How we come to know what we know

This has an interesting parallel with the Germans in Russia. One has to remember when Germany invaded they knew nothing of the KV 1 and T 34. Both initially appeared in small numbers and held a rude shock for the Germans to which they responded with first the Tiger I and then the Panther.
But, the bulk of Russian armor up through 1942 continued to be a mix of older type tanks still in the inventory and the newer light types, the T 60 and T 70. Even as late as Kursk about half the tank brigades involved still were on the 1942 TO&E with about 50% T 60 or T70 light tanks. These older types as well as the T60 and T70 were absolutely no match for the Pz III or IV and barely useful against even the Pz 35 or 38. Even the Pz II could give them a problem.
Yet, we tend to hear only about how the Red Army had fielded hordes of difficult to stop T 34 and KV 1. This too is not the factual evidence until the later half of 1943 when the T 34 became standard. But, by then the KV 1 had been completely abandoned in production to be replaced in 1944 by the IS series.

The comparison with US armor development is a rough parallel.

 

Of course they do. The only problem here is that you cannot tell the difference between historical narrative and tabular studies, and the manner in which they are treated.

My goodness you must be quite angry about this since it is the second time you’ve mentioned it to me in this thread.

Fine by me.

As I said before, I cannot provide what I do not have. However, your ORO studies include some description of methodology, as well as the authors conclusions, but you do not let anyone see them.

Having carefully reviewed my previous response to you, I can say without equivocation that it is entirely rational, and without rancor.

There are no useful numbers in the sources I gave. I realize that someone who has invested a great deal of time and money in collecting reports consisting mainly of numbers might react badly to their absence. It must be a feeling similar to that of a bat that finds itself suddenly out in the bright sunlight. But pause for a moment and consider this…..

Most of historiography consists of narrative. In other words written history is a story of sorts. As someone who has a basic understanding of the quantitative side of military history, I am certain there is much to be learned from its careful application to a given subject. By the same token, the use of disparate numbers derived from unknown methodologies and hidden conclusions is a form a sciolism that might be a thing well met by the uninitiated, but is empty of any serious meaning in the higher sense.

Duckbill

 

With that last entry let me inject a few comments that should be taken to heart by several people in this discussion:

1. This is not an academic setting. People posting here are not held to some academic standard. Instead, the tenor of threads should be more conversational. Where proof or sources are required they should be politely asked for. Whether or not they are provided is optional.

2. We are not keeping score. You gain nothing by demolition of others posts here. Instead, the responses should be kept on friendly terms.

3. For those inclined to tighter standards of evidence and sourcing, feel free to provide them. They are good for everyone to see and use. But, they are not some weapon to use in a battle against other members. This is a friendly discussion between enthuasists of military history and those who might want to learn more about the subject. Total wars between the Magi and Gognards is not going to promote that.

As a final note, I suggest that those inclined to do the obverse of the above to any degree first read and take to heart a book or books like David Fischer's Historian's Fallacies Toward a Logic of Historical Thought.

 

As allways wise words from T.A.

 

So you use the example of Puffendorf. Claim it was "the biggest tank battle in 2nd Armored experience" and then tell us you have NO figures of any sort on the numbers involved?
The mind boggles!
I can tell you that 2nd AD lost more tanks in the period 23-30th December 1944 (some 76) than the 57 lost on the Roer plain if that is any help to you.
Note that I got the figure of 57 from page 325 of your own source. You used a quote from page 326 but it seems you failed to notice the numbers were on the previous page!

 

Fischer's book is well known to me. It is an interesting (and refreshing/upsetting for its time) survey and analysis of what makes history and historians "tick," and what doesn't. However, it should be read in conjunction with other salient works to achieve a more balanced understanding of how history is done. I recommend R. J. Shaefer's A Guide to Historical Method and Oscar Handlin's Truth in History with the suggestion that Fischer's book be read after Shaefer's and before Handlin's. Those with sufficient courage can then go on to tackle New Dimensions in Military History, edited by Russell F. Weigley.

