How we come to know what we know

But, we are mainly discussing the ETO not the MTO or PTO. Shermans had at least 6 different types of track fitted at various times by various model and user including rubber block, steel, rubber bushed steel, among other types.
Bringing up this about the MTO would be akin to mentioning that USMC and Soviet Shermans were primarily, if not entirely, diesel powered and that this made some difference or another in their use.
The point is that in the ETO most Shermans were fitted with rubber block rubber bushed tracks and these were more efficent in road marching long distances at higher speeds.

I would also point out that the US did some useful additions to their Shermans the bulldozer tank being one of these. These allowed units with them, usually independent battalions with infantry divisions, to clear obstacles and fill small streams, cut fords, etc., very efficently allowing not just tanks but other vehicles to move across the landscape more efficently.

 

Nay. These things were all entwined.. logistics you see. Combat experience in Italy led to the renewed production of the steel tracks, and as previously mentioned the new rubber backed steel track solved many of the previous problems experienced with the older version.

M4 medium tanks in the ETOUSA were not fitted mostly with rubber block tracks. This is clear from the large number of steel replacement tracks placed on an emergency order by the ZI by MG Leroy Lutes. In reality the tank were equipped with a mixture of rubber block tracks, steel tracks, and steel tracks with rubber inners. The operational life expectancy of the rubber block track was not a constant as you say. Experience in Italy demonstrated that it was dependent on the conditions of terrain. As you know, there are rocks and mountains in France and Germany as well. Some armored divisions never saw or used rubber block tracks, and went through the entire war on steel tracks. The tankers cussed and fought them every time they traversed cobblestone streets and concrete roads.

Duckbill

 

I'm pretty sure that the M26 would have been a significant improvement over any model of the Sherman for keeping crews alive in Normandy. The Western Allies first encountered the 88mm AT experience in May of 1940, yet little effort was made to design something that could offer better protection for the crew in four years prior to landing in Normandy? The Allies captured a Tiger in Tunisia and also knew of the Panther as well, not to mention what they called a MK.IV special. Did they not have access to information on German AT guns and shaped charge weapons? All of this information was available to Allied engineers/planners/designers, yet they produced and stuck with the Sherman.
I don't look to make a comparative analysis of medium tanks at this time because the loss rates don't really mean much in lieu of the very different set of circumstances each respective country's tanks faced. What do the loss rates of German tanks to Allied tanks mean? If we took air power completely out of the equation the fighting in Normandy would have more or less resembled the Western Front in WWI. I doubt that the Allies could have effected a breakout without airpower weakening the enemy and then blowing open the hole to exploit. The Sherman in Normandy was a deathtrap because the terrain favoured the defender who happened to have a highly developed skill set for defensive operations and plenty of effective tank killing weapons (Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck, AT guns, excellent AT mines and tanks designed for tank vs tank).
Even if the Germans were fielding an identical copy of the M4, that would not have changed the nature of the fighting in Normandy, the outcome or the respective loss rates. Now if you factor out air power, then there will be a huge disparity in losses greatly favoring the defender. The bottom line is that the M4 was inadequate for the job and the rest of the combined arms team more than made up for its shortcomings. It may have been the best the US had available, but to me that is a failure in and of itself. In the strategic sense it was a "successful weapon", which to me is a very callous way to gloss over its mediocrity that cost so many lives. The US could have and should have done a better job in providing the best equipment for its Soldiers instead of proceeding with a "good enough" product. The Sherman is a shining example of WHY the US Army doesn't go to war with "good enough" any more.

 

"The Sherman is a shining example of WHY the US Army doesn't go to war with "good enough" any more."

Black6- I think it good to remember that the biggest, baddest tank on the planet right now can still be killed by an RPG, and definitely by the various AT rokets carried by infantry or maounted on HUMVEE's, Bradleys, etc. I think the Sherman faired as any tank would have in the bocage as it was an ideal defensive landscape, perfect for killing anything that moved. If you isolate one area, one set of circumstances, do you get an accurate picture?

A comparison of German tank losses (from an invasion scenario) would put the losses of Normandy in perspective. I think comparison is essential for making your point.

