How we come to know what we know

Nice post.

My point as to Churchill is that early in the war his was a lone voice to carry on the war against German hegemony. After the fall of France, despondency set in. Many political circles in the West believed that German Nazism was the wave of the future and that Britain should enter into a negotiated peace with Germany. Without Churchill's obstinance, Hitler might have had his war with Russia on a single front.

As to tanks, you're advancing the argument that the tanks at issue were tailored to the needs of their own military force and situation on the ground, not necessarily just for the destruction of enemy tanks. So the question of which was the best tank is relative. I agree with that to a certain extent, and your point about combined arms is well taken. But, at the end of the day, with regard to the Sherman and T-34, it was the mass production of these weapon systems that engulfed the Germans. Industrial output capacity won the war in all respects, ground and air.

So when the fascinating subject of the "best" tank comes up, it comes down to how one defines quality. I don't think ability to be mass produced is relevant to the definition of quality because Germany could never equal the industrial output capacity of the U.S. and the USSR. All things being equal, maybe Germany produces many more "commercial" tanks like the Sherman and T-34. But things were not equal. In this regard, the Germans were forced to design capability into a smaller force in hopes that the superiority of their armour could withstand the massed onslaught of the US and USSR. A failed but valiant attempt militarily, all ugly political considerations aside. In this respect quality in my mind would primarily include the ability to take damage, deal damage, and provide reasonably reliable mobility. Hence, Tiger I.

Peace and thanks for your great response.

 

If one comes to the objective conclusion that the Tiger I or Panther was the best tank of the war, that doesn't mean that person is a Nazi or is making a biased statement against the general quality of American arms. It just means the Germans made the best tank.

I have found, in my years on internet WWII forums, that many people have a bias for the Germans. I think this can result from ethnic bias, or falling in to the trap so many do of not doing in depth research on the subject. As my original post that started this thread mentions, there is a lot of information out there, not all of it accurate or "good." This may not be the case with you but I thought I would mention it.

And, lastly, horse supply transport can be very useful in many situations and do not require the consumption of fossil fuel. If horse drawn transport can do it just as effectively, then....why not? It's another resource to draw upon. I mean, we're not talking about another Napoleonic advance to Moscow. We're talking about hauling some food or fuel a few miles in peaceful territory.[/QUOTE]

The only time I think horse drawn transport makes sense is when trucks can simply not be used, i.e., terrain so rough that horses are the superior (only) form of transport. WWII was an example of mobilization in war, the horse was "obsolete." The horse moving supply and artillery can not be considered effective in a 20th century war. Not only do they require more maintenace and haul less, they haul less slower. Consider how much the Germans lost during their retreats and how much speed is required at a time like that. It most also be remembered that a horse being hit by a bullet or shrapnel almost anywhere is going to be put out of action while a truck can absorb some degree of punishment without the same being true.

 

So when the fascinating subject of the "best" tank comes up, it comes down to how one defines quality. I don't think ability to be mass produced is relevant to the definition of quality because Germany could never equal the industrial output capacity of the U.S. and the USSR.

WWII was won with material. Plain and simple. One can argue that the German had superior tactics to its adversaries and that by using a material advantage, more tanks or artillery for example, the allies were able to blunt and defeat this tactical advantage (and eventually become tactically adept as well.) If Germany possesses finite resources and decides to build tanks that require more steel, copper, etc., they are going to build fewer tanks, its a simple math equation. Many of their best tactical accomplishments came when they used tanks that were lighter and faster and used with other weapons systems. Heavy, less mobile tanks like the Tiger hardly fit into this tactical scenario. The campaign of 1940 in France showed that mobility, combined arms, and superior tactics will win the day, not the best tank. It is my belief that WWII was the time when the superior tank was the medium, fielded in adequate numbers, hence that a tank can be produced in numbers is an aspect of quality.


All things being equal, maybe Germany produces many more "commercial" tanks like the Sherman and T-34. But things were not equal. In this regard, the Germans were forced to design capability into a smaller force in hopes that the superiority of their armour could withstand the massed onslaught of the US and USSR.

