If Stalin attack the West, what year and month was optimum?

This is just filler to make my post long enough.

 

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Suggest you start here at pg 281 Soviet military policy: an ... - Google Books

You would have to build a perfect "what if" for the Soviets to be successful. Based on a huge surprise attack (the chances of which are very remote) the Red Army might be able to sweep across Western Europe, thats about it though.

 

I got it the other day thanks.

Sweeping across Western Europe might just do it. I'm just not that sure that the US could afford or had the heart to step in once more to pull Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece's ass out of the fire. Stalin could stop there and send his 5th columns out to finish the job in other parts of the world.

Quite frankly I'm totally convinced that from 1946-1948 the Soviets could have walked into Western Europe. The future NATO forces were so poorly motivated, trained, led and supplied it was embarrassing. When the West disarms we really do a good job. The politicians at the time let our troops down big time. From funding cuts to pay cuts it was ugly. At least they did a good job with the GI Bill but otherwise the peacetime forces between 46-48 were sorely neglected.

 

You stated historically they had the larger airforce. This doesn't address that. Nor does it give the numbers that were historically present. If the Soviets start concentrating on high altitude aircraft doesn't that potentially raise a warning flag in any case.

That doesn't address my question. I asked for numbers and what sort of reaction time would be required for them to intercept a B-29. Note that quite a few years after this date they didn't manage to intercept a Cessna.
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But you don't have to be nearly as accurate when you are using an atomic bomb.
Very true but the jet stream is very strong. I really don't believe you could drop even an atomic bomb from so great a height have it be buffeted in who knows what direction or directions and have it even come close.
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But the jet stream is pretty predictable in the short term. Dropping a smoke bomb a few minutes prior to bomb release could give you a pretty good correction factr.

I'm not.

How? There aren't that many sets of train tracks in the USSR and they come together at rather fixed points as do the roads.

Who says they wouldn't be escorted? P-51's could escort as far as Eastern Europe. I also suspect that the fighter arm of the LW was more experianced in high altitude interception than the Soviets and furthermore the Soviets had never run into bomber boxes or a force that used a escort doctrine as refined as that of the US. Furthermore the bombing doesn't necessarily have to be by daylight.

The fact that they were our former allies and stabbed us in the back would make it even worse. Japan hadn't pretended to be an ally shortly before PH.

How do you come up with that figure?
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The Mark III atomic bomb was not a tactical weapon. It took 48 hours to assemble on site, a special pit had to be used to load it, a special B29 Silver Plate to deliver it, a highly trained crew to fly it and then had to be used within 48 hours or a battery went dead and they had to disassemble it to change out the battery. It was very hard to use.
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That above doesn't mean that it was hard to use it simply means that you had to plan ahead of time to use it nor does it mean that it couldn't be used as a tactical weapon. Indeed there was considerable thought of doing so for Olympic.
[/quote]I'm not so sure about that. I've read quite extensively on America's post war mood and I'm not convinced at all that we would have jumped once more into the breach. At the very least it would have been very late in the game and not without some very draconian efforts by the US Government. The armed forces would not be full of volunteers and the factories had already shifted to peacetime cars and soap. The worst hold outs would have been the business men. Where would the money come from to once again retool and rearm?
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I think you are very much mistaken. For one thing the US would still be in Europe at the time. An attack on western Europe would be persieved as an attack on the US, indeed it would almost be guaranteed to cause more US casualties than PH did. I don't need to go into the reaction that produced.

 

Something that must be kept in mind here, which seems to be being ignored. The US service personal were in "for the duration plus six months", and Truman didn't declare the "hostilities ended" until Dec. 31st of 1946. While the military servicemen were worrying about who got to "go home first", it wasn't immediately that the point system from release was even put into action. So, a pretty full complement of military would still be on Uncle Sam's payroll until June of 1947, and unless you had been rotated home to become an instructor (like my Dad in Transport Command), or were demobilized because of injury, or had massive "points", you were still in.

My paternal uncle had been wounded at Remagen building the pontoon bridge downstream from the Ludendorf bridge. While clearing mines on the east side of the Rhine, shortly after the crossing was made he was wounded. He was in the Engineers, and a mine had gone off under one of his compatriots and wounded him below the waist.

He was sent to a hospital outside of London, and when he had healed enough to go back to work, he did so. He was still in Germany as one of the occupation troops helping rebuild the infrastructure well into 1948. He had just rotated home when the Berlin Blockade happened, and he was recalled and redeployed and this time didn't get home until 1950! Now his time really was "up" and he was discharged and never called up for Korea.