 

The fundamental flaw in all this talk of 'death traps' is that there are no figures privided that show being in a Sherman was any more lethal than being in a Tiger. Tank crew losses were relatively light (compared to infantry losses) and thus until evidence is shown to confirm a disparity in casualties then it is all speculation and anecdotal evidence.
The argument falls right at the first hurdle.
The Western Allies did not get a Panther to play with until early 1944 when the Russians shipped one over. They did met the Panther in Italy but they had no great impact there nor did the Tiger. Italy seems not to have been the best place to draw conclusions and the Tiger performed very poorly in Africa and Sicily. The so called Tiger phobia is a ETO invention!
By 1944 the power of AT weapons was so great that building a tank to be invulnerable would make it too heavy to be of any real use in mobile warfare. Uparmoring the front of a Sherman to keep out say75% of the hits there would not mean losses dropped 75%. Only around 33% of hits were frontal so the actual reduction would be 25% not 75%. It was a cost effective calculation but then even today Airlines work out how much aircraft safety improvements cost and compare that against claims they could expect if an aircraft crashes without the new measures. If it is cheaper they opt to pay for the funerals.

 

Well actually no (at least not for me), I don't measure loss rates and casualties relative to the enemy's as a means of justification for a given body count. This type of accounting might work in areial combat, but not in major kinetic ground operations.
The Allies needed a heavy tank, Normandy highlighted this need and much planning and effort went into providing one for breaching the Siegfried Line (even if it didn't get there or wasn't needed). The Sherman was put into a type of combat environment in Normandy that it wasn't designed for and its crews suffered grievously, just because the bocage was only one part of the story that in turn doesn't mean we should ignore it either. In fluid operations and in pursuit of a defeated enemy it excelled, does that one piece of its operational history make it a great tank? The Pz. 38t performed in similiar fashion with simliar relative strengths and weaknesses during Operation Barbarossa, I don't consider it a great tank though.

 

The Allies never expected to fight in Normandy. The planners assumed the German would fall back into the interior and use the great French rivers as defensive lines. Once the Germans opted to contest the coastal region then all bets were off. See the so called 'phase lines' for confirmation.
I could add that once the German lines were breached then the German tanks were placed in an environment were they were at a disadvantage. Poor planning on their part was a greater handicap to them that any poor planning on the Allied side.

As you have yet to provide any data for losses, German or Allied, then I suggest you have no case at all.

 

Michael, The statistics you seek are right here: Axis History Forum • View topic - Comparative tank losses, June/July 44 Normandy

And are well known by you, so please don't be coy in trying to bait me into posting statistics knowing full well you happen to be the likely resident authority.

The Allies needed a better tank that could handle heavy combat, a comparative analysis of relative losses and causes reveals that while the overwhelming strength of Allied combined arms also serves to hide and compensate for it.

Defining Allied tank losses in Normandy to be total write offs and tanks in repair beyond the duration of the battle vs. similiar German losses that do not include those captured or abandoned after the breakout might reveal a more accurate exchange ratio associated with comparative analysis/combat effectiveness. Even this method does not provide a weighted factor for Allied air power, artillery superiority or logistical support.

Agreed...

 

The differences would be lengthy. The Sherman hit the battlefield as the best tank in the world; that other nations saw the need for ultra heavily armored tanks does automatically indicate the Sherman as obsolete. As anyone can see the Sherman did fine in the role of a part of a combined arms offensive weapon. Armor's innovation in WWII was as this and the need never changed. Much of what you are offering is not a shortcoming of the Sherman but a disagreement on your part with the decisions made about armored doctrine.

I often wonder about the other tanks that are discussed as the best tank of WWII, like the T-34 and the Panther. The T-34 had only slightly better armor when you consider slope but the quality of the armor was low. The turret was not difficult to penetrate and I've seen spalling discussed in more than one place (T-34 In Action.) The first years saw transmissions so difficult to operate that the driver needed asistance. The compartment was so small that the commander was doing double duty as gunner (not good) and the loader was often on the floor passed out from fumes because there was insufficient exhaust. Optics? Visibility? Don't think so. All with a gun comparable to the Sherman's 75mm. The Panther; a mechanical disaster when it hit the battlefield in Russia since it was rushed without proper testing. Somewhere between 1943 and late '44, when it was being bested by mere Shermans in Europe there are claims that all the bugs (most of the bugs) were worked out. I'm wondering what day...maybe week, the Panther reigned as greatest...though most of them were probably up on blocks for service that week.

