How Germany could've won?

They still had to leave they equipment to the beaches...how soon would their morale returned and weaponry and vehicles replaced??

 

How soon would their weaponry and vehicles be needed ?

And I like to see proofs that their morale was attainted.

 

Hitler was too ideological in his decision-making, with his political beliefs taking precedent in military decisions. This flawed strategic thinking and the vast resources of the Allies had them pinned no matter what. Unless they made more of an effort in North Africa to push into Egypt, get into the middle east, get Turkey in the war on their side, and attack Russia from the South/middle east and towards Moscow, I don't see them winning.

For example, in an articles on military-history online, when referring to Dunkirk, yes the German logistical and supply lines were over-extended, their vehicles needed rest and re-fitting, troops needed regrouping, etc., but Goering convinced Hitler that the Luftwaffe alone could stop the English from retreating in the seas, and the Luftwaffe was built along National Socialist lines while the Army was tradition, old-school German, and they wanted the Nazi Luftwaffe to have the glory of that specific battle. That's where ideology and strategy do not mix.

 

Equipment losesse:

http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=125:british-equipment-losses-at-dunkirk-and-the-situation-post-dunkirk&catid=50ther-articles&Itemid=61

Overall artillery and anti-tank losses are in the region of 60% of total stocks and tanks around 50% of total stock.

The United Kingdoms industry was not war ready at the outbreak of war and had no hope of equipping the rapidly expanding army let alone the 55 division requirement set by the War Office. As the war progressed and the United Kingdom's industries where switched over to the production of the weapons of war, the increase in munitions was rapid and by June 1940 production was more than double that of the average of the first 6 months of war. The period between June 30th and August 31st sees an increase of 134 Infantry tanks, 113 Cruiser tanks and 1,542 carriers of all types. Infantry tank production is steadily increasing from 57 in June to 90 in August, Cruiser tank production is decreasing dropping from 58 in June to less than 30 a month by the end of the year. Carrier production has increased dramatically during the year to over 500 a month by May.

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My quick calculation: Light tanks would be replaced immediately and more, cruiser and infantry tanks 3-4 months.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkirk_evacuation

Casualties[SIZE=small][edit][/SIZE]




A wounded French soldier being taken ashore on a stretcher atDover after his evacuation from Dunkirk



The BEF lost 68,000 soldiers (dead, wounded, missing, or captured) from 10 May until the surrender of France on 22 June.[108] 3,500 British were killed[109] and 13,053 wounded.[110] All the heavy equipment had to be abandoned. Left behind in France were 2,472 guns, 20,000 motorcycles, and almost 65,000 other vehicles; also abandoned were 416,000 short tons (377,000 t) of stores, more than 75,000 short tons (68,000 t) of ammunition and 162,000 short tons (147,000 t) of fuel.[111] Almost all of the 445 British tanks that had been sent to France with the BEF were abandoned.
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Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (1990)

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1202599.1940


1940: Myth and Reality
by Clive Ponting

Britain's "Finest Hour" revealed as a muddle of ineptitude and propaganda. "Thoroughly researched and well written, Clive Ponting's book stands just about every preconceived notion concerning Britain's role in World War II on its head."--William L. O'Neill.


When the first troops arrived at Dunkirk discipline nearly broke down altogether and for the first two days of the evacuation order had to be kept by armed naval personnel until more disciplined regiments arrived on 29 May. Even then men were rushing the boats in their anxiety to get away and General Alexander was shocked by the behaviour of the soldiers. Later in the year, during a secret session of the House of Commons, several MPs told how a large number of officers had run away and deserted their troops so as to get on to the earliest boat. Privately, the War Office was alarmed at the state of the army. As the Director of Statistics later told one newspaper editor: "The Dunkirk episode was far worse than was ever realized in Fleet Street. The men on getting back to England were so demoralized they threw their rifles and equipment out of railway-carriage windows. Some sent for their wives with their civilian clothes, changed into these, and walked home." In private, Churchill told his junior ministers that Dunkirk was "the greatest British military defeat for many centuries'".
No news of the events at Dunkirk was released to the public until the 6 p.m. BBC news on 30 May, five days after the evacuation had started and when nearly three-quarters of the BEF were already back in Britain. The public were then told, in a statement approved by the Ministry of Information, that "men of the undefeated British Expeditionary Force have been coming home from France. They have not come back in triumph, they have come back in glory."

 

Gunslinger why not send divisions to Japan so they could attack Russia from Siberia. The idea of an attack into the south of Russia is absurd, there was no road or rail lines and the mountains would limit any serious attack. Look at the problems in Italy and they are not half the range of the Caucasus mountains

 

I find it hard to believe that England didn't leave any reserve tanks and other heavy vehicles in the isles for a reserve, that they brought the whole lot then had to leave it all.

 

They lost all the tanks they brought to mainland with BEF. Not all tanks.

 

Is this a serious idea? From summer 1941 onwards, the Kriegsmarine didn't dare to send battleships into the Atlantic Ocean and you want to send thousands of men to Japan? How?