People who think America just "cut everybody loose" after VJ Day is mistaken.

 

Thought I'd better throw this in as well...

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

With God's help this nation and our allies, through sacrifice and devotion, courage and perseverance, wrung final and unconditional surrender from our enemies. Thereafter, we, together with the other United Nations, set about building a world in which justice shall replace force. With spirit, through faith, with a determination that there shall be no more wars of aggression calculated to enslave the peoples of the world and destroy their civilization, and with the guidance of Almighty Providence great gains have been made in translating military victory into permanent peace. Although a state of war still exists, it is at this time possible to declare, and I find it to be in the public interest to declare, that hostilities have terminated.

Now, Therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the cessation of hostilities of World War II, effective twelve o'clock noon, December 31, 1946.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 31st day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-first.


HARRY S. TRUMAN

By the President:
JAMES F. BYRNES
The Secretary of State

(bold mine)

P.S. The reason Truman uses the phrase "a state of war still exists" is simple. A formal peace treaty had not yet been signed with Japan and wouldn’t be until Sept. of 1951, which the Soviet Union never signed. And which wasn’t ratified by the U.S. Senate until 1952!

 

How would we know if they were producing more high altitude aircraft? The Soviet Union was a closed book until at least 1948 and even then we knew very little about their capabilities.

You're right historically they did not have an answer to the B29 but this is alternative history so I can't answer your question about numbers because if didn't happen. We could discuss what they would have needed to accomplish the mission.

Possibly but I think you'd have to do an awful lot of guessing to match the performance of a smoke bomb to a 10,000 hunk of iron and plutonium.

Remember we are not talking about a prostrate defenseless victim her. We would not be able to have fighter bombers cruising around unmolested looking for targets of opportunity. We would not have air superiority for a long time if ever at lower altitudes. There is no way we would be able to tactically attack supply lines in even East Germany much less the Ukraine until well after France is conquered.

It's 700 miles to the Med from East Germany. What kind of mileage does a deuce and a half get? Say 3.5 miles per gallon. So 200 gallons per truck that you would have to carry or pick up along the way.

I have evidence of 9 massive virtually unguarded US military storage facilities spaced all over France. They were filled with 24 billion (2011 dollars) worth of material that the Brits, French, Polish, Greeks and Italians desperately wanted to buy. It was not junk.

I can think of a number of ways to "live off the land" using these depots. Remember once the Soviets are loose there is virtually nothing to stop them in the way of organized resistance. The front line troops would be scooped up, by-passed and then it's a Sunday drive to Southern France.

I think I have to make one thing clear here about my take on history and alternate history. I believe that if something is accomplished by one society it can be replicated by another if given enough time and the right leadership.

That being said I believe that if the Soviets were making plans to attack the West they would have studied what the Germans and Japanese did right and what they did wrong. Hence they would change and adapt their tools and tactics as the situation demanded.

Just how accurate was night time bombing and why didn't the US do it more often?

Various sources but the one that comes to mind is American War Plans 1945-1950 by Steven T. Ross.

Sorry too obtuse for my mind to grasp. It was hard to use whether it was because of the planning involved or the actual physical restrictions ... it was hard to use.

If I was Stalin I would purposefully keep the casualties down by surrounding and isolating the US troops. I'm quite certain knowing what I know about their training and make up that they would be in no position to resist for long nor able to break out of even a rudimentary containment scenario.

So you have all these POWs which you round up and offer to give back to the US and Britain with no restrictions. They are transfered to England and show up in good shape.

Then you start winning the hearts and minds of the English. Which had quite a large contingent of Communist sympathizers and where you have a huge and highly placed spy network.

You offer them peace if they allow over flights and kick out the Americans. At the same time you work on the American 5th column, unions, communist party members, peaceniks, etc. See how generous your former ally good old Joe is. We just have a disagreement on what kind of economic model to use.

You'll see France, Germany etc. will be fine. We only attacked because your government (fill in your own cause belli). We mean you no harm and can live in peace just like we are in Eastern Europe. No need to get your undies in a bundle. We control Europe and you control the America's. No big deal. Live and let live. Here have some vodka.

 

First of all I want to state that I do not demean or denigrate anyones service to their country. I have the utmost respect and admiration for anyone who served in the armed services. Both of my Dad's brothers were in Germany from near the end of the war until early 1947 and I'm sure they worked hard and did their best under very unpleasant circumstances.

That being said there is overwhelming evidence in newspaper articles, historical studies, official armed forces reports, unit histories, oral histories and eyewitness reports that the combat readiness of the US/British/French forces in Europe in 1946-1948 was abysmal. They were unappreciated, inexperienced, unwanted, untrained, poorly led, unfit for combat and understrength.