The problem is that often the idea of best tank is simply a testosterone ladden assesment of the heavyweight champion of armor. Other times it is based on some reputation of invulnerability that is not put in perspective. The T-34 gained a reputation of greatness when the Germans invaded and there was surprise that the T-34 was resistant to much of the tank fire and AT fire. Of course the German MkIV had a low velocity 75mm, the MkIII had a 50mm and the mainstay of the German AT guns were a 50mm (I hope I got all that right, my memory sucks these days.) The T-34 could be defeated by the dual purpose 88, of course, but the reputation prevailed. The fact that the Germans destroyed this tank by the bucketful never seems to matter.

 

My reference to General Devers’ assertion that tanks were the best tank destroyers has everything to do with the subject under discussion.

Armored Force doctrine required American tanks to perform a number of missions in combat. One of these was to fight and destroy hostile tanks. The frequency that the M4 medium tank actually engaged hostile tanks is much less relevant than the fact that they were intended to do so. The M4 medium tank’s effectiveness in fulfilling this particular role was compromised by insufficiencies in armament and armor.

Duckbill

 

The introduction into this discussion discrete sets of data that have not been analyzed using the proper statistical techniques is less than useful. This oft repeated activity is proven to hinder any progress that might be made and badly misleads the uninitiated.

Duckbill

 

Allied losses to breakdown or non-combat related causes were just as high as the German totals. Therefore any attempt to discount German losses by excluding their totals is completely bogus. The difference is the advancing force can recover its breakdowns while the losers can't. A tank put out of action, for any reason, is a loss and artificial methods of deflating the German total wont help your case.

And I think we were talking of crew losses not tank losses?

I always ask anyone claiming to have figures what their figures are and where they got them. This is not baiting but fishing. I am always on the lookout for original data.

 

Perhaps I should emulate you and simply post a book title and tell viewers to go and read what it says?
I find that style a trifle arrogant. Parading the title/location of your data whilst at the same time witholding even a glimpse from those not fortunate to reside withing walking distance of this same source does not appeal to me. I post as much as I can so the nit pickers and I-told-you-so's can go over it at their leisure. I have nothing to fear from criticism and if you can make the figures mean something else then good luck to you.

 

Other tanks formed a small part of US tank targetting. The highest % was in N.Africa (suprise!) at 24% and the average for all theatres was 14%.

Table XXVI, ORO-T-117. Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in WW2.

 

On 3 July 1944 Eisenhower cabled his Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith from the First Army headquarters in Normandy. In this cable he described the inability of the 75mm and 76mm guns on the M4 medium tank to penetrate the armor of Panthers and Tigers. He closes as follows:

Please have whole matter investigated probably [sic] with report ready for me upon my return. I am considering sending Bull home with our findings to make sure of our effectiveness in this important matter.

Then on 5 July, 1944 Eisenhower cabled General Marshall describing the shortcomings of the M4 medium tank, concentrating chiefly on its inadequate armament. He begins with:

I have just returned from a visit to the First Army where I found them deeply concerned over the inability of our present tank guns and anti-tank guns to cope successfully with the German Panther and Tiger tanks.

Eisenhower goes on to request M36 tank destroyers and T26 tanks because their 90mm guns would:

…..contribute materially to our anti-tank defense as well our capabilities in attack…. The urgency of this matter is such that I am sending Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Holly to you by air in order to amplify this urgent request,…

Holly was an expert. He organized the Tank Department, Armored Force School in 1940, served on the Armored Force Board until he became commandant of the Armored Force School 1943-44. At the time Holly was Chief of the Armored Fighting Vehicles and Weapons Section, ETO.

There you have it. Please do not attempt to explain this away as Eisenhower being “political” in his concerns over the shortcomings of the main armament of the M4 medium tank. Given the quotations I have provide, it just will not wash.

Duckbill

 

Citing sources in not a trifling matter. It is the very foundation for any rational, intelligent discussion on military history.

The problem with data that has not been vetted and properly analyzed is that it is at best misleading,…. and at its worst, useless.

Duckbill