Is Alan Turing's effort code-breaking effort to the war exaggerated?

That source categorically denies that the Ultra information has ever been handed over to Soviets.

How can I take you seriously? Recently you have denied the existence of British empire.

 

Speaking of taking one seriously...Did you bother to read your own source? I'm guessing...No.
pg 25

This is also discussed in the Notes Section...See Note #14 on pg 68.


So much for "categorical denial".

 

Read page 20 too to find what was categorically denied.

Zitadelle plan has never been send by radio, hence that information couldn't have been intercepted in the first place. By the way, have you finally learned what is an "imaginary unit"?

 

Yawn...So, the spy rings were not being used...But, the British Military Mission in Moscow was.

From pg 25 again.

Seems that the Germans were transmitting their offensive intentions for the summer of 1943.

 

Purported :haha

 

:circlejerk:
LJAd, you have indeed subtle sense for these tinny details: purportedly - indeed. It is interesting how seemingly adult people are ready to believe in unsupported assumptions and at the same time deny well documented facts as rubbish. Like teenage fan-girls.

@GreenSlime: Obviously, we disagree on some subjects which are purely the matter of individual taste. However, there is no reason whatsoever for such intense reactions. Just try to accept that as a fact that someone on internet is wrong. Anger is a health risk, cool down mate.

 

Read what we wrote to see what we said.

???? Just because the plan wasn't sent by radio doesn't mean that information relevant to it wasn't sent. That's a big part of intel work, taking dispirit bits of information and assembling them into a reasonable estimate of what is going on. Even a piece of info that has nothing to do with the question at hand but helps confirm or deny the reliability of a source that does can be quite useful.

Where did this come from and how is it related to the current discussion?

 

I did that, LJAd did that too, very carefully:

Is there anything else except "purported"? Any tangible evidence? Documents? Such thing must have been documented but obviously, that hasn't happened at all. Get serious. A major transfer of important data happened without being documented? I know that you know but you refuse to admit. Last time you "refused to admit" that British empire existed. Nah.

 

Were the Russians at the table when the "good allies" combined all their intel info and plotted out German plans for the duration of the war? No. They were given the wrong directions to the meeting and ended up in Chelsea. Of course all they had to do was look out their window and they might have noticed columns of German troops destroying everything in its path.
Stalin was not the sort of executive who was interested in third party input when Hitler indicated he was coming for him. The challenge was direct and very pointed. The world has proved to be a better place as a result of their tiff and although Russia played out the charade longer, at least we have been spared the possibility of Reich Majestico Maximillan "Herb" Hitler dating Kate Upton.

 

Hot, isn't she? Ultra, please, give me her number.

 

???
Can you try that again but a bit more coherently?

 

That's not the conclusion one would reach by looking at your responses.

 

If I ever want to feel that sense of mental vertigo that comes with following a thread to its end, I only have to read about people like Albert Einstien or the challenge of decrypting messages sent by the Enigma machine during WWll. I can't figure out my tv remote and I for sure couldn't reverse engineer it to produce a transmitter thingy.
I think Turing is an example of the power of mobilization in England to get the right people in the right places in order to survive. And in order to utilize the biggest brains they could get their hands on, they knew you just left them alone all in one place and let them figure it out. It's guys like Turing I blame for email. Maybe because I don't understand how they do that.
Alan Turing was an elite theoretical mathematician whose obsession was creating a machine that would be indistinguishable in its responses from a what a human being would do. The posthumous theory has to do with the death of his only kind friend at the public school Turing stumbled through. Being on what we would call the autistic spectrum today, Turing came off to his peers as exceedingly weird and was exceedingly grateful to one boy who would help him up after the latest beating. This boy died about age 12 and the implication by some people is that Turing's quest for a thinking machine is suggestive of an immortality certainly not addressed to his satisfaction by what was available to him when this loss was felt. From what I understand, no computer yet invented has been able to pass what is called "the Turing test." ("Yeah" for the human brain)
Seriously, what are odds of Alan Turing being in a room with the resources of England within reach and the question he has to solve is proving that the Enigma machine is understandable? The odds seem like they were pretty good because it was war in England and you do your duty.
If you trace the invention of the atomic bomb back it its source, you end up with Einstien. If you do the same with your personal computer, you end up with Alan Turing.

 

The term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with "Enigma decrypts". However, Ultra also encompassed decrypts of the German Lorenz SZ 40/42 machines that were used by the German High Command, and the Hagelin machine.

A sample surviving "tunny" (Lorenzo SZ40/42) decrypt, word for word:

To OKH/OP. ABT. and to OKH/Foreign Armies East, from Army Group South IA/01, No. 411/43, signed von Weichs, General Feldmarschall, dated 25/4:-
Comprehensive appreciation of the enemy for "Zitadelle"
In the main the appreciation of the enemy remains the same as reported in Army Group South (Roman) IIA, No. 0477/43 of 29/3 and in the supplementary appreciation of 15/4.

The main concentration, which was already then apparent on the north flank of the Army Group in the general area Kursk--Ssudsha--Volchansk--Ostrogoshsk, can now be clearly recognised: a further intensification of this concentration is to be expected as a result of the continuous heavy transport movements on the lines Yelets--Kastornoye--Kursk, and Povorino--Svoboda and Gryazi--Svoboda, with a probable (B% increase) [‘B%’ indicated an uncertain word] in the area Valuiki--Novy Oskol--Kupyansk. At present however it is not apparent whether the object of this concentration is offensive or defensive. At present, (B% still) in anticipation of a German offensive on both the Kursk and Mius Donetz fronts, the armoured and mobile formations are still evenly distributed in various groups behind the front as strategic reserves.