One of the best single sources is here:

The resource is US Army in the occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 and can be found online here:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/...&CISOSHOW=3180

Written by Dr. Earl F. Ziemke published by

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, B.C., 1975

The Chapter entitled The Army in Disarray says it all starting on Pages 421. It paints a scathing picture of the US Occupation forces in Germany and their fitness for combat. Just a few excerpts:

Perhaps the most telling quotes follow. Bold and italicized text is my emphasis.

I can produce numerous newspaper articles were by April 1946 Ike is sending home all enlisted men with 45 or more points and officers with 65 points and they are discharged. Riots in both Europe and the Far East when things slow down in January. Draft quotas way below target for up to 6 months in a row. Etc.

Congress did something or the rules changed but millions were discharged and no longer in the military 18 months or more before June 1947. They were not on the payroll and they were honorably discharged without being injured or having massive amounts of points. I don't know about anyones anecdotal evidence only what the official records, newspaper articles etc. tell me.

Oh and I have my own anecdotal evidence from my uncles who were out before June 1947 having been in less than 2 years and seeing no combat what so ever with honorable discharges.

Again I do not disparage anyone who served during the time period I mentioned but the facts are the facts and the US Army in Germany in particular was not in any shape to resist or even impede an attack from January 1946-1948. It was too small and full of rookie troops with no combat experience. We did too good a job at demobilizing.

 

"Hairog":

This was however when a "threat" to the west did NOT exist in reality. All this might very well have changed if the circumstances did as per your alternative history posits. You cannot have one without the other.

 

I have to disagree. Truman and the JCS fully expected that Stalin was going to attack throughout 1946-48 either by design or because of some misunderstanding. Their memos, plans and status reports make that clear. They tried to slow down or even halt the demobilization but congress, the troops and the public demanded faster and faster troop withdraws. Politically they could not even delay it even though they believed that an attack was immanent. Their budgets were slashed yet they planned on an invasion as best they could.

Their fall back plan was to use the atomic bomb. Yet even then we did not increase our production of bombs greatly. We only had 9 at the end of 1946, 13 in 1947 and 50 in 1948.

 

Did you actually read the pages in the link I provided? It clearly stated the huge hurdles the Soviets would have to overcome in order to launch an offensive of limited size, let alone a massive one. The fact that your ignoring here is that it would just as difficult for the Red Army to launch this offensive than it would be for the West to prepare for it. If the basic premise here is to gloss over all of the Soviet issues and assume them over come by waving a wand.... then this scenario is possible. Conversely, so is the reverse. If the Soviets act as they did historically and the US decides to re-arm the Germans, not demobilize, use nukes and overrun all of Eastern Europe, the Ukraine and head to Moscow what can a war ravaged USSR with no Allies do about it. Seems absurd, but its more or less along the same lines as what your suggesting here.

 

But we can look at historical numbers and production rates and get an idea of what was possible. Otherwise it's just all handwaveing.

Not really. If the smoke bomb, it could be just one with a corner reflector so it shows up well on radar, is calibrated it can give you a pretty decent idea of what the wind speed and dirction is given that if you've got your bomb site calibrated for your bomb you should be able to get pretty close.

I'm suggesting that they, along with Soviet airfields, would be the target of choice for the atomic and strategic bombers. This would force the Red Airforce to come up and play at high altitude with the allied airforces in a regime where they would have all the advanteges.

It was pretty well accepted in WWII that it was difficult to operate more than about 300km from a railhead.

Or not. It very much depends on how much of a surprise it was. If it didn't even if signficant forces weren't available for defence destruction of bridges, espeically those over major rivers would be a problem.

One of the problems the Soviets had was that if something didn't fit their doctrine it was pretty much invisible or subject to misunderstanding. They would have learned some things indeed the campaign in Manchuria is a real masterpiece but also shows some weakness.

The Britts really pioneered it and it was only near or even after the end of the war that it became very accurate. It basically required good high resolution radar and or very precise navigation aids.

It might be hard to use if you wanted to hit a particular mobile target. However if you had a number of fixed targets as well as a number of targets of opertunity. No it's not hard to use.

That very much depends on what units and when. In 1945 and proably even 1946 you are talking about units that still contain a lot of combat experiance so I dissagree with your assessement of them. Afterwards it's a bit more problematic but if you look at say Task Forse Smith it's problems had more to do with the situation it was in and how it was equiped than the performance of the soldiers.

Good chance it's too little too late.

