Hitler's summer pause 1941

Above has nothing to do with topic...but I notice a repetitive mistake: hindsighting.

Quite contradictory to claim that it must have been not sure to the Allies that Antwerp was the target (note : enigma codes were broken, yes ?), yet you claim at same time that it was CLEAR that the germans lacked strength to and penetrate to antwerp and finish the allies in the cauldron. How were the allies /Ike to tell in dec 1944 ?
HINDSIGHT !

Fact of the matter is ; a supreme commander may read transcripts of enigma of troops forming at ardennes, the commander may know by heart the data supplied by his intelligence about german estimated (!) strengths, it may even trickle down to regional commanders that "something" may occur and be "vigilant", yet the war may be over by christmas Easter...so not to worry....
YET when the first fat Tiger II tanks start rolling over your troops ..that pre-info and estimates is NOT WORTH A DIME when full panic develops and YOUR front collapses.

Imagine Ike on the phone to the fleeing troops "but you really must believe ME, the germans don't have enough strength to pull off any stunt"
yeah, right...

 

I guess it depends what cited book you read. Even the series narrated by a Brit, Lawrence Olivier, stated France had around 50 divisions on the Western Frontier and did nothing. I've also read books about Capitalism and war that many of the Western European powers could live with the idea of Hitler keeping Stalin in check, as Trotsky was the West's choice but Stalin out-murdered him.

 

It took Poland 5 weeks to fall, and the Wehrmacht was still there after it fell to maintain order and implement the Nazis into power. Hitler wanted to attack France that winter but for once he listened to his generals and waited because it would take time to get them back to the West and repair equipment and manufacture more materiel.

 

Yes there is a huge difference in what a leadership may realise, and what the troops on the ground experience. It's true it doesn't help the poor schmuck getting shot at in the least. That's why it was important to have leaders that the troops themselves believe in.

But it's not just "hindsighting", as the troops didn't flee, in spite of the confusion (panic is a word used too often here) on the first day. The American Army believed in their leadership. They fought hard. The bravery, commitment, vigour, speed and flexibility of the Americans put paid to the meticulous planning and lethargy in committing reserves of Adolph's Germany.

Of course the front shattered when green and severely mauled units in a supposedly quiet section suddenly faces an assault consisting of a large part of the remaining German armoured strength in total. To expect anything else would be unrealistic. Yet, the Allies, were able to contain the threat already within four days. No one is saying it was an easy battle. It was always going to be hard fought. Yet given the hard-won experience of the Americans, their superiority in mobility, logistics, and skill (Yes; their adversaries were a mixed bag of elite veterans and green underage teenagers) they prevailed. The proof is just how far the Germans were from ever attaining their goals.

The German leadership except Adolph didn't believe in what they were doing in the Ardennes.
"It was obvious to me that the available forces were far too small - in fact no soldier really believed that the aim of reaching Antwerp was really practicable. But I knew by now that it was useless to protest to Hitler about the possibility of anything." -Rundstedt

"All Hitler wants me to do is to cross a river, capture Brussels and then go on and take Antwerp. And all this in the worst time of the year ..."
- General Sepp Dietrich, commander of Sixth SS Panzer Army,


What alternative are you suggesting? Encouraging the panic? Fleeing back to Paris?

"Nuts!"

The evidence is that the American Army didn't pull further back; they believed they could turn the tide.

 

I should not put much faith in "The World at War".Better would be to look on French sources .(besides : it is not true that the French did nothing : there was the Saar Offensive)

 

Hitler did not listen to his generals. He postponed the attack some 19 times because of the weather. And it would have been the same as the 1914 attack but once the german plane with info on the attack had to land behind enemy lines, Hitler changed to Sichelschnitt.

 

The facts are

Prior to the declaration of war,France had 20 ID,5 CD and 8 colonial divisions :it was thus impossible for France to have 50 divisions on the German border on 3 september

On 7 september,France was mobilizing 94 division equivalents,but it would take several weeks before these division equivalents would be operational

The scheduled French mobilisation plan was (with D M being 2 september)

M +7 :41 divisions

M +12 : 63 divisions

M + 17 : 83 divisions

M + 22 : 86 divisions,which would be distributed as following:

North-east + Jura : 56

South-east : 9

Interior : 7

North-Africa : 14

As the Germans has already in the West 34 divisions on 1 september,it is very doubtful that the 56 French divisions on 24 september would have constituted the indespensable numerical majority needed for a successful offensive.