There are no signs as yet of a merging of these formations or a transfer to the forward area (except for (Roman) II GDS Armoured Corps) but this could take place rapidly at any time.
According to information from a sure source the existence of the following groups of the strategic reserve can be presumed:- A) 2 cavalry corps (III GDS and V GDS in the area north of Novocherkassk). It can also be presumed that 1 mech [mechanised] corps (V GDS) is being brought up to strength here. B) 1 mech corps (III GDS) in the area (B% north) of Rowenki. C) 1 armoured corps, 1 cavalry corps and probably 2 mech corps ((Roman) I GD Armoured, IV Cavalry, probably (B% (Roman) I) GDS Mech and V Mech Corps) in the area north of Voroshilovgrad. D) 2 cavalry corps ((B% IV) GDS and VII GDS) in the area west of Starobyelsk. E) 1 mech corps, 1 cavalry corps and 2 armoured corps ((Roman) I GDS (B% Mech), (Roman) I GDS Cavalry, (Roman) II and XXIII Armoured) in the area of Kupyansk--Svatovo. F) 3 armoured corps, 1 mech corps ((Roman) II Armoured, V GDS Armoured, (B% XXIX) Armoured and V GDS Mech under the command of an army (perhaps 5 Armoured Army)) in the area of Ostrogoshsk. G) 2 armoured and 1 cavalry corps ((Roman) II GDS Armoured, III GDS Armoured and VI GDS Cavalry) under the command of an unidentified H.Q., in the area north of Novy Oskol.

In the event of "Zitadelle", there are at present approximately 90 enemy formations west of the line Belgorod--Kursk--Maloarkhangelsk. The attack of the Army Group will encounter stubborn enemy resistance in a deeply echeloned and well developed main defence zone, (with numerous dug in tanks, strong artillery and local reserves) the main effort of the defence being in the key sector Belgorod--Tamarovka.

In addition strong counter attacks by strategic reserves from east and southeast are to be expected. It is impossible to forecast whether the enemy will attempt to withdraw from a threatened encirclement by retiring eastwards, as soon as the key sectors [literally, ‘corner-pillars’] of the bulge in the frontline at Kursk, Belgorod and Maloarkhangelsk, have been broken through. If the enemy throws in all strategic reserves on the Army Group front into the Kursk battle, the following may appear on the battle field:- On day 1 and day 2, 2 armoured divisions and 1 cavalry corps. On day 3, 2 mech and 4 armoured corps. On day 4, 1 armoured and 1 cavalry corps. On day 5, 3 mech corps. On day 6, 3 cavalry corps. On day 6 and/or day 7, 2 cavalry corps.

Summarizing, it can be stated that the balance of evidence still points to a defensive attitude on the part of the enemy: and this is in fact unmistakable in the frontal sectors of the 6 Army and 1 Panzer Army. If the bringing up of further forces in the area before the north wing of the Army Group persists and if a transfer forward and merging of the mobile and armoured formations then takes place, offensive intentions become more probable. In that case it is improbable that the enemy can even then forestall our execution of Zitadelle in the required conditions. Probably on the other hand we must assume complete enemy preparations for defence, including the counter attacks of his strong mot and armoured forces, which must be expected.


The enciphered message was intercepted during transmission on the ‘Squid’ radio link between the headquarters of Army Group South and Königsberg.

 

Good to see this interesting thread get back on topic with two, to me, excellent post completely opposite in nature but both bringing insights into this subject both human and technical.

Gaines

 

What von Weichs was writing was known by the Soviets BEFORE he did write it : the content was the strength of the Soviets and their possible strategy if Citadel was launched . Thus this was not useful for the Soviets .

Was the report useful for the Germans ? Also not : the report was signed 25 april ,the informations from before 25 april .;the decision to launch Citadel was given in june and Citadel started in july .

Why should a report that was almost 3 months old be useful for the Germans and for the Soviets ?

Besides, there is no proof at all that it was transmitted to the Soviets .

 

Ummm...Wasn't the decision to launch Citadel made in April...With the earliest start date being May 3rd...As per Hitler's Operational Order #6
http://ww2.debello.ca/library/430415.html

 

@LJAd
In addition to that, the "wrong" distribution of Soviet forces indicates that they based their plans on an outdated information, earlier version of the Zitadelle. Again, this is an indirect proof that the contribution of the Ultra was zero.

Again, taking into account that until 1944 Soviet Union bore the burden of the War almost alone, code-breaking had very little overall influence on the outcome of the War as a whole. Perhaps it made more impact on sideshow battlefields: the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

 

It was claimed, it was better to be a homosexual in Nazi Germany, than in England. That was shown to be false.
It was claimed, information gleaned from ULTRA decrypts was not shared. That was shown to be false.
It was claimed, 'Enigma' did not send that level of information; this was true, but irrelevant, as 'tunny' did.
It was claimed, nothing on zitadelle was transmitted by the Germans. That was shown to be false.

Now you're just grasping after straws. Rather incoherently as well. You know very well that this was not the only intercepted signal sent from AGS to Königsberg.

We do know that intelligence summaries were shared via the British Military Mission in Moscow. Exactly what those summaries contained, is something that is never going to be forthcoming. Something you are both trying to deny. A cheap shot.
We do know, that British summaries weren't the sole source of intelligence for the Soviets, who had their own highly impressive and remarkable effort.

Any attempt to dismiss or confirm the "usefulness" of any individual piece of intelligence post the event is an exercise in futility, precisely because efforts in intelligence are a tedious drudgery of corroboration, confirmation, and affirmation. Which by their very nature are secretive, and fleeting.

 

NO : on 14 may it still was undecided that Citadel would be launched;Hitler was still doubting; there were alternatives as an other attack in the East, or even no attack .