The Germans were caught up in the idea that wonder weapons could win the war. Military thinkers over the years have pointed out that indiviual weapons themselves do not win wars, how weapons are used wins wars. The numbers that Germany produced of tanks like the Tiger were insufficient to make the littlest dent in their war effort. Isolated incidents of Tigers taking on or killing many tanks are noted (and usually exagerated) but were the exception not the rule.

A failed but valiant attempt militarily, all ugly political considerations aside. In this respect quality in my mind would primarily include the ability to take damage, deal damage, and provide reasonably reliable mobility. Hence, Tiger I.

I don't know where to start here. The Tiger I didn't provide reasonably reliable mobility. I think you phrase it this way because deep down you know this. The Tiger was slow, mechanically unreliable, and had a limited combat range. Its weight made it difficult to move since many bridges would not hold it. It needed a track change to be moved by rail. I really don't think I've ever seen anyone that considered the Tigers mobility as even adequate.

I'd really be interested in your definition of quality when it comes to tanks in WWII. Other than gun and armor the Tiger had little going for it in what most people would use for criteria in evaluating a tanks qualities. The Panther had a superior gun and when some of its problems were worked out was far more mobile than the Tiger.

 

Actually, Wiley is very much correct. The mobility "problems" with the Tiger I have been greatly exagerated by many casual and uninformed sources. See Jentz, Schneider, etc. for better info.

Combat range was an issue, that's correct. But combat range was an issue for any heavy tank, or any tank for that matter- especially if logistical support was lacking, as was often the case with German armored units.

Mechanically unreliable? Not any more so than any other heavy tank. The myth of mechanical problems with Tigers stems much more from the weight, and hence the equipment needed to perform some repairs.

Slow- incorrect. Max theoretical roadspeed was 28mph. Max theoretical roadspeed for a Sherman tank was around 30mph.

Bridges were an issue, but that's not a fault of the Tiger. A heavy tank is heavy.

If you've never seen any sources that consider the Tiger I adequately mobile, I suggest you expand your sources. Likewise for the comment about the gun and armor being the only quality characteristics on the Tiger I.


And do you really need to bold everything you type? Just wondering...

 

Two points here:

On horse drawn transportation: It is extremely inefficent. The US recognized this prior to the war and mechanized their military as a result, the British likewise.
The Germans recognized that they were not going to be able to fully mechanize their military simply because they lacked the industrial base to do so. But, what they didn't do is more important: They should have made railway engineering and repair a priority in their military. They didn't simply because the focus of their top military officials was primarily, if not solely, perfecting the operational art of war. The Germans didn't have any equivalent to West Point or what has become today the Industrial War College. Both trained their graduates with a heavy emphisis on civil engineering and logistical planning. The focus was not simply on fighting and winning as German officer training was.
Simply put, if the Germans had had an efficent railway repair and construction service that was well equipped to meet the needs of their army as it advanced into Russia they would have won. Instead, the Wehrmacht found itself within just a couple of months into the Russian campaign already teetering on the brink of logistical disaster simply because the rail system could not bring the necessary supplies forward and they lacked the trucks to move things otherwise. Horse drawn wagons were not going to cut the mustard.

The Tiger I, unlike the Panther and Tiger II was a reasonably reliable and well built vehicle. At the time of its introduction it had a good combination of armor, firepower and mobility. Its one glaring weakness is its overall weight. Many bridges and roads could not take the punishment of such a heavy vehicle moving over them.
By 1944 its armor and firepower are no longer top notch. 100 mm frontal and 80mm elsewhere is simply not sufficent against enemy weapons of the later war period. The 88/56 is still more than adequite as a gun so, the Tiger I remained an effective AFV right to the end of the war.

 

Perhaps at the time but from what I've read the Germans were reluctant to make any sort of extended road march with their tanks and much prefered to move them by carrier of some sort. My impression is that such road marches were not considered all that extreme by the western allies. Reliability is like many other things relative to that of your opponent. By late war I'm not sure that of the Tiger qualifies as "reasonable" any longer.

 

This is exactly what I was getting at earlier in the thread (I think it was this thread, anyway!).

Though- that's a bit of a brave jump to suggest the Germans would have won in Russia with said railway system in place! Probably a topic for another thread, but once again, as with the Sherman v. T34 bit, the makings of a very interesting exercise.