Compared to this, the obstacles in the south of Russia were ridiculous. Just remember, they already passed the mountains and reached a point close to Grosny. The Caucasus region isn't Sibiria, there are big cities and roads between them.

The biggest mistake wasn't a military one, it was sending the Einsatzgruppen immediatly to the occupied cities and towns and behave worse than Stalin, which was really difficult. So there always was the partisan problem and it kept moral of the Red Army high unlike in the First World War.
Stalin did the same in 1939/40 but he learned out of it.

 

OhneGwehr, that map you posted of 1964 hypothetical Europe, since Germany beat France and occupied it in 1940, wouldn't it have been part of their empire in 1964?

 

So they weren't totally depleted of equipment on the isles to form new army groups after the disaster in 1940?

 

The map is out of the novel "Fatherland" from Robert Harris, which takes place in a hypothetical Greater Germany of 1964. Germany negotiated a peace with the western allies after D-Day was a failure and won the war in the East.
France was never intended to be part of Germany, most french people aren't german.
It is a very popular novel, easy to read, there is even a movie about it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Lh6KjqUiI0

The BEF lost all tanks and of some types there weren't any left in the UK. Matilda I for example.

 

No.

[SIZE=10pt]Only 139 A11 Infantry Tank ‘Matilda’ Mark I were built, 65 prewar and 74 between 1 September 1939 and 31 March 1940. Two prototype A12 Infantry Tank ‘Matilda’ Mark II were completed prewar and 34 more up to 31 March 1940. All production Matilda from 1 April 1940 were A11 Mark II, but were supplemented by Valentine production beginning in May. There were a total of 121 Matilda II and Valentine ‘I’ tanks produced in the second quarter, 227 in the third and 354 in the fourth of 1940. Of the 140 Mark I, 97 were lost in France, along with 23 Mark II. In addition, 50 Mark II went to the desert in August 1940. So although the bulk on hand with troops as of 1 June were Mark I (60+), by the end of September the majority in England were actually Mark II (300+).[/SIZE]

[SIZE=10pt]So as of c. 1 June 1940 there were 43 Matilda Mark I and probably 65 or more Matilda II and Valentines in England.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=10pt]By 30 September 1940, about the first practical date the Germans could have attempted an invasion, the British had about 360 Infantry tanks, over 200 Cruiser tanks, and over 700 light tanks in England. [/SIZE]

 

Yes, historical research has proven you correct. There must have been some left, otherwise there wouldn't be an example in the Bovington Tank Museum
I saw a documentary and i remember: the best thing about them (Matilda 1) was, that they all fell in the hands of the germans...So i guess: they were talking of all of them already in France, not all of them ever produced.

How many tanks of all those 1260 were of real value, the light tanks were vulnerable even to tank rifles, weren't they?

 

Given that the earliest practicable landing for the Germans was sometime in late September and that they would have, at best, 196 Panzer III and IV, none with guns effective against the Matilda and many likely lost on the unfamiliar seashore, plus 52 swimming Panzer II, the vulnerability of the British light tanks is almost irrelevant. Most of the Panzer III and all the Panzer IV were equally vulnerable to antitank rifles from the flank and the Panzer II from virtually all aspects. Most of the beaches also were covered by 2-pdr AT, 75mm field guns firing directly, 3" AA, and even some 4" guns.

 

During the Blitzkrieg in France, the Allied tanks were on the most part better than their German counterparts in terms of armor, and in guns they were about equal because the Germans weren't using the big guns on tanks at that point.

 

Ohne, I was being sarcastic, but the idea of attacking through the Caucasus is along the same lines as attacking through Japan, completely out of the question due to transportation and logistical constraints

 

37mm was the best they had (against tanks) and i truly don't understand how they could win tank battles, but they did. Stukas?
The Pz 38(t) was the workhorse of the german Wehrmacht, reliable and easy to drive and maintain, often compared to the american "Honey".

Apart from the Matilda II, which was very slow, all of the allied tanks seemed vulnerable to the small ATGs. Even the Char B was knocked out by shooting at the air vents. There are many famous pictures of wrecked Char Bs and somehow they must have done it.

Wasn't the Northover projector a stop-gap for missing ATGs at the beaches?

 

The problem for the French was most of their tank guns were designed for infantry support. Only the most modern, the 37mm SA38 and 47mm SA35 were really capable against armor, which were found in at most 850 of the total.

The bit about the Char B being knocked out by firing at the air vents is a wargaming myth. Only one was known to have been knocked out in that way - the actual protection of the vents was about the same as the side armor.

The many British stop gaps - the Blacker Bombard was another - have little to do with the actual defenses in place on the beaches.

 

Germany never had any chance of winning World War II.

However Hitler and Mussolini should have declared war on the United States on 2 September 1940 in response to the Destroyers for Bases Agreement.

 

What if Adolf started WWII in September 1938? It will continue in further posts... Or in March 39?

By the time of the Czechoslovakia crisis both the RAF and L'Armee de l'air lack of decent modern fighters. And the armour of GB was simple pathetic. Not sure which was the strength of the Wehrmacht at that moment.

There is no counter offensive in Arras or, with out the Matilda II is easily repeled so the BEF falls.

