How Hitler could have won

Read the original post in the thread.

The original post quoted Raeder's proposed Southern Strategy:

I then said that Goering presented a similar strategy which was aimed at the British Empire and included taking Gibraltar. Raeder also presented a plan to take Gibralter and the south Atlantic Islands.

I then said that for the Southern Strategy to be successful there was a long list of operations that had to be carried out, I then listed these operations and the conditions under which they could succeed. Most of these operations were proposed and/or planned at some point by the Axis powers. Some of the operations happened originally and were successful.

The crackheads then started flaming "my" plan. It isn't my plan. It is a listing of all the operations proposed by Goering and Raeder that have to be included in a Southern Strategy in order for the Southern Strategy to succceed. I also included other Med theater plans proposed by other Axis leaders as part of the southern strategy.

The question asked in the oriiginal post was could Hitler have won the war following Raeder (and Goering's) southern strategy?

I say that the southern strategy would have worked and put the USSR in a completely different situation. The crackheads claim that the Axis powers could not complete ANY offensive operations as dictated by the southern strategy. As always the crackheads give magical capabilities to the allies while treating the Axis powers like the Keystone Cops.

 

So, the black stripe that all French sailors wore on their uniforms to commemorate their defeat at Trafalgar was an example of what? Love for the British.

Your lack of knowledge of world war 2 realities is quite astonishing.

 

Good Lord your the one that needs to brush up on WW2 history not LWD,,but anyways on the Italian Navy...

According to M. J. Whitley's "Battleships of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia" niether Littorio or Vittorio Veneto were really ready till August 2,1940 not June 10 as you have stated. Now as to the Kriegsmarine on June 4-9 during the still ongoing Norwiegion Campaign the Gneisenau & Scharnhorst engaged the Glorious with the latter(Scharnhorst) being heavilty damaged by a torpedo from either the HMS Acasta or HMS Achates while the former(Gneisenau) was hit by a torpedo from the HMS Clyde the result of these episodes is that niether were service ready till the end of 1940.Furthermore a couple of time their machinery forced them to retire from operations. Now the Bismarck didn't sail from Kiel to the Eastern Baltic for trials & working up till September 28,1940 while Tirpitz wasn't commissioned till Feburary 25,1941 then running Prelimanary trials at Kiel on March 9,1941 then she kept working up till January of 1942. The Lutzow suffered a torpedo hit on April 11,1940 & was under repair till March 31,1941. The Admiral Scheer started a refit on April 1,1940 which lasted until late July of 1940. Prinz Eugen was still fitting out in July,1940 and suffered damage from a magnetic mine in this time frame. Furthermore the German CA's suffered from very unreliabe machinery something certainly to take into account in a so-called Southern Operation.

The Norwiegion Pampaign put heavy demands on both the Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine and must be taken into account in planning what your proposing ,most certainly Germany can't get side tracked from the Norwiegion Campaign to one of which your proposing.

Anyways all of this above severly reduces forces availaible for the Southern Operations posted here.

 

Oh another thing what type of fleet train does either the KM or RM have? They are certainly going to need one for siezing islands in the South Atlantic.

 

No, I understand that. Where im a bit confused is, how does accomplishing this win the war for Germany? Are we assuming that in this scenario Germany never goes to war with the Soviet Union? What happens to GB and the U.S. after Germany accomplishes all of this and in what year does all of this occur?

 

Is this another one vs. the rest forum? If it is, I think everyone's seen far too many. Nobody even tries to turn them around anymore.

As for the British and the French, this is probably the period of most goodwill between the two nations. Even in World War I they weren't too chummy after the war started going long, and they started bleeding.

Of course every alliance has bickering and all that, even the Americans and British had friction. But the relations between the two nations were extremely strong, as they were with the French, even though de Gaulle irritated the hell out of almost every leader and every general in the Western Allies. So yes, the British loved the French, who loved the Americans, who loved the British, who loved the Americans, who loved the French, who loved the British!

 

You reminded me of a thing that was sort of funny. Churchill was being interveiwed and was asked if he had said (in reference to DeGaulle); "The heaviest cross I bore during the war was the Cross of Lorrain."