 

I don't mean September 3rd. The Wehrmacht didn't return the second Poland surrendered. The stayed in the East thru the fall into the winter. I have read testimony from Germans from that time saying if the Allies attacked in the West they would have vastly outnumbered Germany's Western defenses (I don't mean September 3rd, a few months into the DoW).

 

SO LJAD im confused, how do you retreat and hold at the same time. SInce SW front didn't retreat and was destroyed and Kiev taken, how is not trying o save as much of the front the best option??

 

Trying to save as much of the front (by abandonning Kiev) can be argued as being a reasonable and defensible position,but,not abandonning Kiev,at the risk of losing the whole SW Front) also can be defended as a reasonable and defensible decision,because,before it was to late,the risk of losing the SWFront if Kiev was not abandonned was considered as low (see the claim by Kirponos on 8 august that there was no big problem),besides:it can be argued that it was better that 100 men would remain to defend Kiev and possibly would die,than that the same 100 men would be saved by abandonning Kiev .

The attacks on the decision to hold Kiev,are essentially based on hindsight .

 

I have read testimony from Germans from that time saying if the Allies attacked in the West they would have vastly outnumbered Germany's Western defenses (I don't mean September 3rd, a few months into the DoW).

I could be wrong, but I guess that you are alluding on the statement of Jodl at Nüremberg,but,I have no faith at all in this statement,for the following reasons:

How could Jodl know ?The success of a French (not Allied) attack was also based on the strength of the French army .

Every day,the Germans became stronger(compared to the French)n 24 september,the French planned to have 56 divisions on the NE front,and,on 24 september ,there were still no British units on the front,these would arrive only a week later,the 55 divisions of the Ostheer were moving to the west .And, a month later,Hitler ordered to attack in the West .

 

I guess you are alluding on the statement of Jodl at Nuremberg,but,I have no faith at all inthis statement,for the following reasons


The French planned to have 56 divisions on 24 september at the NE front (at that day,there still were no British units at the front),a week later,when the first British units arrived,the 53 divisions of the Ostheer were arriving at the Western front .,and,at that moment, any hope for the Allies to have a numerical superiority had vanished ,even more : the Allies never had a numerical superiority that would enable them to launch an offensive with a reasonable chance of succes.

The statement of Jodl was nothing else than to saddle up the Allies with the responsability for the destructions and the Holocaust:it was: if the Allies had attacked in the autumn of 1939,the world would have been spared the 40 millions of dead .Thus,the Allies are responsible,not Germany .

An other statement was used/invented with the same aim : We (the German generals) planned a coup d'état in 1938,but the coup was aborted because Chamberlain capitulated at Nuremberg . We (the German generals) should not be put on trial,but should receive a lot of medals : if one had followed our advices,there was no WWII.

 

If you compare Kiev and for instance Army group Courland plus the fortress cities, did Hitler need the tanks and troops to protect Berlin or staying in a pocket far away from Fatherland??

 

It's not a question of OR :was it possible after AG Courland was encircled,to move sufficient troops back to defend Berlin ?Berlin was only in danger after january 1945.

The idea of the fortress cities was launched in the summer of 1944(when no one in Germany could imagine the Soviets marching to Berlin) and at that moment,the idea was not that stupid .it was hoped that these cities would hinder/delay the Soviet advance .

 

???

No one in Germany? The summer of '44? Who in Germany couldn't imagine it by the end of July '44? With Americans, British and Canadians in France, the AGC destroyed, and the Soviets now rapidly approaching the Borders of Prussia itself?

With absolutely no hope of beating back the Soviets at this stage, ever, to what purpose the delay? Is that not the ultimate in stupidity? Oh yes, the political salvation of the separate peace, and allying with the West against Bolshevism... talk about clutching after straws.

 

Considering the Germans´ losses in Tunis May 1943, Normandy late 1944, and Bagration summer 1944, that is like 300,000+400,000+400,000 men. And In France the armor was lost "twice", in Falaise, and the rest trying to cross the rivers to safety but the Allied fighter bombers made sure they would not get over. Sounds like alot of men to me even if in Tunis some were Italian.

 

The idea of the fortress cities was adopted BEFORE D Day and BEFORE Bagration .

 

The Hitler order about the fortresses (Feste Plätze) is dating from march 8 1944.

 

It is much more :

Tunis : 105000 (Army only)

Bagration : 295000

West (there is nothing for Normandy) :495000 (but the figures are not complete-

North Ukraine (always forgotten) : 206000

South Ukraine + Balkans (idem) : 251000