I think you are also neglecting the feelings of a lot of the East Europeans, that could be very problematic in this scenario.

 

Yes I did and it intrigued me so much so that I bought the book. Fascinating read. The section you referenced has this sentence within the first couple of paragraphs…

“The analysis focused on the period 1947-1948, which coincides with the completion of Soviet demobilization and the beginning of discussions in the West leading to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949.”

My premise for an alternate history is that the Soviets attack in May 1946. Well before the period of this analysis. So much of what he goes on to say about demobilization is invalid for my purposes. So the pages he argues the size of the Soviet forces are much smaller than conventional wisdom do not pertain to the time period I am suggesting.

He then goes on to discuss specific dispositions of Soviet forces in real life and again this is not germane to an alternate history proposal. The placement of individual troops could have course been altered from reality and would have been if Stalin had actually attacked.

Then he goes on to discuss the actual numbers of troops not divisions and again the time period he discusses is after the one I’m interested in and again would have been altered by Stalin if he was going to attack in May 1946.

Then he goes into Soviet capabilities and spends a lot of time trying to prove that Soviets could not do what they in fact did a number of times in reality. I believe that in this part of his presentation he is dead wrong for the obvious reason that the Red Army accomplished in reality under even worse conditions what he claims they could not do.

1. The weren’t capable of blitzkrieg. Manchuria 1945, the Battle of Kursk, destruction of Army Group Center, the pursuit across Poland etc. proves him wrong.

2.The couldn’t supply their troops because of bad roads, bridges etc. : Again Manchuria where the Soviets supplied 80 divisions over 3000 miles from their base of supply and advanced 400 miles in 11 days. Through Poland where they advanced over war torn terrain against a determined enemy they went 550 miles in 14 days from Warsaw to Frankfort.

The author spouts out many statistics about horses used, lack of bridges, tires, different rail gauges and that it was impossible for the Soviets to mount a blitzkrieg type attack which is clearly wrong since they did it historically a number of times. I’m sorry but the guy is obviously wrong in his analysis and the dozens of other studies that quite clearly state that the Soviet army can accomplish in Western Europe what it historically did in Manchuria and Eastern Europe are obviously right in their analysis.

No magic wand just logic and historical precedence and an imagination. What I propose is possible and in many instances quite plausible and that to me is the definition of alternate history.

{quote]Conversely, so is the reverse. If the Soviets act as they did historically and the US decides to re-arm the Germans, not demobilize, use nukes and overrun all of Eastern Europe, the Ukraine and head to Moscow what can a war ravaged USSR with no Allies do about it.[/quote]

I believe there have been numerous alternative history books published on just this premise.

I would contend that my scenario is much less absurd but that is not for me to decide is it. All I can do is present my ideas and back them up with logic and historical precedence. It has been my experience that there are many who just can’t stand the thought of America getting it’s ass kicked even though historical precedence suggests otherwise. Pearl Harbor, the Philippines 4 hours later, Kasserine Pass to name a few.

The US does tend to be caught by total and absolute surprise when it involves going from peace time to war. We are just not good at preparing and then responding to an initial surprise attack. History is on my side in this viewpoint.

We do however tend to comeback with a vengeance.

 

Guys I just got called to work. My job involves 80 hour work weeks for a month or so at a time. I will not be able to respond very often for the next 30 days or so. Sorry for the break in the action but my pay check calls.

 

When you return you should look at the "timeline" and Truman approach to "de-mobilizing" the troops. This was implemented because of the reduced threats to America and the west. And announced in June of 1945.

Goto:

Google Answers: World War II Nostalgia

Be sure to also read the "full text" message to Congress.

 

I would believe that Soviet success in a scenario like this is based upon massive preperation and the ability to effectively conceal it. The West clearly didn't trust the Soviets and watching them demobilize has quite a bit to do with Allied demobilization. Any hint of a major Soviet attack would halt demob of the West and change their defensive posture dramatically. Given the open nature of the border in Germany, that the Germans would tip off the West about Soviet preparations and that there weren't any Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia (strategically necessary step off point) I find the idea of concealing a major operation close to impossible.
A what if on top of your what if... What if the Western Allies ARE tipped off and decide to use nukes tactically on day 1? This would effectively destroy the Soviet attack at its start point where the majority of troops and logistical bases are located. You can use examples of Soviet offensives in WWII, so how about Allied code breaking, electronic warfare and intelligence gathering? Once a few rumours fly itelligence gathering agencies look for more info to confirm of deny the information. Soviet preparations would need to be air tight, otherwise the game is up.