Regarding the more important points of your post, I hear and obey.

Duckbill

 

Just remember:

1. I am a real genuine "old school" hard hat Navy Chief that makes me the equivalent of God and officers and those who have nothing but academic experiance need fear and respect me....

2. I know how to play poker fairly well.

3. "Book learnin'" doesn't impress me.

 

Damn, makes me wish this site had real time audio! That would be really interesting for those that have never incurred the wrath of a Chief. Those of us that have, would seek suitable cover and enjoy the fireworks.

BTW, in this case I think you've shown more patience than it has been my experience for Chiefs to display.

 

Well put and needed to be said TA... Through my graduate classes we had an online forum that was graded on participation and of course content, but I wouldn't expect that type of standard here. There is far less friendly conversation and exchange of ideas here (and other forums) and too much competition and "one-upmanship". Some folks just don't get it I guess.

 

I think your missing that the 75mm AT gun PAK 40 was common by 1942 and was standard by 1943. This gun made short work of the Sherman's armor and was also mounted on the Mk IV, SP guns and TD's.
Also, the T26 could have been available by 6 June 44. The critical period between mid-43 and mid-44 too many bureaucratic errors were made that delayed the vehicle's production and deployoment.

 

Now I'm confused. Not long ago a retired "Chosin" Marine NCO told me he was the equivalent of God, and told me I should fear and respect him (and all Marines). And before that a retired command master sergeant said almost the same thing. Just how many equivalents does God have?

Don't gamble.

Don't worry, your secret of being a closet intellectual is safe with me. If you ever decide to come out of the closet let me know and I'll teach you the secret handshake and organize one of those colorful parades for your coming out party.

Duckbill

 

That has been mulled over 100's of times on forums like this. There is no firm evidence it could have been ready any earlier.
Even if the T26 was mature and combat ready in 1945 and the war had continued then it would have been facing the German 'E' Series. Any Allied catch-up would have been quickly negated. The E-50 and E-75 would have given the Centurion, T26 and IS III significant problems.

 

I'm just an ignorant Army officer, if I got yelled at by a Navy warrant I'd probably shrug and ask what his poroblem is... lol
So I will offer an age old Army truism:
"Arguing with an Infantryman is like wrestling with a pig in the mud, you're both going to get dirty but only one of you is going to like it."
However, I find it much more useful and satisfying to ignore the BS and continue a constructive thread (I hope others agree).

 

You are pretty much on the mark with this. The backstory is a bit complicated, and to some extent has not yet been published, but had LTG Devers, Chief of the Armored Force, remained in his position for another 6 months (he left in May 1943 to assume command of the ETOUSA), the T26 would have been ready in time for the invasion of Normandy. Essentially, Devers was one of the few officers who could by-pass McNair by going directly to Marshall, industry, and the Ordnance Dept., and get away with it. In light of his successes with the Sherman and Chaffee tanks, the M7 105mm how, and other armored force equipment there is every reason to think Devers would have gotten the T26 series tank into production much sooner. He certainly saw the potential of the tank, and as the commanding officer, ETOUSA was the first to request 250 T26s for use in Normandy.

Duckbill

 

As the M-4 was deployed at the same time as the 75mm pak 40 was in significant numbers I believe the same argument applies with the Tiger/Panther. You cannot counter a enemy development until you see it. More to the point, it took all combatant's about a year and a half to 2 years to develop and deploy a effective counter a enemy's 'new super weapon'. On occasion someone stole a march on a opponent in some area leaping ahead before the need was seen, but that was the exception rather than the rule.

In pretty much every war ever fought the poor grunt on the ground, at sea, or in the air (whatever he might have called himself) has had to deal with the fact that the other guy has some bloody marvelous weapon that he deos not. They in turn improvise and make do until the tables are turned.