To which Churchill replied; "No I never said that, but I wish I would have thought of it!" Sir Winston didn't have that great a relationship with the Free French General, but then again few non-French allied officers did. I think "Ike" probably handled the gentleman with the best results.

 

I noticed you mentioned moving Kriegsmarine suface ships to the South Atlantic but just where I presume? Remember even though Brest was within bombing range of the RAF it also had rail/overland links to Germany itself to enable repairing & such. what type of infrastructure would those South Atlantic bases have for servicing/supplying German warships?

 

I don't want to hijack the the thread, so I'll be short:

1) With strategic plans in advance BEF would Never get to be evacuated - unthinkable.
2) With strategic plans in advance all Me109E's would be retrofitted with drop fuel tanks.
3) Luftwaffe was fighting the wrong battle of britain. They should have fought the RN in english ports from the get go. Think about multiple Pearl Harbors.
4) Some simple measures could be taken to significantly improve their barge fleet.

Still- the window of opportunity was narrow and it depended also on weather conditions,
but it was there.

 

your point 4 :Which ones ?

 

Curiosaboutwwii. If you are going to continue to opening disagree with the other members who state well known facts with your own facts, please cite sources for your claims, give them something that proves your point instead of continous banter from both sides of, this also goes for the other members involed..

Also, as the term "crackhead" can be debated as being an insult referring to not one but multiple members, I am asking you nicely to refrain from using the word "crackhead" and similar ones, please show the other members respect.

 

Well, the list is long , but I'll compress it to 2 points:
1) Loading the barges on the French beaches instead of bottling them in ports. (With Freya radar cover and mass coastal artillery + AA protection of said beaches.)
2) Filling the barges with buoyant material - making them essentially unsinkable and better protecting the troops inside.

 

What kind did they have? How many people could they carry? How many did they have?

They certainly weren't going to borrow any from the LW at this point in the war.

 

The plan was for Italy not to get into the war. Italy got in because ll Duce saw a chance to grab some French territory. Why should Italy even consider this option prior to serious German inroads into France? Like wise why would the Spanish consider getting into this?

I don't think so. The problem is planning something like this either presupposes a almost unbelievable success or has to take place afterward. Then there are time constraints. Look how long the planning took for Overloard.

According to Operational History
Eugen isn't really operational until 41
Admiral Scheer Operational History
Scheer goes into the dock in early July and isn't ready until October. This might have been delayable.

Just what do you think these are useful for in this scenario?

Tirpitz isn't commisioned yet, Bismarck is still working up and isn't fully operational until May of 41. Gneisenay is hit by a torpedo in June and isn't operational again until Dec. Likewise Scharnhorst is layed up with torpedo damage from June through the rest of the summer and into fall at least.

Where? Certainly not near Bordeaux for at least a while after the armistace.

Strawman. That's not what I said and there is no reason to get insulting.

It wouldn't have been the first time or the last. Take a look at Sealion or some of the H class BB designs.

How much of it would get through in any sort of condition to do anything? By the way is the LW covering the fleet or is it redploying to the south?

Have you looked at the range of most of the Italian navy? Some of the DDs couldn't even make the West Coast of Spain without refueling.

Strawman.

Could you provide some references for this?

That's real mature

Armored ops in mountains are not all that easy. Stoped perhaps not slowed very possibly and certainly they're not going to surprise Gibralter if they attempt this. I wouldn't want to be in a panzer unit that attempted to take Gibralter in any case.

He probably wouldn't even have gone to said conference.

 

A historical artifact.

Your lack of manors is also. Hopefully you'll either learn some or leave.

 

How so? What strategic plan could for see this happening?

And what sort of impact do you think this will make? It's not enough to defeat the RAF much less the RAF and the RN.

They can't reach most of the RN even if they can they are not that good at sinking ships.

Such as? It's still a barge fleet. In any case how long does it take to assuble it where it's needed?

No there was no "window of opertunity". The Germans had neither the time nor the resources to accomplish what they need to to invade Britain. If they start early enough and commit enough resources to it then:
1) The British will probably see and react to it.
2) They likely will have trouble defeating France which is a necessary precondition.

 

First you have to gather the barges and move them to the general area where they are to be boarded. Historically they nver loaded them. Are you suggesting just beaching them while you wait? If so then you are going to have a number of problems related to that. They might also become a tempting target for naval bombardment. How much castal artilery are you going to be able to get there?