 

There's also the question of just how they go about preping for this. My understanding was that most of the Soviet Union was on the brink of famine in 45. It wasn't just the food it was the ability to distribute it. So Stalin moved a lot of troops out of the front line areas to help with harvesting and also decrease the strain on the log system. If this is indeed the case (and I've mostly read about it on the internet so it could be wrong) is the Soviet Union in a position to movibilize for and conduct a major war in the spring of 06?

 

IN regards to your contention the watching the Soviets demobilize affected the Allies. Do you have any references I could look at that back up opinions and conclusions. I have seen and have numerous references that say otherwise. Truman, the JCS, a number of polls, newspaper articles at the time, various military plans and memos etc. all say the same thing. We know the Soviets are going to attack either by design or by accident soon but congress and the American people will not let us slow down our own demobilization. In fact when Truman tried to slow it down there were riots throughout the military.

As to tactical nukes there was not policy in place for the tactical use of the Mark III. It was too hard to use and they were all in the US or on there way to Bikini Island in May 1946. When Le May took over SAC he said publicly they could not do the job and that his atomic crews where incapable of performing the mission. The Mark III was just not ready for prime time tactical use. Then there is the fact that until 1949 we didn't have very many.

The US intelligence on the Soviets from 1946-1948 was very, very poor. We were using maps from the Tsarist era. According to other posts by other people we thought they had more troops of better quality then they actually did. According to the JCS and all intelligence estimates they were supermen. Someone is wrong either way and it just shows how bad our intelligence was.

We did not break any of their codes of note in fact they completely outfoxed us and the Brits throughout the 40's add 50's. They had agents in the highest places in the British services and the US atomic bomb program. Look up the Cambridge Five and an agent named Delmar. You will be amazed.

I was referenced a book by the expert in Surprise Attacks. Here is the prologue and the central points to his book.



History proves that the peace time US military was incredibly bad at dealing with surprise attacks.

 

Except, as Korea showed this was only possible in day time. When the USFEAF switched to night operations their losses plummeted to essentially zero and were zero from aerial interception. That is, the North Koreans and Russians had no credible nightfighter force at the time.

The jet stream changes position world wide radically over the year. It can also vary in position from day to day. It doesn't take much more than watching the weather channel or TV news weather to see that.

So, the Western Allies would have gotten reconnissance going in short order. Given the plaucity of airfields and non-existance of an early warning system on the part of the Soviet Union, the West would have had little or no problem taking lots of aerial reconnissance photos, ELINT and, other reconnissance of these areas in short order. The biggest factor in trying to recon them would have been range. The West would have had to find, modify and, use extremely long ranged aircraft to get at these areas. But, even as spy plane flights proved the Soviets up through the early 60's were not in much, if any, shape to stop such flights from occuring.

I don't think most European countries would have had much say in this in 1946 - 48; particularly Germany. If the US wanted to bomb something it is most likely they just would have gone ahead and done it. Back then Presidents didn't go to the UN or get an opinion poll taken before doing stuff like that in wartime.

Back in the late 40's early 50's the US public would have cheered on the military for stomping the snot out of whoever they were fighting. The UN was basically meaningless. Look at how many open air tests of nuclear weapons the US did. Take Smokey II in 1954. In that test the US Army had several battalions of infantry in just their field uniforms dig trenches and take cover for the explosion a few thousand yards from ground zero. The men were formed up just 30 minutes after the blast and marched across ground zero (more or less) and then "decontaminated" using brooms. No gas masks. No CBR suits.
It was a different time and a different mindset in America.

More due to the inefficency of those shut down like the plant using electromagnetic seperation at Oak Ridge. There were also new more efficent plants being proposed and built like Savanah River GA and, Rocky Flats CO.

....as nuclear scientists working largely for the government. The reason many US scientists and engineers were put in the military was simply to shield them from the draft. A good number of them received commissions while many highly skilled technicians were given senior NCO rank. In fact, these later sometimes had a hard time explaining how they came to be a first sargent with no service stripes, no awards or, any other indication of being a long service veteran as would be expected.

Depends on circumstances. They might use far fewer to not lose the war. Winning can sometimes wait. The most likely case is that the West would have wanted to stabilize the war situation (ie turn it into a more static war of attrition on favorable terms) and then build up a winning force afterwards.

The US was in far better shape than the Soviet Union in 1946. The Soviets couldn't even feed their own people. They plundered most of Eastern Europe of its manufacturing capacity to make up for wartime losses at home in that respect. In terms of high technology they were extremely dependent on getting Western technologies to assist in trying to catch up in most areas.