union doesn't mean that Stalin and the Soviet Union considered this. Zhukov was against any peace at this time also (the only man Stalin feared). Stalin does not fear a separate peace and there is nothing in the Soviet Archives which backs this. I will have to look at LJAD's link (haven't checked it out). The Soviet Union would accept nothing less of the 3rd Reichs destruction. I'm also unfamiliar with any historians leaning in this direction either.... Regarding peace with Germany after Stalingrad. It logically doesn't make any sense. Even if every single German soldier was dragged from Western Europe (if the Allies did sign a seperate peace) Germany would still b weaker than she was in 41' while the Soviet Union would be stronger.... Seems we will have to agree to disagree on this one friend.
It is impossible to assess any separate peace among the Third Reich and the USSR without taking into account the third protagonist, Churchill, the cunning leader of the British Empire who was extremely hostile towards the USSR. Hostilities with Germany came later in thirties as the interlude to the main conflict – against the main and the ultimate target: Soviet Union, the colony-to-be of the British Empire. Now suppose that the Third Reich and the USSR have concluded a separate peace at any possible line between two countries. In the end the British Empire would have either (1) invaded Europe or (2) made a peace with the weakened Third Reich as a starting point for joint attack on the USSR. Therefore, for the USSR it was the only choice to shift the future frontier as west as possible. The best would have been a border at the Atlantic coast - sweet little iron curtain at Pais-de-Calais would have been just fine. So, the real question is: why should the USSR want to have the British Imperial Army in Ukraine as a starting point of the next invasion?
Once again, you speak from hindsight. It was not obvious, that the war was lost. Once again, without the LL deliveries, without the Western Allies, the road forward would've been extremely hazardous for the Soviets. Once again, Stalin is known to have suffered from paranoia. The fighting in Africa was trivial, it meant nothing, when compared to the effort on the Eastern Front. "No Western front was needed", and yet Stalin does nothing else but bleat on about it. The Soviet archives mean very little, how much did they contain on Stalin's ideas and attitudes (or those of his close cahoonies) towards the Famine? That was denied for only 60 years, even in the face of survivor's stories and photos. Once again, the question isn't whether it "nearly happened", but that it was even considered. People such as yourself categorically deny it, yet there is every indication, as stated previously, that the Soviets were willing to negotiate, even those sources refered to by LJAd were stating such. You can't both be "willing to negotiate" and categorically never considering it. "Separation of politics and strategy, and the neglect of the requirements of politics for purely strategic reasons are fraught with dangerous consequences. . . . Politics and war influence each other but they are not factors of the same order; primacy always belongs to politics, " - Col E Razin, published article in Party organ "Bolshevik". Jan 1943 "It is not our aim to destroy all organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible . . . but . . . also inexpedient from the point of view of the victor." - Stalin Nov, 1942 On 23rd February '43, Stalin's address to the Red Army made not a single mention of the Western Allies. No mention on the Soviet "German People's Radio" of the "unconditional surrender", for almost the entirety of '43. The Soviet-sponsored Moscow Manifesto to Germany. Stalin's insistence on the '41 borders at almost every negotiation with the West, repeatedly, ad nauseum, to the point of breaking with the Polish govt in exile, also at this critical juncture, April '43. The evidence is strongly indicative, but definitely not conclusive. Which is how Stalin would have wanted it to be.
This off-topic subject has been discussed in our previous conversation. In THIS post I have provided a scientiffic paper dealing with the subject and that is the best that can be found. It is possible to speculate but claims about the separate peace negotiations between the USSR and the Third Reich are unfounded. Just read the paper attached to that previous post.
What is always forgotten in all these discussions is: Not only Churchill wasn't a true friend of Stalin and his dictatorship, there were still two other Allies: Free France and Free Poland. Great Britain supported Finnland during the winter war, supported the opposition during the civil war in Russia and stopped negotiations for a peace treaty in Summer 1939. France supported Finnland during the winter war and planned to bomb the caucasian oilfields in 1940. Poland was established mainly on soviet territory and won a war against Russia only a few years ago. Why should he trust them? What could Stalin expect in 1943 after a successful war alongside Churchill/Roosevelt? A devastated country and not the borders of 1941 but those of 1939 with an reestablished Poland supported by Great Britain and France and then without a hostile Germany between them. Hitler/Ribbentrop knew this and that is why they never offered a peace within the old borders. With the death of Sikorski and the successes of the Red Army in 1944, the situation changed. But in 1943, a peace with the old borders would be a very surprising success for Stalin. And as a bonus he could sit back and watch Nazi-Germany and the Western Allies killing each other.
And, of course, in 1943 Stalin was looking at the Red Army in 1944, and no doubt was pleased with what he saw if not satisfied.
Furthrmore, there was also another war between Roosewelt and Churchill about the future, or should I say, the end of the Empire. Paradoxically, efforts to save the Empire have brought the Empire to the end, owing to the allies. In 1944 the USSR wasn't just enabled as you said recently - the USSR was at that time on steroids. That has ended a dream of re-gaining British dominance in Europe. A simplified story is: Stalin stopped Churchill in Europe, Roosevelt did that elsewhere.
While a minor affair, the fuel requirements were not minor nor was the air assets required to support the operation
Not in the original meaning of the word, but having the control over countries, limiting sovereignty, restricting trade, acquiring possessions of other nations by force etc. equals to colonialism. Colonialism evolves, but essentially it is the same. But If we agree that there are nations worthy having prefferential treatment and that there are other, savage nations, we addopt and support savage, uncivilized reasoning behind the (neo) colonializm. I believe that even today many nations are effectively colonies.
Sorry for being late to notice this; I've been busy. In a word, no. Heersgruppe Süd did not exist after 7 July 1942 for 6. Armee to "spearhead". It was replaced by Heersgruppe A and B for Fall Blau, of which A was the main effort - the "spearhead" if you will - directed at the Caucasus with 1. Panzerarmee, 11. Armee, and 17. Armee. Heeresgruppe B covered its flank and rear with 4. Panzerarmee, 2. Armee, 6. Armee, and the Italians and Hungarians. At that time, 6. Armee consisted of two Panzer, one motorized, six infantry, one security, and one Hungarian division. 4 Panzerarmee had one Panzer, three motorized, and five infantry divisions. 1. Panzerarmee had three Panzer, eight infantry, two Jäger, one Gebirgs, one security, and four Romanian divisions. 17. Armee had six infantry and two Jäger divisions. 6. Armee was certainly no more experienced than 2., 4., 12., 16., or 18. Armee and was not "more mechanized" in any significant way than any of the other armies involved on the Eastern Front, during Blau or earlier or later. Not sure how armies get "decorated"? Its original "field marshal" was Walter von Reichenau; not sure what makes him so special in your mind? BTW, 6. Armee did not "capture" Paris, which was an open city. It was occupied by 18. Armee. 6. Armee was at Royon at the time.