What boyant material? Where are you going to get enough to fill thousands of barges? Then there's the problem that the barges are cube limited and not weight limited and this material will take up cube (as well as weight).

 

The very existance of ready strategic plan and intent to invade England would have never allowed for the strategic error to stop the ground attack on Dunkirk.

My point is that the LW was fighting completely unwinnable and unneccessary fight against the RAF while it should have attacked the RN from the get go.
The RAF couldn't have stoped the invasion, the RN could.

provided long range fighter support LW could reach most of the RN's home fleet.
They were not good in sinking ships cause they were not exercising in sinking ships.
They were instead making holes in the dirt of RAF runways.
One month of exercise and they would have improved sufficiently.
Besides they didn't need to sink the whole RN , it would be enough to damage and hamper it sufficiently, destroy port installations , force it to disperse (which LW btw did to an extent )
in order to create situation favorable for crossing the channel.
All of the above the LW was quite capable of doing even without extra training.

I am quite aware that this is the generally accepted view on Sealion.
I just happen to disagree.

Btw. nothing I mention requires any strategic resources or diversion of industries, only rational planning in advance and intent.
Which was not so little...as it turned out lol.

 

True. But they can't be sunk while waiting on the beach and if damaged can be repaired while waiting.
All german artillery + AA obviously ... everything that's not crucially needed elsewhere... and that's a lot... several thousand guns.

There are many possible materials , but simple cork wood would be the best I think.
It would take a lot of space, but if distributed correctly (including outside the hull of the barge) it would still leave sufficient space.
Spain, Portugal and Italy were the main world suppliers so there would't have been a problem with the amounts required.
I suppose it would be also good for the morale of the invading troops to be at least on an unsinkable vessel and with some extra protection against small caliber fire.

 

Cork? Are you serious? CORK! What a laugh, the room taken up by the cork would render each barge so small in capacity it would be of no worth. Unless the plan is to transport cork instead of landing troops. Cork is bulky, every 5 lbs. of commercial grade cork has a buoyancy of 20 lbs. So to support/float each 100 lbs of weight you need 20 lbs of cork, have you ever looked at 20 lbs of cork?

The proposed invasion called for 140,000 men (9 divisions) to be transported across the channel in river barges. Many of the Baltic sea barges sank in coastal waters while being transported to France. The river barges were even less seaworthy. The landing would require another 20,000 trained seamen to man all the vessels to transport the 9 divisions across the channel. A smaller force had literally no chance of securing a foothold on a defended coast.

The plan called for it being done at night, the column of barges going single file, going down the channel, then simultaneously turning to shore and heading to their beaches. The plan was to land along 275 miles of coastline. A tug pulling 2 of the barges could move 2-3 knots. The current might move at 5 knots and it was estimated that it would take 30 hours of travel to cross the channel. The barges had such a low seaboard that the wash of a fast traveling ship would sink them. The UK DD's could sink a lot of the barges without firing a shot.

A trial was run, during daylight, in France. One single main exercise was carried out, just off Boulogne. Fifty vessels were used, and to enable the observers to actually observe, the exercise was carried out in broad daylight. (The real thing was due to take place at night/dawn, remember). The vessels marshalled about a mile out to sea, and cruised parallel to the coast. The armada turned towards the coast (one barge capsizing, and another losing its tow) and approached and landed.

The barges opened, and soldiers swarmed ashore. However, it was noted that the masters of the boats let the intervals between the vessels become wider and wider, because they were scared of collisions. Half the barges failed to get their troops ashore within an hour of the first troops, and over 10% failed to reach the shore at all. The troops in the barges managed to impede the sailors in a remarkable manner; in one case, a barge overturned because the troops rushed to one side when another barge "came too close". Several barges grounded broadside on, preventing the ramp from being lowered.

In this exercise, carried out in good visibility, with no enemy, in good weather, and limited current after traveling only a short distance, with no navigation hazards or beach defenses, less than half the troops were got ashore where they could have done what they were supposed to do.

To top it off, the RAF was completely aware of the gathering of the barges and bombed them without let-up when ever they were detected in large groups. I'll find the old link if you like which has the bombing runs recorded.