Husband E. Kimmel during Pearl Harbor

With reguard to Kimmel/Short any US commander who suffers the loss(or near loss) of his command without inflicting comsurate damage on the enemy is almost sure to lose their command. It is not always fair, but it is the way its done. The military eleventh commandment - thou shall not be embaressed or allow the President to be so.

MacArthur retained his command for Four reasons,

1) His fame and stature within the military.
2) His close ties to the Phillipine Government.
3) His command was still under attack and the threat to Pearl Harbor was at an end. Hard to replace him, easy to replace them.
4) Best summed up by the line in the film ZULU, the empire cannot have two disasters in one day, it upsets the public at the dinner table.

 

FDR was the country!, but you are right as well. By the way I know your avatar is from the master race and all, but doesn't his arms ever get tired?

 

Forgive me, tounge was planted firnly in cheek!!

 

I do not really fault Mac for the loss of his air force, it was too small and most of its aircraft were obsolete (P-26/B-18). Being cought on the ground may have save quite a few aircrew lives. In any event his air commanders should take the bulk of the blame on that one.

What he cannot escape blame for was his use of ground forces. The Phillipine army (bulk of his force) was incompletely trained and equipped. The small US Army/Marine contingent was in 1941 not a first class force, good men, but equipped and trained to refight WWI.

This was well known before Dec.7th, and war plans took this in account. As I understand it the plan called for all US/Phillipino troops to fall back to Bataan and Corrigadore with all available supplies and wait for the Pacific Fleet to sail over the horizon.

MacAuther in his wisdom took his illtrained and illequipped army into the field to engage the army, with understandable results. The now battered and somewhat demoralized remnants fall back to Bataan/Corregadore but are forced to leave some supplies behind.

MacAurther was leading small contingent of regulars and militia against veteran combat units. He should have known better.

 

Exactly. You have to take into account the differing responsibilities inherent to each level of command. Pinning Kimmel and Short and not MacArthur was correct because the disaster at Oahu was the result of failures within the commanding officer’s jurisdiction, and at Luzon the defeat came about at a lower level despite MacArthur having prepared his command for battle.

With respect to his conduct of the land campaign, it was flawed. Then again, there wasn’t a commander in the free world that was not going to lose that battle. The responsibility on this score was in Washington, where the Rainbow Five war plan had failed to identify a coherent purpose or objective to the Far Eastern Command within the context of a coalition war against Japan.

 

Very well said, I agree.

 

Glenn239 wrote:

The Army Air Forces in the Phillipines (FEAF) were within MacArthur's jurisdiction (Commander USAFFE), the Air Commander, Gen. Brereton, was a direct subordinate of MacArthur's. I do agree with Belasar that the Air Commander should take the bulk of the blame but not because MacArthur was not also at fault. The Air Commander in the absense of direction from his Commanding Officer (MacArthur) should have taken some action. Especially when radar reports were received of the incoming strike while it was still an hour out. In the end the air forces were weak and probably wouldn't have accomplished much, even though they were the largest USAAF unit outside CONUS (91 P-40's, 35 B-17's plus older types).

That's questionable. Had MacArthur staged his supplies properly, deployed his forces as planned and fought a delaying action as was planned the campaign could have been drawn out. In fighting this type of action the lack of training in the Phillipine Forces could have been greatly negated, but MacArthur's ego got in the way. He got beaten, his forces fell back and he was forced to destroy the majority of his supplies to keep them out of the hands of the Japanese. The rapid Japanese victory allowed them to pull forces from the Phillipines and accelerate their schedule of conquests.

 

Why MacArthur chose to engage the Japanese in open battle is a mystery to me. Yes the PacFleet was not comming to the rescue as planned, but that did not change anything in real terms. Did MacAuthur have a 'senior' moment, thinking he was back with the Rainbow Division? Or did he want to go out like some kind of western samuri? Or perhaps he was under pressure from the Phillipino Government to defend the Islands to the fullest?

MacArthur was egotistical and vain, and could give drama lessons to both Monty and Patten, but he was not a complete hack like Gamelin in France. He could adapt to new tactics and weapons, or at least surround himself with people who could.

USMCPrice is correct, following the plan as written would have allowed Bataan/Corregidore to hold out much longer than it did proving to be a severe embaressment to Imperial Japan. In fact if you look closely at some of Japan's attacks they were very near things indeed.

The first Wake assualt was thrown back. Singapore was also a near thing. If the original plan had been followed, Japan would have needed reinforcements to take the Phillipines, and Guadelcanal may never have happened.

 

There is a fairy detailed description in John Costello's 'The Pacific War 1941-45' of the events at the several airfields on Luzon. Costello describes Bereton first sending messages to Mac from around 0400 to 0600, then attempting to personally see Mac. Col Sutherland turned Bereton away. Bereton claimed his messages & attempt to see Mac concerned launching the proposed airstrike at the Japanese airfields on Formosa. No bombers were launched with bombs or orders to attack Formosa. There may have been a reconissance mission sent using a B17, I'd have to check.

Around 10:00 two events caused the bombers to be sortied & sent south to a holding point. One was the attack by a small flight of enemy bombers on a small auxillary airfield in Northern Luzon. the other was a interpretation of a RADAR return as a flight of enemy aircraft nearing central Luzon. Most of the fighters were sortied and the bombers were sent south out of the way. Some folks misinterpreted this bomber sortie as a an aborted attack on Formosa. I recall my father, a AF Lt at the time, refering to this years later.

After 11:00 the bombers were ordered to land. There were several options for bringing them down, but Clark Field was choosen as it had the only bombs for the B17s. (thats what Costello claims anyway). The fighters were also brought in to refuel, tho I've seen claims some were on CAP over Manilia harbor some twenty miles from Clark Field.

At this point my fathers version & Costello are the same. After the bulk of the aircraft landed between 11:00 & 12:00 discipline broke down. The air and ground crew had been awake since called to their posts around 03:00, most had missed breakfast, so far too many drifted off looking for lunch & coffee. & thats when the Japanese showed up.

Mac later claimed he was at his HQ that morning. Sutherland & the others of the inner circle suposedly back him up on this. i've not read many personal accounts but the claim by Costello is that no one outside Macs inner circle saw him at the CP or anywhere else that morning.

It may be Bereton lost control of events from 11:00. Someday I hope to take a look at other detailed accounts of the events that morning. What I have to wonder is WI Bereton had risked his ass & ordered up the attack on Formosa without Macs permission. While they might not have done much damage the bombers would have not been caught awaiting fuel & bombs that lunch hour.

 

They didn't get the "shaft," they got what they rightfully deserved. Just because MacArthur did not get his "just desserts" does not excuse Kimmel and Short for their multitude of failures.