In addition to the bridges bit- I'd say the one real mechanical issue the Tiger I DID suffer from was the transmission. From what I've read, the transmission tended to be very stressed due to the weight of the vehicle combined with an engine that had to put out a lot of torque. This tended to lead to a fair amount of stress on said transmission.

At least, that's what I seem to recall- still need to brush up on a fair amount of stuff given my hiatus from WW2 studies!

And- I'm pretty sure that the same (or at least very similar) engine and transmission were used in the Tiger II as well, which severely exacerbated said transmission issue.

 

This was entirely true- though not really due to issues that effected the "mechanical value" of the Tiger I in terms of a battle tank. Much more due to the idea that regardless of the tank, said long road marches inherently put a lot more stress on the tank than other means (railroad) of transport. And, fuel consumption... which wasn't a good quality in ANY heavy tank, let alone the Tiger. The amounts of fuel used in such long road marches would be massive.

That being said- I'll check TiC as soon as I get the chance, but I do recall that in many cases when Tiger Is were in fact forced to make long road marches, they actually did far better than one might think.

This is more of a subjective debate, but I'd tend to go with TA on this one. By the end of the war, the Tiger I certainly wasn't the "beast" that it was in 43 and early 44... the Russians, Brits, and Americans all had tanks/tank destroyers by the later years that could compete on even ground with the Tiger I.
But that being said- even competition would qualify the Tiger as still being a very worthwhile and effective tank. Had they been fielded in larger numbers...

 

TA (not to pick on your post, I always read what you write), the DR (Deutsches Reichsbahn) was the most highly developed and efficient railway service in the world at the time of WWII. It was highly integrated into German military planning (since its emergence in 19th century), although it was outside the Wehrmacht's direct control due to its power and clout in the political arena. This was rectified after the Soviet winter offensive 1941-42.

Kriegsacademie? West point is where junior officers are trained, just for clarity. Higher learning happens at branch schools and ultimately the War College at Leavenworth.
Interestingly enough the Germans had 5 officer training schools (Kriegschulen, candidates were Fahnenjunker, interesting videos on youtube). The German Kriegsacademie was the equivalent of the Army War College, the US had an exchange program with Germany prior to the war with several US Army officers attending. There is a great write up from Percy Black and Franklin Hartness of their experiences there. The Germans didn't think highly enough of the US Army to send anyone to Leavenworth.

German officer training was basic at the five Kriegschulen, it became specific at their Truppenschule or branch school to include engineer and logistician courses.
The real problem lay in the mindset, not the education of the German officer corp. The German staffs were always operational centric with logistical services always forced to meet the needs of the plan, not vice versa. This is an internal battle with all armies, the US just does it better than most and that has alot to do with material wealth. We're really not smarter....sorry.

The DR was not involved in the operational construct of Barbarossa, only the build up. There were no DR crews involved with the advance, those were understrength, under-equipped para-military Wehrmacht railroad crews (not DR personnel).
Also, according to the intel that was available prior to Barbarossa the logistical support plan was adequate to support the advance to Smolensk, which it did.

As far as the inefficiencies of horses are concerned here.... The point is that there wasn't enough fuel to support more vehicle density in the Wehrmacht regardless of how efficient German industry was. The inefficient horse was both necessary and far better than nothing because of a lack of fuel.

 

Yes. That is why I do it? I'm quite certain the moderators would take a dim view of the answer to this question that is in my head right now. Suffice it to say I would prefer we have a discussion about tanks in WWII and not how I type, what font I use, the use of bold type, or now, the color of the type I use. Sound good?

 

The problem wasn't with the DR it was with the conversion of the Soviet rails to German standard, the movement of supplies across the interface, and the generally inadequate nature of the captured Soviet net.

 

No that wasn't what he was saying. What he was saying is that repair was difficult on a Tiger because of the weight issues involved in repairing one.

The Tiger did provide reasonably reliable mobility.

If you want to argue that Germany's fuel supply problems made it not reliable, then go ahead, but in my view that doesn't go to "reliability". That just means without fuel, the Tiger won't run.
You can make that argument about any motorized vehicle in Germany towards the end of the war.