The US did respond with better armor on the Sherman, a better gun (76mm), better ammunition (HVAP-never enough to go around). The US had thought it had stolen a march on Germany with its Tank Destroyers, but could only claim mixed results in that arena. The Allies also looked to extensive use of ground attack aircraft to even the odds. If Allied tankers had "Tiger Fright", then there German counterparts certainly had "Jabo Fever" as well.

The Pershing probably could have seen service 3 to 6 months earlier, but would have had the same reliability problems that the early Tiger/Panther tanks did. Further US tank crews had a steep learning curve as the Germans possessed a nearly 2 year experience gap in heavy tank operations. The delay seems to lay at the feet of Gen. McNair who favored the Tank Destroyers over a heavy tank design. In any event US tankers would have some measure of revenge as McNair had the crap bombed out of him by the USAAF.

P.S. You veterans may be willing to risk the wrath of our magnificent and ever watchfull god, but this civilian will be standing over here quivering in my flip-flops thank you very much!

 

I agree that I have yet to see convincing evidence that the T-26 could have been fielded in meaningful numbers much sooner than it was. I don't buy the E series German tanks making a significant contribution if the war had extended further into 1945. Germany at this point in the war just didn't have the capacity to produce such a vehicle in any quantity.

 

I meant that all the claims that the T26 was the answer to the problem ignores the fact new problems were on the horizon. The Germans stopped all developments because of her dire situation but they were working on designs that would be an improvement on the Panther and Tiger. The T26 was not some super weapon that would have solved everything. 2 of the 4 T26 tanks knocked out fell victim to 8.8cm guns and the Germans had a new 12.5cm dual purpose AT/Art gun ready for production.
The Allies were always responding to German advances.

 

It took something like 5 or 6 months for the Sherman to go from the drawing board to full production, and there is no reason to think the T26 would have beem any different had it been pushed through the redtape in a similar manner. 250 T26s landing shortly after 6 June 1944 would not have hurt the American army one bit.

Duckbill

 

First of all it's not a Navy Warrant it's short for Chief Petty Officer, a senior enlisted man in the Navy. One of their duties is training junior officers. It's a naval service thing, Chiefs and Gunny's strike fear in their enlisted subordinates and junior officers. Higher grade officers listen to and heed their advice and treat them with a great deal of (deserved) respect. I have on occasion been the subject of their ire and it's not a pretty thing. Having served in both the Marine Corps and U.S. Army, and having been deployed on several ships, I can attest to the fact that there is a world of difference between the power vested in naval service NCO's and Army NCO's. You really can't appreciate the difference unless you've lived it.
So I will offer an age old Marine Corps truism: (same goes for Chiefs)
Gunnery sergeants. Don’t know the answer? Ask the gunny. Need something? Ask the gunny. In trouble? Avoid the gunny.
As for arguing with an Infantryman, Gunny's and Chiefs don't argue. I have seldon seen sailors or Marines argue with a Chief/Gunny and those that do usually don't ever, do it again.

Sea Story: During the older sons last Iraq tour they were manning an outpost on the Syrian Border. They got a new Lt. and he decided it was his duty to catch Marines sleeping in the bunkers at night. He'd sneak up behind the bunker and pop his head around through the front aperture. He almost got shot a couple of times and the junior enlisted men went to the Gunny about it. The Gunny called the Lt. aside and advised him that his actions were ill advised. The Lt. decided that he'd put the Gunny in his place and began a verbal diatribe. Gunny knocked him out. The Lt. went to the hospital, the Gunny was relieved and sent to Al Asad. The troops started writing WWGD (What Would Gunny Do) every where they went, walls, vehicles, mission boards, etc. The company commander, when he got the whole story, let things calm down a couple of weeks, transferred the Lt. out and brought the Gunny back. Morale went through the roof.

I do and wise advice.

 

Hunnicutt's timeline.
Design started.............Feb 1941
Wooden mock up.........May 1941
Pilot tank...................Sept 1941

Production starts........Feb. 1942