BUTTERFLY EFFECT:

MED OPTION

In 1938 the SCW is still in heavy fighting . I will assume the RN would have cut the Nationalist suplies ...and french advisors could had go there: The Ebro Battle is a Rep success Catalonia is saved and the Republican area is reunited in a single body whose southern border is in Málaga/Motril, 170 km from Gibraltar So in june 1939 new data of the fall of France, there is a real chance that one of the sides let the germans get into Gibraltar.
That triggered the MED option, not sure if the LW could have launch and invasion over Malta but for sure with a petty part of the BoB losses could knock out the garrison for good. Two Panzer divisions are send to Lybia and there is no decent armour in Egypt.
The Med is now the Benitto's "Mare Nostrum" and Rommel Arrives to Damascus. So the suplies arrive to Lebanon Beirut/Tripoli , and by Railway to Damascus/Bagdad /Basra not to mention Haifa , Port Said and Alexandria.

The Northern Irak oil fields (Kurdistan) and the pipelines to the MED through Syria are intact. Noe id time to consolidate this huge gains, expulse the British empire from Arabia and protect the oilfields form future landings in the area, Ethiopia o Northern Africa. AH agrees to pospone Barbarossa till summer 42.

URANIUM CLUB

Otto Hanh (and Lisa Meitner) discovered the Uranium fission in December 1938 there is a chance they are not allowed to publish freely their results , or even that Meitner is not longer in this world (you know what was going on in Germany)
Harteck get the Uranium sacked from Belgium (Congo's origin) and get his "proto pile" in September 1939 instead April 1940.
The Norsk Hydro Plant falls in German's hands one year before as actually did. (Or AH did not invade Norway, anyways after the fall of France the heavy water production would have gone to Germany) Harteck conducts and experiment with 300 kg (660 pounds) of that D2O and in three months gets the Girdler process (as historically did in 1943 as the same time than the USA) the in march 1940 . The conclusion is that a nuclear pile with two tons of D2O could become critical (or so)
As Germany now has more oil than even needs there are resources to build a Heavy water secret plant in South Germany, or two as the Bomber Command had yet launched its night campaign.

The Herr manage to establish some kind of central administration of the whole thing, the central office and work are send to a little old city near Göttingen. The main works are conducted underground in the old carbon mine in the area.

Heisemberg , with a dubious loyalty to the regimen is just a main advisor, same for Weishack and others, Harteck had probed more loyalty and in fact is a better experimentalist , I guess he is the man that get the things done .

The traditional rivalries and backstabbing of the Nazi regime this time work in favor of the project. and while Harteck tries unsuccessfully and slowly to find ways to enrich Uranium, Heisemberg and Weishack propose as the most viable a reactor capable of either propelling a ship indefinitely ... or producing what the Germans called "element 94."

Historically Bothe was put in charge of calculating the possibility of using carbon as a moderator in May 1941, he failed to realize that boron impurities ruined that possibility, In this timeline he was commissioned in 1940. He initially fails , but Harteck's own experiment with dry ice and the ones with paraffin of the young Nz scientist marginalized from the main project indicate that carbon is adequate, by the end of 1941 the error is corrected.




JET ENGINE - Heavy Bombers

The initial Heinkel's work on the jet engine come to light just after the declaration of war in September 1938 . And rise the same enthusiastic response of Helmut Schelp and Hans Mauch in the RML. The design of Jumo 004 start 9 months earlier.

As in this timeline Turkey is surrounded by the axis and his still ally, the SU and Germany still gets raw materials from her the development of the jet engine is a little more easier for the German industry as had more chromium and manganese , even more wolfram as Spain is under somewhat occupation and Portugal simply could not refuse to shell ALL its production to the axis.

As the project goes on, is self evident that the LW would need a jet bomber able to drop the "Heisenberg artifact" over GB . Something like a 6 engines He 339 comes to the design table. Historically there was a workable Jumo 004 in 1943 but it was too expensive for mass production as used too much chromium and manganese. In this timeline just 40 of them are really needed.

To hypothetically attack both Moscow and Leningrad the option is a He 177, as the dive bombing capacity is not needed, so the natural option a traditional 4 engines plane comes on (He 277) for night high altitude raids.

To be continued...

EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Historically the German u boot sunk the HMS Corageous British carrier in 1939, Scharnhost and Guinessau the HMS Glorious in the Norway invasion in 1940 , the Ark Royal narrowly escaped and attack in 1939 as a result of failed torpedoes. I wonder if in this timeline the pistols would have been the old good Kaiser ones.

3 carriers out over seven. That brings insane ideas both the Kriegsmarine and the Regia Marina who conducts a war game... some kind of planification before entering the war against GB. The gemans inform and offer the RADAR (under German operators and control ) to the Italians. The Flottiglia Decima planned his attacks on Alexandria and Gibraltar knowing the British could "see" them in the night. So in june '39 the war against Italy stars with a pair off sneaky Pearl Harbours or Tarantos if you prefer. 6/5 of 7 carriers konckout.

That operations enlighten the Japanese about what kind of ships they had to sunk in a near future in the suicidal and infamous first blow against the USA.