 

Really? I've read that it was more a problem with the fact that it wasn't designed to be easily repaired. Heavier weight puts more stress on a number of components and heavy tanks on all sides tended to have lower availability than lighter ones.

 

Exactly. There's an obvious level of difficulty in maintaining and repairing a heavy tank. But if we use that as a judgement on the worth of said tank, then the obvious implication is that EVERY heavy tank was essentially worthless.

Within the context of a WW2 heavy tank, the Tiger was one of the better examples produced, including the areas of maintenance and reliability.

Fuel consumption... again, the Germans were always short on fuel. Hence it was a problem across the board for all motorized vehicles throughout the war. To use that across-the-board deficiency to suggest a flaw with the Tiger I is completely removing any context, which makes the point worthless.

And apparently roadspeed isn't a worthwhile measure to judge a tanks speed. Go figure. But if one wants to actually dig a bit deeper, let's look at Ground Pressure:
Tiger I: 14.8 psi on combat tracks
Sherman: 13.7 psi.
Comparable.
Weight to power ratio:
Tiger I: 12.3 hp/ton
Sherman: 15.8 hp/ton
Not too far off there either.

The Sherman was obviously more mobile than the Tiger; but not by a huge amount. And given the size and weight difference between the two, that speaks to the good level of mobility the Tiger I possessed.

The transmission was a problem, as noted. I don't see that as enough of a problem to out-of-hand dismiss the tank entirely. Neither did the Germans. Or the allies. Or the majority of historians who have studied the Tiger.

But hey, to each their own.

 

I'd be interested in some more info on that bit. On the basic level, it would seem that the design of the Tiger I accomodated repair and maintenance on a similar level to many comparable tanks. Engine accessible through rear deck, tracks able to be replaced by hand, relatively easily accessible final drive, etc.

I would entirely agree with this point in terms of heavy tanks. But as I suggested above, to use a point like that- an issue that existed for all heavy tanks- to make a qualitative judgement on one of such tanks removes all context.

 

Not really an expert but for instance one of the things I've heard caused problems was the interleaved road wheels. I'm pretty sure I've read of others but don't remember the details. There are obviously tradeoffs here, for instance the interleaving may produce a more even track tension. It's a matter that really needs to be looked at in more detail than we have to date.

Well if the conclusion is that as a catagory medium tanks are more useful than heavy tanks then it would imply that the best medium tanks may be more useful than heavies. Of course that is subject to debate and even the classification is rather nebulous.

 

Correct and I no way want to refute that other than it wasn't "the" problem as if to suggest everything that went wrong started and ended with the rail conversion.
The biggest problem lay with the initial operational plan based on bad intel which in turn created assumptions which the logistical plan was based on. The culmination point of the campaign was to be reached for all intensive purposes at Smolensk, therefore the motorized Grosstransportatum assembled in conjunction with the Handkoffer of fuel within the armored/motorized elements was considered sufficient within the context of the original plan.

Thus one of the real problems behind Barbarossa's failure is born.... OKH decides that DR involvement isn't necessary beyond the build up for the invasion. Once the operation kicks off the DR has no significant role in the conduct of upgrading the rail system in the Soviet Union (job was given to hastily assembled paramilitary rail crews...aka- "gray railroaders"). The OKH left out the most experienced rail engineers, maintenance/construction personnel and decades of experience from the planning and execution of the conversion effort.
The reasons for this are political, personality driven and similiar to more familiar clashes within the 3rd Reich hierarchy. The OKH thought the major part of the campaign would be over at Smolensk, therefore why even try to work with the DR (in a nutshell).
-edit- The blue suited DR personnel were civilian and not under control of the Heer commanders while in their command zone during this period, something only the crisis of the first winter could cause to be rectified.

With DR expertice, manpower and assets who knows how much more efficient rail conversion would have been and how much faster supplies would have flowed. Suffice it to say that things would have been faster, the question is how much.

 

What about the years before that? The weapon in Germany's arsenal that gets the description of reliable is the one that makes it to the battlefield most often and stays in the fight longer.

 

I suspect that the Tiger stayed in the fight longer than most. But, I think you and I are now fighting over apples and oranges. Anybody know how the Tiger performed in the desert? That's a nice indicator of mechanical reliability.